




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
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Burgess fecit.

Bonvicini fecit.

THE GENERAL
HISTORY of the Late WAR:

CONTAINING IT'S
Rise, Progress, *and* Event,

IN
EUROPE, ASIA, AFRICA, and AMERICA.

AND EXHIBITING
The STATE of the Belligerent Powers at the Commence-
ment of the War; their Interests and Objects in it's
Continuation; and REMARKS on the Measures, which
led GREAT BRITAIN to Victory and Conquest.

INTERSPERSED WITH
The CHARACTERS of the able and disinterested STATESMEN,
to whose Wisdom and Integrity, and of the HEROES, to
whose Courage and Conduct, we are indebted for that

NAVAL and MILITARY

Success, which is not to be equalled in the Annals of this, or
of any other Nation.

AND WITH
Accurate Descriptions of the SEAT of WAR, the Nature and
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VOL. I.

Historici est: nequid falsi, audeat dicere: nequid veri, non audeat.

POLIB.

By the Rev. JOHN ENTICK, M. A. *R*
And other GENTLEMEN.

LONDON:

Printed for EDWARD DILLY, in the Poultry;
And JOHN MILLAN, at Charing-Cross.

M.DCC.LXIII.

THE GENERAL
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VOL. I.

By the Rev. JOHN ELLIOT, M.A.

LONDON

Printed for Edward Dilly in the Strand,
and for John Almon, in Pall-mall.

TO
The RIGHT HONOURABLE
WILLIAM PITT, Esq;

L A T E

One of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State;

A Man

Honoured by his KING, Rever'd by the PEOPLE,
Dreaded by our ENEMIES;

UNDER WHOSE ADMINISTRATION

All Parties united for the common Good, Confidence between the Court and Country was restored, a respectable Militia was established, the natural Strength of the Nation was exerted by Sea and Land, the Terrors of an Invasion were removed, Public Credit was carried to the greatest Height, the British Arms triumphed in every Quarter of the Globe, Trade and Navigation were promoted and protected, and France was humbled, and reduced to the Necessity of suing for a Peace;

T H I S H I S T O R Y

Is most humbly Inscribed,

With a grateful Sense of that glorious Part, which by his Wisdom, Vigour, and Firmness, He has acted in the Course of the late War,

B Y

His most devoted and obedient Servant,

John Entick.

T O

The Right Honourable

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His most devoted and obedient servant,

John Barwick.



THE
GENERAL HISTORY
OF THE
LATE WAR.

THE INTRODUCTION.

ALL the writers on the laws of nature and nations lay it down, as a maxim, not to be departed from, That arms or force should never be employ'd, without an intention thereby to obtain an honourable and lasting Peace. But, the Machiavelian politicks, which have been adopted by the enemies of our nation, and the disturbers of the repose of Europe, and have prevailed in the formation of treaties of pacification, within the present century, depart from that desirable end of a just and necessary war; and shew that their intention is not, in the least, to decide the contentions of jarring interests; to curb

Modern
politicks.

the exceedings of ambition; to reconcile or abate implacable hatred; to prevent craft, double-meaning and insidious conferences in negotiations, nor to give sufficient security for the performance of treaties.

To this depravation of politicks, in the cabinets of our enemies, we may place an account of those prodigious sums of money, and that most surprising loss of men, expended by Great Britain, and sacrificed to establish peace in Europe, and to preserve this island and its dependencies from the power, tyranny, encroachments, dilapidations, intrigues and perfidy of her own natural, and Europe's common enemy.

Treaty of
Utrecht.

The war with France, which terminated with the treaty of Utrecht, cost this nation upwards of sixty millions in the whole, and left it fifty millions in debt: besides, after repeated victories, as well as unexpected success, put the English, and their posterity, in a worse condition, not only than any of their allies, but even their conquer'd enemies. The national interest was not provided for in any better manner by the treaty of peace, concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle. Matters rather devolved into worse. At Utrecht the confederates with Great Britain obtained a valuable augmentation of territory, and a barrier, against the French, in the Netherlands: But by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which left the enormous debt of eighty millions upon the British nation, their Austrian ally was obliged to cede several considerable possessions. And tho' the war with Spain was avowedly

Of Aix-la-
Chapelle.

edly commenced to obtain an uninterrupted navigation in South-America, and to procure a proper satisfaction for our South-Sea company; yet the definitive treaty was couched in such indefinite terms, that nothing was stipulated with any preciseness, but a suspension of arms between the two crowns, and the re-establishment of commerce, between their subjects reciprocally, without mentioning a word of what gave rise to the war, in regard to America.

Let the treaty itself vouch the truth.

It was on the 7th of October 1748 the British, French and Dutch plenipotentiaries sign'd the general and definitive treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle, as did the Spanish plenipotentiaries on the 9th. In the preamble we find this remarkable fallacious expression; "Europe *now* sees the happy day shine forth, that the divine providence had pointed out for the establishment of her repose;" when it is certain, from the measures immediately pursued by the French court, that war remained in their heart. However, under this deception, it is set forth in the *first* article, That there shall be a christian, universal and perpetual peace, and a sincere and inviolable friendship preserved between the contracting parties: that no hostilities of what nature or kind soever shall be permitted, on either side, or on any cause or pretence whatsoever; industriously avoiding all things for the future that might any ways disturb or alter the union established by this peace; and that they should use their utmost endeavours to procure, on all occasions,

sions, whatever may contribute to their mutual glory, interest and advantage, without giving the least aid or assistance, directly or indirectly, to any persons whomsoever, who would willingly injure or prejudice any of the high-contracting powers whatsoever.

By the third article, the treaties of Westphalia in 1648; of Madrid in 1667, 1678 and 1679; of Ryswick in 1697; of Utrecht in 1713; of Baden in 1714; at the Hague in 1717; of the quadruple alliance at London in 1718, and the treaty of Vienna in 1738, are renewed and admitted to serve as a basis of the present treaty. By the fifth article all the parties renounce all right and claim, by what title or pretence whatsoever, to the places they mutually covenant to restore. By the ninth article his Britannic Majesty restores Cape Breton and all the conquests made by his arms in the East and West Indies; and agrees to give hostages for the faithful performance of this covenant. By the sixteenth article the Catholic King allows the asiento of negroes, and the annual ship for the south seas, to continue for four years. The seventeenth article demolishes Dunkirk on the sea side, conformable to antient treaties; and allows it to remain fortified on the land side. By the eighteenth article we have a true specimen of French prevarication; for, by leaving certain points or demands open, not regulated by the plenipotentiaries, nor inserted in the present treaty, but to be settled amicably, by commissaries nominated for that purpose, on each side, or otherwise,

wife, as it shall be agreed on by the interested powers; we shall find that this christian, universal, and perpetual peace, and sincere and inviolable friendship, so artfully and pompously set forth at the beginning of this treaty, is entirely enervated and exposed to the intrigue, caprice and ambition of our enemies, whenever they might want a pretence to break it. And by the nineteenth and twentieth articles all the contracting powers guarantee the succession of Great Britain and the Electoral dominions of his Britannic Majesty.

Let us now enquire how conformable the French and Spanish monarchs behaved to these engagements, so solemnly sign'd and ratified. France put on the mask of sincerity, and engaged Spain to make the first demur to the faithful execution of her part of the definitive treaty. Notwithstanding the advantages of the sixteenth article, which grants only four years, instead of nine non-enjoyment of the *assiento* contract, the Spanish ministry were now as refractory in satisfying the demands of the English South-Sea company^a, as they were before the commencement of the war; tho' the British troops and subjects had formally evacuated the island of Ratan. They were even so untractable, as to reject all the expedients offer'd on this subject by Mr. Benj. Keene, the British minister at their court, who made the strongest solicitations for compromising the differences un-

Behaviour
of France
and Spain.

^a Which, by their account deliver'd to the secretary of state, amounted to the sum of 1,300,000l.

Spanish
definitive
convention
upon that
treaty.

adjusted by the definitive treaty, until the fifth of October 1750; when they were pleas'd to sign what they called a definitive convention. In which, after a fallacious preamble (setting forth the desire of their respective sovereigns to adjust the *disputable* points, which at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle remain'd unsettled, in regard to their respective pretensions, and to the commerce of their subjects, and declaring their willingness to terminate all things thereunto relating, by a friendly *compensation*) it was agreed to acquiesce in the following articles:

I. His Britannic Majesty cedes to his Catholic Majesty his right of enjoyment of the *assiento* of negroes; and of the annual ship, during the four years stipulated by the sixteenth article of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

II. His Britannic Majesty, for a compensation of 100,000*l.* sterling ^b, which his Catholic Majesty promises and engages to pay at Madrid, or at London, to the royal *assiento* company, within the term of three months or sooner, from the day of the signature of this treaty, cedes to his Catholic Majesty all that might be due to the said company in any manner, on account of the said *assiento*: inasmuch that this compensation shall be esteemed and regarded as a full and entire satisfaction on the part of his Catholic Majesty, and shall extinguish for the present, for the future,

^b Instead of 1,300,000*l.* demanded on a fair account by the South-Sea company.

and for ever, all rights, pretensions, or demands, which might be form'd in consequence of the said assiento or annual ship, directly or indirectly, either on the part of his Britannic Majesty, or on the part of the company.

III. The Catholic King cedes to his Britannic Majesty all that he might demand, in consequence of the said assiento or annual ship, as well with regard to the articles already liquidated, as those, which might be easy or difficult to liquidate; so that neither on one side, nor on the other, is ever the least mention to be made thereof.

IV. His Catholic Majesty consents that the British subjects shall pay no greater or other duties for the merchandizes, which they import or export at the different ports of his Catholic Majesty, than those, which they pay'd, for the same merchandize, in the time of Charles II. of Spain, regulated by schedules and ordinances of the said King, or of his predecessors: And, tho' the *Pie del Fardo* was not founded upon any royal ordinance, his Catholic Majesty declares nevertheless, that he wills and ordains, that it be observed for the present, and the future, as an inviolable law, and that all the said duties be levied with the same advantage and ease to the said subjects.

V. His Catholic Majesty permits the said subjects to take salt in the island of Tortuga, without any molestation, as they did in the time of King Charles II.

VI. His Catholic Majesty consents, That the said subjects shall not pay any other duties, than

those paid by the subjects of his Catholic Majesty in the same place.

VII. His Catholic Majesty grants the said subjects all the rights, privileges, franchises, exemptions and immunities whatsoever, which they enjoyed before the last war, in virtue of schedules or royal ordinances, by the articles of the treaty of peace and commerce made at Madrid in 1667. The said subjects shall be treated in Spain on the same footing with the most favoured nations. In consequence no nation shall be rated at less duties for the merchandize they send into or carry out of Spain by land, than the said subjects pay for such as they import or export by sea. All the rights, privileges, franchises, exemptions, and immunities, that are permitted to any nation, shall be granted to the said subjects: And his Britannic Majesty consents, that the same thing be granted and permitted to the subjects of Spain in the kingdoms of his said Britannic Majesty.

VIII. His Catholic Majesty promises to take all the care possible, on his part, to abolish all the innovations, which have appeared to be introduced in the commerce; and in order to avert them for the future, his Britannic Majesty promises likewise, on his side, to take all possible care to prevent all innovations of that kind.

IX. Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties confirm by the present treaty, that of Aix-la-Chapelle, and all other former treaties; which are hereby confirmed in all their articles and clauses, excepting such as are derogated from by

by the present treaty ; as also the treaty of commerce concluded at Utrecht in 1713, except those articles which are found contrary to the present treaty, which become abolished and of no force, namely, the three articles of the said treaty of Utrecht, commonly called *explanatory*.

X. All the reciprocal differences, rights, demands, and pretensions, which have subsisted between the two crowns of Spain and Great Britain, wherein no other nation hath any part, interest or right of intervention, being hereby accommodated; the two serene Kings mutually engage for the punctual execution of this treaty of reciprocal compensation, which shall be ratified by their said Majesties, and the ratifications exchanged within the term of six weeks, from the day of the signature hereof, or sooner if possible.

It was reasonable to expect that this definitive convention would have determined the disputable points, not regulated, nor settled by the definitive treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle; some of which were nothing less than the very points, which had occasioned so long and expensive a war; to the mutual injury of Great Britain and Spain. These points were, 1. What the common voice included in the words NO SEARCH, and signifies free trade and navigation, in British bottoms, with our West India colonies, without being subject to be boarded by Spanish guarda costas, in open seas, and rummaged or searched by them for Spanish goods, of the growth or manufacture of New Spain or other

Its deficiency in regard to the principal objects of the war.

other territories, islands and places bordering on those seas, and subject to the crown of Spain. By which right claimed by the Spaniards, our navigation from Jamaica, especially, was rendered precarious; it being impossible for those islanders to make proper returns, without selling, or bartering, for Spanish money, or goods, brought to their markets by Spanish agents; and almost as impossible for our shipping to make a safe voyage, without making the coast of Cuba in their way to Great Britain; as might be instanced in the many depredations made upon them by the *guarda costas*. Except we are to understand the Spanish renunciation of this right, under the ambiguous terms in the eighth article of this convention; where the Catholic King promises to take all the care possible, on his part, to abolish all the *innovations*, which have appeared to be introduced in the commerce. Such no doubt were the practices of the *guarda costas*; but not so sufficiently and definitely here described and acknowledged, as to regulate and settle this disputed point, which had been the cause of so much bloodshed and expence. So that Spain was left in a condition to revive this dormant right, and to return to their depredations in those seas, without breach of treaty; and from the silence of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, &c. to insist upon *searching* all British bottoms, which sailed near their coasts. Secondly, Another point in dispute was our right to cut logwood in Campechy and Honduras. A trade of the utmost import-

portance to Great Britain; for, without this wood, several considerable branches in trade and manufacture would be at a stand. A right so well established upon the clearest title, as set forth by our board of trade and plantations in the reign of George I. that, the only means for the Spaniards to avoid its acknowledgment, was to decline its Why, discussion, and thereby to leave the foundation of another quarrel. Which, notwithstanding the formal ratification of former treaties, and the particular stipulations and promises, concerning rights, privileges, franchises, exemptions, immunities, and favours in regard to duties, appears, and shall be proved, in the course of this history, to have been the intention of Spain, as well as of France, at the time of signing the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Thus the French succeeded in their scheme to strike up a peace, at a time their maritime French motives for a peace. interest had suffer'd extremely, and they saw their own ruin inevitable, should they neglect the pacific disposition of the present ministry of Great Britain, and risque all to the chance of more warlike and vigorous measures, to which his Britannick Majesty was personally more inclin'd. Yet they kept two things in view to secure the confidence and affections of their allies: and to keep Great Britain embarrassed, both abroad and at home. They faithfully protected the territorial property of their confederates; whereas we consented to, or rather obliged the Queen of Hun-

Hungary to cede Silesia to the King of Prussia, and a large territory to Don Philip in Italy. And by prevailing with the Spaniards not to admit the British right to a free navigation and to cut log-wood, they ruin'd the British ministry in the affections of the people: so that by raising a jealousy between the court and the country, they gain'd time to carry their perfidious plan into execution; having consented to a peace only to prepare and strengthen France for the renewal of war.





THE
GENERAL HISTORY
OF THE
LATE WAR.

BOOK I.

*Shewing the provocations leading thereunto, and
the means to prevent it.*

THE treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle having tied the hands of Great Britain, France immediately improved the present moment. Her emissaries were dispatched throughout all the world. She re-exerted her political intrigues at Constantinople, where she procured the deposition of the Musti, the disgrace of the Grand Vizir, and endangered the safety of the Sultan, by irritating the janizaries against all, who had recommended or favoured a pacific disposition during the wars of christendom : and she reigned still predominant at Stockholm ; and renewed the subsidy treaty with his Danish majesty. New alliances were sought :^a subfi-

A. D.
1748.

France's
conduct
after the
peace.

^a By promoting the marriage of the Infanta Donna Maria of Spain with Victor Amadæus Maria Prince of Piedmont,
a treaty

A. D.
1748.

subsidiary treaties were renewed : her militia well regulated and disciplined : her armies^b kept up : her fortifications repaired, and a more than ordinary effort was made to recruit and to establish her marine^c in a more respectable condition, than heretofore.

Examples
of French
faith.

After the
treaty of
Westpha-
lia.

Pyrenees.

But what does this vary from the constant practice of the French at other times, when perhaps they had not such a plausible defence for their breach of faith ? Not content with the acquisition of Alsace by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, under the restriction of maintaining the privileges and liberties of ten imperial cities situate in that extensive and important country, the French monarch invaded their freedom, abolished their privileges, and by force obliged them to submit to the laws of his own will, as soon as he found the guarantees of that treaty disarmed. The means by which the French got a footing in Flanders contrary to the treaty of the Pyrenees : the wanton-

a treaty was brought about between France, Spain and Sardinia, under a pretence of maintaining the peace of Italy : it was agreed to comprehend the King of the Two Sicilies, the Duke of Modena, the Republic of Genoa, and the Infant Duke of Parma and Placentia, with engagement by France and Spain to furnish 30,000 men, should any of the contracting parties stand in need of assistance.

^b In Sept. 1749, her forces consisted of 150,000 effective men, ready for action ; besides the militia.

^c A plan was formed by M. Rouille to have 111 ships of the line, 54 frigates, 22 bomb ketches and 25 fire ships—always ready in time of peace to put to sea. Twenty millions of *livres* were appropriated for this service, annually.

nes

ness with which Lewis XIV. violated the treaty of Nimeguen almost *before* it was definitively signed: and the story of the partition treaty, which was abandoned by France, as soon as it was solemnly ratified, are eternal mementos of French perfidy. To these add the conduct of Lewis XV. in regard to the pragmatic sanction, whose guarantee was purchased at the extraordinary price of the dutchy of Lorrain, annexed to the crown of France: yet upon the demise of the Emperor Charles VI. the armies of this perfidious nation were prepared, and actually assisted the Elector of Bavaria, to overturn that very treaty, and to dethrone the Austrian heiress, whom their King had so lately sworn in the name of the Holy Trinity to protect and defend from all her enemies. And in regard to Great Britain alone, the treaty of Utrecht furnishes sufficient ideas of that nation's intentions, when our interest and their own interfere with each other. By that treaty (twelfth article) "All Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient limits, and with all its dependencies, is ceded to the crown of Great Britain." And (fifteenth article) "The subjects of France, inhabitants of Canada, and else where, shall not disturb or molest, in any manner whatever, the five Indian nations, which are subject to Great Britain, nor its other American allies."

Clear as these articles may seem to be, it is certain that the French never intended to submit to their contents. They, ever since they thought trade and commerce an object worthy of their attention, have kept two capital views in sight,

A. D.
1748.
Nimeguen,

Partition
treaty.

Pragmatic
sanction.

Utrecht.

Two ob-
jects of
French po-
litics.

A. D.
1748.

whenever America has been the object of consideration. The one was to extend themselves from Canada southwards, through the lakes, along the back of our colonies: in order to cut off our communication with the Indian nations, and to open a communication for themselves between the rivers St. Lawrence and Mississippi; and thus to join, as it were, their colonies of Canada and Louisiana. The other, and indeed the most important to them and most fatal to the English, was to gain a communication with the ocean; the only access to Canada being commonly shut up half the year.

Encroach-
ments in
North
America
begun.

Therefore full of this project of American empire; for, that is the aim of the French, wherever they gain a footing; they, in defiance of the treaty of Utrecht, began, soon after its ratification, to violate those solemn concessions, by large encroachments, &c. In the year 1720, they seized upon the important pass of Niagara, situate in the country of the five Indian nations, from which they were expressly excluded by the fifteenth article; and fortified it, with a view to defend their encroachments already made and designed to be carried on with force upon the British empire in North America; they being able by this usurpation to command the lakes, and at leisure to extend themselves to the Ohio, and to continue a chain of forts and settlements down to the Mississippi.

The plan of usurpation on the back of our colonies, from henceforward, went on gradually and successfully, from year to year. The Indians, acknow-

acknowledged by the treaty of Utrecht to be under the dominion of the British crown, were debauched from our interest and their allegiance, and spirited up to massacre and scalp the English: So that in the year 1731 the French had the insolence to erect the fort of *Crown Point* in the centre of the *Five Nations*; and actually within the limits of the province of New York; in order more effectually to expose our most valuable colonies to Indian massacres and French usurpation, and more easily to open a communication with the great ocean, as may be seen by casting an eye upon its advantageous situation for these purposes. Yet suffered to proceed without any resentment on the part of the British ministry!

A. D.
1748.
Seduce the
Indians.

The infidelity of the French, in regard to Nova Scotia or Acadia, kept pace with their other conduct in North America. This Peninsula, (as it were deserted by the British court, which never thought of settling it for the national interest, till after the peace of Aix la Chapelle, and where the French foresaw no resistance, whenever it should suit them best to make a total seizure thereof for completing their American plan of empire) laid exposed to whatever uses they thought proper to put it. They formed a plan, during this long interval, to rob us of this extensive country, whenever they should be able to bring the British ministry into a temper to submit the title, given us by treaty, to the uncertain determination of commissaries, as shall be shewn hereafter; resolved at the same time, if they should not be able to carry

Their
claim to
Nova Sco-
tia or Aca-
dia.

A. D.
1748.

their point, in that way of negotiation, to strengthen themselves upon the premises, and to support a bad argument by force of arms.

Such was the situation of affairs in America, and the most certain index of the measures taken by the French, upon the signing of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; in which they gained this singular advantage, to encourage them to proceed in their usurpations in North America; namely, That, notwithstanding it was notorious to all the world, that the increase of their territory and the diminution of our power, on that continent, had been the object of the French councils, ever since the treaty of Utrecht; and that hostilities were commenced in those parts, before the war; the

Weakness
of the
British mi-
nistry to sit
sib

British ministry, neither availed themselves of the war to dispossess the French of our property; nor, when they were negotiating a peace, does it appear, that they paid any regard to a point of the last importance to Great Britain. If his Majesty's plenipotentiaries received no instructions on that head, it could not be owing to the want of intelligence; for it is certain that repeated remonstrances were transmitted from the Governors of our colonies against the practices of the French; which scarce can be thought to have miscarried; or to have been destroyed or neglected by them in power.

British conduct after
the peace.

Great Britain, ever credulous, was the only power that disarmed, and could not believe any latent evil design, in the measures taken, by her perfidious neighbours, to break the peace. Even

his

A. D.
1749.

his most gracious Majesty, in his speech to both houses of parliament on 13 June 1749, was so thoroughly satisfied, That he says, " All the powers concerned have declared themselves in so clear and friendly a manner, on this subject, as leaves no room to doubt of their sincere disposition to render the peace lasting in all parts." The sailors were discharged, the ships of war laid up: The shipwrights paid off, and permitted to enter, as did our seamen, into the service of France and Spain. Our army was reduced to 18,000 men; and, what was equally as impolitic, we had disgusted our late allies; disposed them to receive overtures from our natural enemy, and took no regard to secure any others; except Bavaria, which was engaged by an annual subsidy of 40,000 l. two thirds to be paid by Great Britain, and the other by Holland, to keep 6,000 men in pay to march at the requisition of those powers, for six years; but not to be employed against the Emperor, nor the Empire; with promise of indemnification by the maritime powers, in case Bavaria should suffer any damage on this account.

The affairs of the North, which threatened to break out into troubles on the expected death of the King of Sweden, favoured the political conduct of France, always ready to snatch every advantage from the quarrels of other nations. The consequences of France's interfering in those troubles, on one side or other, might be no less than the flames of a new war; which might by treaties involve us again in connections, that would en-

Troubles
in the
North im-
proved by
France.

A. D.
1749.

tirely deprive us of the benefits of peace, and of the means to resent, or provide against the armaments and hostilities of France, either in Europe or America. This seems to have been foreseen by the British court; and Colonel York, the British minister, at that time, at Paris, was ordered^d to sound the Marquis of Puyfieux, the French minister, concerning the premises, and the disposition of his royal master in case of a rupture between Russia and Sweden. To whom that minister replied in such terms, as left no room for doubting of the French monarch's readiness to take a part in those troubles. He said, "That as
" future events are in the hands of Providence,
" time only could discover whether that part of
" Europe was really destined for the renewal of
" broils, and the calamities of war; to ward off
" which his Majesty [Lewis] would neglect no
" means in his power. But that in case all his
" pains and endeavours should prove fruitless, and
" his Majesty be called upon to fulfill his engagements with Sweden, it was (from his Majesty's
" well known character) needless to inform him
" [Colonel York] that he must answer the demand with the exactness and punctuality, which
" the execution of solemn treaties requires."

Why the
King of
Prussia
kept up his
army.

A few days after (March 18) appeared the following exposition of the motives, that determined the King of Prussia to keep his army^e in readiness to march on the first warning: "The

^d In the beginning of March 1749.

^e Then consisting of 150,000 men, well provided.

" King

A. D.
1749.

“ King considering peace and union among the
 “ Princes of Europe, as the greatest happiness
 “ they can aspire to, his Majesty greatly rejoiced
 “ to see the foundations thereof laid at Aix-la-
 “ Chapelle by the contracting parties in the late
 “ treaty of peace.—There was nothing wanting
 “ in order to render this happiness universal; but
 “ the dispersion of the clouds, which seemed to
 “ be gathering in the North. The King labour-
 “ ed as effectually, as he possibly could, to prevent
 “ the effects thereof.—Nevertheless those clouds
 “ are still lowring, and give reason to fear that
 “ they may, this approaching spring, be produc-
 “ tive of some event capable of disturbing the
 “ tranquillity of the North; unless the wisdom of
 “ Divine Providence preserves Europe from this
 “ disaster.—The extraordinary movements made
 “ in the dominions of some neighbouring powers,^f
 “ the armaments and preparations carried on
 “ there, sufficiently intimate, those powers are
 “ filled with the same apprehensions, as the King,
 “ in regard to the interruption of the public tran-
 “ quillity.—It becomes the prudence of Sove-
 “ reigns, when they foresee events, which may, in
 “ their consequences, influence the tranquillity of
 “ their dominions, and of their subjects, to take,
 “ long beforehand, the necessary precautions
 “ against a sudden surprize.—Such then is the
 “ motive, which has made the King judge it ne-

^f Alluding to Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, who all pretended to arm with the same views; and to the declaration and measures of the French.

A. D. 1749. "cessary that he should make likewise dispositions
 "for putting his army in a condition to act, in
 "order to keep at a distance from his dominions
 "all the unforeseen dangers, that might disturb
 "the repose of his faithful subjects, &c."

French
 seize upon
 the neutral
 islands,

France made so sure of embroiling Great Britain with a northern war, that, instead of complying with the directions and obligations of the late treaty, which had delivered her from the power of our arms, her ministers were encouraged to raise fresh difficulties, and to employ force to defeat the real intention of the conferences stipulated to be held by commissaries on the disputable points not settled by treaty. For, before the day^s of solemn thanksgiving for the peace, the nation was alarmed with the following act of hostility upon the islands, whose right had been subjected to the determination of the said commissaries.

The ordinance of the General of the French windward islands in America, of the 7th of December^h 1748, N. S.

French
 Governor's ordi-
 nance
 thereon,

CHARLES de Thebieres, de Levi, de Pestel, de Grimoard, Marquis of Caylus, Knight of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, and of the royal and military order of St. Lewis, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's ships, his Governor and Lieutenant General of the islands of

^s 25 April 1749.

^h Only one month and 26 days after the signing of the definitive treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle.

Marti-

A. D.
1749.

Martinico, Guardalupe, Grande and Petite Terre, Deseada, Mary Galant, the Saints Dominico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bequia, Canaouan, Cairiouacon, Grenade, and of all the islands and islets commonly called the Granadillos, Tobago, St. Bartholomew, St. Martin, Cayan, and the Continent comprehended between the rivers of the Amazons and Oronoque.

The island of TOBAGO commonly called *Tobacco*, one of those under our government, *indisputably* belonging to his Majesty, and the property which he has in it having been authentically acknowledged by treaties, and no Prince or sovereign power whatever laid any pretension to the sovereignty, or dominion of the same; has obliged us to give no credit to an information we have received, that a small frigate, stiling herself English, and authorized by certain pretended powers issued from the Governor of Barbadoes, should have been about a month since at the said island of Tobago; and there clandestinely stuck up to trees in different parts of the same a pretended proclamation, importing, that Mr. Greenville, Governor of Barbadoes, who in the same proclamation calls himself, without any foundation, Governor of St. Lucia, Dominico, St. Vincent and Tobago, together with all the islands, colonies, and plantations in America, commonly called or known by the name of the Caribbee islands (which islands and plantations, nevertheless indisputably belonging to his Majesty) had ordered the inhabitants of Tobago, who are *all subjects* to his Majesty, to

A. D.
1749.

quit the same in the space of 30 days, giving them to understand, that they must expect military execution in case of their non-compliance; the nature of such an act, and the terms, in which it is conceived, puts it out of all doubt that it could never have proceeded from the Governor of Barbadoes, but is the work of some evil disposed person, and determines us to wave the demanding any satisfaction from the pretended author of it, who in all probability had no hand in it.

Nevertheless, it being necessary to hinder any person, of what quality, condition, and nation soever they may be, from falling into the snare laid for them: We declare to all the subjects of his Majesty, who are settled upon the said island of Tobago, as well whites, as Indians, Negroes, Mulattoes, Mestees, and all others, that it may concern, that we will defend them against the attempts, that any nation, strangers to us, may form against the said island; and that we will send them such a quantity of ammunition and provisions, as they may stand in need of.

We prohibit their having any correspondence or dealing with the neighbouring colonies, belonging either to the English, Dutch, or Danes; nor to suffer any of them to continue amongst them; or to permit their coming on shore in the said island of Tobago, until such time, as we shall have sent a commanding officer with regular troops, for their protection and defence.

It is our will, that these presents be read, published, and set up in all the quarters of the said island

island of Tobago, that no person whatever may plead ignorance of the same.

A. D.
1749.

Given under our seal at arms, and the counter-
terfign of our first Secretary at Martinico,
the 7th day of December 1748.

Le Marquis DE CAYLUS.

By his Lordship's command.

MOURET.

This ordinance was supported by two French frigates, one of 40 guns, the other of 36. In the interim his Britannic Majesty's ship, the Boston of 20 guns, Captain Wheeler, arrived at the same place.ⁱ The French commander demanded his business there, (which was for wood and water, and to prevent the usurpations of the French on that neutral island) and forbid him to send his boat on shore, or to give any disturbance to the French in that island; adding that they were surpris'd Mr. Greenville would take upon him to order any of the inhabitants to withdraw from off that island, which belonged to his most Christian Majesty, and that if they found him there again, they would repel him by force.^k At the same time the French, to prevent any surprize, erected a battery of twelve guns, and began another of equal force.

Maintain-
ed by force.

The like hostilities began now also to be practis'd in Nova Scotia or Acadia, whose limits were

ⁱ Courlanders Bay.

^k Advice from Barbadoes, dated 21 January 1748-9.

referred

A. D.
1749.

The im-
portance of
Nova Sco-
tia.

Ordered to
be settled.

For what
reasons.

referred to the decision of commissaries. Cape Breton having been given back by the treaty to France, the people of New England represented the importance and necessity of cultivating or colonizing this country so effectually, by describing its produce, capacious and safe harbours for ships of any burden, and shewing that by its situation, it might be made not only a barrier against all the schemes and forces of the French in those parts, for extending their trade; but a key to their fur-trade and cod-fishery, and to counteract any attempts made against our settlements on that coast, by the greatest power France is able to equip at Cape Breton; that plans were form'd, and his Majesty approved¹ of one for the better peopling and settling the province of Nova-Scotia in America, and for extending and improving the fishery thereof, and establishing a civil government.

Amongst other arguments to forward this resolution of the British council, it was urged, That the restoration of Louisbourg might prove very fatal to us in another war, unless the government could be prevailed upon to settle and fortify Nova-Scotia, which, as it would be a barrier to all our northern provinces, and, as it might be made a check upon Louisbourg and the French encroachments in the fishery, would, in time, be of more service to the nation, than half the colonies already settled. That it has a very large extent of sea-coast, abounding with fine rivers, bays, and har-

¹ In council on 7 March 1749. O. S.

bours, and is surrounded with such fishing banks for cod and other fish, as are to be found in no other part of the world: That the soil is vastly prolific in all sorts of herbage, grain and fruit, and abounds with excellent timber. That its trade, when properly settled, would be the greatest seminary, we can have, for seamen; and add a considerable weight to our commercial interest, and greatly enrich his Majesty's kingdoms; the climate being healthy and agreeable, perfectly adapted to the English constitutions; that it would want but little encouragement more than a proper protection under the form of a civil government, and a humane governour.

Transports were provided, and proper encouragement offer'd to such as would venture upon the settlement and cultivation of this colony; and

A large colony transported thither.

General Cornwallis was appointed their governour, with a sufficient number of forces, and directions to fortify the country, and to assure the French, that should be found within the limits of the British dominion, in that province, that they should be protected in their settlements, on the sole condition of taking an oath of fidelity to his Britannic Majesty. The number of families, which entered voluntarily for this colony were three thousand seven hundred and fifty, and upwards; which sailed from England in the beginning of May 1748, and arrived at the harbour of

Their arrival.

Chebuctou, the place of their destination, to erect fortifications and to build a regular town, surrounded with a strong pallisade, on the shore of

one

A. D.
1749.

Town of
Hallifax,
why so
called.

one of the most secure and commodious havens in the whole world, and situated about midway between cape Canseau and cape Sable. Which town was named HALLIFAX in honour of the noble Earl of that title, who then presided over the board of trade and plantations, and had in a particular manner distinguished his judgment and capacity in executing the plan, and his patriotic zeal in the remarkable diligence and trouble with which he cherish'd and establish'd that infant colony ^m.

Disturbed
by the
French.

Immediately upon the appearance of this powerful body, reinforced with two regiments from Cape Breton, and a company of rangers from Annapolis, the only fort at that time belonging to Great Britain, on the peninsula, the French settlers, who, in time of peace, had affected to call themselves *Neutrals*; but, upon every dispute between the two crowns, intrigued with the Indians, and join'd with their own countrymen in support of their usurpations, encroachments and hostilities; either were compelled by M. de la Corne, or they rejected the protection of Great Britain, drove away their cattle, burnt their houses, and withdrew to St. John's, &c.

This was follow'd by open hostilities. A party of French and Indians, in their interest, seized upon a vessel belonging to Boston, in New England, *Beath*, Master, at or near Canseau; and Cap-

^m The expence incurred this year, by the new colony of Nova-Scotia, appears by the estimates laid before parliament to exceed 76,000l.



Hall sculp.

EARL OF HALLIFAX.



tain Donnel was attack'd at the head of the bay of Fundy, near Chebuſtou: he was wounded, and had three of his men killed. Every day produced freſh complaints of the hoſtile behaviour of the French and Indians under their influence: which obliged the governor to employ force in his own defence. He detached 1000 regular forces under the command of Major Lawrence, with four ſloops of war to Chignecto, to drive out the Indians, who had been engag'd by the French to annoy the Engliſh ever ſince their firſt landing. Theſe Indians mixed with the neutral French, to the number of about 800, being entrenched behind ſtrong banks and palifadoes, made cannon-proof, obſtructed their landing. But Major Lawrence, at the head of a hundred choſen men, made a ſecond attempt about a mile and half from their entrenchment; where alſo the enemy detached a ſufficient party to receive him with their ſmall arms; but he landed in the miſt of their fire, without returning it, till his men had run up to their noſes; by which means a great number of the enemy were killed, before they had time to load again. The remains fled with great precipitation under the protection of a French commander, encamped on the ground acroſs the river, and claim'd by Franceⁿ. Major Lawrence deſired a parley with the French commander: in which he demanded to know, “ why the French inhabitants had ſhaken off their allegiance to the King of Great

A. D.
1749.

Meaſures
of defence
by the go-
vernment.

ⁿ He had built a fort here by the name of Beau Sajour.

Britain :”

A. D. Britain:" but could get no other answer than, he
1749. had orders to defend that post; which he was
resolved to obey.

Thus the French were determin'd to seize upon
all Nova-Scotia, beyond the bay of Fundi, from
the river Chignecto to the river St. John. But
both their actions and intentions, in this province,
will more fully appear in the memorial delivered
to the French court by the Earl of Albemarle.

Memorial
concerning
Nova-Sco-
tia.

THE under-written Ambaffador-extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary from his Majesty of Great
Britain, has orders from the King his master;
dated Hanover the 26th of last month, to repre-
sent to the court of France, how much he is sur-
prised at hearing the violent proceedings of the
French in America, under the authority and di-
rection of M. de la Jonquiere, who has readily
avowed them.

M. Cornwallis, Governor of Nova-Scotia, has
informed the Duke of Bedford, by a letter dated
the 1st of May this year, that the French have
taken possession of all that part of Nova-Scotia
beyond the bay of Fundi, from the river Chig-
necto to that of St. John, making the first the
limits of that province.

They have reduced Beubassin to ashes, and car-
ried to the other side of the river the inhabitants
with their effects; compelled them to take up
arms, and form'd them into companies; so that
the Sieur La Corne, a French officer, has at that
place, under his command, a body of 2500 men,

A. D.
1649.

made up of regular troops, Canadians and Indians.

The Sieur La Corne and father Loutre, a French missionary, have made use of repeated and innumerable promises and menaces, in order to persuade all the inhabitants of the province to leave the country.

The inhabitants declare openly their abhorrence of these proceedings; but the Sieurs La Corne and Loutre threaten them with a general massacre from the Indians, if they remain in the province. They support and protect openly the Indians, our declared enemies; who enlist under the banners of France. They detain the King's subjects, his officers and soldiers prisoners. They excite the King's French subjects to rebellion, and those, who remain loyal, they threaten with destruction. They send their Indian slaves all over the country, where they are guilty of all sorts of outrages.

They have set fire to the town acknowledged by themselves to appertain to his Britannic Majesty.

Governor Cornwallis sent the Sieur Lawrence, Major of foot, with a detachment to Chignecto; where he arrived on the 20th of last April. They saw the French set fire to the town of Chignecto, French colours planted on the ditches, and the Sieur De la Corne at the head of his detachment, braving Major Lawrence, and declaring that he would defend, to the last, that ground as belonging to France.

The

A. D.
1749.

The Sieur De la Corne having sent to desire a conference with the Sieur Lawrence, the latter, accompanied by two captains of foot, went to meet him; and demanded by whose orders he had thus come into his Britannic Majesty's territories, and committed such acts of violence. The Sieur De la Corne answer'd: it was by those of M. De la Jonquiere, who had also commanded him to take possession of Chippodi, John's river, Mamram, Cooke, Pitcordiack, and of all that country, as far as the river, which was on the right hand of Major Lawrence, as belonging to his most Christian Majesty; or, at least, that he was to keep and defend it as such, till such time as the limits were settled by commissaries appointed for that purpose.

Though the Sieur Lawrence had under his command a detachment of regular troops, very little inferior to that commanded by Sieur De la Corne, he forebore committing any hostilities, in obedience to the King of Great Britain's orders for that purpose.

The King cannot persuade himself that these acts of violence have been committed with the knowledge of the court of France, and he is so fully convinced of his most Christian Majesty's equity, and his desire to maintain a good understanding between the two crowns, that he assures himself the most Christian King will readily shew his disapprobation of such conduct.

Governor Cornwallis has never made, nor designed to make any settlements out of the limits
of

A. D.
1750.

of the Peninsula, which the French before never pretended to belong to them: the King of Great Britain having had no intention in forming a settlement in his province of Nova Scotia, to encroach on the rights of his most Christian Majesty, or to take forcible possession of a country, of which the King had referred the right of property to the decision of commissaries appointed for that purpose, before it was possible for them to have met in order to proceed to the settling of the limits.

The under-written ambassador has orders to demand, that the conduct of M. de la Jonquiere be disavowed, that positive orders be sent to him immediately to withdraw his troops and the Indians under his authority, from the places which belong to Great Britain; that amends be made for the acts of violence which have been committed; and the damages which the King's subjects have suffered: And his Majesty is persuaded that the court of France will make no difficulty, to give the under-written Ambassador a duplicate of the orders, which will be sent to the governor of Canada, that he may transmit them to his court.

Done at Compeigne the 7th of July 1750.

Sign'd ALBEMARLE.

The Marquis of Puyfieuix answered this memorial, by a letter to the Earl of Albemarle, dated the 23d of July 1750. in the form following.

VOL. I.

D

S I R,

I

A. D.

1759.

The answer by the
court of
France.

S I R,

IN the memorial, which your excellency has given me concerning the complaints of M. Cornwallis, Governor of Acadia, are contained many facts, so contrary to the equity of his Majesty, the instructions of M. De la Jonquiere, and that, if they are found to be such, as they are represented, the King will take care justice shall be done to his Britannic Majesty's subjects, and will give such fresh orders, as will prevent the rise of any dispute of what kind soever between the two nations, his Majesty being thoroughly persuaded his Britannic Majesty will give, on his side, orders to the same purpose.

Give me leave, Sir, to tell you, I cannot be prevailed upon to believe, but that the facts are exposed with too much exaggeration, and from my knowledge of M. de la Jonquiere's prudence, and the instructions which he has, I am sorry M. Cornwallis has not applied for redress, before he had made complaints to his court. I sent your memorial, as soon as I receiv'd it, to M. Rouille, and desir'd he would take the proper steps, to be inform'd in a speedy and precise manner, of what has passed at Canada, so as I may be enabled to give your excellency a more positive answer. I have the honour to be, &c.

Sign'd PUYSEULX.

Soon after the French ministry gave the Earl of Albemarle a letter, wrote by M. Rouille to M. De la Jonquiere, in which he was desired to forbear hostilities upon the subjects of England; which
entirely

A. D.
1750.

entirely answered the ends of the court of France, to keep Great Britain inactive, and to gain time to execute their own perfidious schemes. For M. Cornwallis was not properly reinforced, to drive the French from their encroachments, and they kept their ground, and continued their hostilities, till the year 1755. when they were driven out by the New England troops.

The French insincerity on this occasion is very easily to be gathered from this evasive answer. But on the 15th of September following the French ministry delivered a memorial to Lord Albemarle; by way of confutation of that delivered on the part of his Britannic Majesty; in which counter-memorial they deny most of the facts laid to the charge of their governor and officers in Canada and Acadia; and speak of the limits of the province of Nova Scotia in the most quibbling manner.

The French did not confine their operations of war to the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia. This was only the fagg end of their grand American scheme. The strength and riches of their mother country were found to increase in proportion to their power and trade in the West Indies: and they were as fully satisfied, that their sugar islands could not be supported, with the desirable advantage, unless they could be supplied with provisions, lumber and other necessaries from the plantations, under the dominion of France in North America. Such is the natural connection of those two parts of the new world; which puts

Other operations of the French court in North America.

A.D.
1736

our enemies upon measures to procure those conveniences by intrigue, breach of faith, misinterpretation of treaties, unjust claims, usurpations and encroachments in times of peace, which they could not obtain by treaty, or by force and arms. They pursued this plan, for many years, by erecting a cordon of forts and garrisons on our back settlements, from the bay of Fundy, in Nova Scotia, to fort du Quesne, on the confines of Virginia: and, when they discover'd the inattention of the English ministry towards those encroachments, at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, they immediately prepared to carry on their approaches towards the sea; strengthen'd and increas'd their fortifications; augmented their forces on the continent, and proceeded in every other manner, as people determin'd to carry their point by surprise; as those regions on the south of the bay of St. Lawrence did not fall under the article of disputable points to be decided by commissaries: tho' the several provinces under the British dominion had, from time to time, remonstrated to their court, in the strongest terms, against the French practices amongst our Indian allies, and their encroachments on our territories.

These new friends, to confirm us in a belief of their sincerity, not only took these early steps to establish their own trade and interest upon more certain grounds, than the faith and courtesy of their neighbours; but they glanced at every object, which appeared in favour of Great Britain,

See 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht.

to

to render it abortive, and to avail themselves of our miscarriages. A.D. 1759.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the peace, the ministry attempted to efface some of the popular dislike, they had incurr'd thereby, with certain parliamentary regulations for the improvement of commerce. Amongst these was the monopoly of our African trade to the coast of Guinea; by which our plantations and sugar islands are supplied with negroes; and a very extensive traffic is carried on for British manufactures. This monopoly, in the African company, was become extremely obnoxious to the nation in general; but more particularly to the merchants adventurers in those seas; who having made their allegations good before parliament, the trade was made free and open, and the protection of that navigation and trade was committed to the crown.

The benefits of these national resolutions arising to our sugar islands, plantations and manufactures could not escape the envy of the French. They look'd upon this parliamentary act to be intended for the support of an exclusive right to the trade of Guinea, to which the French could pretend no claim by right of discovery: but now insist upon a share, under the sole argument, that as the sea is free, they have a right to trade on that coast, as well as the English. M. Durand was sent to London from Paris on this errand, to try what might be done by intrigue and bold assertions: And in the mean time the French court encouraged their merchants to fit out shipping for the African

Parliamentary resolutions concerning the African trade.

The French take umbrage thereat.

Endeavour to get it from England.

A. D.
1750.

and Guinea trade, with promises to support them with sufficient force against the English ^{p.}

Thus France was covering her hostile designs under the prospect of a fallacious peace, and preparing to act with vigour, could Great Britain be lulled asleep in an insidious security, or chain'd down to the continent of Europe, by the part she would be obliged to take in the quarrels of the northern and German powers, could their disputes be, in any wise, blown up into a storm.

Remon-
strances
from Ame-
rica against
their hostile
behaviour.

The affair of Tobago, and the like usurpations on St. Lucia, and the other neutral islands, were represented by the Governor, &c. of Barbadoes to our court ^{p.} The Governor of the infant colony of Nova Scotia transmitted his complaints of the hostile obstructions thrown in the way, by the French, to the peaceable settling of that province. And such remonstrances were sent from the other colonies in North America, as represented the imminent danger, to which they were exposed, from the continual encroachments of the French.

Transmit-
ed to Paris.

The British court transmitted these accounts to the Earl of Albemarle, their ambassador at Paris,

^p The French sent twelve merchant ships, under convoy of two men of war, to the coast of Guinea, on which were embarked 250 pieces of cannon, and a large quantity of ammunition and provisions, to establish forts, &c. in those parts.

^q Having first tried to bring the Marquis de Caylus to reason, by sending the Chesterfield and Richmond men of war, and Speedwell sloop, to deter him from such proceedings, but without effect.

with

with proper instructions on the respective heads of complaint against those acts of violence; so contrary to the letter and tenor of the late treaty, and to the conduct of Great Britain. And by this time the storm, which had seemed gathering in the North, on which depended the final resolution of the French ministry, in regard to the measures they were to keep with Great Britain, being blown over, or rather prevented by the vigilance, activity and strength of the King of Prussia, whose destruction appears to have been threatened by a treaty signed, about this time, between Vienna and Petersburg; though the Czarina's intermeddling with the succession of Sweden, and its form of government was the public pretence for so many armaments; they took the shortest way to exculpate themselves to our Ambassador, by absolutely disavowing the proceedings, of their Governor Caylus, on Tobago, &c. and of their Commander in Acadia; and further the French ministry promised, that, if it should be proved that any thing of such a nature was in agitation, immediate orders should be given to put a stop thereunto. And in order to induce a belief of their sincerity in this declaration, they indirectly accused the Governor of Barbadoes's account of fiction or misrepresentation, by assuring our minister, that no body had been sent to Tobago from Mar-

A. D.
1750.

Disavowed
by France.

* Importing, that if either power shall be attacked in any part of its dominions, by christians, or infidels, the other shall immediately march 50,000 auxiliaries according to the terms stipulated in the convention.

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A. D.
1750.

tinico; and that they were well informed, that the battery complained of, and the two ships of war, which were upon the coast, to defend the entry, were the sole work and property of certain privateers, lately put out of commission; and that measures should be taken to punish them, and to prevent the like for the future.

No redress,
but further
grounds of
complaint.

Nevertheless the Marquis de Caylus continued to keep possession and to fortify Tobago, in the strongest manner, and with the utmost diligence. For, by advices from Barbadoes, dated July the 24th 1749, it appears, that several families were then transporting themselves and effects from Martinico, and that the French Governor had declared, he would not give it up. And when Commodore Holbourne, with the Rose Captain Bladwell, and the Jamaica sloop Captain Galbreath sailed to Martinico, with the King of France's orders, as delivered to our Ambassador at Paris, to be forwarded by the British ministry, by the way of Barbadoes, to M. Caylus, for the immediate evacuation of the islands of St. Lucia, Dominico, St. Vincent and Tobago, and appeared with those dispatches on the coast of that island; a boat was sent off, to forbid their landing. Whereupon the Commodore sent his dispatches ashore by his secretary and Captain Bladwell, charging them to enquire the reason, why they were not permitted to land? To which the commanding officer, that acted upon the occasion, answered, that it was by the order of M. Caylus, who was represented to be a considerable distance from his place of residence,

at

at that juncture; and that the Commodore should have a final answer in twelve hours. But this was only a finesse in the Governor to gain time: For M. Caylus was really upon the spot: who, after some consultation, sent orders for the English ships of war to depart from that coast, he [M. Caylus] having no orders from his master about evacuations.

A. D.
1759.

Commodore Holbourne withdrew, and ordered the Tavistock to call by the way at the island of St. Lucia; where also the Captain had the mortification to see the British flag insulted with a command from the French to depart in twelve hours: which he was obliged to obey. Such was the good faith of our new friends.

M. Caylus, having thus eluded the orders of his court, transmitted by the way of England: but satisfied, that, if an expedient could not be soon devised, in favour of his master's pretensions, he should be obliged to comply with a repetition of the late orders, had recourse to a treaty of accommodation, by which he endeavoured to draw the Governor of Barbadoes into a direct acknowledgment of the French King's equal right and title to that island of Tobago, with his Britannic Majesty, by a clause importing, "That the Kings of Great Britain and France, shall entirely pre-serve their respective pretensions to this island, &c." By which Great Britain would have been misled into a concession of a right claimed by the French to that island, and given the conferences of their commissaries greater weight in that case,

M. de Caylus's attempt to draw us into a concession prejudicial to his Britannic Majesty's right and title.

than

A. D.
1750.

than all the proofs drawn from history and treaties; and furnish'd them with a plausible pretence at any time to seize upon that island, should nothing be concluded by the commissaries. However, though the deception was seen through, this negociation so far answered the purposes of the French, as to procrastinate and puzzle, as much as possible, in expectation of a more favourable opportunity, or to gain some advantage by equivocal, or unguarded expressions.

During this negociation another incident happened, which was the death of M. Caylus, to drive off the evacuation. For, advices from Barbadoes of the 24 June following relate, That not only Caylus, but his successor M. Point Sable was also dead, without taking one step to evacuate the islands; and that the French continued to clear the lands in Tobago, and to complete their settlements with negroes, and every necessary for people determined to maintain their footing.

The inclination of the French court for the neutral islands put them upon another expedient, when they had spun their thread of negociation, as long as it would bear, at Martinico. A demand of satisfaction for an insult pretended to be committed upon the *Galathea*, a French frigate, by the Governor of Nevis, was thrown in the way, and magnified in such a manner, as to make it a sufficient remora to the above mentioned evacuations.

The behaviour of the French in regard to Nova Scotia was equally as trifling, insincere and fallacious.

A. D.
1750.

cious. The British court backed their remonstrances with the most authentic and uncontestable proofs of their King's title to Acadia within its ancient limits. The French temporized; it was not yet a time to renew the war. They endeavoured to stop the present clamour with strong assurances of preventing the like to come. But, these promises and orders were made and executed with just as little sincerity and punctuality, as those relative to the neutral islands. Instead of laying down their arms and withdrawing from their encroachments, the French built a fort on the neck of the Peninsula called Bay Verte, another on the north of Bay Fundy, and a third on the river St. John, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and added both force and treachery to disturb and to discourage the new settlers in that province. For, Captain Bartlo reconnoitring the country about Chiconecto, with a party of Rangers, fell into an ambush of French Indians, who killed him, took an ensign, and also took, and killed, 13 private men; and then joined Mons. Le Corne, who hoisted the French flag on the other side of the river, and declared he had orders to defend all to the northward, as the property of the French

The French continue their hostilities in Nova Scotia.

* The Lords of trade and plantations produced an act whereby it appeared that all the Indian Chiefs within the whole extent of Acadia, took an oath of fidelity to King George I. in 1725, agreeable to the treaty of Utrecht, which was transmitted with the remonstrances against the French encroachments, to the Earl of Albemarle for the perusal of the French court.

A. D.
1750.
Treach-
rous deal-
ings to-
wards Cap-
tain Cobb.

King. Captain Cobb, who commanded a sloop in the public service, hovering off St. John's in Nova Scotia, had also like to have fallen a sacrifice to those same people. The French decoyed him ashore under a friendly pretence. But he was presently surrounded, and made a prisoner by a band of Indians, who threatened to kill him. In the meantime a French officer, going aboard, attempted to get possession of the sloop by way of security or ransom for the Captain's life; which so exasperated the mate, or Lieutenant, that he declared his resolution to defend the sloop; and further, that he would hang him, meaning the French officer, as a treacherous villain, if Captain Cobb was not immediately released, and sent on board: which had its desired effect.

Ignorance
of the Bri-
tish m—y
concerning
the bounds
of North
America.

As for their other encroachments and usurpations, our ministry were so deficient in their knowledge concerning the just limits of the British provinces on the south of St. Lawrence's, and for many years so regardless of their security and protection; and the French so artful in their descriptions, and pertinacious in their claims, that they passed almost unnoticed, till the Ohio company roused them from that American lethargy; which had for many years seized upon the British cabinet.

Ohio com-
pany a
means to
inform
them.

The merchants interested in that company, seconded the remonstrances of the provincials so warmly, that the ministry began seriously to set about the means to settle the differences left undecided by the definitive treaty, and to enquire

into

into the nature and reality of the French encroachments, especially on the banks of the Ohio. Of which we may look upon the following act of hostility committed by the Governor of Canada, and the proceedings thereupon to be full evidence.

A. D.
1750.

In the year 1750, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, Governor of Canada, sent several detachments of troops, not only to Acadia or Nova Scotia, but to the country upon the Ohio; where they seized four English traders, confiscated their goods, and sent them by the way of Quebec to Rochelle in Old France, where they were cast into the common goal. These prisoners having found means to represent their case and situation to Lord Albemarle then at Paris, his Lordship transmitted the same to Lord Holdernesse, Secretary of State, at London, in the manner following:

Hostilities
begun by
the French
on the
Ohio.

Paris March 1, 1752.

"I must acquaint your Lordship, that in the month of November last, I received a letter from three persons, signing themselves, John Patton, Luke Irwin and Thomas Bourke; representing to me, that they were Englishmen, who had been brought to Rochelle, and put into prison there, from whence they wrote; having been taken by the French subjects, who seized their effects, as they were trading with the English and other Indians on the Ohio, and carried prisoners to Quebec; from whence they have been sent over to Rochelle; where they were hardly used.

Lord Albemarle's letter concerning three English prisoners taken on the Ohio.

Upon

A. D.
1750.

Upon this information I applied to M. St. Contest, and gave him a note of it, claiming them as the King's subjects, and demanding their liberty, and the restitution of their effects, that had been unjustly taken from them.

These three persons, I find by the paper your Lordship has sent me, are of the number of those demanded of the French by Mr. Clinton, and named in M. de la Jonquiere's letter. I have wrote to a merchant at Rochelle to enquire after them, and to supply them with money, to make their journey hither, if they are not gone; that I may receive from them all the informations necessary, on my seeing M. St. Contest next Tuesday. I will represent the case to him, in obedience to his Majesty's commands, that la Jonquiere may have positive orders to desist from the unjustifiable proceedings complained of; to release any of his Majesty's subjects he may still detain in prison, and to make ample restitution of their effects. And I shall take care to shew him the absolute necessity of sending instructions to their several Governors, not to attempt any such encroachments for the future."

Another
letter on
the same
account.

Accordingly Lord Albemarle, by a letter dated the 8th of March, further writes to Lord Holderness, "That he had seen M. Rouille, delivered to him a note of the several complaints he had orders to make against M. de la Jonquiere's conduct, and told him, in general, the contents of it; insisting, for the preservation of a good under-

understanding between the two crowns, upon the necessity of sending such positive orders to all their governors, as might effectually prevent, for the future, any such encroachments on his Majesty's territories, and committing such violence on his subjects, as had been done in time past; adding to this remonstrance, that he hoped, they would be taken into consideration quickly, that he might be able to give him an answer next week, or as soon afterwards as he possibly could.

That M. Rouille had promised to use his best endeavours for that purpose; and assured him that it was the intention of the court of France to prevent any disputes arising that might tend to alter the present correspondence between the two nations, and it might be depended upon that such orders should be sent to their Governors accordingly."

A. D.
1759.

M. Rouille
promises
redress.

At the same time Lord Albemarle mentioned this affair to M. Rouille his Lordship delivered him a memorial, which among other things, complained, "Of the French encroachments on the Ohio, and demanded that the most express orders should be sent to M. de la Jonquiere to desist from his unjust proceedings, and in particular to cause the fort, which they had undertaken to build on the river Niagara, to be immediately razed, and the French and others in their alliance, who may happen to be there, to retire forthwith; as likewise to set the six Englishmen, whom they had made prisoners at liberty, and to make them ample satisfaction for the wrongs and losses they have

Lord Al-
bemarle's
memorial.

A. D.
1750.

have suffered; and lastly, that the persons who have committed these excesses, be punished in such a manner as might serve for an example to those, who should venture on any like attempt."

Though these remonstrances and complaints were founded upon the most notorious acts of hostility; they produced no other effect than the release of the 3 prisoners at Rochelle. No restitution, nor reparation of damages was ever made, or intended by France for the losses sustained by the British subjects. And the French court were so far from calling Jonquiere to an account, or restraining him from pursuing his encroachments, that he was encouraged to complete the usurpations he had begun on the back of all our provinces in North America: for he had prepared a considerable army for that service, and was, when death prevented him in March 1752, to execute his intentions for that purpose: and it might have convinced the British ministry of the insincerity of the court of France in all their answers to our grievances, that the blame did not rest upon M. de la Jonquiere; for, his successor M. du Quesne was immediately dispatched with the same instructions; and did not abate, in the least, the diligence, with which his predecessor had spread the terror of the French power in that vast continent; and carried their encroachments every day further and further; confiding in their success of deceiving the British court with fair promises.

Commis-
saries ap-
pointed

Commisseries were appointed, and sent to Paris well instructed and provided with irrefragable

gible proofs of his Britannic Majesty's right and title to the disputable articles, referred to their cognizance and determination by the definitive treaty; the Lords of trade and plantations having searched every treaty and record, both on the part of England and France, that could be produced equitably in that debate, by way of proof.

At D.
1750.

to settle
limits, &c.

France, which never intended to terminate an affair, in which they were sure to be worsted, had avoided, as much as possible, this appointment; and received the English commissaries with so much coolness and backwardness, as promised no happy issue to their conferences.

How re-
lished by
France.

William Shirley and William Mildmay, Esqrs. opened their commission at Paris, on the 21st of September 1750, with a memorial reciting the twelfth article of the treaty of peace concluded at Utrecht, the 11th of April 1713; "Whereby
" the most Christian King agreed, amongst other
" particulars, to yield and make over by solemn
" and authentic letters, or instruments, all Nova
" Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient boundaries;
" as also the city of Port Royal, now called An-
" napolis Royal, and all other things in those
" parts, which depend on the said lands, &c."

Commissi-
on opened
by British
commissa-
ries.

And that in conformity to this treaty, the said most Christian King by his letters and authentic acts, signed with his own hand at Marli, dated in the month of May 1713, "did yield up for ever
" to the said late Queen of Great Britain, the
" said country of Nova Scotia or Acadia, in its
" entire, conformable to its ancient limits, as also

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E

" the

A. D. 1750. " the city of Port Royal, now called Annapolis
 " Royal, and generally all that depends on the
 " said lands, &c, to be possessed for the future in
 " full sovereignty and propriety, with all the
 " rights acquired by him the said King, and his
 " subjects, by treaty or otherwise, by the said
 " Queen, and the crown of Great Britain, mak-
 " ing over to her, to this effect, full and entire
 " possession for ever."

Bounds of
 Nova Sco-
 tia or Aca-
 dia de-
 manded by
 his Britan-
 nic Majes-
 ty.

Then the said commissaries declared what those limits are, which they demanded on the part of Great Britain, as the true boundaries of the said territories of Nova Scotia or Acadia, in its entire, conformable to its antient limits; namely—" On
 " the west towards New England, by the river
 " Penobscot, alias Pentagoet, beginning at its en-
 " trance and from thence drawing a straight line
 " northward to the river St. Lawrence, or the
 " great river of Canada.—On the north by the
 " said river of St. Lawrence, going along the
 " south side of it to Cape Rosiers, situated at its
 " entrance.—To the east by the great gulph of
 " St. Lawrence, from the said Cape Rosiers,
 " running south-eastwards by the islands of Ba-
 " calao or Cape Breton, leaving these islands at
 " the right; and the gulph of St. Lawrence and
 " Newfoundland, with the islands belonging
 " thereto, on the left, unto the Cape or Promon-
 " tory called Cape Breton.—And to the south by
 " the great Atlantic ocean, drawing to the south-
 " west from the said Cape Breton, by the Cape
 " Sable, taking in the island of that name, round
 " about

“ about the bay of Fundi, which goes up eastward
 “ to the country, at the entrance of the river Pe-
 “ nobscot, alias Pentagoet.”

A. D.
 1750.

These were the limits, which they offer'd to prove were the ancient boundaries intended by the treaty above-mention'd: And agreeable thereto the British commissaries demanded all the lands, continents, islands, bays, coasts, rivers and places, comprised within the said limits, or dependant on the said Nova Scotia or Acadia, bounded as above, with the sovereignty, &c. which the Christian King, &c. ever had in the said lands, &c. as belonging to the crown of Great Britain, by virtue of the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, without reservation or diminution; including also the lands or territories westward, between the rivers Penobscot and Kennebequi, which the French had pretended, at divers times, to be a part of the said Acadia; tho' the said lands did always belong to the crown of Great Britain.

Then the commissaries concluded with a demand, That necessary orders should be dispatched for the due execution of the said twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, agreeable to the true intention and spirit of the same, as also for the withdrawing of all the establishments made by the subjects of his most Christian Majesty, if any there might be within the limits, as above^t.

On the part of France were appointed La Gal-
 lissiere and De Silhouette, who by a rescript of
 Commissaries on the part of France, their answer.

^t See the memorials of the English and French commissaries, 4to. vol. I. p. 3, &c.

A. D.
1750.

the same date pretended and affirm'd, That by ceding Annapolis Royal, distinctly by itself, it appears not to have been comprised within the ancient limits of Acadia, according to the most ancient descriptions of the country, and consequently, that the ancient Acadia made but a part of the peninsula so called. That the island of Canseau being situated in one of the embouchures of the gulph of St. Lawrence, could not be ceded by his Christian Majesty, as part of Acadia: And that nothing had been altered by the treaty of Utrecht, in regard to the limits between New France and New England, from what they were before that treaty. And by another memorial these French negociators fix the ancient limits of Acadia, from the extremity of la Baye-françoise, depuis le Cap de Sainte-Marie, or le Cap Fourchu, then along the coast as far as Cap Canseau^u.

Limits of ancient Acadia, according to the French account.

The nature of the proofs for the King of Great Britain's claim.

A. D.
1751.

This proceeding obliged the British commissaries to descend to particulars, and on the eleventh of January 1751, they deliver'd a very long memorial^w concerning the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia, to evince the truth of those limits, described, and demanded, by them, in their memorial of the 21st of September last, and to demonstrate his Britannic Majesty's just title to all the lands, &c. comprehended within them, by authentic facts and conclusive evidence; they being able to support every part of their claim, not only from several declarations and acts of state, on the part of the crown of France; but also,

^u Ibid. p. 10, 11.

^w Ibid. p. 13, &c.

from

from the uniform possession of that crown, for many years, both before and after the treaty of Breda; which crown, as often as it claim'd and possess'd Acadia, claim'd and possess'd it in that extent, and with the same limits they demand it.

The French commissaries, in their memorial, above-mention'd, by way of discouragement, held out a plan to shew the difficulties, with which they could embroil, and the length, into which they were able to protract these conferences; and thereby the little success the English had to expect from them. They, to the loose manner, in which they answered our demand of the entire country of Nova Scotia or Acadia, added a memento of the claims their master had on us in other places: and that the definitive treaty did not confine their conferences to the limits of Acadia only, but empower'd them to settle the limits of all their other colonies, and all other matters left undecided at Aix-la-Chapelle.

But instead of discouraging, they hereby drew from the English commissaries the following spirited declaration: "With respect to the boundaries of any other dominions belonging to the two crowns in America, it is sufficient for us to say, That the present discussion is confin'd singly to the limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia: But should any difference of opinion hereafter arise in deciding what are the limits of any other of his Britannic Majesty's territories in North

A. D.
1751.

The evasive reply
of the
French.

The spirited
answer
of the Eng-
lish com-
missaries.

* See *ibid.* p. 11.

A. D. 1751. “ America, our master, the King of Great Britain, desirous on the one hand, in no instance, “ to break in upon the rights of his neighbours, “ will on the other be found ready to assert and “ vindicate his own.” Concluding their long memorial, which has connected, in a most judicious and impartial manner, every fact and evidence essential to the matter in question, with this just and sensible challenge^z: “ As the possession “ of Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient limits, was finally determin’d to Great Britain, “ by the execution of the treaty of Utrecht; “ what were those ancient limits is the only matter now in dispute; and as we have ascertain’d “ the limits, with which his Majesty claims Acadia or Nova Scotia, under that treaty, and produced our proofs of that claim, it is equally “ incumbent on the commissaries of the court of France to set forth particularly the limits, “ which the court of France would assign as the “ true limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia, and to “ produce their proofs in support of them.”

Thus stood the case of the disputable article concerning the limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia, seemingly more embarrass’d, by the French tenaciousness, than ever; which join’d to the complaint of their not having fulfilled that article of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, concerning the demolition of Dunkirk, prognosticated no long continuance of the peace between the two crowns.

^y Ibid. p. 65.

^z Ibid. p. 81.

To spin these conferences out to the greatest length, the French commissaries, without taking any notice of the affair of Acadia or Nova Scotia, produced on the 11th of February 1751, N. S. a memorial concerning the neutral island of St. Lucia; only; which is set off with a preface or preamble to prejudice the reader in favour of the French claim to St. Lucia and Tobago, and to divest Great Britain of all right to St. Dominico and St. Vincent; alledging, with a good grace, that they could produce sufficient proof of the former; and that they did not doubt, but it would be admitted, That the two nations had guaranteed the two latter to the native Caribbees, under the protection of France.

A. D. 1751.

French memorial concerning their King's title to St. Lucia, &c.

They argue first from priority of discovery; and, laying that title down, as valid by the laws of nations, they attempt to prove an equal good title from a possession taken of any country or island deserted, and not reclaim'd, by the other nation, in whom was the original right of discovery.

Their proof founded upon desertion.

To shew this to be the case of the island of St. Lucia, they affirm, That the English had been driven off, and had abandoned that island; having suffered a massacre by the natives: and that the French ventured their lives to secure its possession, and had maintain'd their footing against the savages, twenty years before the English reclaim'd any right to the said island; pretending that this possession had been acknowledged by several treaties: That the English had made use of the French

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1751.

to make their peace with the savage Caribbee islanders; and that the French had never quitted the island of St. Lucia, but had always kept up a succession of governors and commanders upon it, without any impeachment of their right; and promise to prove these assertions by evidence from cotemporary histories, and from authentic instruments and papers.

Their political insinuation about sincerity.

But, with a craft peculiar to those, who intend to deceive, the French commissaries put on an air of uncommon sincerity and respect, “ desiring
“ the English to read this memorial and the others,
“ intended to be laid before them, without pre-
“ judice, without partiality, with that spirit of
“ equity which ought to direct the actions of two
“ such great and puissant nations. That being
“ the only means to arrive at the truth, whose
“ discovery would be of infinite importance for
“ their reciprocal good and tranquillity, and
“ which the commissaries of each nation ought to
“ make their only object.”^a

Detected.

French pretences to a right by discovery also detected.

How far we may admit of the sincerity of the French commissaries in this address, their candour in the recital of facts will explain. They suppress the original discovery of St. Lucia by the English, and won't allow any account thereof, till Sir Thomas Warner took possession of it in the year 1626; and that by this Warner's agreement a French adventurer, D'Esnambuc, who divided St. Christopher's with him, return'd to France, and obtain'd for himself and others a charter, not only for the island of St. Christopher, but for Barbadoes,

^a Ibid. vol. II. p. 7, &c.

and

and the other neighbouring isles, from eleven degrees to twenty, within which parallel lies the island of St. Lucia. Whereas it was not till the year following, that the first public and authentic act appeared for the establishment of the English property of this island, by a charter granted to the Earl of Carlisle.

This being their only proof for possession and title by priority of discovery; their next attempt is to shew that in the infancy of our adventures amongst these islands of the new world, both the English and French would frequently attempt a settlement, and be obliged to leave it for a nation more able than themselves to maintain its possession. Thus, say they, the French tried to settle Antigua and Montserrat; but these first adventurers abandoning these islands, the English entered upon and kept them. So in like manner, they infer, the English attempted in 1639 to settle St. Lucia, but not being able to support themselves against the native savages, they were forced to abandon it in the year following: And the French immediately took possession of the same.

As the whole of the argument in support of the French claim, turns upon this principle^b, let us cut it short, and, after stating the right, which the King of Great Britain has to that island of St. Lucia, examine its validity by authentic facts, and strictly just conclusions drawn from them.

The English commissaries replied^c, with a be-

^b See the memorial in vol. II. p. 3, &c, p. 45, &c.

^c Ibid.

A. D.

1751.

Equity and
sincerity of
the Eng-
lish.

coming dignity; That they were perfectly convinced, that while they consider'd the memorial with temper, disinterestedness and a spirit of equity, recommended to them by the French commissaries, and preserved this temper, they were conforming to the intentions, and executing the commands of their master, who came into this negotiation from the motives of justice and friendship; desirous on the one hand, in no instance to encroach on the rights of France, determined on the other to maintain his own; and sensible at the same time, that in all cases, where two states, at peace and in alliance, have inconsistent pretensions on the same dominion and territory, nothing is more sure to preserve that peace, and to perpetuate the alliance, desired by both, than the bringing such claims to an amicable decision.

Answer e-
very argu-
ment of the
French
memorial.

By shew-
ing our pri-
ority of
discovery.

They then protest against the pretended guarantee of the islands of St. Dominico and St. Vincent, and produce evidence that St. Lucia was discovered by three ships fitted out by the Earl of Cumberland in 1593, and settled in 1605 and 1606 by a colony of English, under the direction of Sir Oliph Leaph: which was strengthen'd a few years after by another colony sent by Sir Thomas Warner, in 1626, who appointed major Judge Governor of that island. This destroys the French title by priority of possession or discovery.

As to the commission or patent to d'Esnambuc and others, it is, say the English commissaries, worded in such a manner as to induce a belief, that

St.

St. Lucia was not so much as known to the French at that time (1626). It does not so much as mention the name of such an island, which appears in the Earl of Carlisle's, under the form of an old colony; and therefore no title can be drawn from that commission; whose silence of such a place shews at least, if it was known to the French, that they consider'd it to belong to the English.

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1751.

As to acquiring a right of possession by the removal of a prior settlement, it is answer'd in this case; That in the year 1640, in the month of August, the savage natives of St. Lucia overpowering the English colonies, killed the Governor, and destroyed all that came in their way with fire and sword. Such, as escaped this massacre, fled away to Montserrat. Which is the forsaking or abandonment, the French chiefly found their title upon. For, it was immediately^d after, in this very year 1640, that M. du Parquet, not without suspicion of being a chief abettor in that bloody scene, carried a colony of 35 or 40 effective people to St. Lucia, and built a fort, &c. to protect them, and to assure their usurpation against the English, should they return with force.

By deny-
ing the de-
sertion of
St. Lucia.

It is undeniably evident, That the desertion of the island, by the English, was not voluntary, but forc'd upon them by an unhuman massacre, and therefore the property could not be lost by the flight of those who escaped; but it remain'd in the nation, to which they were subjects, to reclaim and repossess, when time and opportunity should

^d Within a month. See *ibid.* p. 69, 71.

serve.

A. D.
1751.

serve. Accordingly Lord Carlisle, in the midst of our distractions at home, sent over several English in the years 1644 and 1645: But neither these, nor another armed force, sent against those usurpers in 1657, were able to make good their landing: who kept their usurpation till the year 1664; when Col. Carew, with a regiment of soldiers, drove the French off, regain'd possession, and was made Deputy-Governour of the island under Lord Willoughby.

What is
the law of
dereliction.

Now, as to the law of dereliction: That such a law is necessary, is allow'd; but then it must be a law, established on the consent of all nations, to prevent extensive countries from being withheld from the common utility of all people, upon a pretence, in any one, of a right to that which they use not, and to prevent frequent wars being perpetually carried on in support of uncertain and revived titles. And this law is not to be founded upon an act of necessity; but upon an act of choice and conveniency.

Therefore, there can be no absolute dereliction of a country, but where the last possessor leaves it voluntarily, and without any apparent necessity. To make such dereliction in one people a foundation of right in any other coming after them, it is necessary that the acquiescence of the first power under the possession of the latter, be an acquies-

* Ibid. p. 73.

† Pro derelicto habetur, quod dominus eâ mente abjecerit, ut id in numero rerum suarum esse nolit; ideoque statim dominus ejus esse desinet. Ibid. p. 83.

gence intended voluntary and clearly manifested. A. D. 1751.
 So that a desertion, forced upon any people by an enemy, or a temporary acquiescence under that expulsion, occasion'd by necessity, cannot extinguish the right of any people to the country they so abandon. Which was the very case of the English in the year 1640 at St. Lucia^s. And in consequence, all the arguments drawn from a succession of Governors, and bargains and sales, &c. are of no consideration.

As to the whole of their argument we may form the best conceptions of their evidences from the declaration; with which the English commissaries wind up their reply; "We, say those commissaries, "have gone thro' the history of his Majesty's ancient, uniform, and clear right to the island of "St. Lucia: We have shewn that this right began, "and was established, by a discovery and settlement made many years before the French, upon "the testimony of their own writers, had any "knowledge of the Caribbee islands; and that it "was uninterruptedly continued and kept up by "all proper and sufficient acts of government, "and, in later times, it has more than once received the final sanction of treaties; at the same "time making it appear, That the commissaries "of France have nothing to oppose to this right, "but pretences of early discovery and possession, "which their own historians overturn; or, "a temporary settlement, gained by an usurpation, "which the law of nations will not justify; or,

Observations on all the French proofs.

^s See *ibid.* p. 85.

" a re-

A D. 1751. " a remote construction of treaties, inconsistent
 " with both the letter, intention and spirit of
 " them: and therefore think themselves warrant-
 " ed to conclude with a renewal of that assertion
 " they began with," That "*the right to the island*
 " *of St. Lucia is not in the crown of France, but*
 " *in the crown of Great Britain.*"^h

Conduct of
the French
in these
confer-
ences.

The expedition of these conferences being now entirely in the power of the French commissaries, they did not deliver in their memorial of proofs concerning the most Christian King's title to Nova Scotia or Acadia, till the fourth of October 1751, and then it was made up of such materials as both, for their matter and form, shew'd that they paid no regard to truth, and were only intended to gain time for backing their negotiations with an effectual naval and military power, sent, in the most secret manner, to cover and secure, for the French crown, the places under debate.

Hostilities
continued
by the
French in
the West
Indies.

During these conferences the French kept up the same hostile spirit, as before. They pretended that his most Christian Majesty had willingly agreed to a provisional and conditional evacuation of the Neutral Islands: but this boasted evacuation amounted to no more, than a suspension of arms; for the French still kept possession of their forts and settlements on those islands. Their Indian allies alarmed the very city of Halifax by an incursionⁱ to the town of Dartmouth,

In Nova
Scotia.

^h See the memorial presented by the English commissaries, 15th of Nov. 1751. p. 149. vol. II. printed at London.

ⁱ 27th of March 1751.

opposite to that metropolis, which they plundered, and left reeking with the blood of the English inhabitants, besides making a number of captives. And they made such progress in their practices with our Indian allies on the back of the other provinces in North America, that these also received arms from the French, and were persuaded by them to break their treaties with England, and not only to commit the most horrid murders and outrages upon the outsettlers, but to penetrate within a few miles of Charles Town, in South Carolina. *

A. D.
1751.

On the
Ohio.

On the coast of Guinea Commodore Buckle, in his Majesty's ship Assistance, with the St. Alban and Sphynx, in the beginning of 1752, found three French men of war, one of 64, the others of 54 and 24 guns, tampering with our friendly natives at Anamaboa, by presents and an offer of 15,000 l. sterling, for liberty to build a fort there. Commodore Buckle obliged them to desist and retire. But the French promised the natives better presents and more money, and to visit them in ten months time.

Their attempt on
the coast of
Guinea.

A. D.
1752.

By this time also the malignity of the intentions of the French in the East Indies was detected by several authentic accounts of their hostilities, renewed against the English and their allies. M. Dupleix had acquired great power and riches for himself, and gained such an acquisition of strength and trade for his country by a new alliance with the Marattoes, that it was determined, in all outward appearance, to make use of these allies to ruin the English East India company.

In the East
Indies.

* In September and October 1751.

¹ In 1750.

A. D.

1752.

Upon what
pretence.

The contended succession to the government and kingdom of Arcot gave the French Governor of Pondicherry a favourable opportunity to disguise his real intentions, and to ruin the English on that coast under the name of justice, and of auxiliaries to an exiled family: a game, which the French court has often played in Europe, by invasions and rebellions in Great Britain and Ireland. M. Dupleix in possession of the Pretender to the kingdom of Arcot, at the time peace was concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, and foreseeing the vast advantages arising from the improvement of so lucky an incident, when he had no opposition to fear from the English, fettered by the faith of the late treaty, he joined the Pretender Muzapherzing with six hundred Europeans and a train of artillery.

The reigning Nabob was slain in the defence of his capital: his eldest son fell into the hands of the French and their allies; Mahomed Allee Cawn escaped to Trichinopoly; and Arcot, and the whole province, submitted to the arms of the invaders; who, afraid to alarm the English too much, at once, returned to Pondicherry, till Admiral Boscawen, who was still on that coast, and expressed himself with great resentment against the French Governor on this occasion, should sail for Europe.

The English fleet under that Admiral's command departed for England on the 21st of Oct. 1749; and next day the French and their allies took the field, and raised contributions all over

Take the
field.

the

the country. The French troops were commanded by Mr. Law, nephew of the famous Mississippi Law. The King of Tonjore refusing to acknowledge the usurper Muzapherzing, they besieged his capital, which was defended with much bravery; till the English, finding it necessary to put a stop to the progress of the French, and to prevent an increase of power in an oppressive neighbour, that must at last have proved their ruin, and were solicited by Mahomed Allee Cawn to assist him in defence of his right, sent Captain Cope with a detachment from Fort St. George to Trichinopoly; who, being joined^m by a large army of horseⁿ under the command of Nazirzing, Vice Roy of the Deckan, obliged them to raise the siege and to return to Pondicherry.

A. D.
1752.

Opposed by
the English.

Being reinforced with 2,000 Europeans, a numerous body of Sepoys, and a large train of artillery under the command of M. d' Auteuil, they again took the field, and marched to seek Nazirzing. This obliged the English to send another detachment from Fort St. George, consisting of 600 men, under the command of Captain Lawrence, who has favoured the world with this account, accompanied by Mr. Westcott, one of the council, by way of commissary, to manage the conduct of the allies for the interest of his nation.

Nazirzing appointed Captain Lawrence Generalissimo of his army; and both armies were ready to engage, when the French General's heart, begin-

^m At Waldore, in February 1750.

ⁿ 30,000 men, 800 cannon.

A. D.
1752.

French
stratagem
to defeat
the English.

ning to fail him, had recourse to stratagem, in hopes of prevailing with the English to stand neuter in the time of action. M. d' Auteuil sent a messenger to General Lawrence, to acquaint him, " That although they were engaged in different " causes; yet it was not his design, nor inclination, that any European blood should be spilt: " but that, as he did not know the post of the " English, he could not be blamed should any of " his shot come that way, and hurt the English." To which General Lawrence sent back this answer: " I have the honour of carrying the English colours on my flag gun; which by a proper lookout will direct where the English are posted. " But whatever your design and inclination may " be, I am resolved, if any shot come my way, " to return them; though I should also be very " loath to spill European blood."

The cannonading began, and M. d' Auteuil, like a true Frenchman, fired a shot directly over the heads of the English: which General Lawrence ordered to be returned by three guns well pointed, to convince him, that the English were not to be cajoled or terrified into a state of inactivity, at so critical a juncture, when a defeat of their friendly Indians would put the French in possession of all the inland country, circumscribe the English within the walls of their sea ports, and cut off their commercial intercourse with the natives.

Miscarries.

This resolution had its effect. M. d' Auteuil having nothing to hope for, from his stratagem to keep the English inactive; and not daring to risk

the

A. D.
1752.

the issue of a battle with such a numerous army, so well supported by the English, he decamped, and retreated with his Europeans and Sepoys, in the night, leaving behind eleven pieces of heavy artillery, with part of his artillery-men, in order to conceal his real design; for, he gave out that he was marching to alarm the camp of the enemy, by night, and would be back in the morning.

Thus deserted, the French allies were immediately attacked and routed with a most shocking carnage by Nazirzing; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the English saved some of the French gunners from the fury of the Moors. The English General committed the wounded to the care of his own surgeons; and provided for them all with a humanity and generosity becoming an Englishman. But in return for this friendly distinction, M. Dupleix laid hold of it, by way of proof that the English had broke the peace, by making them prisoners; and wrote a long protest against General Lawrence for that purpose. Which the poor French artillery-men, that survived, sensible of their obligation to the English, effectually confuted, by gratefully acknowledging their tender usage of them, and confessing that their lives were entirely owing to the forcible interposition of the English General.

Humanity
of the
English.

Nazirzing had in his army a body of 3,000 men under the command of one Morarow, a kind of freebooters, and ready to execute any desperate service. Having completed his victory over the forces of his native enemies, he the same

A. D.
1752.

M. Du-
pleix's
plot.

night dispatched this corps in pursuit of M. d'Auteuil, whom he overtook and obliged him with great loss to hasten his march into Pondicherry.

From this moment M. Dupleix, convinced he should never be able to carry his point, against the English and their friendly Indians, by a superiority in the field, determined to try the success of intrigue, and the basest treachery. He engaged Muzapherzing to make an insidious submission to Nazirzing, that he might be always at hand to facilitate the intended conspiracy against the Vice Roy's life; which M. Dupleix looked upon to be the greatest obstacle to his success. He also found means by fair promises of aid and great rewards, to gain Nazirzing's prime minister, and the Nabobs of Cadapah and Condanore, to be parties in the treason against their sovereign; while they amused the Vice Roy with flattering hopes of an accommodation by Ambassadors, sent with a public character, that they might more effectually concert measures with the chiefs of the conspiracy, at his court.

Means to
carry it
into execu-
tion.

The only thing the conspirators dreaded was the power of the English auxiliaries; Therefore means must be contrived to get rid of them: which the prime minister, the Vice Roy's favourite, undertook to bring about, without giving his master any suspicion of a design to weaken his army. He knew that the English could not be prevailed with, in such circumstances, to leave their settlements and frontier bounds exposed to their enemy's force; which would be the case, provided they should

follow

A. D.
1752.

follow his master's army to Arcot. He therefore, so wrought upon his master's passions, that determined him to take the rout of that city, and to leave the English under a necessity to return home,

At Arcot the court was so conducted, as to gratify his passions for women and hunting, and to take away his attention from business, and the designs plotted against him. In which state of security the Vice Roy was kept, till roused by fresh hostilities, which attacked the corps of Morarow, and put them to rout; and surprized the fortress of Trividy, only 16 miles west from Fort St. David.

A new requisition was made by Nazirzing for a detachment of English from Fort St. George; who marched under the command of Captain Cope: but the Vice Roy poisoned by his prime minister, treated them with such indifference and prevarication, that they, for want of pay, were soon obliged to separate from his army, commanded in chief by the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn. As soon as the departure of the English was known, the French and their allies attacked the Nabob's camp, and gained a complete victory; the Nabob himself escaping with great difficulty. This victory was followed with the surrender of the strong town of Gingee. The conspirators improved this loss so pathetically, as to make it an argument for Nazirzing to take the field in person to oppose the progress of his enemies. Thus under the pretence of recovering Gingee, and chastising his enemies, they brought the Vice Roy,

A. D.
1752.

The plot
executed.

before that town, in the teeth of the French and their allies, encamped under the cover of the guns on the ramparts. The tragical scene here began. The French had agreed to attack that part of the camp occupied by the two traitorous Nabobs; and their troops had instructions to make no resistance. The Nabobs had also personally engaged, on their part, to assassinate their Sovereign Nazirzing, at his first appearance on the alarm. The attack was no sooner begun, but the two Nabobs made directly for Nazirzing's tent, and meeting him, as he came out, intreated him to mount his Elephant, and hasten to punish the rebels. But whilst the credulous and unfortunate Prince was preparing to follow their advice, one of them stabbed him with a poinyard, and the other shot him with a pistol. His head was immediately severed from his body, fixed upon a spear, and carried to his competitor Muzapherzing, whom the murdered Prince had brought with him, as a state prisoner; and whom the rebels, taking the advantage of the confusion and panic of the army, placed upon the Elephant prepared for the deceased, and proclaimed him Vice Roy of the Deckan, without any material opposition; every friend of his country endeavouring to provide for his own safety, at a time they did not know, who were to be trusted. While the natives were thus employed, the French pushed forward to Nazirzing's tents, where they found vast riches in money and jewels; out of which they raised immense fortunes; but none so great

as M. Dupleix's; who from this time looked upon himself to be the richest subject in Europe. And such was his ambition, that in memory of this massacre he caused a town to be built upon the spot, called *Dupleix Fatea bat*, the place of victory.

A. D.
1752.
How M.
Dupleix
got im-
mense
riches.

The consequences of this success to the French were most extraordinary. The government of Arcot, with its dependencies, was given to their fast friend Chunda Saib, and Dupleix himself was associated by the new Vice Roy to share the government with him.°

His Power.

Nothing seemed now to stand in the way of the French scheme of superiority, but the escape of Mahomed Allee Cawn, who, at the first hearing of the assassination, made the best of his way, without any attendants, and got safe to Trichinopoly; imploring the aid of the English, who sent him a strong detachment under Captain Cope. By this assistance Trichinopoly was defended, this whole year: and by another detachment of about 300 Europeans and 500 Sepoys, officered by gentlemen, that had never been employed in a military capacity, under the command of Captain Clive, the city of Arcot, the capital of the province, was surprized on the 1st of September. This was made more glorious by the defence of their conquest; in a siege of two months by a large army, and conducted by European engineers. At last the town was assaulted in breach, in three different places; but Clive's little garrison beat the enemy

Captain
Clive's he-
roic acti-
ons begun.

° January 1751.

A. D.
1752.

off with considerable loss; and the Captain taking advantage of their confusion, sallied out, and following the blow, took all their cannon and levelled their trenches: Being immediately reinforced with a detachment from Trichinopoly, he pursued the French and their allies till he gave them a total overthrow at Cauverypauk, in the month of March 1752, and did not halt till he had reduced the Forts of Timery, Cauverypauk, Aranie and Conjeveram.

The conspirators
disagree
and quarrel.

But this was not the only mortification of the enemy. The two Nabobs, that assassinated Nazirzing, thinking themselves neglected in the distribution of rewards, and growing jealous of the power of the French and their connection with Muzapherzing, mutined in their march to Aurenghabad, the usual residence of the Princes of the Deckan; and though not strong enough to master the French, who consisted of 600 Europeans, 3,000 Sepoys and a large train of artillery under the command of M. Buffy, charged with a commission to place Muzapherzing in possession of his new acquired Vice Royship; they fell upon the flank of Muzapherzing's troops, defeated them and killed Muzapherzing himself; with a great loss of their own party and the life of the Nabob of Condanore, one of Nazirzing's murderers.

From this time the war was continued with various success. The French and their allies, attempting to prevent Colonel Lawrence's entrance into Trichinopoly, were severely handled, and obliged to retreat, and soon after to surrender prisoners of

war

war to the said officer, who took measures, when reinforced, to cut off the enemy's communication with the country, from whence they were supplied with provision. They were commanded by Mr. Law, and according to Mr. Dupleix's account were 20,000 in all, including 600 Europeans, Topasses and Coffrees.

This was followed with the surrender of the post of Elmiseram, after a faint resistance. But the French having, by a false report of a large convoy of stores to be on a certain day at Outatour, about 15 miles from a Pagoda, where Mr. Clive had taken post, drawn out that active officer with the chief part of his men, in expectation to surprize it; they, advised of his march, detached a considerable number from their army, with orders to march after dark, and to make their attack on the party left for defence of the Pagoda, at day light. Captain Clive not finding at Outatour any advice of a convoy, as reported, suspected the report as it was really intended; and therefore after refreshing his men, returned with the utmost expedition, and regained his post at the Pagoda about eleven at night; no enemy appearing, his men went to rest, and himself retired to his Pallankeen. So that at four in the morning, when the French arrived before this post, they found all quiet; and ignorant of Captain Clive's return, they advanced, and by the help of deserters from the English, they deceived the guard left there in the morning; who having challenged them, and being answered

A. D.
1752.

Captain
Clive's
bravery,
danger and
success.

friends,

A. D.
1752.

friends, were not convinced of their mistake till the Sepoys began to fire.

The firing roused the garrison: Capt. Clive ran immediately to the place of action, and was so confused, at first, that he ran amongst the French Sepoys, who were pushing into the Pagoda, and, thinking they were endeavouring to skreen themselves from an attack, reprimanded them in their country language, demanding what they were firing at. A French officer cut at him with his sword; but Mr. Clive closing with the Frenchman, received the blow from him so near the hilt, that it did no execution: and one of his own Sepoy officers, coming accidentally to his relief, cut the French officer down.

Captain Clive thus providentially saved and disengaged, hurried in search of his own men, and found them under arms. But the French had got possession of the post. He then formed his detachment, marched to the Pagoda, and after summons to surrender, which the French rejected, he prepared to storm it. But the French made a sally, in which their officer was killed, with a few more: the rest surrendered at discretion. The Sepoys in the French interest, who remained without the Pagoda, endeavoured to escape by flight, but were pursued by the Marratta cavalry, and cut all to pieces.

The siege of Pitchunda was undertaken; and the garrison in three days surrendered themselves prisoners of war. A party^p of French, under

^p Thirty officers, five men, 300 sepoy, and 300 horse.

the

the command of M. D'Auteuil, were first driven by Captain Dalton from Outatour, which the French deserted in the night, and were made prisoners, with a large quantity of stores, at Volconda by Capt. Clive, on the 29th of March.

A. D.
1752.

Such a series of misfortunes, which had deprived the French allies of supplies both in provisions and money, determined great numbers of the Indian army in the French interest to come over to us. Amongst whom was one of their Generals, Coop Saib, with a thousand horse, a large body of Sepoys and fourteen elephants. Even Chunda Saib, the grand partizan of the French, was so dispirited, as to throw himself into the hands of our allies; who thinking it unpolitic to let such a dangerous man go out of their possession, but not agreeing to whose care he should be committed, some of Monagee's, the King of Tanjore's General's people, cut off his head⁹, unknown to the English commander.

French deserted by some of their allies.

Capt. Law, who defended Seringham, surrendered by capitulation to the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn, on the same day Chunda Saib was decolated, and Captain Dalton took possession of that town, in which he found 30 pieces of cannon, ten of which were 18 and 12 pounders, the rest field pieces; two large mortars, a number of cohorns, and a great quantity of ammunition, and all kinds of warlike stores.

M. Dupleix was not easily cast down. His pride supported him, and at the same time, says

M. Dupleix's conduct.

⁹ On the 3d of June, 1752.

my

A. D.
1750.

my author's, his mind was full of resources. The injustice of his cause never disturbed him; and provided he could gain his ends, the means never gave him any concern. His council was chiefly composed of his own creatures, who never disputed what he proposed. He was married to a woman, endowed with as much spirit, art and pride, as himself; born in the country, mistress of all the low cunning peculiar to the natives, and well skilled in their language.

At the season Law was obliged to surrender, the ships from Old France arrived with a large reinforcement; which, as it indicated the hostile intentions of the French court, encouraged M. Dupleix to proceed with the utmost vigour to execute their grand project of dominion. And that he might not want a pretence for his hostile conduct, which ceased with the life of Chunda Saib, lately beheaded, Dupleix raised up another Pretender to the province of Arcot; and that he might seem to have an unbounded right to appoint, whom he pleased, he gave out that the Mogul had sent him commissions, declaring him Governor of all this part of the Carnatick, from the river Kristnah to the sea. Which was a mere forgery.

Usurped
power.

The young Pretender was Raja Saib, the son of Chunda Saib; but this youth having neither money, nor interest with his country-people, was soon obliged to resign his Nabobship to the Governour of Velloure, whom Dupleix, by virtue of

* Col. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 41.

his

his pretended commissions from the Mogul, raised to that dignity for a valuable consideration in money. But after trusting Dupleix with three lack of rupees, not finding any effect likely to ensue to his own advantage from a mere title, he stopt his hand.

A. D.
1752.

The French forces were now considerably augmented, not only by the reinforcements from Europe, but by pressing all the sailors from the China ships, that touched at Pondicherry, committing their navigation to Lascars. Our force was rather upon the decline. Nevertheless the Governour of Madras concerted the siege of Gingee; a strong place by art and nature, on the west of Pondicherry, well garrisoned and well provided; besides being most difficult of access amongst mountains well fortified: which ended in a repulse, with considerable loss of men and officers. Major Kinner, who commanded the detachment, was wounded, and died of a fever and flux, before he was recover'd of his hurt.

Siege of
Gingee
concerted,
and mis-
carries.

This advantage so puffed up the French Governour, that he order'd all his forces to take the field, and to march close to the bounds of Fort St. David. Which motion alarmed the English. The troops in St. David's were order'd to encamp without the walls, and Capt. Schaul's company of Swiss were sent from Madras in boats; but were intercepted by a ship sent by M. Dupleix, carried into Pondicherry, and there detained prisoners of war, in open violation of the peace between England and France.

M. Du-
pleix's or-
ders to seize
English
troops.

* In August 1752.

Such

A. D.

1752.

Conduct of
the English
on that oc-
casion.

Such an open hostility only served to animate the English; as it made the French principals in the Indian war, and would justify our more vigorous operations against their forces. General Lawrence took the field before St. David's on the 7th of August with 400 Europeans, 1700 Sepoys, 4000 of the Nabob's troops and nine pieces of cannon. The French army, commanded by M. de Kerjean, nephew of M. Dupleix, consisted of 400 Europeans, 1500 seapoys and 500 cavalry, encamped at Trichanky Pagoda; who being so near, as to discover our preparations for an attack, stole away in the night to Bahoor; and, seeing themselves pursued, they retreated to Villanour, within three miles of Pondicherry. But, finding it impossible to force them to an action, unless he should follow them into their own bounds, which he had no orders to do, the English Commander had recourse to a stratagem, to decoy the French back again, with a supposition, that his retreat from their bounds was a token of fear and want of courage: and accordingly M. Dupleix swallowed the bait, and by a peremptory order obliged his nephew to pursue the English to Bahoor, two miles from fort St. David, and to risque a battle.

Defeat the
French.

This was just what the English Commander wanted; who on the 26th of August at two in the morning, got under arms, and march'd up to the enemy's camp, and advanced firing; the French standing their ground, till our bayonets met. Then our grenadiers push'd with such fury, that the

the French threw down their arms and ran for it, leaving the English masters of the field, all their baggage, eight pieces of cannon, and all their ammunition, tumbrils and stores, with the loss on our side of one officer killed, four wounded, and 78 men killed and wounded.

A. D.

1752.

This victory was followed by the surrender of fort Covelong, about 16 miles S. of Madras, and fort Chengalaput, about 40 miles from that settlement; which, tho' exceeding strong, almost encompassed by a morass and surrounded with two walls, whose ramparts are 16 feet thick, a wet ditch fenced with stone sixty feet wide, quite round the outward fort, and another half round the inner, surrendered on the first of August, to a small party commanded by Capt. Clive.

Its consequences.

In Europe the countenance with which the court of Spain tolerated the seizure, and search of British ships in the West Indies; and the notorious advantage given to the French trade in Spain, in preference to the English; and the diligence, with which the navy of Spain was order'd to be increased; exemplified of how great power the influence of the French was, at that time, in the court of Spain; and that the Spanish ministry were resolved, sooner or later, to join all their force with France against Great Britain, should matters end in a rupture between those crowns, and France stand in need of the navy and treasure of Spain, as the event has shewn, to extricate her from the arms of the conqueror.

Conduct of Spain towards Great Britain.

Every

A. D.

1752.

Barbarities
of the
guardacof-
tas.

Every packet, from the West Indies and our plantations, brought fresh accounts of the obstruction our commerce, in those parts, met with from the Spanish guarda costas, which had been civil for a while. These arm'd vessels swarm'd on the coast of Coracoa, and in the summer 1752 took all vessels, that fell in their way, without respect of persons, amongst which was a sloop belonging to Coracoa coming from Aruba^t. John Gasney, master of the ship Eagle of Boston, sailed from Port Royal in Jamaica on the 20th of May 1750, bound for Coracoa in ballast and five negroes; but meeting with tempestuous weather, violent squalls and tornados, with calms and a strong current westward, was forced to the leeward of the island of Ratan, where he fell in with a Spanish half galley of eight guns and sixty-five men, and a sloop of eight guns and seventy men, commanded by Don Pablo Gracia Tolon, who fir'd four shot thro' his sails and rigging, and order'd him immediately to lie too, and go on board of his sloop, or he would board him and cut him and his people to pieces. The master, furnished with proper papers to shew he was upon a lawful trade, complied with the Don's commands. But was detain'd on board the Spaniard in a hostile manner: and while he was kept under arrest, the Spaniards seized his boat, went on board the Eagle, then eight leagues from the shore; robb'd and plunder'd the ship's stores and provisions; broke locks and chests, and in a wanton and ma-

^t By letter from New York, Sept. 23, 1751.

licious

licious manner tore and destroyed every thing, that did not seem of service to them". But this was mild treatment compared with the case of Patrick Roney of the ship Diamond, who in his voyage from Port Royal in Jamaica to Charles town in South Carolina, was brought to, and boarded, off Cape Nicholas, by a Spanish sloop; carried into Cape Nicholas Mole; rummaged, plundered of 3000 l. in money, and after being obliged, by threats to have his ears cut off, to sign a paper he did not understand, was put on board a schooner and sent to Jamaica". A letter, dated July 16, this same year, from Providence in North America, relates, That the Cool from Jamaica to cape Fear, was arrived there in distress, occasioned by her ill usage from a Spanish guarda costa, which brought her to; in the windward passage, and after a strict search, finding no money on board, the Spaniards were so exasperated, that they used the people with such cruelty, that there were only three men able to stand the deck; which obliged them to steer for Providence, to get able hands to carry the vessel to the northward. All which depredations were approved of by the Spanish court.

In Spain itself our merchants in vain insisted upon the privilege of being treated with the same regard, as was paid to the most friendly nations

Behaviour
in Spain
to British
merchants.

^a John Gasney's deposition at Kingston in Jamaica.

^w As appears by the oaths of Patrick Roney, John Holt, and Francis Welsh, sworn before Thomas Hibbert, at Kingston in Jamaica, 11th of January 1752.

A. D.
1752.

settled in her sea-ports, or elsewhere. For, advantageous tariffs were made with France, and the British commerce was loaded with so much more at the custom-house, as enabled our chief rival in trade to under-sell our manufactures and goods in the Spanish markets.

The
strength of
the Spanish
navy.

The appointments for the marine, and the measures pursued for making it respectable, promised, in a short time, to fulfil their wishes. In 1752 it was confidently given out that the Spanish navy, before the end of the winter would consist of 64 ships, from 60 guns and upwards, and 28 frigates.

Naval pre-
parations
in France.

The naval preparations were carried on in France with so much diligence and vigour, that, at Rochelle, it was denied a private English gentleman the request to view the great dock at that port, in which only there laid, in the winter 1751, fifty sail of men of war and frigates, besides several ships of force upon the stocks.

These accounts, it might be thought, should have awakened the British ministry; to take into consideration the actual state of the naval forces of France and Spain, and the continual attention of those powers to augment their marine, which could not possibly be intended against any other nation, than Great Britain. Besides the French troops, ordered for the year 1753, which together made 211,755 men, discovered their hostile intentions.

A. D.
1753.

Yet, his Majesty at the opening of the parliament, on the eleventh day of January 1753, informed them, by a speech from the throne, "That all

all his views and negotiations had been calculated and directed to preserve and secure the duration of the general peace." And added, "That he had the satisfaction to be assured of a good disposition in all the powers, that were his allies, to adhere to the same salutary object."

A. D.
1753.

The
King's
speech.

But as it could not be hid, that a war was unavoidable, and that this nation was at the very eve of a rupture, with her most formidable enemy, the address did not pass in the House of Commons, without some severe animadversions on the inconsistency of the speech, with the real state of affairs in Europe; nor without many spirited declamations against French perfidy and continental connections.

How received.

But, so little regard was paid by the ministry to the apprehensions of the nation, alarmed by the measures pursued by France and Spain; in defiance of the late treaty, that our forces by sea and land were continued in the low state of the preceding year. However, the parliament provided for the maintenance of Nova Scotia and Georgia, for the support of the castles on the coast of Guinea, and for erecting a new fort at Anamaboe, where the French last year had attempted, and threaten'd to return and to make a settlement.

Conduct of
the ministry.

Parliamentary
supplies.

In the course of this year the French ordered crosses and copper-plate inscriptions, fastened upon large posts, to be erected on the West Indian islands, not already settled by Europeans, con-

French
practices to
keep up
their pre-
tensions to
the Neutral
Islands.

* 94,615l. 12s. 4d.

7 16,000l.

G 2

taining

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Conduct of
the English
on this oc-
casion.

taining the French King's arms, and these words,
"A Continuation of the Possession of Lewis XIV.
King of France 1753." Which being discovered
on Turk's island, Caicos and Haneaga, by Cap-
tain Julian Legge, of his Majesty's ship Shore-
ham, he cut them all down, and brought them
away: and lest the French should misuse the Ber-
mudians, who were on those islands, when they
should find the marks taken away, he left the fol-
lowing declaration at each place; "To prevent
"any violence being used to any of the people
"who live on Grand-key, Salt-key or Seal-key,
"it is thought proper to leave this declaration,
"that we cut down the arms of the most Chris-
"tian King, and the crosses that were set up as
"marks of possession upon the said islands, and
"carried the same away, pursuant to instructions
"for so doing: and further, That his Britannic
"Majesty will not suffer any marks of possession
"to be put up on any of the keys or islands
"known by the name of Turk's-islands."

British
commis-
saries reply
to the
French
memorial
concerning
Nova Sco-
tia.

On the 23d of January 1753. the English com-
missaries delivered their reply to a long, tedious
and fallacious memorial of proofs produced by
the commissaries of his most Christian Majesty
on the 4th of October 1751. In this reply they,
in general, accuse the French of going into a va-
riety of considerations, not immediately connected
with the point in discussion, and of an attempt to
puzzle the debate by a confused method of di-
viding and arranging their materials. And, in
particular, they in the first place protest against
the

the leading principle in the discussion laid down by the French commissaries, That because the peace of Utrecht ceded the country of Nova Scotia or Acadia to Great Britain, therefore no additional lights and evidence are to be brought from acts of government, treaties between two nations, or similar cessions of the same territory, previous to the treaty of Utrecht, to clear up and enforce the true meaning and real intention of that treaty.

Then they proceed to shew, That the design of the crown of Great Britain, in the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, was not to secure an exclusive fishery, but to gain possession of all Acadia or Nova Scotia, as a territory that would give strength and intireness to the British settlement in North America²: and that the commissaries of his most Christian Majesty, by treating the object of the twelfth article concerning the territory of Acadia, and the thirteenth article concerning the fishery as one, they restrain the sense of one part of these articles by confounding it with the other; first misrepresenting the views of Great Britain at the time of the treaty, and afterwards supporting their misconstruction of the words of the treaty by the help of that very misrepresentation.

But for as much, as the French commissaries accuse the English of producing evidences foreign to the question, in proof of their interpretation of the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, concerning the antient limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia, they appeal to, and shew from the treaty of

² See Memorials, vol. I. p. 244, &c.

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St. Germain's, by which this same country was, with its antient limits, restored to France, that England then ceded the very same territory, and within the same limits, as now they claim under the title of the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht. They also refer to the treaty of Breda, where the crown of France made the very same claim upon Nova Scotia or Acadia, as Great Britain now does, and supported it upon the very same method of argument, and sort of proof, which Great Britain now alledges, and which the French commissaries now condemn as foreign to the question.

The French commissaries threw out several insinuations, as if the King of Great Britain had no intention to come to any accommodation, for the mutual advantage of the subjects of the two crowns, inhabiting countries so distant from their respective sovereigns: And that this claim, founded on the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, discovers an inclination in Great Britain to open a way to Canada, that she might seize it on the first favourable opportunity.

The sincerity of his Britannic Majesty in this negotiation.

The English commissaries reply, " That his Britannic Majesty was fully sensible of the expediency and extreme satisfaction, that would arise to the subjects of both crowns in North America, from a final ascertainment of the boundaries of their respective dominions: that he was also extremely desirous of strengthening and perpetuating the present peace and good

^a Ibid. p. 249.

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" correspondence, which subsists between the two
 " crowns, and of promoting, by every method in
 " his power, the amicable settlement of every
 " matter in dispute between them; but then the
 " more important that interest is which his Ma-
 " jesty hath in this question, and the more re-
 " mote his subjects in America are from his per-
 " son, and the immediate residence of his govern-
 " ment, the more necessity does he judge it to
 " be, to maintain his actual rights, and to pre-
 " serve his just dominions in America intire, for
 " the encouragement, advantage and security of
 " those very subjects; and that his Majesty had
 " given the strongest proofs of his willingness to
 " take proper measures in concert with France
 " for adjusting all differences, when he acceded
 " to the present negociation, and continued to
 " act, to that moment, according to the strictest
 " justice and candour, when he claimed no other
 " possession of Nova Scotia or Acadia in conse-
 " quence of the treaty of Utrecht, than the crown
 " of France actually enjoyed by the treaty of
 " Breda, making the claim of France in conse-
 " quence of that treaty, and the possession of
 " France in consequence of that disputed claim, the
 " rule and boundary of his own pretensions.^b"

As to the insinuation of Great Britain's hostile
 designs against Canada; the commissaries " ap-
 " peal to the late counsels and measures of Great
 " Britain, and the part she has acted both in Eu-
 " rope and America: in many instances the pro-
 " tectress, but in none the invader of the rights

Had no
 hostile de-
 sign against
 Canada.

^b Ibid. p. 254, &c.

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of other nations, and who has never, at any juncture, or in any instance broke in upon the possessions of France in America, contrary to the laws of peace, and to the faith of strictest alliance and friendship." And then very sensibly and justly observe, "That the rights of one nation are not to be determined upon the apprehensions of another: nor is Great Britain to have her possession of Nova Scotia or Acadia narrowed or pared down to the idea of the French commissaries, and reduced to the south-east part of the peninsula, merely because, if fully possessed and improved by Great Britain, it might give umbrage to the French settlements in Canada. Which would be to make Great Britain to hold this country by a still more precarious and barren tenure, not even by the treaty of Utrecht, as the French commissaries themselves explain it; but by the comparative state of the French colonies in North America."

The French commissaries charge the English of having possessed themselves of Acadia in 1629 and 1654, times of full peace. This, say the English commissaries, was owing to a want of attention to the history of those times. For, England declared war against France in 1627, which continued to the year 1632. And it is well known that Cromwell treated France, and looked upon her, as an open enemy from the year 1652 to 1655.

^c See Memorials, vol. I. page 237.

^d Ibid. p. 259. See also Lettre de M. d'Entrades, vol. I. p. 289. Bataille Annales des Provinces Unies, p. 352.

The

The first proof produced against our claim is from certain maps of Acadia, which the French commissaries presume to say are all on their side. In reply, it is urged, that this kind of evidence, in the case before us, is very inconclusive: but nevertheless that it may be proper, *ad rem*, to observe that the most ancient map extant of this territory, published by Escarbot in 1609, does not so much as mention the name of Acadia; therefore can't be produced in evidence by either party. But the map, which followed this in 1615, printed in the fourth volume of Purchas's Pilgrim; and is the first ancient map that has the marks of knowledge and correctness in it, gives both the boundaries of every territory within it, and the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia, in every particular, contrary to the description of that country by the French commissaries: and therefore confutes the system of the court of France, so far as the authority of one map goes.

Having supported this part of their reply by the maps of Laet in 1633, under the title of *Indiæ occidentalis Tabula Generalis*: Of Berry, intitled, *North America divided into its principal Parts*, in King Charles II's time: Of Morden's *English Empire on the Continent of America*, in the same reign: Of Thornton, intitled, *A New Chart of the Sea Coast of Newfoundland, New Scotland, New England, &c.*^a; which coincide with the

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Answer to
their proofs
from maps.

^a See Memorials, vol. I. p. 269.

^r Ibid. p. 271.

^s Ibid.

^b Ibid.

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ancient limits demanded by Great Britain; and by four French maps¹ published by De Lisle, Bellen and d'Anville, which confine the country of New France to the north side of the river of Canada, and mark out the limits between Acadia and New England to the westward according to the claim of his Britannic Majesty; and the fourth by Champlain, which carries Acadia beyond the Peninsula, and makes Pantagoet the western boundary of it; they further say, That Hennepin in his travels marks Acadia on the continent, between New England and the river St. Lawrence: That de Fer² the French King's geographer, in his Atlas, makes Nova Scotia and Acadia one and the same country; extending it to Canada northwards, and assigning the same extent of limits to them both; terminating the western limit at the river Pantagoet: and that Gerdreville³ in his Atlas makes Acadia to extend from the Kennebec to the island called Persee at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence.^m

Then having shewn what little authority the maps of Mr. Halley, Popple and Salmon are of,ⁿ the English commissaries conclude this part of the argument with the following observations: ° That the more ancient maps absolutely contradict and destroy the idea, which the French commissaries have of the ancient limits of Acadia: that there

¹ See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 271.

² A. D. 1705.

³ A. D. 1719.

^m See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 275.

ⁿ Ibid.

° Ibid. p. 281.

is not a single map to be found, not even amongst the French maps, which does not expressly confute the main and essential part of the system of the French commissaries: That though they do not exactly mark out the antient limits, as the commissaries of his Britannic Majesty contend for them, yet every map is a distinct and clear answer to the opinion of the French commissaries, as founded upon maps; because every map differs from their description of the antient limits, in some essential point, and all of them are inconsistent and irreconcilable with their general idea of them:—That many antient and modern maps in different countries support the claim of his Britannic Majesty, but no one can be found to authenticate in any degree, or in any one particular, the pretensions of France. ^p

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The second authority, produced by the French commissaries in this case, is taken from Denys, Champlain and Escharbot, historians of North America.

To which the English commissaries reply with a previous observation, That their adversaries have cited these authors in a very uncommon and broken manner; and that the proof pretended to be drawn from these authors are founded upon general observations on their title pages, on marginal notes found in their works, and incorporated into them by the French commissaries; frequently on single expressions detached from the context,

From historians.

^p See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 283.

and

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and sometimes upon the mere omissions of the name of Acadia, rather than upon the full and entire sense of any passage in these writers fully and satisfactorily cited. By which means books may be made to carry any appearance. They then proceed and examine each of these historians by taking every paragraph in question entire; and having gone through each author distinctly, they sum up their evidence in these words: "We have now examined all the French historians cited by his most Christian Majesty's commissaries to establish their system of the ancient limits of Acadia, and we think ourselves authorized to say, from this view of their several works, that the Sieur Deny's commission in 1654, and that clause in particular which grants him the sedentary fishery on the coast of Acadia, marks out the southern bank of the river St. Lawrence, as the northern boundary of Acadia, and makes it extend as far to the west as New England: That Mr. Champlain agrees with the Sieur Denys in the northern limit of Acadia, and makes *Sainte Croix within the western limit of it*: That Ascarbot never assigns any limits to Acadia, or even mentions the country: And that, therefore, one of the only two historians, from which any evidence at all can be collected, is a very full evidence in support of the whole claim of Great Britain; and the other by assigning the southern bank of the river St.

¹ See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 283.

² Ibid. p. 285.

" Lawrence

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"Lawrence, as the northern, is authority also for
 "the western boundary we assign as far as *Ste.*
Groix; and both confute the assertion of the
 "French commissaries, That these writers con-
 "fined the bounds of Acadia to the Peninsula,"

The French commissaries have recourse to a
 proof founded upon this circumstance, That sever-
 al parts of the country, which his Britannic Ma-
 jesty claims as Acadia, have always passed under
 distinct names. A method of proof calculated
 rather to confound than to confute: however the
 English commissaries put even this prolix and con-
 fused kind of evidence upon a thorough and dis-
 tinct examination: and having refuted each par-
 ticular, conclude, "That there is no real weight
 "in that argument founded upon the particular
 "names, which particular parts of Acadia have
 "borne different from the general country: And
 "that *New France* has from very early times been
 "the name given by the French writers, the
 "people and crown of France, to the French
 "territory in North America."

Then they enter into a particular examination
 into the state of the history of Acadia and the re-
 volutions it underwent from the year 1632, the
 date of the treaty of St. Germain, to the treaty
 of Utrecht: and upon the whole conclude their
 reply in this summary way: "All the evidence
 "brought by the French commissaries, in support

The sum
 of this ar-
 gument.

* See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 325, &c.

p. 327 to p. 399.

p. 399 to 521.

† Ibid. from

" Ibid. p. 395.

" Ibid.

" of

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“ of their system, has been demonstrated to be
 “ destructive to it, and applied in the strongest
 “ manner in maintenance of the claim of Great
 “ Britain. And it appears upon the whole, that
 “ the King of Great Britain, bringing no evi-
 “ dences from sources, that are not authentic, is
 “ supported in his claim by every transaction be-
 “ tween the two crowns for above a century past ;
 “ and that in claiming the country from Pantagoet
 “ to the River St. Lawrence, as Acadia, his Bri-
 “ tannic Majesty demands no more than what
 “ France has always received under that name in
 “ the most general restitution ; than what, if the
 “ antient limits of it be determined upon maps,
 “ historians, the uniform decisions of the two
 “ crowns for above one hundred years together,
 “ and upon the declarations of the crown of
 “ France at the treaty of Utrecht itself, the
 “ crown of France must in all equity and fairness
 “ acknowledge to be a just claim upon the words
 “ of *cession* in the treaty of Utrecht.”

“ The French commissaries, on the contrary,
 “ are equally incapable of supporting their system
 “ and their limits upon the maps and historians
 “ they cite, and upon the proceedings of govern-
 “ ment, treaties and better evidence produced by
 “ us. They dare not abide by any possession ever
 “ taken by France in consequence of the most
 “ general words of restitution ; nor by the pos-
 “ session of France for above an hundred years
 “ successively ; nor by any declarations made by
 “ the crown of France at the time of the treaty
 “ of

“ of Utrecht ; but setting aside all these evidences,
 “ taken from times of certainty and preciseness,
 “ they are obliged to have recourse to maps and
 “ historians of less certainty in point of time, and
 “ less preciseness from the nature of them : both
 “ which, when they come to be strictly examined,
 “ absolutely destroy their system, fall in with the
 “ sense and operation of the better and latter evi-
 “ dence of treaties and transactions between the
 “ two crowns, and become so many auxiliary
 “ proofs in support of the claim of the crown of
 “ Great Britain.”*

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Here rested the argument upon the claim of his
 Britannic Majesty upon Acadia or Nova Scotia,
 according to the antient boundaries of that coun-
 try, ceded by France in the treaty of Utrecht, and
 demanded by the English commissaries, as set forth
 in the premises.

It was the latter part of the year 1754 before the
 French commissaries delivered their reply to the
 British memorial concerning the title of his Bri-
 tannic Majesty to the island of St. Lucia : spun
 out to such a length, as to prevent the amicable
 decision of that point by a clear and just examina-
 tion of the matter it contained ; for the French
 court had now so far entered into hostile measures,
 to defeat the strength of the most convincing
 evidence in favour of his Britannic Majesty's
 right, that the British commissaries were obliged
 to break up the conferences, and to return home,

French re-
 ply to the
 British me-
 morial con-
 cerning St.
 Lucia.

* See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 541, &c. See p. 50.

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before they had time to examine and confute the pretended proofs of his most Christian Majesty's claim; in which the French had employed the like arts of chicanery and cavil, as you have seen in the case of Nova Scotia or Acadia.

Their proceedings in North America on the Ohio.

M. du Quesne, who succeeded M. de la Jonquiere in the government of Canada, being charged with an immediate and vigorous execution of the expedition to subdue the country on the Ohio to the crown of France, detached the Sieur de St. Pierre early in the year 1753 with a sufficient force to make a lodgment and to maintain his ground on the river Beuf, or Beef river, till reinforced: which St. Pierre performed; and he built a fort upon the spot in honour to M. du Quesne. Such a disagreeable neighbour soon notified his accession by the outrages committed on the back settlements of Virginia and Philadelphia, and more particularly by cutting off the Indian trade, and seizing upon our traders and their goods.

A messenger dispatched from Virginia to the French at river de Beuf.

In October 1753 the Governor and council of Virginia, having orders from England to repel force by force, dispatched a messenger to examine the territory behind their settlement, and to explore the French encroachments and operations; who brought back an account, That there had been 1500 regular forces sent to those parts from Old France: That the French had built three forts upon the *Ohio*, on the lands lately granted to certain gentlemen in London, by the crown. That, as the French met with no opposition, they were resolved to maintain their ground. This

advice

advice concluded with observing, That unless means were used to drive off the French, and likewise forts built on the banks of the Mississippi by the English, the French would fortify themselves in such a manner, that it would not be in our power to expel them.

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This report made by the provincial messenger appeared of such an interesting nature to the crown of Great Britain, that Governor Dinwiddie immediately^z sent the following letter by Major George Washington to the French Commander in Chief, at the fort on the river Du Beuf.

S I R,

THE lands upon the river Ohio, in the western parts of the colony of Virginia, are so notoriously known to be the property of the crown of Great Britain, that it is a matter of equal concern and surprize to me, to hear that a body of French forces are erecting fortresses and making settlements upon that river, within his Majesty's dominions. The *many* and *repeated* complaints I have received of these acts of *hostility* lay me under the necessity of sending, in the name of the King my master, the bearer hereof, George Washington, Esq; one of the adjutants general of the forces of this dominion; to complain to you of the encroachments thus made, and of the injuries done to the subjects of Great Britain, in violation of the law of nations, and the treaties now sub-

Governor
Dinwid-
die's letter
to the
French
command-
er on the
river du
Beuf.

^z October 31, 1753.

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sisting

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sisting between the two crowns. If these facts be true, and you think fit to justify your proceedings, I must desire you to acquaint me, by whose authority and instructions, you have lately marched from Canada with an armed force, and invaded the King of Great Britain's territories, in the manner complained of; that according to the purport and resolution of your answer, I may act agreeably to the commission I am honoured with, from the King my master. However, Sir, in obedience to my instructions, it becomes my duty to require your peaceable departure; and that you would forbear prosecuting a purpose so interruptive of the harmony and good understanding, which his Majesty is desirous to continue and cultivate with the most Christian King, &c.

ROBERT DINWIDDIE.

Major
Washington's in-
structions and en-
quiries in
his jour-
ney to river
du Beuf.

Mr. Washington was also instructed to make a further and diligent enquiry into the French encroachments and designs. For this purpose, it appears by his journal on this occasion, that he travelled by the way of Fredericksburg, Winchester and Will's Creek, and thence to the mouth of Turtle Creek on the river Monongahela; where he was informed of the death of the French General in Chief in those parts; and of their troops returning into winter quarters.^a From thence he passed to the forts of the Ohio, about 10 miles distant, where the Monongahela is joined

^a It being the 22d of November.

by

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by the river Alligany. On the 25th of November he met with a few French deserters, from whom he got intelligence, That they were part of 100 men, sent with eight canoes laden with provisions, from New Orleans to Kuskaskas, with a promise of being joined there by an equal number of French from the Mississippi, to convoy them and their stores up the river. That the French had built four small forts, between New Orleans and the Black islands, garrisoned by 30 or 40 men, and a few small pieces of cannon in each. That at New Orleans, near the mouth of the Mississippi, there were 35 companies of 40 men each, with a fort of six carriage guns: And at Black islands,^b a fort with eight guns, and several companies. They also acquainted him, that there was a small pallisadoed fort on the Ohio, at the mouth of the Ouabach or Wabash;^c a river, which heads near the west end of Lake Erie, by which the French on the Mississippi, communicate with those on the Lakes.

With these deserters was an Indian trader, named Brown, who informed him further, that at Shanaoh town, he had met with a King of the *Six Nations*, from whom he learnt, That the French had built a fort on Lake Erie, and another on a small Lake, about 15 miles asunder, with a large waggon road between. That three nations of French Indians had taken the hatchet against the English. That the French had called all the

^b Distant 130 leagues above the mouth of the Ohio.

^c About 60 leagues from the Mississippi.

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Mingo's, Delawares, &c. together, and told them, that they had intended to be down the river, this fall, but were obliged by the inclemency of the season, to defer their march till the spring, when they would certainly come with a much greater number; and threatening them with military execution, in case they would not remain neuter: for that they expected to fight the English three years, and did not doubt of success, and of conquering all the lands on the Ohio.

Major
Washington's arrival at the French station, and reception.

Mr. Washington arrived at Verango, on the 4th day of December 1753, an old Indian town at the mouth of French Creek on the Ohio; where he found the French colours hoisted at a house, from which they had driven Mr. John Frazer, an English subject; and met with Captain Joncaire, who was the French Commander of the Ohio; who received him courteously, and referred him to the General Officer of the next fort with his letter. However Joncaire kept him at supper, and after the glass had passed about cheerfully, the French Captain told him, That it was their absolute design to take possession of the Ohio: And by G-- they would do it: For, though they were sensible the English could raise two men for their one, yet they knew their motions to be too slow and dilatory to prevent any undertaking of theirs; grounding the right of France to the river, upon a discovery made by one La Salle, about 60 years before: And agreeable to this conversation, they had seized all straggling English traders, and had orders to make every person prisoner, who attempted

attempted to trade on the Ohio, or the waters of it: and now the Commandant returned the following answer to the Governor's letter. A. D. 1753.

S I R,

A S I have the honour of commanding here in chief, Mr. Washington delivered to me the letter, which you wrote to the Commander of the French troops. I should have been glad, that you had given him orders, or that he had been inclined, to proceed to Canada to see our General; to whom it better belongs, than to me, to set forth the evidence and the reality of the rights of the King my master, to the lands situate along the river Ohio, and to contest the pretensions of the King of Great Britain thereto. I shall transmit your letter to the Marquis Duguisne, or du Quesne. His answer will be a law to me. And if he shall order me to communicate it to you, Sir, you may be assured, I shall not fail to dispatch it forthwith to you. As to the summons you send me to retire; I do not think myself obliged to obey it. Whatever may be your instructions, I am here by virtue of the orders of my General; and, I intreat you, Sir, not to doubt one moment, but that I am determined to conform myself to them with all the exactness and resolution, which can be expected from the best officer. I do not know that in the progress of this campaign, any thing has passed, which can be reputed an act of hostility, or, that is contrary to the treaties, which subsist between the two crowns; the continuation

The French commander's answer to Gov. Dinwiddie's letter.

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whereof as much interesteth, and is as pleasing to us, as the English. Had you been pleased, Sir, to have descended to particularize the facts, which occasioned your complaint, I should have had the honour of answering you in the fullest, and, I am persuaded, the most satisfactory manner, &c.

From the Fort Sur
la Riviere au
Beuf, Decem-
ber 15, 1753.

LE GARDEUR DE ST. PIERRE.

British
court com-
plains of
these hosti-
lities, with-
out effect.

These hostilities were also transmitted to the court of Great Britain: and the complaints against them were exhibited in a memorial by the Earl of Albemarle the British minister at Paris: but without any other effect, than delusive promises to curb and withdraw the causes of those complaints. And the British ministry still gave so much ear to those vain pretences and excuses, that they prevented his Majesty, at the opening of the parliament on the 15th of November 1753, from taking proper notice of the French conduct towards his American subjects; and permitted him to declare, "That the continuance of the public tranquillity, and the general state of Europe remained upon the same footing, as when they last parted; and assured them of his steadiness in pursuing the most effectual measures to pre-serve to his people the blessings of peace."

King's
speech.

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The Governor of Virginia was convinced otherwise; and endeavoured, with a true British spirit, to prevail with the Virginians, and his neighbouring governments, to arm in their own defence, and to erect a fort on the Forks, to curb the French

French encroachments, and to defend the British traders and property. But for want of a national countenance and succour, this scheme failed, and, instead of deterring the French from their designs, it served only as a means to provide them with arguments to make the native Indians jealous, and to oppose the English.

Governor Dinwiddie prevailed at last with his province to raise 10,000 l. and 300 men, to protect their frontiers: and the command of this small regiment was given to Mr. Washington, a brave and prudent young gentleman, who began his march on the 1st of May, and on the 28th came up with a party of the French, took 20 prisoners, killed ten, and put the rest to flight. Having learnt from his prisoners the real strength of the enemy in those parts, under the command of the Sieur de Contrecoeur, in chief on the Ohio, and informed by his scouts, that this Commander in Chief, informed of the advantage he had gained over the French party on the 28th, had sent the Sieur de Villers with 1000 French, and 200 Indians, to attack him, and dislodge him from a little fort he had run up, called Fort Necessity, as a temporary defence, and cover for his handful of men, till some troops, which had been promised to follow him from New York, might arrive; he made the best disposition possible for one in his circumstances, to maintain his post, and to beat off an enemy, if any such should attempt to disturb him. Which came to pass on the 3d of July, when the body of 1200 men above men-

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Colonel
Washington's
expedition.

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tioned marched up to the attack of his little camp and fort. The English were by this time, by one casualty or other reduced to 200; but they sustained the enemy's whole force for upwards of three hours. and laid 200 of the enemy dead in the field. So much resolution greatly discouraged the French; and put their General upon some less dangerous method of dislodging the English. Thus, at the time Colonel Washington expected nothing better than to be surrounded and put to the sword, the enemy called a parley; which ended in an honourable capitulation for the brave remains of our provincial troops; of whom 30 had been killed, and 70 wounded: The enemy had 300 killed and wounded. For our men behaved with singular intrepidity, determined not to ask for quarter, but with their bayonets screwed, to sell their lives, as dear as they possibly could.

Capitu-
lates,

His capitu-
lation,

The capitulation was, That each side should retire without molestation; and that the English army should march away with all the honours of war, and with stores, effects and baggage. But, after Colonel Washington had marched out of Fort Necessity, the Indians, whom the French had seduced from their allegiance to the King of Great Britain, attacked them, plundered their baggage, and made a great slaughter of the men, cattle and horses. And, when the French Commander was applied to, he pretended to be extremely concerned, drew his sword, and ran amongst the Indians; but, instead of using means to stop their breach of the capitulation, he encouraged

couraged them to plunder and murder the English.

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The importance and distress of our Provinces at this time, and the great neglect there was somewhere in England, to relieve and to support them against those violent measures, which the French executed with impunity, are well described in the following letter, wrote about this time, from Williamsburg to a merchant in London.

S I R,

I N the name of curiosity, what are you about in England? If we might judge of you by the rules of good sense and policy, I should imagine you to be in all the hurry of preparation for war: for, you will not surely suffer the most notorious and repeated violations of rights and treaties to go unrevenge'd. The French have long since, commenced actual hostilities against us here; have not only entred upon our territories *manu forti*, but have taken from us our forts, and strong holds, such as they were. In short, all our colonies are in the utmost hurry and confusion from the approaching danger. By this situation of our affairs, you, gentlemen merchants of the mother country, must expect to be in great measure affected with us: For, whilst we are sending our youth, to the repulsion of the enemy, and recovery of our frontiers, cultivation must be, and is, neglected: And without a full attention to our produce, how shall we be able to make the proper returns to England. What will really be the consequences

The importance and miserable state of the colonies.

A. D. 1754. sequences of these proceedings, God only knows. But certainly you ought not to be indifferent, as to the danger, because at present it is at a distance from you.

It requires not a very great degree of knowledge and judgment to comprehend, that on the security and prosperity of the colonies, depends the present flourishing condition of the mother country. The immense quantities of goods, which are annually imported into America from England, to the amount of some millions sterling; the greater number of shipping and hands employed in the exportation of them, make up, I doubt not, the most considerable part of your present trading interest; and by manufacturing the materials for this particular commerce, what number of individuals, nay families are wholly supported in England!—In short, Great Britain is chiefly indebted to us, that she makes so rich, so potent and respectable a figure in Europe. A truth that, however evident, we have reason to suppose, from the tenor of their past conduct, has not been so obvious to your ministry; or, in other words, to those in power, whose immediate duty it was to inform themselves concerning it.

It does not escape our notice here, how ready and generous England has been, and still is, to grant subsidies upon every paltry alarm, to some petty German Princes, to the tune of some hundreds of thousands, merely for the sake of preserving, as the ministers call it, the balance of power. How much has been done to preserve the
the

the balance of trade, or even our undoubted rights in America, let them declare, who know it. In short, and to tell the plain truth in few words, we are looked upon by your great men, as a subject too low for their sublime politics; by your country 'squires and coxcombs, as a set of transports and vagabonds; and by your boards, as unruly children, that want more to be corrected than encouraged. Thanks to their wisdom in taking so little care of our breeding!

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It has been for many years past, that the French have uninterruptedly been forming a force on the back of our colonies, from the Mississippi to Canada, by gaining over the Indians to their interest and erecting forts at proper distances, which might open a ready communication from north to south. They had a triple policy in this. (1.) That by securing the alliance of the Indians, they might engross the peltry and fur-trade. (2.) That by such a chain of forts and strength, they might not only prevent the extension of our colonies, but even straiten and distress them at pleasure. (3.) That by such an establishment and possession, they might be able to preserve the back parts of America by negotiation and treaty, whenever our ministry might be provoked to look into our rights; and take up the resolution of calling them to account for such a procedure.

As far as my observation has gone, it has ever been through negligence and negotiation, that Britain has, first, permitted her proper rights and
advant-

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advantages to become disputable, by suffering them to be invaded, without an immediate proper resentment: and after she has come to the resolution of asserting them, she has too easily condescended to a treaty; and at length been contented, or made satisfied, with a division. It is this kind of conduct, that I doubt we shall have more reason to be afraid of, hereafter, than we seem to be at present, least the ministry should not grant us a subsidy. For, after all the inconveniences which we must inevitably go through, after the great expences and losses we must actually suffer, as well in lives, as in matters of property, before we shall be able to regain our forts and frontiers; if there should be any composition made with the French, as to the lands on this side the Mississippi, it will be only protracting the evil day, and prove to be so much blood and treasure expended to little purpose. For how can our colonies be ever safe with a French enemy on their backs? Or, whilst such a danger is hanging over them, what security can be given to the industrious, that they shall reap the fruit of their own labours?

To conclude, we desire to be considered only as a petty German Prince, with relation to your liberality; but with respect to the rights of the British empire, and the rights of industrious subjects, we hope to be empowered and encouraged not only to assert, but to recover, to defend and enjoy them in their full and just extent, in spite of
of

of all the power, perfidy and stratagem of the French, and even of the devil himself, should he think fit to join them. I am, Sir, &c. &c.

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This feasonable and sensible representation, of the danger and importance of our American plantations, deserves a serious attention, as it contains many interesting remarks concerning the value of those provinces to the mother-country; the means of preserving and improving them, and the hazard this nation runs by every neglect to drive off encroachments, and by any composition or division of the lands behind those settlements; which were daily extending their limits, especially into the fertile and delightful country of the Twightees, inhabiting the plains on the Ohio; by a company of merchants at London. Who have obtained a grant from the crown to settle that tract of land under the protection of Great Britain, with an exclusive privilege of trading with the Indians on the banks of the river Ohio.

The Ohio
company
established
with an
exclusive
right.

This grant was made soon after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle: and it no sooner transpired, than the French Governor of Canada wrote to the Governors of New York and Pensylvania; giving them to understand, "That as the English inland traders had encroached on the French territories and privileges, by trading with the Indians under the protection of his Sovereign, he would seize them, wherever they should be found, if they did not immediately desist from that illicit practice." This menace not being regard-

Its effects
in regard
to the
French.

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1754.

regarded, he next year caused three British traders to be arrested. Their effects were confiscated and their persons sent, by the way of Quebec, to Rochelle in Old France, and there imprisoned: As already related more at large ^c.

In regard
to the In-
dians.

This grant produced another unlucky effect ^d. The new company not only neglected to gain the consent of the native Indians, on the back of the royal patent, which might have been done at a trifling expence, and what has been usual on like occasions; but they sent a person to survey their country in such a dark mysterious manner, as gave a people, naturally jealous, too much room for suspicion and discontent. Which disposed them to receive any overtures, with more willingness from the French, offered by way of protection. Besides, the jealousy of the Indians was greatly heightened by the traders from Pennsylvania and Virginia, who foresaw that they themselves would be great losers, in that valuable branch of traffic, from which they were to be excluded by the royal privilege of a new monopoly.

French
court's be-
haviour at
the com-
plaint a-
bout Fort
Necessity.

The action at Fort Necessity being transmitted to London; it was represented by the British Ambassador at Paris, as an open violation of the peace. Which did not meet with the same degree of respect, as on former occasions of complaint; the time now nearly approaching for the French to pull off the mask of moderation and peace. For, instead of disavowing the conduct

^c On page 44, &c.

^d Ibid.

of their American Commander, orders were expedited for reinforcements of men and ammunition to perfect their pernicious designs on that Continent.

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As all this could not be concealed from the British ministry, which was known to all the people; the nation murmured greatly at their supine inactivity; whose only care of that vast and important Continent amounted to no more than some cautionary instructions transmitted to the Governors of our provinces; and for them to unite in their own defence. The instructions ran thus; "It is his Majesty's command, that in case the subjects of any foreign Prince should presume to make any encroachments in the limits of his Majesty's dominions, or to erect forts on his Majesty's lands, or to commit any other act of hostility; and should, upon a requisition made to them to desist from such proceedings, persist in them, they should draw forth the armed force of their respective provinces, and use their best endeavours to repel force by force." The Governors were likewise ordered to form a political confederacy. And the Governor of New York was appointed to confer with the Chiefs of the Indians, and by presents, and other means, to keep them steady to the British interest.

Instructions sent to our Colonies to unite in one confederacy.

This, to be sure, was a desirable union, and a measure that, if effectually executed, might have answered the intention of preventing further encroachments; but, such is the bad policy of British subjects, that they, by their own contentions, fre-

How they were frustrated.

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1754.

frequently frustrate the best concerted measures. Thus, when unanimity and activity were most necessary, the national interest was neglected, and obliged to give way to the religious and political disputes of the Provinces. The assembly of Virginia quarrelled with Dinwiddie their Governor, about a fee he demanded for every grant he should pass for land. The Pensylvanian Representatives wasted their time in vain deliberations and violent disputes with their Proprietaries, while the enemy invaded their frontiers, and fortified themselves. New York was divided into factions by some men of property, but of turbulent spirits, who exerted their influence to distress the views and designs of the Government. A congress was appointed and held for that purpose at Albany, by Commissioners from all the British Provinces. But few Indians attended, and they behaved with so much indifference, that, though they accepted of the presents, renewed treaties, and demanded aid to drive the French from their territories, it appeared plainly, that they were gained over to the French interest, and thought the English would be obliged to deliver up their country to the French. Though they seemed to be very well pleased with their presents, which were much more considerable than ever had been known, they, in their speech to Mr. Lancey, Lieutenant-Governor of New York, spoke with great warmth, severely blaming the neglect and indolence of our nation, and in praise of the French for their diligence and care to fortify and maintain
their

Speech of
the Indians.

their garrisons, while the English left both their settlements and their allies exposed to invasion and destruction. They particularly recriminated upon us the desertion of our fort at Saraghtoga, in the last war; represented the defenceless condition of our frontier city of Albany; and concluded with seasonable and rational advice to defend ourselves, and to encounter the French with more spirit and conduct for the future.

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In this congress a plan was concerted, after long debates, for executing that salutary measure of a general union of the British colonies, and for creating a common fund to defray all military expences: and it was agreed to lay this plan before his Majesty and council; but, it was never carried into execution.

General union agreed upon.

During the sitting of this congress Mr. Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts bay prevailed with the assembly of his Province to build a strong fort near the head of the river Kennebeck, and to provide 800 men for that service, to protect the Province from the incursions of the French and Indians. In pursuance of this resolution of the assembly, Mr. Shirley, in the summer 1754, marched with the troops to the eastern frontier, and, with the consent of the Indians, built Fort Western, about 37 miles from the mouth of the river Kennebeck, and Fort Hallifax about 54 miles down the same river; of which proceedings when Governor Shirley transmitted an account to the ministry at home, he also represented the imminent danger to which Nova Scotia was exposed, from

Forts built, &c. by New York.

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1754.

Remon-
strances a-
bout Nova
Scotia.

the encroachments and fortifications of the French, which had extended themselves to the very neighbourhood of the English settlements; and from any sudden attack, which might easily be formed against that Province from St. John's Island, Cape Breton, and Canada.

Approved
of.

This remonstrance seemed to carry some weight: for Governor Shirley received not only the approbation of his Majesty and Council for the service he had performed on the river Kennebeck, but a command also to concert measures with Mr. Lawrence, Lieutenant-Governor and Commander in Chief of the Province of Nova Scotia, for attacking the French forts in that Province. But nothing could be done in this service till the next summer; except raising 2000 men in New England, and receiving 2000 stands of arms from London.

General
Braddock
appointed.

It was also resolved in his Majesty's Council to appoint a Generalissimo for the service of North America. This command was conferred on General Braddock, whose courage and military discipline had recommended him, as of ability for so great a trust. At the same time orders were issued for raising two regiments, of two battalions each, in North America, to be commanded by Sir William Pepperel and Mr. Shirley, and for the embarkation of Halket's and Dunbar's regiments of foot, to sail with all expedition with General Braddock for Virginia; but they did not get from Ireland till the 14th of January 1755.

Though

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1754.

Though it was not possible to fix upon any plan to unite the Provinces effectually, for their common safety under these perilous circumstances, the Governors and principal Planters repeated their representations to the ministry in England; of the bad state of their respective colonies, assuring them that they must inevitably fall a prey to the French invaders, if not speedily and powerfully assisted by their mother country. And posterity will review with astonishment the negligent remissness with which the British Ministry suffered the cause of those complaints to continue, and those valuable territories, which make so considerable a part of the British dominions, to remain in so exposed and defenceless a condition. All that can be urged to exculpate such a neglect, is the supposition; That the Provinces had a sufficient internal strength to defend themselves. But, this is a fallacious way of reasoning: for, though it be allowed, that the inhabitants of the British empire on the Continent of North America, exceeded the French and Canadians, at the rate of ten to one, it ought to be remembered also, that, while these provinces or governments continue in separate states, with separate interests, without any connection with one another, their strength is divided, and might, one after another, fall a prey to the combined force of the French, Canadians and Indians. However, though the Provinces might have done more at this time for their common defence, than they did, that is no excuse for the British ministry, who ought either to have

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compelled them to submit to such impositions, as the legislature might find necessary for their mutual interest in time of danger and war; or, to have protected them with regular forces sent from Europe.

In this they would only have imitated the enemy, who, by every ship to Louisbourg and Quebec, kept continually sending regular troops to encourage and to strengthen their subjects and allies. By these Col. Washington was defeated; and with the same force the French improved that defeat, by seizing all that fine country on the Ohio, and its branches.

The pacific
temper of
the court
of Spain.

Mr. Pitt's
conduct in
regard to
Spain de-
fended.

However, Spain seemed so much inclined, (upon the change of her ministry, this year, when the Marquis De la Ensenada was forced to resign to Mr. Wall) to maintain the peace with England, that the disputes about our cutting logwood in the bay of Honduras were amicably adjusted between the said Mr. Wall, the Spanish Prime Minister, and Sir Benjamin Keene, the British Ambassador. No wonder, therefore, that Mr. Pitt did afterwards treat the Franco-Spanish memorial, in which the cutting of logwood was pretended, amongst other grievances, to be a principal article to obstruct the pacific negotiations, then carrying on, between Great Britain and France, with the indignity such an after-claim deserved. And he had good reason, from such a change in the conduct of Mr. Wall towards Great Britain, to believe him frenchified, and to be seeking an opportunity to join the enemy of our country, under the

the specious pretence of maintaining the rights of his own nation; in a point they had already given up and adjusted.

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This year had not yet produced any remarkable alteration in the affairs of the northern powers, so as to affect the interest of Great Britain; though it was very certain, that no court in Europe, ever so obscure, had escaped the attention of France, and being tempted to adhere to her interest, either by promises, threats, or subsidies: And at the same time representing the complaints and measures of Great Britain, against their encroachments in America, in a most disadvantageous light.

Affairs in
the north.

In the East Indies, M. Dupleix, assuming the port and character of an Eastern Monarch, under his forged commission from the Mogul, continued the war, with all his power, to distress the British interest. But notwithstanding his riches, superiority of men, and connections with the natives, he could not, all this time, strike any effectual stroke against our settlements; but, on the contrary, was obliged to submit to many disappointments and rebuffs from the conduct and courage of our troops.

Affairs in
the East
Indies.

The British ministry, during this summer (1754) had managed the national affairs without the help of a Premier, which place was last vacated by the Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Esq; brother to the Duke of Newcastle, who departed this life in the beginning of March. And his Majesty, on the fourteenth day of November opened the parliament with informing them, " That the general

Death of
the Right
Hon. Hen-
ry Pelham
Esq;

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1754.
King's
speech.

“ state of Europe had undergone very little alter-
“ ation since their last meeting: That he had
“ lately received the strongest assurances from
“ his good brother the King of Spain of friend-
“ ship and confidence: That his principal view
“ should be to strengthen the foundation, and
“ secure the duration of a general peace; to im-
“ prove the present advantages of it for promoting
“ the trade of his good subjects, and *protecting*
“ *those possessions* [North America] which consti-
“ tuted one great source of their wealth and
“ commerce.

Remarks
thereon.

Supplies
granted.

Though his Majesty avoided mentioning the particular encroachments of France, in order to prevent debates upon the address, it is evident that he said enough to convince the nation, of his resolution to humble the insolence of that perfidious neighbour. Thus also was he understood by the parliament, which unanimously granted for the service of the ensuing year 4,073,729 l. of which one million was expressly given for augmenting the forces by sea and land. They also voted 32,000 l. subsidy to the King of Poland, and 20,000 l. to the Elector of Bavaria, on a supposition that such subsidiary allies were necessary to defeat, or prevent, any after game, to be played by France against Hanover, should that perfidious nation drive Great Britain to an open rupture.

Behaviour
of the
French on
this occa-
sion.

Such public acts, as these, convinced the French, that the English were in good earnest to exert themselves against their encroachments in America:

And, as they, with all their diligence, were not in a condition to complete their intended armaments, by sea and land, for that service, to be time enough to secure their posts on that Continent, before the British forces might arrive at the places of their destination, they took great pains, once more, to amuse the British ministry with general declarations, that no hostility was intended, nor the least infringement of the treaty: which declarations were communicated to the court of London, by the Marquis de Mirepoix, their own Ambassador at the British court, the Earl of Albemarle being lately dead at Paris.

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Mirepoix, on this occasion, played the part of the Archbishop of Ambrune, the French Ambassador at Madrid, in the last century. The French King, by the Pyrenean treaty, had guaranteed all the Spanish dominions, to the successor of the King, upon the throne; the King of Spain, with whom that treaty was made, dies within seven years, and leaves a son and successor, a minor, on the throne, whose sister had been married to the Dauphin, with the express condition of her renunciation of all right and title to any part of her father's dominions, together with the consent, approbation and ratification of the French King and her husband. But Lewis XIV. in defiance of renunciations, ratifications, treaties and every other motive for maintaining good faith, kept up a powerful army, and as soon as he heard of the King's death, made the necessary dispositions to seize upon Flanders, a part of the Spanish mon-

The artful
conduct of
the French
Ambassa-
dor. Mire-
poix.

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archy, and to add that fine country to his own dominions. These preparations and intentions reaching the court of Spain, the Queen mother questioned his Grace the Archbishop? Who, either deceived by his instructions from France, or prepared to keep the Spanish court in a ruinous state of security and inactivity, by the strongest assurances of his royal master's resolution to maintain the faith of the late treaty, and not to invade any part of the Spanish dominions, during the young King's minority, continued, with the most solemn protestations of sincerity and friendship, to amuse the Queen mother and her ministry, till the very news of the French having invaded Flanders arrived at the court of Madrid. Thus the Marquis de Mirepoix was ordered, (whether in the secret or not) to amuse the British court, and, if possible, to delay, or slacken their armaments for America, till the French had sufficiently strengthened their usurpations from Europe.

Repairs to
his own
court for
further in-
structions.
Remarks
thereon.

It is certain Mirepoix acted his part extremely well: even so far, as when facts were daily alleged to confront his pacific declarations, this thorough-paced politician pretended to be struck with astonishment and chagrin, and to repair to Versailles to upbraid that ministry for making him the tool of their dissimulation.

This conduct of the French Ambassador, has been urged in favour of his candour and sincerity: But, if we consider it with all its circumstances, and compare it with the Archbishop of Ambrune's behaviour, in a similar case; this astonishment, chagrin,

chagrin, rage and departure of Mirepoix, will appear to have been a concerted finesse to gain that time by suspense, which they were not able to obtain by prevarication. Mirepoix's reputed honour and the politeness, with which he had ingratiated himself at the British court, conduced greatly to fill some of our statesmen with hopes of accommodating matters, by his presence at Versailles: And, at his return to London, they triumphed greatly at the pacific intentions of his royal master, which he declared were delivered to him by the King himself: Which assurances, having been long detected of falshood, could find no other means to gain credit, but on the good opinion the British Court entertained of the Marquis de Mirepoix.

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France, ever watchful of the proceedings between our King and parliament, easily foresaw the resolution of his Britannic Majesty, and the determination of the parliament to support him against the French violation of treaties. Therefore, not to be behindhand, the French ministry ordered a powerful armament to be immediately fitted out at Brest, for North America; and took other measures, which prognosticated their intention to strike some important blow, that might serve for a declaration of war.

Conduct of
the French
ministry at
this time,

De Cosne, the secretary of our embassy at Paris, by letter dated the 1st of January 1755, informed Sir Thomas Robinson, Secretary of State, That 17 men of war, the Admiral's ship of 70 guns, were ordered to be equipped at Brest,

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Brest, and that the greatest part of that fleet was destined for *America*, with regular troops on board. By another letter of the 8th, he specifies the number of ships to be 16 of the line, and five frigates; and the troops to be 3000 men: and adds, that they would be ready to sail by the end of March. On the 23d, he writes, That there were eight ships more to join them from Rochfort and Rochelle, which would make in all 30 ships of war, 20 of which were of the line, and would take on board 6000 forces; and that they were working night and day to get to sea.

By the same hand, the ministry were informed on February 16 and 23, That M. Macnamara was to command this expedition. And in a few days after, the Earl of Holderness was informed, That in all these armaments there appeared a plain design to make settlements and to build forts: besides, that, it was given out, they resolved to augment the fortifications at Louisburg, and to build more forts on the Ohio.

But those armaments were not confined to Brest, &c. For Mr. Birtles our consul at Genoa, sent advice dated February 10, That the French had 24 ships of war at Toulon, besides three on the stocks, and one of 70 guns careening; that they were ordered to be got fit for sea with all expedition; and that the magazines and stores were in such order and readiness, as to make it possible to send all those ships to sea in a very short time. Which intelligence, as well as that, which followed from Mr. Banks, our consul at Carthegena,

on

on the 12th of March 1755, that the Great Admiral of France was to have the chief command, and that transports were taken up for a great number of land forces; it shews that they had already planned the invasion and conquest of Minorca.

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On the 17th of March six ships of the Brest squadron got into the road: but the advices of the 25th said, that they could not sail before the beginning of April, and that they would endeavour to slip away, without noise, with succours for America; and that the M. now Duke of Mirepoix's negociation was only to gain time, till the French might arrive at the places of their destination, and be provided to declare open war. Accordingly it was discovered that six of the Brest squadron, had sailed in the night between the 17th and 18th, privately, with troops for America. Six others took their station in the road, and received on board a number of regular troops; among whom were many Scotch and Irish officers. And five more ships were ordered to be expedited with the utmost diligence.

Our diligent Secretary at Paris further informs, That the frigate *La Diane* had been dispatched and sailed from Rochfort, on the 27th of March, to Louisbourg and Quebec, with advise of these succours: that eight more ships of the line were ordered to be victualled and fitted for sea in two months, and that M. Macnamara, who had resigned the command of the fleet already sailed, to M. de la Mothe, upon account of his great age,

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age, had received orders to sail with a squadron on the 16th of March.

The British court thus informed, saw through the artifice of Mirepoix, and the fallacious word of his most Christian Majesty; and entered upon such measures, as they supposed effectual to prevent the fatal effects of the French armaments.

Proclamation for raising seamen.

A proclamation was issued^e to encourage seamen to enter themselves on board his Majesty's ships of war; offering a bounty of 30s for every able bodied seaman, between 20 and 50 years of age, and 20s. for every ordinary seaman. The same night there was a warm press below bridge; warrants for the same purpose were dispatched to the outports; and public notice was given at Greenwich hospital, for all the seamen, who were willing to go to sea, to give in their names, and that they should not fail of the usual encourage-

For calling home sea-faring men.

ments. Another proclamation^f was published, for recalling all masters of ships, pilots, mariners, seamen, shipwrights and other sea-faring men, his Majesty's natural born subjects, from the service of all foreign Princes and States, and prohibiting such persons from entering their service. And

Encouragement for seamen.

this proclamation increased the bounty for seamen from 30s. to 3l. and from 20s. to 2l. who should voluntarily enter before the 10th day of March next following: and further promised 2l. reward to any person discovering any able seamen, and 30s. for ever ordinary sea man, who should secrete

^e On January 23, 1755:

^f February 8.

them-

themselves, so that such seaman should be taken, for his Majesty's service, by any sea officer, employed for raising men.

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1755.

In March 1755 his Majesty sent a message by Sir Thomas Robinson, then Secretary of State, to inform his parliament, "That having at the beginning of the session declared, that his principal object was to preserve the public tranquillity, and at the same time to *protect those possessions*, which constitute one great source of the commerce and wealth of his kingdoms; he now finds it necessary to acquaint the house of commons, that the present situation of affairs makes it requisite to augment his forces by sea and land, and to take such other measures, as may best tend to preserve the general peace of Europe, and to secure the just rights and possessions of his crown in America; as well as to repel any attempts whatsoever, that may be made to support or countenance any designs, which may be formed against his Majesty and his dominions; not doubting, but that his faithful commons would enable him to make such augmentations, and to take such measures for supporting the honour of his crown, and the true interests of his people, and for the security of his dominions, in the present critical juncture, as the exigency of affairs may require."—

A message
from the
King to
the parlia-
ment.

This message was answered with a warm and affectionate address: and the ministry in the cabinet as if they were fully resolved to execute the necessary measures in such a critical juncture, ordered a body of forces to America, to act in con-

How re-
ceived by
both houses
of parlia-
ment.

junction

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Mutiny
bill extend-
ed to North
America.

A speech
in parlia-
ment by a
general
officer.

junction with the provincial troops. Which order produced an extraordinary clause to the mutiny bill, to render it more clear, extensive and useful for the national service: wherein it was provided, " That all officers and soldiers of any troops, " being mustered and in pay, which are or shall " be raised in any of the British provinces in " America, by authority of the respective governors " or governments thereof, shall at all times, and " in all places, when they happen to join or act " in conjunction with his Majesty's British forces, " be liable to martial law, and discipline, in like " manner, to all intents and purposes, as the " British forces are, and shall be subject to the " same trial, penalties and punishments."

A General officer, who on this critical occasion was called up in the house of commons, by a spirit, becoming a true patriot, expressed himself in the following manner; " We seem, said he, to be driven upon the edge of a high mountain; on every side a dreadful and tremendous precipice: too much expence makes us bankrupts: too little makes us slaves. Some years ago, the French were by no means a match for the Five Nations: now they have a communication, by a range of forts, from the river St. Lawrence, in Canada, to the Ohio, near the Mississippi. Hence it is, that they hold our colonies between the two ends of a net, which if they tighten by degrees, they may get all of them into the body of it, and then drown them in the sea. When the ship is sinking, the man at the helm in vain lays the blame upon

upon the labourer at the oar, or, the labourer at the oar, recriminates upon the man at the helm: we are all in one vessel: it is our interest as well as our duty, to unite heartily in the common cause; and laying aside private ambition and animosity, to act with alacrity and confidence, and to perform every thing in our power, for the preservation, honour and happiness of our country.

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So many men were provided for the sea service, by proper means, that a squadron of 11 ships of the line, and one frigate, bearing in all 5,945 men, was got ready and sailed for America, on the 22d day of April, under the command of Vice Admiral Boscawen. This squadron had on board a considerable body of land forces^s to attend the motions of the enemy: And the Admiral's instructions to attack the French fleet, where ever he should meet them, was notified to the Duke de Mirepoix. To which that polite ambassador replied, "That his royal master would consider the first gun, fired at sea in an hostile manner, to be a declaration of war."

Admiral
Boscawen
sails for N.
America.

Mirepoix's
behaviour
on this
event.

This language, so reverse to his pacific conferences, seemed to whet the resentment of our councils, so as to redouble their preparations for war: and the public began to think, that the ministry were come to a resolution to fulfil their desires for the defence of America, and to oppose all other machinations of the French against their trade, navigation and possessions; so that the

How it
operates
upon the
ministry.

^s Two regiments, which he took up at Plymouth.

moneyed

A. D. moneyed men subscribed 3,880,000 l. immediately,
1755. ly, instead of 1,000,000 l. required to be raised by way of lottery.

The
French
squadron
sent to N.
America.

Our ministry had certain advice^b from M. de Cosne, That the fleet from Brest and Rochfort, consisted of one ship of 90 guns, three of 74, four of 70, seven of 64, one of 58, one of 50, and five of 30 guns, from Brest; two of 64 guns, one of 50, one of 30, and one of 26 guns, from Rochfort: Together 18 ships of the line, and nine frigates; in all 27. But ten of these line of battle were converted into transports, and mounted no more than from 18 to 22 guns a piece, under the command of M. Macnamara and M. Bois de la Mothe.

This united fleet had orders to be ready to sail by the 18th or 20th of April, with 11 battalions on board; but it was wind bound, till the 3d of May: Of which M. de Cosne did not fail to give immediate notice, adding, That it was generally believed, that Macnamara's orders were only to convoy the ships that serve for transports, to a certain distance, and then to let them pursue their voyage without him.

Remarks
on the Bri-
tish mini-
stry at this
time.

Here it may be seasonable to enquire, what was done on the part of Great Britain, besides the proceedings in parliament, to counteract the vigorous measures of our enemy? It is evident from all these advices, and from the facts themselves, that these kingdoms had nothing to fear from an inva-

^b Dated the 15th of April 1755.

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sion: For, though France had a few more ships in the ports of Brest and Rochfort, fit for service, they had neither sailors, nor ordnance, nor provisions, nor ammunition to fit them for sea; nor any number of vessels capable of transporting an army into this island, as all accounts from abroad agreed, had they ever so seriously meditated a descent in favour of the Pretender, as Mr. Barnham from Dover had intimated his suspicion: which, by other advices, was treated with contempt. Why then was there not a more powerful fleet ordered in time, not to fight the French convoy under Macnamara in the American seas, or to block up, or intercept their fleet at Louisbourg, or Quebec, but at Brest and Rochfort? What must be thought of such management, that, out of the numerous navy, which Great Britain had at this time in pay, they could spare, or, were afraid to suffer, no more than 11 ships of the line and one sloop to defeat the French embarkation for America; and to be at the extraordinary expence and hazard of sending a squadron to do that work in the American ocean, which, in all probability, could have been done with little or no risk and much less expence, near the chops of the British channel. Such an appointment was very wide of the utmost exertion of our power in defence of our colonies, and to maintain the dominion of the seas; when the ministry, duly and certainly informed of the force under sailing orders at Brest, confined their own strength to a squadron under Mr. Boscawen, of a little more

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than half the force of the enemy; and paid no manner of regard to the equipment of the naval preparations at Toulon, of which they had positive advice on the 14th of April; nor to the intelligence from Consul Banks, on the 12th of March, who gave it, as his confirmed opinion, that there would be a powerful expedition with land forces from that port.

The only step taken to remedy these egregious omissions, or whatever you may please to call them, in the British politicks, was to risk six ships of the line and one frigate, under Admiral Holbourne, to follow and strengthen Admiral Boscawen; who not sailing till the 11th of May, when the chance of his falling in with Macnamara's strong squadron, which sailed but eight days before, was against him, the national disgust with the ministry daily increased.

King's
speech at
the end of
the session.

On the 25th day of April his Majesty closed that session of parliament by a most gracious speech, wherein he told the two houses, "That
"the zeal they had shewn, for supporting the honour, rights and possessions of his crown, had
"afforded him the greatest satisfaction: That
"his desire to preserve the public tranquillity had
"been sincere and uniform: That he had religiously adhered to the stipulations of the treaty
"of Aix-la-Chapelle, and made it his care not to
"injure or offend any power whatsoever; but
"that he could never entertain a thought of
"purchasing the name of peace at the expence
"of suffering encroachments upon, or of yielding
"ing

“ing up, what justly belong’d to Great Bri- A. D.
 “tain, either by antient possession, or by solemn 1755.
 “treaties : That the vigour and firmness of his
 “parliament, on this important occasion, had
 “enabled him to be prepared for such contingen-
 “cies as might happen : That if reasonable and
 “honourable terms of accommodation could be
 “agreed upon, he would be satisfied, and, in all
 “events, rely on the justice of his cause, the ef-
 “fectual support of his people, and the protection
 “of divine providence.”

The parliament was prorogued to the 25th of May : A regency was appointed, and his Majesty departed for his German dominions on the 28th of April.

M. Macnamara returned into Brest with nine ships on the 20th of May, which were victualled for six months, and sailed again on the 4th of June under the command of M. Du Guay, on a cruize near the streights of Gibraltar, and in such parts of the Atlantic ocean as might favour the return of La Mothe and Salvert, his coadjutor, in case of bad news from North America. The other ships in Brest and Rochfort, for some time, wanted both men and cannon ; and when they got supplies it was ordered that they (15 in all) should not sail till the court had certain advice of the fate of their fleet in America. Thus it appears, that the whole attention of the French councils was taken up with their American interest, or at least to favour the return of their ships from Canada : and that Britain had nothing to fear of an invasion,

Departs
for his Ger-
man domi-
nions.

Attention
of the
French to-
wards
North A-
merica.

A. D. 1755. from any preparation at Brest or its neighbouring ports.

Advice concerning the Toulon Squadron.

In the mean time the Lords of the Admiralty received advice from Captain Buckle, of the Unicorn, dated May 9th, in Genoa-mole, That eleven days before, there had been orders published, by beat of drum, for sailors to repair to Toulon; and that orders were likewise sent to Toulon; to fit out all the ships in that harbour.

Admiral Hawke sails on a cruise.

But, though it was confirmed by letters to Lord Holderness, dated July 19th, and received on the 22d, that no ships were fitting out at Brest; and that they were equipping with expedition nine ships at Toulon, with orders for the sailors not to depart from thence; the British ministry contented themselves, as we shall shew more fully hereafter, with sending Sir Edward Hawke on the 24th of July, to cruise till September, only to endeavour to intercept Du Guay's squadron in its return from Cadiz; or any ships, which might escape the vigilance of Mr. Boscawen, and attempt to recover any port in France: His whole force being no more than twenty-one ships of the line, and five frigates; whereas, if there was any credit to be given to our intelligence, it was probable that he might have met with Du Guay's squadron of ten ships, joined by five ships from Rochfort, ten ships from Brest, and the ten ships in their return from America? By which it appears that this fleet was commanded upon a very hazardous service; and all the advices concerning the

Very hazardous.

the naval preparations in the Mediterranean were
disregarded. A. D. 1755.

The equipments in the port of Toulon, which hitherto had been carried on with more artifice, began now to appear openly, and to keep pace with the armaments facing the British shore; formed merely to give umbrage to the English; and with the motion and augmentation of their troops. For, letters of the 6th of August declare expressly, that orders had been sent to Toulon to equip, with all expedition, all the new ships, and to get the old ones also in a condition for service; that these orders were then pursued with great diligence, and that they were to take on board several companies of land forces, besides mariners. They further advised, that since the arrival of two expresses at Toulon, which had caused the holding of two extraordinary councils, attended by the principal officers of the marine, the hands, which were at work in fitting out the nine ships there, were doubled, and six other ships of the line put in commission, and ordered to be equipped with the former nine, so as to be able to put all the fifteen sail to sea before the 18th or 20th of August, and to be victualled only for three months. Which letter concluded: "Tho' the destination of this squadron is not known, it is generally conjectured to be intended against Gibraltar: But be that as it will, never was there a greater hurry in that port, than at present." At the same time it ought to be observed, that we had no force in those seas to prevent Du Guay's

The arma-
ments at
Toulon
expedited.

A. D. 1755. Squadron, which did not sail from Cadiz till the beginning of August, from joining the Toulon squadron.

His Majesty's conduct in Germany.

Concludes a treaty with Hesse-Cassel.

It cannot be suggested that his Majesty remained as indolent, as this regency appeared to be; for he was trying, abroad, every prudent measure to obviate the difficulties that might arise, in the course of a war from the French against his German dominions. To cover these from any insults and attacks, on account of their connections with Great Britain, and which already threatened the Electorate of Hanover by French magazines erected in Westphalia, under the jurisdiction of the Elector of Cologne, and to guard against the effects of a secret treaty, which he grew jealous of, and was carrying on between Vienna and Versailles, his Britannic Majesty concluded a subsidiary treaty, on the 18th of June, with the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; by which his serene Highness engaged to hold in readiness, during four years, a body of eight thousand men, for his Majesty's service, to be employ'd, if required, upon the Continent, or in Great Britain, or Ireland; but not on board the fleet, or beyond the seas: And also, if his Britannic Majesty should judge it necessary, or advantageous, for his service, to furnish and join to this body of 8000 men, within six months after they should be demanded, four thousand more; of which seven hundred to be horse or dragoons, and each regiment of infantry to have two field pieces of cannon.

At

At the same time his Majesty proposed to renew the treaties with Bavaria and Saxony. But the connections of these two houses with France, though no bar to their receiving a subsidy from Great Britain in time of peace, would not let them hearken to any renewal, at the eve of a war with that crown. However Russia accepted of subsidiary overtures for a large body of troops, which, though not carried into the form of a treaty, before his Majesty left Hanover, may be properly noted in this place, That the Empress of Russia should hold in readiness in Livonia, and upon the frontiers of Lithuania, a body of forty thousand infantry, with the necessary artillery, and 15,000 cavalry: And also on the coast of the said Province, 40 or 50 galleys with the necessary crews; to be ready to act, upon the first order, in his Majesty's service, in case his Majesty's dominions in Germany should be invaded on account of the interests or disputes, which regard his kingdoms: But that neither these troops nor galleys were to be put in motion unless his Britannic Majesty, or his allies, should be some where attacked. This treaty was to exist four years, from the exchange of the ratifications. But it was unluckily inserted, in the seventh article, That considering the proximity of the countries wherein the diversion in question will probably be made, and the facility her troops will probably have of subsisting immediately in an enemy's country, she takes upon herself alone, during such a diversion, the subsistence and treatment of the said troops, by sea

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1755.

Bavaria
and Saxo-
ny refuse
to treat.

Treaty
with Rus-
sia begun.

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1755.

and land. And in the eleventh article it was further stipulated, That all the plunder, which the Russian army might take from the enemy, should belong to them.

Operations
of the
French on
the Ohio
continued.

The operations of the French on the banks of the Ohio had been carried on, all the winter, with great diligence and activity; and with powerful reinforcements from Old France: For, by advice dated the 2d of January 1755, from Philadelphia it was notified, That about 6000 men of the best troops of France, selected and sent over upon this particular service, were just arrived at the lower fort on the Ohio, and were employed, even in that rigorous season, in fortifying that country. Those troops were sent by the way of Quebec, and from thence were seen, by the Indian traders, to cross the lakes Oswego and Erie, in a prodigious number of battoes, of which the several Governors received notice.

Notwithstanding this the assembly of Pennsylvania continued as obstinate as ever, there being no probability of their granting any money towards the expence of the necessary armaments in this time of danger; although they were to adjourn within two days. The Governor represented, in the strongest terms, the defenceless state of their Province, and recommended the establishment of a regular militia; but to no purpose.

It was also observed, that the activity of the French, in the depth of winter, was a convincing proof, that they were forming some grand design in regard to that Continent; and that it seemed

seemed probable, their first attack would be upon Pennsylvania, as being in the center, and not only the most plentiful, but the most defenceless and unweildy of all his Majesty's colonies: And, having once got footing there, they might issue forth upon the colonies on each side; which had not a single regiment from Europe to defend them.

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1755.

Accordingly we find, that the French made such good use of the time, we remained inactive, that in the beginning of the year 1755, they had advanced with their camps and forts within 225 miles of Philadelphia.

This account, without any prospect of measures to put a stop to the encroachments of our enemies, filled every lover of his country with dire forebodings for the safety of their American brethren: When the nation received some glimmerings of better things from the dispatches of Admiral Boscawen, who by letters dated off Louisbourg, on the 22d of June 1755, informed the ministry, That on the tenth of that month, the Alcide, a French man of war of 64 guns, and 480 men, commanded by M. Hockquart, and the Lys, commanded by M. Lageril, pierced for sixty-four guns, but mounting only 22, and having eight companies of land forces on board, being seperated from the French squadron commanded by M. Bois de la Mothe, fell in with the English fleet off the banks of Newfoundland, they refusing to pay the usual compliment to the British flag, and, that his Majesty's ships, the Dunkirk, and

The Alcide and Lys taken,

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1755.

Admiral
Boscawen
joined by
Adm. Hol-
bourne.

and Defiance, after an engagement of five hours, in which they fought so close, that a man killed on the yard of a French man of war fell into the Dunkirk, had obliged them to strike, and brought them into the fleet. The Dunkirk lost 90 men. The Lys had on board 76,000l sterling in money to pay their troops, and eight companies of soldiers, besides several general officers and engineers. He also gave advice, that he had been joined by Rear-Admiral Holbourne, with whom he sailed, the same day, within a mile of Louisbourg harbour: where seeing four large ships and two frigates lately arrived from Europe, under the command of M. du Perrier, he stationed Rear-Admiral Holbourne off that harbour with five or six ships, and proceeded to his own rendezvous, being the best adapted for preventing M. de la Mothe's squadron getting into the gulph of St. Lawrence, had not the fogs and hard gales of winds disappointed him, and carried them safe to Quebec, the place of their destination.

Mirepoix
departs
without ce-
remony.

Immediately upon this, though much beneath the sanguine expectations conceived of the prowess and strength of Mr. Boscawen and his fleet, the spirit of the nation revived, and the French Ambassador, the Duke of Mirepoix, was ordered to depart the kingdom in twenty-four hours, and accordingly he set out for his own country betimes in the morning of the 24th of July, to avoid the insults of the mob.

The expedition against the French in Nova Scotia, which by his Majesty's command, had been con-

certed

certed between Governor Lawrence and Governor Shirley was carried into execution, with the aid of 2000 New Englandmen, and had its desired effect. For by a letter ¹ from Lieutenant-Governor Lawrence, our government were informed, that the French fort of Beausejour surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Monkton, by capitulation, after four days bombardment, before his Majesty's forces had mounted a single cannon upon their batteries, though that fort had twenty-six cannon well mounted. The same fate befel a small fort upon the river Gaspereau, running into the bay Verte, where the French had their principal magazine for supplying the French inhabitants, and Indians with provisions, arms and stores of all kinds.—He proceeds, and says, “ At Colonel Monkton's first arrival the French had a large “ number of inhabitants and Indians, four hundred and fifty of which were posted at a block-house, which they had on their side of that river “ Messaguash, to defend the pass of the river : “ Here they had thrown up a strong breast-work “ of timber, for covering their men, and had “ cannon mounted on the block-house. At this “ place they made a stand for about an hour, but “ were forced by our troops, with some loss, “ leaving the block-house and the pass of the “ river, clear for our people, who marched without further interruption, to the ground intended for their encampment. As we had not men

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Transactions in Nova Scotia.

Several forts, &c. taken.

¹ Dated the 28th of June 1755, at Hallifax in Nova Scotia.

“ enough

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“ enough to invest the fort intirely, several got
“ away; and when the fort surrendered, there
“ remained 150 regulars, and about 300 inha-
“ bitants, several of which, with their officers,
“ were wounded. We do not yet exactly know
“ the number that were killed in the fort; but
“ we believe their loss has not been trifling, as
“ several laid half buried upon the parade. Co-
“ lonel Monkton has new-named the fort, and
“ called it Fort Cumberland.”

By this means Colonel Monkton disarmed 15,000 Acadians. And in the mean time Captain Rous, being ordered to attack the fort, the French had lately erected at the mouth of St. John's river, the enemy abandoned it, at the appearance of his small squadron; having bursted their cannon, blown up their magazine, and all the works they had raised, as much as time would permit them to do.

By means
of the New
England
resolu-
tions.

This success was greatly owing to a vigorous resolution taken, in the beginning of this year, by the assembly of Massachusetts bay in New England; which had prohibited all correspond-
ence with the French at Louisbourg, and, besides the large detachment of troops sent under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Monkton, above-mentioned, had fitted out three frigates and a sloop, under the command of Captain Rous, to favour their operations, by covering the coast.

While the New Englandmen assisted in the reduction of Nova Scotia or Acadia, which was effected with the loss of only twenty men killed,

and about the same number wounded, the Virginians built a fort, likewise called Fort Cumberland, and formed a camp at Will's Creek, in order to attack the French on the Ohio. Which promised success, had this provincial measure been effectually backed by Major-General Braddock, and his two regiments of regulars from Ireland. This little army landed safe in Virginia before the end of February.

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1755.

Fort Cumberland built by the Virginians.

General Braddock and his troops land in Virginia.

As soon as he possibly could, the general summoned the several Governors on that continent to meet him at Alexandria in Virginia, to consult upon the business of the approaching campaign. In which convention, after much debating, it was agreed, That for the preservation of Oswego, and reduction of Niagara, Shirley's and Pepperel's regiments should march to lake Ontario; on which lake one or more armed vessels, of about 60 tons each, should be built to command that lake: And Mr. Shirley was charged with the execution of this part of the service. General Braddock undertook their next resolution, which was to attack Fort Du Quesne: And General Johnson was ordered to invest Crown Point with the Provincial troops.

Summons a council.

Resolutions.

These resolutions and plans were commendable: But how far they answered in the execution of each, is matter of the greatest astonishment and concern.

Mr. Braddock had neither provisions nor carriage for a march of so considerable a length, which was greatly increased and embarrassed by his orders to take the rout of Will's Creek, which road,

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1755.

Bad mea-
sures pur-
sued in his
operations.

road, as it was the worst provided with provisions, more troublesome and hazardous, and much more about, than by the way of Pennsylvania; and the long delay, occasioned by the contractors for the army, who had neither provided a sufficient quantity of provisions for the troops, nor a competent number of carriages for the army, overturned the expedition. Mr. Braddock should certainly have landed in Pennsylvania: And the contract for supplying his troops would have been best made with some of the principal planters of that Province, who, both in regard to convenience in carriage, and in plenty of provisions, could have performed their engagements with more ease and punctuality. For, such is the attention of the Virginians towards their staple trade of tobacco, that they scarce raise as much corn, as is necessary for their own subsistence; and their country being well provided with water-carriage in great rivers, an army which requires a large supply of wheel-carriages and beasts of burden, could not expect to be furnished with them in a place, where they are not in general use. But Pennsylvania abounds with corn, and with most sorts of provisions, and its inhabitants carry on most of their business with carts, waggons and horses. Besides, had he encamped near Franc's town, or somewhere upon the south-west borders of this Province, his road to Fort Du Quesne would have been as practicable, and fifty miles nearer than from his camp at Will's Creek. This is not mere speculation, but what is strongly confirmed by facts, and from the season-

seasonable and generous assistance of some gentlemen in Pennsylvania, who at last were applied to, and did make up the deficiency of the Virginian contractors, without which it was not possible for the army to proceed.

A. D. A.
1755.

It has also been hinted, that much of the disappointment in this expedition was owing to the General himself, in point of conduct. The plan was laid, and his instructions settled, in such a manner, as to put him always upon his guard against ambuscades, which were to be expected in a march thro' woods, deserts and morasses. But this gentleman, placing all his success upon the single point of courage and discipline, behaved in that haughty, positive and reserved way, that he soon disgusted the people, over whom he was to command. His soldiers could not relish his extreme severity in matters of discipline: And, not considering the nature of an American battle, he shewed such contempt towards the Provincial forces, because they could not go through their exercise, with the same dexterity and regularity, as a regiment of guards in Hyde-Park, that he drew upon himself their general resentment.

His conduct blamed.

Give this General his due, it is certain that his service was attended with many unforeseen and unconceivable difficulties. He was obliged to march his army through a rugged, pathless and unknown country, across the Allegheny mountains, through unfrequented woods and dangerous defiles, rendered more dangerous by almost every thing he had to do with the Provinces, as more particu-

The difficulties he had to surmount.

A. D.
1755.

particularly appears in his letters to the British ministry, complaining of the neglect and disaffection of all employed to supply necessaries for the troops, and setting forth the continual labour and fatigue of his soldiers to cut out roads across mountains and rocks of an excessive height, steep, and divided by rivers and torrents.

Put all these together, what was extraordinary in his conduct, and what was extraordinary in the way of the service, there could be formed no good idea of the issue of such an untoward expedition.

His march
to the at-
tack of
Fort du
Quefne.

He arrived safe, and without any manifest decrease of his strength, at Fort Cumberland, and being informed that the French, at Fort du Quefne, lately built on the river, near the conflux of the Monangahela, were expecting a reinforcement of 500 regular troops, which, as it required all the expedition, he could prudently make, to prevent such an increase of strength in the enemy, determined him to push forward by forced marches. But the impetuosity of his temper kept him from paying that due regard to the representations of his officers, and to the hazard of entering woods and thickets without reconnoitring the enemy, which

proved his ruin. The General marched from Fort Cumberland on the 10th of June 1755, with 1400 men, and the greatest part of the ammunition and artillery, having, for greater dispatch, left Colonel Dunbar, with 800 men to escort the provisions, stores and baggage, with as much expedition, as the nature

Leaves his
baggage,
&c. at Fort
Cumber-
land, with
orders to
follow.

of

of the service would allow. Thus Braddock with ten pieces of cannon, and necessary provisions and ammunition, marched without delay or fear of danger through the woody desert; and arrived on the 8th of July, within 10 miles of Fort du Quesne; without meeting any opposition.

He was now 40 miles encamped a-head of his corps of reserve, under Colonel Dunbar, and must expect all the stratagems and force of an insidious enemy; which was expressed to him in the strongest terms, especially by his Colonel Sir Peter Halket, who earnestly desired him to proceed with caution on such hostile and dangerous ground, and to order the Indians, to reconnoitre, by way of scouts or advanced guards, in case of an ambuscade, for which that country was so well adapted. But, as if courage could do the whole work of a soldier, the General paid no regard to their wholesome and seasonable advice. He commanded his men to resume their march next day, without endeavouring to inform himself of the situation or disposition of the enemy, and without detaching scouts to preserve him from the surprize of ambuscades, though surrounded with woods. So that, having proceeded with this unpardonable carelessness through a defile of the enemy, so artfully concealed behind the trees and bushes, that not a man of them could be seen, his little army, about noon, was surprized by a general fire upon his front, and along his left flank: which obliged the van-guard to fall back immediately upon the main body; and in an instant a panic and con-

A. D.
1755.

Rejects,
and is deaf
to all ad-
vice.

Is surprized
in an am-
bush.

Put into
confusion.

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1755.

Routed.

Killed.

Baggage,
&c. lost.

fusion seized the regulars: who disgusted with their commander, could not be prevailed upon, either by promises, intreaties or commands to keep their ground; yet some of the officers did honour to their country by their gallant behaviour under such desperate circumstances. A few remained by their General's person. But most of those brave officers and men, that stood till the last, remained only to be sacrificed to the General's further misconduct. For, instead of ordering a retreat, when he found his men flying with precipitation, till he could scour the avenues lined by the enemy, with grape shot, from ten pieces of cannon, he had with him; or ordering the Indians to advance, in flanking parties, against the hidden enemy; he obstinately continued upon the spot, where he first received their fire, till he was almost left alone, with his officers and men killed about him; his obstinacy increasing with the danger. At last, having had five horses shot under him, a musket shot, through his right arm and lungs, gave him a mortal wound. He was carried off the field by the bravery of Lieutenant Colonel Gage, and another of his officers; but survived only four days.

The confusion of the few that remained was now turned into a real and disorderly flight; and though not pursued, and no enemy in sight, they deserted and left all their artillery, ammunition and baggage, and amongst the rest the general's cabinet, a prey to the enemy; in which the French found all Braddock's letters and instructions,

tions, made use of afterwards by their ministry in printed memorials and manifestoes, to throw the breach of peace upon Great Britain.

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1755.

It is but justice due to the behaviour of the Provincial troops, under Braddock, in this action, to observe, That they were not so affected with the panic, as the regulars; though the enemy's fire fell as heavy upon them, as upon any of the rest of the army: And, that when the regulars could not be prevailed upon to stand their ground, nor to fight with brakes and bushes lined with unseen destruction, the Provincials bravely formed, offered to cover the fugitives, and, by advancing alone against the Indians in the wood, prevented the regulars from being all cut off.

Behaviour
of the Pro-
vincial
troops.

The panic of those that fled infected them with such terrors, that they never stopt till they met the rear division; which receiving the infection, they all retreated without stopping, till they arrived at Fort Cumberland: Though the enemy never attempted to pursue, or ever appeared in sight, either in the battle, or after the defeat.

The loss of the English in this unfortunate affair, amounted to 700 men, besides the baggage, artillery, &c. The officers suffered most in proportion; the Indians being good marks men had picked them out. Sir Peter Halket, at the head of his regiment, fell at the first fire. The French will allow that they lost no more than 400 men, mostly Indians.

The loss
of men on
both sides.

Thus ended this tragical expedition, whose bad consequences to the British interest were rendered

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1755.

worse by increasing the spirit and activity of our enemies, and riveting the Indians more firmly in the interest of their new allies. On the contrary, the Indians in the British interest, despised us for not being able to protect ourselves: and such an universal panic seized on all our colonies, that they seemed, for some time, to give up all for lost.

At home great pains was taken by the public to fix the cause of this misfortune. Some cast the whole blame upon the General; others were as sanguine against the ministry. But a little impartiality and cool attention, will discover both the general and ministry faulty. The capital mistake was his orders to land in Virginia instead of Pennsylvania, for the reasons already given. Then his march would have been shortened six weeks and performed with less fatigue and expence. His obstinacy, severity and inattention to the advice of his officers, &c. his contemptuous behaviour towards the provincials, and his neglect to reconnoitre the enemy, and to make a proper disposition and use of his artillery on the day of action, fell heavy upon Braddock.

Dunbar to
leave the
back settle-
ments ex-
posed.

Nothing now could prevent the outrages and encroachments of the Indians and French on the back of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, except a respectable garrison left at Fort Cumberland, well fortified: which ought to have been done by the remains of Braddock's army; who might have fortified themselves against any surprize, during the rest of the summer, and, in the winter, would have been a sufficient check upon the French and

and their scalping Indians. But, instead of so prudent a measure, the Commander in Chief left only the sick and wounded, under the care of two companies of provincial militia, at Fort Cumberland, and, with 1600 men, marched on the 2d of August, for Philadelphia, where their presence could be of no service. General Shirley, upon whom, by the death of Braddock, the chief command in America devolved, ordered these troops from Philadelphia to Albany, in New York.

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1755.

Retires
with his
1600 men
to Phila-
delphia.

Is ordered
to Albany.

Yet this is the expedition and battle, upon which the French court laid that stress, as to fix upon Great Britain the odium of beginning the war. Which invention to reproach our ministry with giving Braddock instructions, inconsistent with their declaration to the French ambassador, denying that Braddock had orders to act hostilely, or invasively; of all the instances of French ingenuity, and of abusive groundless declamation, with which they have endeavoured to inodiate our nation to all Europe, there is not a more flagrant, or a more easily refutable one.

The
French
make this
the first act
of hostility
between
the two na-
tions.

To say no worse, the French discovered a strong and immediate inclination to attack our American Provinces; had built forts, and formed camps upon territories, from which they were excluded by treaty, and had very lately attackt and defeated a body of Virginians, guarding their own frontiers, and demolished their fort. The Provinces apply to their mother country for relief and defence. Braddock is sent with a small force to their assistance, and with instructions how to be-

Refuted.

A. D.
1755.

have, and to pursue incidentally the advantages of war, or to oppose force to force, should the French persist in their unjustifiable extension of the country, they called Canada, upon the same motive of self-interest, as they had endeavoured to contract Acadia. Such a declaration, therefore, made to the French ambassador at London, that the destination of the forces sent to the succour of our oppressed, threatned and defenceless colonies, in North America, had nothing in it, but what was literally and rigorously true, both in fact and inference, was purely pacific; for nothing is more universally allowed, than that a preparation for defence and offence, is the most sure expedient towards preserving and restoring public peace. That Braddock then should be furnished eventually, both with defensive and offensive instructions, with plans of operation adapted to contingencies, was plainly matter in course of his expedition, and of which the French could not have the least reason to complain, unless they would ingross to themselves an exclusive right to invade their neighbours, or suppose us meek, or passive enough not to resent their hostilities, when they had dared us by their encroachments and forcible entry, to defend our possessions. In this fair and obvious sense, what contradiction, what prevarication, can be laid to the charge of the English government, (whilst they openly sent that reinforcement to their colonies, which the proceedings of the French themselves had made an indispensable measure;) for their vouchsafing an
assurance

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1755.

assurance and declaration of pacific intentions? Was this, by any construction, other, or more, than telling them, that nothing on our part was intended to break the general peace, should the French desist from provocations, and from giving us reason to support our rights by arms, or to exact satisfaction for future injuries? That Braddock then was equipped with all the instructions necessary for the most determinate war, is not in the least repugnant to the most sincere professions of wishing and meaning nothing but peace. As a man, who puts on a sword, may for all that, desire nothing so much, as not to be compelled to draw it, or to make use of his fencing master's instructions.

What is still more surprizing, though Virginia, Maryland and Pensylvania, were by these means left entirely destitute of all protection, from their hostile enemies behind them, the usual disputes between their governors, assemblies, &c. got the better of their reason, and so divided their councils, that they came to no effectual resolutions for the public safety. It is true Pensylvania was at last excited to vote 50,000 l. for the defence of their western frontier; but this trifling sum was rendered abortive by the governor positively refusing to give his assent to the act of the assembly for raising that sum; because they had rated the proprietaries estate equal with those of the inhabitants. By which miscarriage the Province was left defenceless, to the destruction of many of the poor settlers upon the western frontier. Besides

Dissentions
in the Pro-
vinces con-
tinue.

Their
effects

A. D.
1755.Conduct
of New
York.

such inactivity and neglect of their own possessions impressed the Indians with a very contemptible opinion of the English, and made them either esteem, or fear, the French invaders.^k

Two expedi-
tions pro-
posed.

The people in New York acted more for their own and the common interest. Their assembly laid a prohibition upon all provisions being sent to any port, settlement or island belonging to the French, on, or adjacent to, the continent of North America: and voted 45,000 l. for the defence of their colony, exposed most of any other to an invasion of the French, from Crown Point. With this little supply, and the assistance of other colonies to the east of them, together with the small body of troops, ordered thither by General Shirley from Pennsylvania, under Colonel Dunbar, it was resolved, as the best way to keep the enemy from invading their Province, to undertake the two expeditions, one against the French fort, at Crown Point, the other against Niagara, between the lakes Ontario and Erie, as had before been concerted with General Braddock at Alexandria.

By whom
command-
ed.

The expedition against Crown Point was committed to the care of Colonel, afterwards General Johnson, an Irishman by birth, but an old inhabitant in the western parts of New York. He had settled on the Mohock river, and not only acquired a considerable estate, but was universally beloved both by the Inhabitants and the neighbouring Indians: whose language he had learnt,

* See the Indian speech, p. 112, 113.

and

and whose affections he had gained by his faithful and humane behaviour towards them. General Shirley took upon himself the command of the expedition against Niagara.

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1755.

Albany was appointed for the rendezvous of the troops for both expeditions : which arrived in good time, towards the end of June. This army consisted of near 6000 men, besides Indians, raised by the government of Boston, Connecticut, New-Hampshire, Rhode island and New York, and soon after marched forward, about 60 miles from Albany, under the command of Major General Lyman. But the artillery, battoes, provisions, and other necessaries for the attempt upon Crown Point, were not got ready till the 8th of August, when General Johnson set out with them for Lake George, where he met and joined his army ; that had been employed to build a fort at the landing place, on the east side of Hudson's river, called Fort Edward. He marched 14 miles more northerly, and encamped at the south end of Lake George, alias Sacrament, in a very strong situation, covered on each side by a thick woody swamp, with the Lake in his rear, and by a breast work of trees in front ; to wait for his battoes, and then to proceed to Ticondaroga, distant 15 miles from Crown Point, which the French called Fort Frederick.

Carried
into execu-
tion.

General
Johnson
arrives at
Lake
George.

The Baron de Dieskau, who arrived at Quebec in the spring with Mons. de Vaudrevil, and troops to defend Canada, had instructions to make his first attack upon Oswego, and to reduce it, which

The in-
structions
of the
Baron de
Dieskau.

A. D.
1755.Why he
departed
from them.

which the French court thought to be of singular consequence for facilitating their grand scheme of forcing a way through our colonies to the great western ocean. According to these instructions the Baron, without delay, proceeded to Montreal, and detached 700 troops up the river, intending himself to follow and join them with the remainder. But in this interval the Indians alarmed the inhabitants of Montreal with an account of a numerous army assembling near Lake Sacrament, alias Lake George, for the reduction of Fort Frederick; from whence the victors might easily penetrate into the heart of Canada. This advice occasioned a grand council, by which the Baron was prevailed upon with great difficulty to suspend his first intention, as directed by his instructions, against Oswego, and to proceed directly thro' Lake Champlain, for the defence of Fort Frederick. Where he waited some time, expecting that General Johnson would advance and give him battle. But being disappointed of his expectations, he embarked his men in battoes, and landed at the South Bay, about 16 miles from Johnson's camp, intending first to reduce Fort Edward at the carrying place, and then to proceed and attack the English camp under General Johnson; and resolving, if he should succeed in both attempts, to lay waste all our northern colonies, burn the towns of Albany and Schenectady to ashes, and so to cut off all communication with Oswego.

This

This embarkation from Fort Frederick landed without opposition, or the least discovery. But, when they were advanced some miles from the shore, the scouts brought General Johnson intelligence, that a considerable number¹ of the enemy where on their march from Ticondaroga,^m by way of the South Bay, towards that fortified camp, since called Fort Edward, built and garrisoned, with upwards of 400 of the New Hampshire and New York men, by General Lyman at the Carrying Place, Colonel Johnson gave notice thereof to Colonel Blanchard, the commander, with orders to call in all his out parties, and to keep his whole force within the entrenchments. He was further informed by his scouts, about 12 o'clock at night, that they had seen the enemy, about four miles only from the camp at the Carrying Place; but he took no measures for the support of Colonel Blanchard, till next morning;ⁿ though he perfectly knew the importance of that camp's defence, for the safety of his whole army. Early in the morning General Johnson called a council, in which it was resolved, to detach only 1000 men, with a number of Indians, to intercept the enemy in their retreat, either as victors, or defeated in their attempt: though they had no account of the

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1755.

Reinforce-
ment sent
to Fort
Edward.

¹ It was found, on their defeat, that they consisted of 2000 men, including 200 granadiers, 800 Canadians, the rest Indians of divers nations.

^m Situated on the Isthmus, between the north end of Lake George, and the southern part of Lake Champlain.

ⁿ On the 8th of September.

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1755,

number or strength of the enemy; neither could they get any certainty thereof, from the Indian scouts; because those savages have no distinct words or signs, whereby to express large numbers, otherwise than pointing to the stars in the firmament, or to the hair of their head, which sometimes may denote 10,000, when at another time, it may signify not more than 1000, or an inferior number.

According to this resolution, Colonel Williams marched between eight and nine o'clock in the morning with 1000 men, and 200 Indians. But, the French General having been deceived, by the information of deserters from General Johnson's camp, with an opinion of its want of cannon, and of its defenceless state, which made it more exposed and much easier to be surprized than Fort Edward, where several pieces of cannon were mounted, he was prevailed upon by the common voice of his troops (when he was within four miles and a half, from Fort Edward, the first object of this expedition) to proceed to the attack of the camp, which he expected to be without cannon, and without lines and breast-work.

Though this alteration in the enemy's rout, did in all probability save Fort Edward; it had like to have cut off the whole detachment, under Colonel Williams. For, Williams had not marched two hours, before his detachment fell into the very mouths of the French. However, the Colonel behaved with great gallantry and prudence, and maintained his ground for a considerable

time,

The detachment
defeated.

A. D.
1755.

time, till obliged by numbers to fall back. Hereupon began some confusion: several companies fled, and made the best of their way to the camp; which had been already alarmed, at first, by their firing in the skirmish, and more effectually by the fugitives. So that the General detached Lieut. Colonel Cole with 300 fresh men, who came time enough to stop the enemy's pursuit, and to cover the retreat of the English, who otherwise might have been entirely cut off. This alarm gave Johnson time to strengthen his front with heavy cannon, to take possession of some eminencies on his left flank, and to fix a field piece in a very advantageous situation.

The French, flushed with this advantage, pushed forwards in a very regular order towards the center; and had they attacked the camp, which was then all in confusion, it is probable, they might have succeeded and obtained an easy victory. But Providence had ordained better things for us: The enemy, without any apparent reason, instead of attacking the breast-work directly, halted at about 150 yards from the camp, and began the attack at such a distance with platoon-firing, that it did no execution against troops covered by a strong breast-work; and this ineffectual fire so raised the spirits of the English forces, that, having prepared their artillery, during the time the enemy halted, (which was served well under the direction of Captain Eyre) they soon dispersed the Indians and Canadians, by a brisk discharge of grape shot, who fled into the woods on each side the

French at-
tack Gen.
Johnson's
camp.

A. D.
1755.

Deserted
by the
Indians
and Cana-
dians.

the camp, and sought for defence from the trees and bushes, behind which they hid themselves.

The French, deserted by the Indians and Canadians, instead of retreating, as prudence directed, fell into another error. Their General, not able with his small number of regulars to make a close attack upon the front of the camp, which he, contrary to his intelligence, found well fortified and lined with cannon, attempted in vain to penetrate the breast-work, first on the left, and then on the right. These several attempts served only to weaken and dispirit his men, who suffered greatly by the fire from the camp: and they being at last thrown into confusion, General Johnson's men, and his Indians, about four o'clock, without waiting for orders, jumped over their breast-work, attacked the enemy on all sides, killed between

Repulsed
and defeat-
ed.

seven and 800, took 30 prisoners, and dispersed those, that were able to fly with the most speed. Amongst the prisoners was their General, the very Baron Dieskau, who sailed with the fleet from Brest, and escaped Admiral Boscawen, under favour of thick fogs and hard gales of wind, in his voyage to Quebec. He was found alone, dangerously wounded, and supporting himself on the stump of a tree, a little distance from the field of battle. The loss on our side chiefly fell

Their Gen.
taken.

On the 8th of September, 1755.

Amongst whom was Monsr. St. Pierre, who commanded all the Indians, and the most useful officer the French had in all their expeditions in those parts, and in their treaties with the Indian natives.

upon

upon Colonel Williams's detachment. In which skirmish we lost almost 200 men killed: amongst whom was Colonel Williams, Major Ashley, six captains, and many subalterns. In the camp the loss was very small, and no person of distinction fell but Colonel Titcomb, who was killed. The General and Major Nichols were wounded. Our Indians mourned for the death of the brave old Hendrick our fast friend, the Sachem or chief captain of the Mohocks. They also lost 40 private men.

The commander at Fort Edward, getting information of the attack, which had been intended against himself, being turned and fallen upon General Johnson's camp, detached, about eight o'clock at night, 120 of the New Hampshire regiment, and 90 of the New York regiment, under the command of Captain M^r Ginnes, from his garrison to reinforce the General. But the Indians and Canadians, which had escaped from the slaughter of the French army in the morning, having collected themselves into a body of about 400, and rendezvoused at the place where Williams was defeated, in order to scalp the dead left on that spot, intercepted this detachment about four in the morning. Our brave men, says General Johnson, in his letter to Governor Wentworth, fought them for near two hours, and made a con-

The other Indians, upon the approach of the French, retired from the camp, and did not join General Johnson till the battle was over; which shews, that they were determined to join the conqueror, French or English.

A. D.
1755.
Loss on
our side.

Detachment from
Fort Edward.

Intercepted by the
flying enemy.

A. D. 1755. **Defeat the enemy.** considerable slaughter amongst them, and extricated themselves with the loss of no more than two killed, 11 wounded and five missing. Amongst the wounded was Captain M^c Ginnes, whose wounds proved mortal; of which he died in a few days at General Johnson's camp, whereunto he conducted his party.

M. Dieskau's character.

Monf. le Baron de Dieskau, the French General, was wounded in his leg, and through both his hips; a man in years, an experienced officer, and a person of high consideration in France. He had brought 3171 regular troops under his command, to Quebec, in the late fleet; and had disposed of them partly to garrison Crown Point, and partly in encampments at Ticondaroga, and other advantageous passes between Lake George and Crown Point.

General Johnson's conduct.

The skirmish Captain M^c Ginnes had with the remains of the French army, and the certain account Gen. Johnson had from Dieskau and the officers, in his custody, of the number of regular troops encamped between him and Crown Point, put him greatly upon his guard against a surprize, and to provide the best in his power against a more desperate attack. This determined him not to pursue the fugitives, beyond the probability of a safe retreat. The enemy, he was convinced, were in a disposition to rally, and had reinforcements near at hand: therefore he was watchful to maintain the advantages he had gained, without weakening himself by detaching parties in pursuit of an enemy, whom it might be dangerous to meet: and for several days, till



S^R. WILLIAM JOHNSON .



WILLIAM JOHNSON

till he was thoroughly convinced by his scouts, that there appeared no intentions of the enemy to give him further trouble, he kept his men constantly upon their arms by day, half the whole upon guard by night, and the rest laid down armed and accoutred.

A. D.
1755.

Fruitful minds have endeavoured to lessen the merit of the two Generals, that commanded in chief, on this occasion. Dieskau's conduct is highly arraigned for departing from his first plan of operation, by leaving Fort Edward at the Carrying Place, and attacking the main body of the British forces encamped under the command of General Johnson. They say, that the garrison of Fort Edward did not exceed four or 500, and that the loss of this fort would so have distressed the main camp, as to prevent its proceeding further, and its subsistence where it was. So that the French might have had an opportunity to harress it, in its retreat. What dissuaded the French General from his first opinion was, a certain information that Fort Edward was well garrisoned, and mounted several pieces of cannon, of which he was in want: That should he be detained before that fort, which could not be expected to yield to his summons, its vicinity to the main camp made him liable to be put between two fires, of the cannon of the fort, and of the army under General Johnson, who would certainly endeavour to relieve it: that the army laid exposed in an heedless security, without either cannon mounted, or breast works thrown up to prevent a surprize,

Both Generals defended.
First, M. Dieskau.

A. D.
1755.

which was the real case three days before, when those deserters, that gave him the information, fled from their colours: And that it was more agreeable to the Canadians and Indians to engage an enemy in the woods, where they had no cannon, than in a fort, where their bush-firing could do them no service. Under these circumstances, the most prudent reader will allow that Deistkau ought to be acquitted of misconduct, when he engaged in that attack, which, in the nature of things, promised him more sure success; both in regard to the chance of the issue, the inclination of his whole army, and to the want of artillery, or heavy cannon to reduce the fort.

Second,
General
Johnson.

As for General Johnson. They accuse him of losing the opportunity of totally destroying the French army, by a too reserved restraint upon his men, whom he would not suffer to pursue the flying enemy; and of neglecting to improve his victory by advancing to the attack of the main object of his expedition at Crown Point. But there is no need of refutation or apology, more than that General himself furnishes in his letter to Governor Wentworth; which shews plainly, that he had reason to suspect a renewal of the attack; that it was dangerous to weaken his main body by detachments to scour the country; that the passes to Crown Point were so well provided with regular troops and Indians, that he would find work enough for his strength, to force his way through them, if at all, and then could not, after so much fatigue, and perhaps great loss of men and ammunition,

munition, hope to be in a condition to reduce Crown Point, where their chief force was lodged. Reasons, however they may appear to the captious, sufficiently commended by his Majesty's parliament and government: And for which service, the King created General Johnson a baronet, and the parliament voted him a present of 5000*l.* in reward of his merit.

General Johnson apprehending that he had done all in his power, at a season of the year, which very soon would prevent his keeping the field, and having good reason to think, before he resolved upon his decamping to return home, that the enemy was in no condition to do more than remain upon the defensive, he made the necessary preparations to break up his camp, and returned to Albany, leaving only a small garrison of militia, in a little Stockaded fort, at the higher end of Lake George, to assert the right of his Britannic Majesty to the country round about.

General
Johnson
returns
home.

General Shirley, who took upon himself the command of the expedition against Niagara, did not meet with the like approbation at the British court. His dilatory and defective preparations, on this occasion, at his first setting out promised no great advantages to the common cause. His success chiefly depended upon an early march to the object of his armament. But time was consumed so lavishly, that his first division, Colonel Schuyler's New Jersey regiment did not march from Albany till the beginning of July; and it was near the end of that month, before Shirley's

Expedition
against
Niagara.

General
Shirley's
conduct
censured.

A. D.
1755.

Excuse of
the Indians
not to serve
in the war.

Army ar-
rives at
Oswego.

In want
of every
thing.

and Pepperel's regiments followed; and then they were so dispirited by the news of Braddock's shameful defeat, that many of the troops deserted; and the battoemen in particular were struck with such a panic, that there could not be found enough to carry the necessary stores for the army. However, General Shirley set out with his regiment, and, in his way to Oswego from Albany, endeavoured to strengthen his forces, by applying to the Indians of the Six Nations for their auxiliary aid. But very few joined his army; excusing themselves, as a trading people, from taking any part in the quarrel between the French and English; and insisting that Oswego, being a place of trade, traffic and peace, ought not to be disturbed by either party.

Under these disappointments General Shirley arrived at Oswego^r on the 18th of August; but the rest of his troops and the artillery did not get up there before the last day of that month; and so badly provided with provisions, that it was impossible for them all to proceed to Niagara. He then resolved to draw out six hundred men, and with them to attack Niagara, and to leave 1400 at Oswego, to prevent a surprize from the French fort Frontenac, which was very powerful, and could easily make a descent, a-cross the lake On-

^r About 300 miles west from Albany, where there were 250 men in garrison, under Captain Broadfreet, besides workmen to be employed in building sloops on the lake.

tario, upon Oswego^s. But it was the 26th of September before provisions could be provided for so small a force; and to leave only twelve days short subsistence for the troops left behind: And the boisterous rainy season having begun, which drove many of the Indians home, and made the navigation of the lake Ontario very dangerous; it was by a council of war, after weighing all circumstances, unanimously resolved to defer the attempt upon Niagara, till the next year; and to employ the troops, then at Oswego, in building barracks, and two new forts, one on the side of the river Onondaga, 450 yards distant from the old fort, to command the entrance of the harbour, by the name of Ontario Fort, and the other at the distance of 450 yards west of the old fort, and to bear the name of Oswego New Fort. These were wise dispositions against the superior power of the French Fort Frontenac, which was too strong for Oswego Fort alone. But General Shirley mar'd all the benefit of those councils, by marching on the 24th of October to Albany, and leaving no more than seven hundred men, under Colonel Mercer, both to garrison Oswego, and to complete the two forts, not near finished; and without any possibility of relief in case of a siege by the enemy in the winter.

A. D.
1755.

Resolved
to return
home.

Leaves the
country,
&c. expos-
ed to the
enemy.

^s Situated on the south bank of the lake, consisting of a stone wall, and mounted with five cannon, three or four pounders, and otherwise in a very bad defenceless condition, when General Shirley arrived there.

A. D.
1755.
General
Shirley
summons's
all the Go-
vernors to
Albany.

General Shirley set out from Oswego in a whale boat on the 24th of October, attended by some battoes, and arrived at Albany on the 4th of November. On the 2d of December he, by circular letters, summoned the several Governors upon the Continent, as far westward as Virginia, to meet him there, in order to form a council of war, which, by his Majesty's instructions to him, was to consist of as many Governors and Field-Officers of his Majesty's troops, as could attend.

This council met on the 12th, but consisted of a very few. Mr. Shirley laid before them his Majesty's instructions to General Braddock, and then delivered his own sentiments to the board, which were, at all events, to secure the navigation of lake Ontario; that 6000 troops should be employed to reduce the French forts on that lake, and 10,000 against Crown Point: to which they agreed. There was a proposal to renew the expedition against Fort du Quesne, and to attack the French in the river Chaudiere, but that was consented to only conditionally, provided it could be done without interfering with the two principal expeditions. The council then unanimously declared it to be their opinion, that it would be impossible to recover and secure his Majesty's just rights without an additional number of regular forces, besides those already upon that Continent, and, as the French were building vessels of force at Frontenac, they ordered a snow, a brigandine and





O C E A N

A New & Accurate MAP of
NORTH AMERICA

Including the
British Acquisitions gaind
BY
the late WAR.
1763.

Bermudas
Iles



and a sloop to be built with all diligence at Fort Oswego. A. D. 1755.

As many passages in the American war, which will come under your eye and consideration, must lose their proper effect, and be rendered abstruse and unsatisfactory in regard to the right, importance and limits of the British Empire upon the Continent of North America, it will be necessary to give you some account of the manner Great Britain became possessed of those territories in the new world; to explain their benefit to their mother country, and to describe the limits of the several provinces, and the nature of the French encroachments, with some topographical remarks on those particular places, which more immediately come under the cognizance of this History.

An account of North America.

To fix the original right to our possessions in North America, it is necessary to go back to the age, in which the powers of Europe were first inspired with the spirit of making discoveries in what was, at that time, the unknown world.

When this new world was first discovered.

Columbus, who first offered his service to our Henry the Seventh, to sail in quest of a new part of the globe, being neglected in England, had alarmed Europe with his discoveries in the service of Spain; by which tenure only the Spaniards hold their islands and that vast extent of territory, which were, in a course of years and various attempts, discovered in South America, from whence they drew such immense riches, as amaze the whole world. Two years after Cabot, a Vene-

By Columbus.

A. D. 1498. Italian born, but settled at Bristol, a maritime port,
 1755. at that time of great repute in the western parts
 By Cabot. of England, being well skilled in cosmography
 and navigation, naturally inferred from the discoveries made by Columbus in the south-west, that there was as much probability of success in ploughing the Atlantic Ocean towards the north-west, presented a memorial to King Henry VII. setting forth, that he made no doubt, but if his Majesty would please to employ him, he could make some useful discoveries, in his name, and find out islands and countries abounding with rich commodities, no ways inferior in value to those already discovered by Columbus in the service of the King of Spain.

King Henry VII. hearkened to the proposal, and commissioned John Cabot "and his three sons" to sail in quest of unknown lands, and to annex them to the crown of England; with this clause, *which before this time have been unknown to all Christians*. His first essay, as related by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who was employed in the like service afterwards by Queen Elizabeth, was to discover a north-west passage to Cathay or China; in which voyage he sailed very far eastward, with a quarter of the north, on the north side of *Terra de Labrador*, till he came into the

* See Peter Martyr Hist. Ind. Occiden. and Rapin.

" Hacklun's Voyages, vol. III. p. 4. and Rymer's Fœdera, A. D. 1498.

371 This commission was dated the 5th of March, in the 11th year of Henry VIII. north

A. D.
1755.

north latitude of sixty-seven degrees and a half. In his next voyage, which was made with his son Sebastian, in the year 1497, he steered to the south-side of *Labrador*, and fell in with the Island of *Baccalaos*, which is Newfoundland, and took possession both of that island and all the coast of the north-east part of America, as far as cape Florida; which he also, by landing in several parts of it, claimed in the name of his master the King of England.

In memory of this discovery, and by way of evidence, there was a map or chart of the whole coast of North America, drawn by Sebastian Cabot himself, with his picture and this title, Effigies Seb. Caboti Angli, Filii Jo. Caboti, Venetiani, Militis Aurati, &c. and with the following account of the discovery above-mentioned,

“ In the year of our Lord 1497, John Cabot,
“ a Venetian, and his son Sebastian (with an English fleet) set out from Bristol, and discovered
“ that land, which no man had before attempted.
“ This discovery was made on the 24th of June
“ about five o’clock in the morning. This land
“ he called *Prima Vista* (or *the first seen*) because
“ it was that part, of which they had the first
“ sight from the sea. It is now called *Bonavista*.
“ The island, which lies out before the land, he
“ called the Island of *St. John*, probably because
“ it was discovered on the festival of *St. John Baptist*.”

This map was hung up in his Majesty’s privy-gallery at Whitehall; and, it is to be feared, the nation

A. D.
1755.

nation was deprived of such a valuable testimonial of their American title to the whole coast of North America, by the fire, which destroyed that gallery in the late King William's reign.

Authors ^x, who confirm this account, and are more creditable, for having lived nearer the time this discovery was made, write that Cabot, having sailed beyond the cape of *Labrador*, till he had passed 58 degrees, and being stopt in the month of July with cold and ice, turned again towards the west, refreshed himself at *Baccalaos* or Newfoundland, and afterwards sailed along the coast (of the Continent) unto 38 degrees, from whence he shaped

Extent of
his discovery.

his course to return to England. By which we are authorized to comprehend Hudson's Bay, with the adjacent countries and the banks of Newfoundland, under the dominion of the British crown: A territory which extends, along the sea coast, seventeen hundred miles, in a direct line. But as Hudson's Bay has not been concerned in the present contest, it will suffice to confine this subject to the territory trading from Cape Charles on the south-east point of Terra Labrador to Cape Florida; including the islands and fishing banks upon that extensive coast, and by right of discovery, as there were no Christian power had any settlement thereon, or claim thereto, or even know-

^x See Francis Lopez de Gomera, a Spaniard, in his History of the West Indies, book II. c. 4.

Peter Martyr. Decad. 3. ch. 6.

Baptista Romulus in the Preface to his 3d vol. of Navigations. And Hakluyt's Voyages, vol. III.

ledge

ledge thereof, comprehending all the heathen possessions and immense wildernesses, to the utmost extent of that Continent westward, as far as it is bounded by the South-sea.

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1755.

In this light it is certain the powers of Europe, to whom Henry VII. of England notified the possession he had taken of the premises, by his captains the Cabots, father and son, understood this discovery to exclude their commissions and navigators from this coast and these islands and banks: for we read of no attempt of that sort within these limits, till a lust of dominion, a rivalry in trade and navigation, and a natural antipathy and envy, which the French took up against our nation, prompted them to set a-foot new commissions for paring the territories and districts of other Christian nations in the new world. They succeeded most in the West Indies, where they got possession of those islands, from whence they draw so great national resources by trade and navigation. Nor did they fail, in a course of years, to explore the coast of North America. But with that secrecy, as to make a strong lodgment in the most obscure part thereof, before it was probable to interrupt their operations, and to drive them off. Thus favoured by the indolence and neglect of the English, who did not pay that due regard to the improvement of their North American regions, they stole up the bay and river of St. Lawrence, and fortified themselves at Quebec, by which influence they obtained a great extent of land, by them called Canada, and have maintained

First attempt of the French.

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1755.

tained that usurpation by force, till conquered in the present war.

The death of Henry VII. and the schemes carried on by his son and successor Henry VIII. to enslave his subjects, to satisfy his lust, and to rob the religious foundations, by introducing a religion of his own invention; (for he was no otherwise a Protestant, than as he abolished the Pope's supremacy in England, still retaining the worst of doctrines, and the spirit of persecution against all dissenters from his six sanguinary articles) interrupted the laudable and profitable adventures, set on foot with so much success, for discoveries and the settlement of unknown countries, inhabited only by heathens.

Neglect of
our disco-
veries.

The island
of New-
foundland.

Newfoundland being the first land mentioned in Cabot's discovery, we begin with its description. It is an island of a triangular form, about 930 miles in circumference, separated on the north, from Terra de Labrador by the streight of Bellisle, which runs north-east, and is about 23 miles over in its narrowest part. On the west it has the gulph of St. Lawrence, and on the south and east the western or great Atlantic ocean. Cape Race or Raz is the most southerly point of the island, and lies in $46^{\circ} 45''$ north lat. the most northern point is in lat. $51. 30.$ so that the greatest length of the island from north to south is 280 miles. And as Cape Raye is its most westerly point, in north lat. $47. 35.$ the distance between it and Cape Race is about 240 miles.

This

This island abounds with spacious and excellent bays and harbours; and is otherwise well supplied with fresh springs and waters. The produce of the land, though it might be made, by industry, to turn to some account, is not the consideration of the adventurers, whose principal, and indeed only care is to enrich themselves by the cod-fish trade upon its coast; which fish is so plentiful in this sea, as to be sufficient to supply the whole world; including what is taken on the banks, which are vast mountains concealed under water, as if nature had designed them for inexhaustible magazines of cod-fish. Besides, from the livers of these fish the adventurers draw off great quantities of train oil, of which they make a considerable advantage. And as this navigation brings up the best and great numbers of seamen, and there is a great demand in France, Spain, Portugal and Italy for Newfoundland fish, an exclusive right to this trade and navigation, which we are intitled to by priority of discovery, is of the greatest consequence to England; as it serves, at the same time, to enrich and strengthen ourselves, and deprives other nations of the like means to supply themselves with fish, and to man their navies.

The Continent, under this discovery, has by several grants, from time to time, been divided into a number of provinces and districts, of which Nova Scotia is the most eastern settlement.

The Continent.

Nova

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Nova Scotia or Acadia.

When first settled by the English.

Ceded to the French.

Undergoes several revolutions.

Nova Scotia or Acadia, as to its antient boundaries has already been described in the demand made by the British commissaries upon the French King, for the faithful performance of that part of the treaty of Utrecht, which cedes Nova Scotia or Acadia, according to its antient boundaries to his Britannic Majesty.

This province was first settled by the English, before the year 1602, which the French historians allow to be two years, before their navigators skulked up the gulph of St. Lawrence, and made a lodgment on the northern borders of this country. In 1620 the crown granted all that part of Acadia, as far as the 48th degree of north lat. to the council of Plymouth or New England; and in the next year the council of New England resigned to the crown all parts of their grant to the north of the river St. Croix, when it was then granted with the rest of Acadia to Sir William Alexander, Secretary of State for Scotland, and by him, or his charter, named Nova Scotia, instead of Acadia. In 1623 all Acadia or Nova Scotia was given in marriage with King Charles the First's daughter to the French King. Sir David Kirk took it from the French in 1627; but it was again ceded to France by the treaty of St. Germain. In 1654 Cromwel reduced it. But King Charles II. in 1662, without any regard to the remonstrances of New England and his parliament, against admitting the French so near to our colonies, delivered it up again; and confirmed its possession to

See before, p. 50.

France

France by the treaty of Breda in 1667. The New Englandmen labouring under great disadvantages from a French neighbour in that maritime situation, laid hold of the first opportunity of a war to force it again out of the hands of the French, and took it from them in 1690 with 700 men only. But their hopes were once more disappointed; for the treaty of Reswick gave it back to France. However, the time at last came to fix this possession in its original right: For Nova Scotia or Acadia being reduced in 1710 by united forces from Old and New England, it was, as already largely² explained, confirmed to the crown of Great Britain by the treaty of Utrecht, "with its antient boundaries, as also the city of Port Royal, as fully as ever France possessed them by treaty or other means."

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Ceded to
Great Britain
by the
treaty of
Utrecht.

The importance of this settlement to the French was very considerable. In the first place, it opened for them a way to the great western ocean from Canada, and secured a communication between Old France and that back colony, without the delay and hazard of the navigation through the river St. Lawrence: Again, it put them in possession of the banks on that coast, with whose produce they might easily rival, if not beat England out of the cod fishery.

Its importance to the
French.

An author, well acquainted with this subject, remarks, That could France have carried her point in her claim upon Acadia or Nova Scotia,

Remarks
thereon.

² See before, p. 49, 50, and 84, &c.

with

A.D. 1755. with the contiguous islands and Cape Breton, such an acquisition would have made our natural enemies more terrible, than ever, to our colonies: because it might secure to them a superiority in the fishery for ever, and the whole fur-trade of the northern continent: it would provide them with materials for building ships of the greatest force, and with excellent ports and harbours, from whence they might embark and launch into the ocean; instead of the tedious and hazardous navigation down the river St. Lawrence. So that in proportion as France should be deprived of these advantages, Great Britain, by retaining the possession of Acadia or Nova Scotia, maintains her superiority in the fishery and in those seas, and preserves her colonies from the encroachments and threats of their enemies, or rivals in trade. France was so sensible of the ruin of all her fine plans, for the extent and improvement of her Canadian colony; and for the destruction of the British power, interest and trade on the Continent of North America; should she not be able by negotiation or force to maintain her perfidious claim to Acadia, that we have seen all her policy, riches and strength employed, in this war, to get it once more into her actual possession.

New England first settled, and composed of four Provinces.

New England, which was begun to be inhabited in the year 1606, by patent from King James I. is now composed of the provinces of New Hampshire, Massachusets Bay, Rhode Island and Connecticut; which have, in course of time, confederated for their common support against

against the several attempts made by the French A. D. 1755.
on their back settlements : For, so early as the year 1611, the French made encroachments upon the New England patent, and endeavoured to secure their usurpation by several forts at mount Mansel, St. Croix, and Port Royal; and were making dispositions for further invasions, when Sir Samuel Afsall drove them off, dismantled their fortifications, and carried away both their artillery and stores *.

Encroachments by the French.

At present, and for many years, New England abounds with trading towns, of which Boston, the metropolis of the province of Massachusetts Bay, is the first city of all North America. It contains ten churches, and about 30,000 inhabitants, is built on a peninsula at the bottom of a capacious harbour, defended from the violence of the ocean by several islands and rocks, that appear above water; and from an enemy by a regular fortress at the narrow entrance of the river. The chief branch of trade in this city seems to be in fish, which employs a vast number of people; but the inhabitants also drive a brisk trade with the West Indies for lumber and provisions; and with England in masts, yards, pitch, tar, turpentine and staves, and some peltry. Besides, by taking molasses in return for lumber on the sugar islands, the people of Boston have ingrossed the Indian trade on that Continent for spirituous liquors, and supply the British colonies in North

The town of Boston.

* See Harris, Part I. p. 851. 1st Edition.

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America, the Newfoundland fishery, and the greatest part of the commerce on the coast of Guinea, with a kind of rum distilled from that barter. But nothing does the industry of the New England-men more honour, than the number of ships built in their ports. By which they draw great sums from other countries, and have become carriers for most of the other colonies. They have manufactures of hats, linnen and woollen; and on all occasions, when called out for war, have distinguished themselves in courage; and therefore the French have always been endeavouring to creep down upon them, and to circumscribe both their trade and power; which has been particularly manifested by building Fort Cohasset and Fort Frederic or Crown Point, a considerable way within their acknowledged frontier. These confederate provinces contain about 350,000 inhabitants, including a small number of blacks and Indians.

New York
settled by
Swedes and
Dutch.

New York is the next colony to the south. It was first settled by the Swedes, and by the name of New Sweden; and afterwards the name of New Netherland was imposed by the Dutch, who got footing on the Delaware river by the help of Henry Hudson, an English commander of a ship, fitted out by the Dutch East India company to find a nearer passage to China. Who, failing in his discovery by the north west, steered for the coast of Florida, pushed into the river, and made a lodgment at the place, where New York now stands, in the year 1609. Which, in a few

a few years, throve so well, under the influence and aid of the United Provinces in Europe, that the Swedes were obliged to submit to their jurisdiction. But as soon as our national strength and spirit revived after the restoration, the English asserted their right; and the Dutch not able to resist the force sent to reduce them, or to drive them off, submitted to the King of England on promise of being protected in their persons and properties, in the year 1664. King Charles II. had granted this territory to his brother the Duke of York by letters patent, before the expedition failed; and therefore it was immediately named New York in compliment to his Royal Highness the Proprietor.

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Driven out
by the Eng-
lish.

This province is about 50 miles in breadth, within which compass lies Long Island, on the south of Connecticut. But it extends on both sides of the river Hudson, northerly, about 200 miles, till it meets with the Iroquois or Indians of the Five Nations.

Long
Island,

Hudson River is navigable almost 200 miles. At its mouth is the island Manahatton, 14 miles long and five broad, which forms an excellent harbour, and contains the capital city, also named New York. In which are upwards of 8000 inhabitants, who drive a good trade in corn, flour and other species of provisions to the West Indies. It is neatly built, and has four churches. At the distance of 150 miles stands the town of Albany, upon the same river; which, though not large nor populous, is a place of great trade

Hudson's
River,

Town of
New York.

Town of
Albany,

A.D. 1755. with the Indians, who come here to barter their goods for powder and shot, fire arms and cutlery ware, coarse woollen cloths and linnen, &c. And this is the place where all transactions and treaties are negotiated between the English and Iroquois; once the most powerful of all the heathens on that Continent, but so enervated by the use of spirituous liquors chiefly, that their whole confederate nation is not able to bring above 1500 men into the field, though augmented by the Tuscororas, an Indian tribe, which was driven from the confines of Carolina, and joined in their confederacy.

Iroquois
Indians.

It is computed that the province of New York, including Long Island, contains 80,000 inhabitants. It should seem, from the situation of Crown Point, between lakes Champlain and Sacrament, which stands at least thirty miles within the river Iroquois, that the French must have gained over those Indians to their interest, so, at least, as to stand neuter upon any breach between them and the English; which is confirmed by their answer to General Shirley's invitation to accompany him to Niagara; and that they were fortifying a road, that in a little time might put them in possession of Hudson's river; which could be easily performed from Quebec, by the river Richelieu and the lake Champlain and George; and, consequently, gain them a settlement in the heart of our colonies, and a safe and easy communication with the western ocean. The Mohok Indians inhabit the country advanced from Albany.

New

New Jersey lies in a southerly direction from New York, and is that piece of land, which is inclosed between the boundaries of New York and the river Dalaware, on the west, about 150 miles in length, and 50 miles broad, containing about 50,000 souls. It is so advantageously situated between New York and Pensylvania, that its back settlements have little to fear from the hostile Indians: and this small tract of land excels in grain and in all kinds of provisions and fruits, particularly in peaches and melons. Its forests, which are large, abound with oak, ash, beech, cedar, chestnut, cypress, wallnut-tree, pine, sassafras and hickery. Both this country and New York produce good hemp and flax. All which commodities the inhabitants send to the markets of New York and Pensylvania, though there is a very commodious harbour, capable of receiving ships of great burden, at Perth-Amboy, its capital, which is very thinly inhabited; though the province is supposed to contain about 60,000 souls.

Pensylvania stretches southerly from New York and New Jersey, 250 miles in length, and 200 in breadth, having no communication with the sea, except by the mouth of the Delaware; containing above 250,000 inhabitants, who carry on a large commerce with Europe and the West Indies: and the importance of this colony to its mother country, may be gathered from the value of the imports from England, which in the year 1757 amounted to 268,426l. 6s. 6d. sterling. Philadelphia, its capital, is an extraordinary large,

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1755.

New Jersey.

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1755.
The town
of Phila-
delphia.

rich and flourishing city, built on a tongue of land, at the conflux of the Dalaware and Schu-
kel, two navigable rivers, in the form of a regular oblong; with broad, spacious and uniform streets, cross each other at right angles, leaving proper spaces for public edifices. The houses are also neatly built of brick, and there are commodious docks for building of ships. But one great misfortune attends this opulent and numerous people, whose religious principles of Quakerism, being too pacific, have encouraged the subtle French to hover more about their borders than some other of their neighbours. They even erected a fort on their property, at Lake Erie, and another at some distance to the southward of the River Au Beuf, besides other encroachments, unmolested.

Maryland.

Maryland, in length about 140 miles, and almost of the same breadth, spreads along the Bay of Chesapeak, bounded on the north by Pensylvania, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the south by the river Potowmack. Its number of white inhabitants do not exceed 40,000: But their negro slaves are upwards of 60,000, by whose labour they cultivate and manufacture 40,000 hogheads of tobacco, which is the staple commodity of their province. Their capital is called Annapolis, beautifully situated on the river Patuxent.

Virginia.

Virginia, which is now properly so called, and distinguished as a province on this continent, is the next settlement to the southward, bounded on the north, by the river Potowmack; on the east,
by

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1755.

by the bay of Chesapeak; on the south, by Carolina; and without any limits to the westward; though the plantations have not yet extended beyond the Allegany mountains; making in length about 240 miles, and in breadth not more than 200 miles. The white people in this province are computed to be 70,000, and the blacks many more; employed chiefly as in Maryland, and raising much the same quantity of tobacco, which is the staple commodity of this province; though Great Britain is supplied from hence with a considerable quantity of flax, hemp, iron, staves, wallnut-tree and Cedar-planks; and a good trade is carried on with the West Indies in lumber, pitch, tar, corn and provisions.

This province abounds with vast forests of timber, and produces plenty of corn, and every sort of fruit in great abundance and perfection.

The Bay of Chesapeak runs from south to north 300 miles into the country, covered from the western ocean by the east side of Maryland, and a small part of Virginia on the same Peninsula, and receiving many rivers on both sides; as James river, York river, Rappahannock, and Potowmack.

As to its towns. James Town, its antient capital, is dwindled into a village; and the present seat of government, named Williamsburg, is neither large nor populous.

The Carolinas, bounded on the north by Virginia, form a shore on the western ocean of 400 miles and upwards; extending in breadth near

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1755.

300 to the lands inhabited by the Cutabaws;^b Creeks,^c Cherokees,^d and Chickefaws.^e

They are divided into two provinces, the north and the south. North Carolina is most populous, and carries on a very considerable trade in tar, pitch, turpentine, staves, shingles, lumber, corn, peas, pork, beef, tobacco, deer-skins, indigo, wheat, rice, bees-wax, tallow, bacon, hogs-lard, timber, &c. Its chief town is small and called Edenton. But the capital of South Carolina, called Charles town, is commodiously situated at the conflux of two navigable rivers, with a commodious harbour; contains about 800 houses well built, and is well fortified. The trade of this province is much in the same things, as in North Carolina; excepting its staple commodities of rice and indigo, which here are cultivated with good success.

Georgia.

Georgia, the most southern of all our settlements on this coast, extends about 60 miles along the sea shore, and runs almost 300 miles from thence to the Apalachian mountains, widening in the inland parts to above 150 miles in breadth:

^b They live in the middle of our plantations, about 200 miles from Charles Town.

^c Inhabit a beautiful country, beginning at about 500 miles from Charles Town, and running westward within 100 miles of the Mississippi; and are accounted a brave and wise people.

^d Distant 500 miles from Charles Town, and 200 miles from the nearest English settlement.

^e Live about 600 miles west of Charles Town, and are a brave, friendly and faithful people.

But thinly inhabited. It is bounded on the south, by the river Attamaha, not far from the late Spanish fort of St. Augustine. The inhabitants raise large quantities of rice and indigo; and have made some progress in the culture of silk. Its capital is named Savannah, commodiously situated on a river of the same name, about 10 miles from the sea. It has another town named Augusta, about 200 miles higher up that river, navigable for large boats; at which town the Georgians carry on a profitable trade for skins, with the Creeks, Chickesaws, and the Cherokees, who are at present the most respectable tribes of Indians, both for number and strength.

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1755.

The towns
of Savan-
nah and
Augusta.

Let us now resume the thread of our history. The hostilities commenced in the North American seas, as well as on that Continent, gave such a turn to the spirit of the nation, which received the news with the greatest joy, as obliged the government to proceed; it being too late to retreat. And, as the war was expected to be confined to the sea, and to operations in North America, depending upon a superiority on the ocean, they pretended to strike such a stroke, as to deprive the French at once of the means to man their fleets. But this amounted to no more than an order for our ships of war to make reprisals upon the French, by taking all their ships, wherever they should be met; and to dispatch Sir Edward Hawke, with 18 men of war,^f to wait for the French fleet, un-

The mea-
sures taken
by the Bri-
tish court.

Reprisals
made.

^f On the 21st of July.

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1755.

Admiral
Hawke's
cruise.

der the command of M. de Guay, who had put into Cadiz; and was expected shortly to return to Brest. Sir Edward's orders were, to cruize off Cape Finesterre till the French fleet came in sight: than which no station could have been appointed so favourable to the French. It was ordered upon the mere presumption, that the French fleet must fail in that tract and in no other, leaving the whole Bay of Biscay, and the Atlantic Ocean, as far as the English channel, open, for the course of M. du Guay's fleet, as well as for the return of the ships from North America, which du Guay had been sent out to convoy safe into port. Accordingly M. du Guay soon got intelligence of Admiral Hawke's strength and station, and the purposes for which he had orders to lie there: And like a skilful seaman, the French Admiral seized the opportunity of the English squadrons confinement, so far distant from Brest; and, departing from Cadiz, steered directly west from Spain into the Atlantic Ocean, and, at a great distance from the coast changing his course, he stood directly for the Lands End of England; whereby he avoided Admiral Hawke's fleet, cruising off Cape Finesterre, arrived safe in the British channel, fell in behind it with his squadron, and got safe into the harbour of Brest^s on the 3d of Sept.

Upon advice of du Guay's safe return, Adm. Hawke was called home; where he arrived on the 29th of September. The ministry in order

^s See the Observation concerning this measure, on p. 132.

to stop the clamour of the people, who were greatly exasperated at their imprudent conduct on this occasion, pretended to strike some extraordinary blow by another fleet of 22 ships of the line and six frigates. But, it is evident, this was only intended for a temporary expedient to cover themselves from national resentment: for, this squadron, committed to the command of Admiral Byng, sailed on October the 14th, and returned on the 22d of November, from a western cruise, which was all the service he was directed to perform. Commodore Frankland was sent to the West Indies with four men of war, under the like instructions. By this commission for reprisals, the French trade was distressed, and their navy deprived of a great body of seamen. For before the end of the year, our cruisers brought 300 merchant ships, many of which were very rich, from St. Domingo and Martinico; and 8000 sailors, into our ports. By which the French government were distressed for men, and the merchants and manufacturers were ruined.

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1755.

Admiral
Byng's
cruise.

French
trade dis-
tressed.

But this violent proceeding, without a formal declaration of war, on the part of Great Britain was loudly impeached of injustice, and breach of faith by the French ministry, and not greatly approved of by many thinking people at home.

Remarks
on the
measures
of the Bri-
tish mini-
stry.

A pamphlet soon appeared with remarks on this measure; the author of which said, "Whilst the French are palpably obnoxious to the charge of having been originally the incendiaries of the war; whilst the English have, on the other hand,

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1755.

hand, the justest of causes to maintain against the open invasions of their rights and properties, it seems the fate of this nation, never to *imitate* the French, but in those points, which redound to the reproach of their taste, and of their honour.

The French, it is true, set us an example of committing hostilities without a previous declaration of war. But was such an example to be followed? Or can the matter we blame, be given as a reason, and a sanction for our own proceeding? If they violated the sacred law of nations, in their unformal attack upon a fort, in an obscure, remote spot of America, the old fair English way was, to have instantly declared war, and to have repelled their perfidy in a manner more suitable to the dignity of the nation.

To urge, that it was apprehended Spain would have joined with France, had Great Britain declared war first, is a weak supposition. For an open act of hostility is a more effectual declaration of war, than mere words in form. And we had that advantage of the French. Nothing was more easy than to prove it.

The failure then of this essential form, has furnished the French with that handle for declaiming against us, of which they have taken such advantage.

The hostilities begun and committed by them in a corner of North America, though to the full, as real breaches of the peace, as any we have since retaliated upon them, were not of that glaring and universally striking nature, as the predatory

tory war carried on by us upon the sea, which was spread with their merchantmen, secure, as they had reason to apprehend, upon the faith of a peace; of which this rupture had, as to them, received no sanction of a declaration of war; and surely such a measure could not, humanly speaking, fail of bringing it on: So that, to treat them only as provisional captures, is as false, with respect to politics, as it is with respect to the law of nations. Indeed, nothing could have been contrived more effectually to give such a good cause, as ours, the air and face of a bad one.

This was then playing the game agreeable to the desires of the French. They could not but feel the damage; but though the merchantile interest was very dear to them, it was considered as subordinate to their general system: Therefore, in this case, they bore the injury with national fortitude, and secretly solaceing themselves in this reflection, That by such an act of precipitation in politics, the English were doing themselves greater, and even irreparable damage in the opinion of the public, and had given them a fair opportunity to vindicate their own breach of faith in the repairs of Dunkirk, which they had, ever since the treaty of Utrecht, made a capital object of their councils.

Advices from the East Indies, this year, complained of a want of strength, in the English, to maintain their former advantages over the French and their allies: and that a negotiation, set on foot between Mr. Saunders, the English govern-

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Affairs of
East Indies.

A negotiation
set on
foot with
Mons. Du-
pleix.

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1755.

His forgery
discovered.

governor, and M. Dupleix, had miscarried; the commissaries on our part having detected a forgery in the commissions, under which Dupleix pretended to act from the Great Mogul, appointing him Governor General, from the river Kristna to the sea.^b

Hostilities
renewed.

The congress broke up, and hostilities continued, as usual, in the neighbourhood of Trinopolis. The English were in possession of the town, and the enemy well encamped upon the island before it, with a large body of cavalry, and the river every where fordable.

This situation of the enemy was of great disadvantage to parties sent out for provisions and stores, which could not be avoided. In the month of February 1754, they cut off a party of two captains, six officers, 180 men rank and file, four pieces of cannon, 800 Sepoys, and about 7000 pounds of money, with a large convoy of provisions, by a party of 120 French infantry, about the same number of deserters, a French troop of about 80, 6000 Sepoys, a large body of Maissore cavalry, and the Marattas, making in all about 10,000, with seven pieces of cannon: And it was with great courage and conduct, that another convoy escaped the like fate, on the 12th of May following. In which skirmish we lost

^b They discovered that it was a false seal fix'd to the Saned or grant, called the Mogul's; and another had no date. Every grant from the Mogul is authenticated not only with a small seal, on which is engraven the name of the Mogul, but also with that of his Vassals.

about 200 Sepoys, 59 private men, killed and wounded, and six officers wounded. In this hazardous situation, our Indian war continued the whole summer, till it was happily concluded by an unforeseen negotiation.

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1755.

The French East India company, having great reason to be disgusted with M. Dupleix's conduct, which served to enrich himself, and to extend his own power, so far, as to make them jealous of his design to raise himself to the dignity of an independent Eastern Prince, and to establish his government at their expence, and perhaps upon their ruin in those parts; and dreading the consequences of a war with the English, on that trading coast, in case of a rupture between Great Britain and France, which they were not able to support; endeavoured to get clear of Dupleix, and to establish a good harmony with the English East India company at the same time: Having also intelligence, that the British ministry had already dispatched Rear Admiral Watson, and Rear Admiral Pocock, with a squadron^k of capital ships, and Colonel Adlercroon's regiment, to support the British interest beyond the Line; they immediately dispatched M. Godeheu, with a commission of Com-

Resolutions of the French East India company.

Admirals Watson and Pocock sail for E. Indies.

ⁱ In March 1754.

^k Consisting of the Kent 70 guns, Captain Speke, with Rear Admiral Watson on board: the Cumberland, 66 guns, Captain Harrisson, with Rear Admiral Pocock on board; the Tyger, 60 guns, Captain Latham; the Salisbury, 50 guns, Captain Knowles; the Bridgwater, 20 guns, Captain Martin; and the King's Fisher sloop, 14 guns, Captain Smith.

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1755.

Dupleix
superced-
ed.

missary General and Governor General of all their settlements, and 1500 Europeans, and with instructions to supercede M. Dupleix in his government, and to do his endeavours to strike up a provisional treaty of armistice and pacification with the governor of Fort St. George, and with the other English settlements on that coast.

M. Gode-
heu's paci-
fic conduct.

M. Godeheu executed his commission with dexterity and honour. He, on his arrival, found the English squadron upon the coast. A truce, if possible to be gained, admitted of no delay; and in order to conciliate a good opinion of his pacific intentions, he, immediately upon his landing, sent back the troops which M. Dupleix had stopped¹ in their passage from Madras to Fort St. George, and detained prisoners ever since at Pondicherry; and at the same time signified his inclination to pursue pacific measures, and proposed a suspension of arms between the two European grand commercial companies.

Such a sudden change in the French was highly acceptable to the English. The governor and council by their dispatch and promise concurred with M. Godeheu in this work, and it was soon after^m agreed to suspend all hostilities: and on the 26th of December 1754, articles of a provisional treaty, and articles and stipulations of a truce, were signed by Thomas Saunders, Esq; President for the honourable East India company on the coast of Coromandel and Orixá, of Fort St.

A cessation
of hostili-
ties.A provi-
sional
treaty be-
tween the
two com-
panies.¹ See before, p. 77.^m On the 11th of Oct. 1754.

George,

A. D.
1759.

George, on the part of the English united East India company; and by the Sieur Charles Robert Godeheu, Commissary for his Most Christian Majesty; Commander General of all the settlements of the French company on both sides the Cape of Good Hope, and at China; President of all the councils there established, and Director General of the India company of France.

By the provisional treaty it was agreed in the first article, That the two companies, English and French, should renounce for ever all Moorish government and dignity, and never interfere in any difference that may arise between the princes of the country.—In which article the conduct of M. Dupleix is particularly pointed at and condemned, whose ambition had put him upon every device of arms, of intrigue and forgery, to robe himself with the pageantry of an eastern monarch; to force himself into the Moorish government, and to pillage the Nabobs, &c. of their treasure; ever fomenting difference between the Princes of the country, that he might by some means come in for a part of the spoil.

The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th articles, relate to the settlements of both nations and their districts. By the 8th article, it was agreed, “ That these conditions accepted on both sides, altho’ they are not to be a law for a definitive treaty in Europe, should nevertheless produce a truce between the two nations and their allies, until news be received in India of the answers made in Europe concerning this agreement.”—By

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the

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the 9th article, " That neither nation should be
 " allowed to procure, during the truce, any new
 " grant or cession, or to build forts for the defence
 " of new establishments; but only to rebuild and
 " repair the fortifications now subsisting in the
 " establishments they possessed at that time, in order
 " to prevent their entire ruin."—By the tenth,
 " That until the arrival of answers from Europe
 " to these articles, which were to be dispatched
 " by the first ships, to be submitted to the decision
 " of the two companies, under the pleasure and
 " approbation of the two crowns; the two na-
 " tions should not proceed to any cession, retro-
 " cession, or evacuation of what they now pos-
 " sess, every thing being to remain on the foot-
 " ing of *uti possidetis*."—And lastly, " That in
 " regard to indemnification, the two nations may
 " expect for the expences of the war; This arti-
 " cle should be amicably adjusted in the definitive
 " treaty."

A truce
concluded.

The articles and stipulations of a truce, conclud-
 ed on the same day, and between the same parties
 to promote the re-establishment of tranquility in
 this part of India, were as follow :

Art. I. To take place on the 11th of January
 1755, the day of the expiration of the suspension
 of arms, proclaimed on the 11th of October
 1754: all hostilities shall cease between the English
 and French.

Art. II. During this truce, which shall be in
 force until we are informed in India of the an-
 swers made in Europe concerning the said provi-
 sional

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sional treaty; the troops of the two nations, French and English, shall not act against each other, either as principals or auxiliaries.

Art. III. The two nations, English and French, engage to oblige their allies to observe all that is stipulated for the accomplishment of a truce by virtue of the treaty, and whoever shall dare to infringe it shall be reputed a common enemy, and shall be reduced to good order by force of arms.

Art. IV. If either of the two nations, French or English, or either auxiliary troops or allies, shall commit any act of hostility, possess themselves of any place, or any one shall cause any damage to be done to another during the said truce, both oblige themselves to make reparation, proportionable to the damage and to the entire restitution of whatever shall be taken.

Art. V. If the allies, or other troops in pay of either nation, shall be guilty of any act of hostility, or commit any pillages in the territories whereof either nation is now in possession, it shall be lawful for both nations to repulse their insults by force, by which the injured nation shall not be deemed to have infringed the present agreement.

Art. VI. If the allies or auxiliaries, troops of either nation shall take up arms and insult the countries of which the nation, they are allied to, is now in possession: in this case, the two nations shall assist each other against this enemy, who shall thereby become the common enemy of both.

Art. VII. The troops of the two nations shall be employed, during this truce, in the care of

A. D. 1755. their present establishments and possessions; they may be transported freely, and without any difficulty, from one place to another, at the pleasure of the Governor, Generals, Commanders, &c. of each nation; and all persons actually under the protection of either flag, may likewise go and come at pleasure, without being molested either in their effects or persons.

Art. VIII. Trade shall be free throughout the Carnatick, and in all the countries to the northward of the Coromandel coast, for the two contracting nations: they may fetch merchandizes from all the places in the dependance of each other, and transport them freely, without any restraint, through the respective jageers and territories.

Art. IX. All common enemies, or the particular enemies of either nation, who shall come to attack the English and French in their present possessions, and trouble the tranquillity which is to reign in India, shall be repulsed by the united force of the two nations, French and English.

Art. X. As soon as the truce is proclaimed, the mutual exchange of prisoners shall be set about, man for man, and means shall be resolved on for the ease of those, which shall not be exchanged.

Art. XI. Commissaries shall be appointed on both sides, to examine into the infringements committed by each party, or their auxiliary troops or allies, and settle the restitution to be made of all the places taken, during the truce, against the tenor of the suspension of arms; as likewise of all that may have been taken from them by the said

auxiliary troops, in merchandizes, effects, money, &c. and further to settle in a fixed method, for a guide, during the whole time of the truce, all the names, and the extent of every country, paragonaⁿ, and village, under the power and in the possession of the two nations, English and French.

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Art. XII. It is agreed, that whenever, in the course of the truce, any complaint shall be made by either of the said nations of an infringement of the *fourth* article, the said commissaries on each side appointed, shall certify and examine the fact, that justice may be done accordingly to the injured nation, either by restitution or reparation, according to the nature of the injury received.

Done at Fort St. George, Dec. 31, 1754.

Dated at Pondicherry,

Dec. 26, 1754.

These treaties (though manifestly most favourable to the French, as they left them at liberty to recover from the unnatural state, into which Dupleix had thrown the company's affairs, by his ambition, avarice, and tyranny; had opened a free trade and communication for their undertakings by sea, and left so many essential points to be settled by commissaries, with a people that are known never to determine in such cases, but by the single argument of their own convenience and interest) promised the English considerable relief from the burthen and hazard of war; and they were rendered more satisfactory by the de-

Remarks
on these
treaties.

ⁿ District.

O 3

parture

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parture of M. Dupliex; who was ordered and sent to France by the first ships; and by the friendly conduct of M. De Saussay, commander of the French at Seringham, who, being solicited by Nauderauze, the Maifforean General, with an offer of three lack of rupees, to march off and leave him at liberty to surprize Trichinopoly, in possession of the English, rejected the bribe with disdain.

The truce
broke by
the French.

But, the Sieur Godeheu being returned for Europe, M. de Leyrit, his successor, and M. Bussy, who was left at liberty, in the late treaty, to enlarge the valuable and extensive possessions which the French held in the north, soon convinced the English that the tranquillity was not founded upon such a solid basis, as expected; and that while one side of the country had laid down their arms, there was no security for our extensive concerns and interests in other parts. For, expressly contrary to the ninth article of the provisional treaty it appeared very early in the year 1755, that the French were endeavouring to acquire the dominion of all the provinces of the Deckan°. Bussy demanded of Salabatzing, the possession of the fort of Golconda; and Leyrit took the part of the Polygar of the Velloure, the strongest fort in the province, against his Sovereign the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn; threatening, by letter to the Governor of Madrafs, and by marching 300 French, and as many Sepoys, from Pondicherry,

° See the account of the war in India, by Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq; p. 132.

to support the rebel, and to oppose the English employed by the Nabob to collect his revenues from the tributary Princes, that held under him^p; our fleet having then sailed upon an expedition to reduce the piratical state of Angria, on the Malabar coast, which had for many years infested the trade of Bombay, and greatly endangered the navigation of, not only the English, but of the Dutch, &c. from Europe.

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After this survey of the transactions beyond the seas, let us return to the state of affairs at home. Affairs of Europe.
Where, at the end of September, the admiralty list of the royal navy exhibited a most formidable aspect for our enemies to meditate upon. It consisted then of

1 ship carrying	110 guns	1100 men	British navy.
5 ships carrying	100 —	1000 men, each	
13 —————	90 —	700	
8 —————	80 —	600	
5 —————	74 —	500	
29 —————	70 —	480	
39 —————	60 —	400	
3 —————	54 —	350	
28 —————	50 —	300	
4 —————	44 —	250	
35 —————	40 —	250	
42 —————	20 —	140	
31 carrying from 18 to	10 —	100	

213 Besides a great many bomb ketches, fire ships and tenders.

^p Ibid. p. 117.

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Such a navy was sufficient to oppose the united maritime force of all Europe; whilst that of the French, even at the end of this year, and including the ships upon the stocks, amounted to no more than

French
navy.

6 ships carrying 80 guns

21 ————— 74 —————

1 ————— 72 —————

4 ————— 70 —————

31 ————— 64 —————

2 ————— 60 —————

6 ————— 50 —————

32 frigates

113

French remon-
strance
against
Admiral
Boscawen's
proceed-
ings.Answered
by Sir
Benjamin
Keene.

The French court, as soon as they heard of Admiral Boscawen's taking their two men of war, dressed up a fresh remonstrance against Great Britain to the court of Spain; and represented this action, before a declaration of war, to be a proceeding, that threatened the very dissolution of all faith amongst nations; with a view to draw the Spaniards, at once, into their quarrel. To which Sir Benjamin Keene the British minister to his most Catholic Majesty confronted a strong memorial, importing, "That it was well known, "the French fleet sent to America, carried troops, "ammunition, and every necessary for defending "countries, which the French had unjustly usurped "in North America, and of which the English "claimed the property. That the rules of self-
" defence

“ defence authorize every nation to render fruit-
 “ less any attempt that may tend to its prejudice.
 “ That this right had been made use of only in
 “ taking the two French ships of war, and that
 “ the distinction of place might be interpreted in
 “ favour of the English, seeing the two ships
 “ were taken on the coast of the countries where
 “ the contest arose.” Such was the disposition or
 policy of the Spanish court at this time, that they
 seemed satisfied with Sir Benjamin Keene’s answer
 to the French complaint; though the French mi-
 nister replied with observing, That the hostilities
 of the English had begun in the European seas,
 from whence they had taken and carried a vast
 number of French ships ^p into their ports.

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Reply of
 the French,

But what is more extraordinary, the French
 ministry still maintained an appearance of mode-
 ration, and a desire to accommodate matters with
 Great Britain without coming to blows. It is
 certain, they were afraid of our superiority at sea,
 should it be let loose upon them; and they were
 disappointed of their American scheme, to secure
 their possession by a superiority of European troops,
 &c. before we should be ready to oppose them.
 Therefore any device to curb, or to keep us in-
 active, was the best game they could play. So
 that, after we had carried the national resentment
 to the lengths above related, taking every ship
 our cruisers could meet with, and detaining both
 their cargoes and crews, the French ministry, as
 soon as they heard one of their men of war had
 taken at sea, and brought the Blandford man of

Their pa-
 cific pre-
 tences con-
 tinued.

^p About 195 at this time.

war,

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Blandford
man of war
released
and sent
home.

war, belonging to his Britannic Majesty into Nants, with Mr. Littleton, appointed Governor of Carolina, on board; they ordered the Governor to be set at liberty, and shortly after released both the ship and crew. Whatever might be the motive for this restitution, whether to throw upon us the breach of faith and the commencement of the war, or to provoke us to more moderate measures, it had no effect. Our preparations for sea service were accelerated with incredible activity and expedition. And the French in earnest began to make the best of their case, in order to deprive us of the benefit of a naval war. Their preparations for a land war went on with extraordinary diligence: They made sure of the Empress Queen, our old ally, and marched great numbers of their troops on the coast of the British Channel, to terrify us with an invasion; a scheme that had often delivered them from the power of the British arms, when they were not able to cope with us in open battle.

Threaten
us with an
invasion.

The
King's re-
turn from
Germany.

In the midst of this hurry his Majesty returned from his Electorate, which he left on the 8th of September, and he arrived at his palace at Kensington on the 15th of the same month.

Debates
about the
treaties
with Russia
and Hesse
Cassel.

The first thing his Majesty did was to finish the treaty with Russia, above-mentioned^a, which was ratified on the thirtieth of the same month. But when this and the treaty with Hesse Cassel came before the parliament, they were canvassed

^a See page 135.

with

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with a good deal of dislike: and previous to that, the King of Prussia taking great disgust at the seventh article in his Britannic Majesty's treaty with Russia, which he looked upon as a menace levelled against himself, declared by his ministers in all the courts of Europe, "That he would oppose, with his utmost force, the entrance of any foreign troops into the Empire, under any pretence whatsoever."

King of
Prussia's
declaration
on that oc-
casion.

This spirited declaration by the King of Prussia, at a time France had erected and filled several great magazines in Westphalia, by permission of the Elector of Cologne, and had already marched large bodies of troops towards the frontiers of the Empire, drew overtures from that court immediately. The Duke de Nivernoise was sent to Berlin, and proposed a new alliance with his Prussian Majesty, in order to persuade his Majesty to retract his declaration: and the French Ambassador's reception was such as made England dubious of the King's resolution to abide by what he had declared. In this ambiguity his Britannic Majesty dreading the fate of his Electoral dominions, in case Prussia might be gained over by France, whose forces on the Lower Rhine were provided with magazines, all the way to Hanover, applied also to the court of Prussia, with such advantageous proposals, as made him entirely relinquish all thoughts of further negotiation with the Grand Monarch: Though our treaty with his Prussian Majesty did not take effect till some months after.

Its effect on
France.On Great
Britain.

His

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Queen of
Hungary
refuses to
aid Great
Britain ac-
cording to
treaty.

His Britannic Majesty at the same time demanded the auxiliaries, which he had a right unto by treaties, from the Empress Queen. But, with an unprecedented ingratitude that heiress of the house of Austria, for whose support against France in particular, Great Britain had spent and run our nation in debt more millions than her hereditary dominions are worth, not only absolutely refused to perform her engagements, under the pretence that an American war was not a case of our alliance with her: But afterwards, when required by England also, to defend her barrier towns in the Low Countries, obtained for her family by British blood and treasure, on that express condition, she excused herself from the service, under a pretence of her fears from the King of Prussia.

National
discontent
with the
ministry.

The nation began to be greatly alarmed at the measures of the court. The ministry, notwithstanding the attention given, all this year, to our marine, and the lengths they had run, in making reprisals, and in commencing hostilities in North America, were so perplexed and dispirited with the news of Braddock's defeat, that they seemed wavering in their councils, and more inclined to an accommodation, than to proceed in their demands of satisfaction, and to maintain their national rights, by way of arms. And his Majesty's taking such a powerful army of Russians and Hessians into British pay, without consent of parliament, and, as it was suggested, having drawn upon the Treasury for a part of the money (which

had

had been particularly intended by the vote of credit in the last sessions of parliament for the sea service, and to maintain our possessions in North America) to make good his agreement with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel; this created a jealousy in the people, that it was intended to enter into such continental measures, as would necessarily deprive Great Britain of the means to distress the enemy by sea, and to do herself justice in America.

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The spirit of the nation at this juncture, will best appear from the political observations published by the patriots. It was observed, That the nation had been long under the direction of state empericks; whose only merit had been to skin our wounds and palliate our distempers. That it was now time to search the wound to the bottom, and to apply wholesome and regular medicaments to the almost corrupted body: That the cure, though perhaps painful, must be speedily undergone: because a delay would certainly bring on more dreadful symptoms, and infallibly end in political death. That the nation had been long deluded by the magic sound of words, and some of the principal men had been drove from the throne by odious distinctions and false imputations; whereby the rancour and animosity of parties had been kept up, and the Sovereign deprived of the assistance of some of the ablest of his subjects, most firmly attached to his person and family: That we were loaded with a most heavy debt, and alarmed by imminent dangers from within; and just upon the brink of a war with

Remarks
on the spi-
rit of the
nation.

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1755.

with a great, and our most powerful enemy; the event of which might determine our being, as a free and independent nation. Therefore, that nothing less than a vigorous exertion of our natural rights, and unanimous concurrence, with the divine assistance, in the defence of our liberties, King and country, could prevent us from sinking under the weight of such multiplying and growing evils.

Does not the voice of the people, said they, who pay the taxes, cry loudly at present for a war, to restrain the ambitious views of our perfidious neighbours, the French? So that let those, now concerned for the nation, steer clear of the blunders, mistakes and malpractices, which deprived Great Britain of the advantages expected in the last war; and make the true interest of their country, the sole object of their operations, and they need not doubt of giving satisfaction to the nation.

The interest of this nation is so very plain and obvious, that honesty can never mistake it: we want no extraordinary talents to feel our own strength, or to know our own good. The sea is our element to fight upon, ships are our castles: and our marine is an over-match for all Europe. We may in such a war humble the Grand Monarch, and reduce him to submit to equitable terms of peace. It is as natural for Britain to trust in her fleets, as a bull in his horns, or a lion in his paws. But on the Continent France must
beggar

beggar us and dispose us to accept of the conditions she may please to grant.

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As for subsidiary forces; it was asked, What had the British Empire got by the vast sums of money paid in subsidies to the Dutch, Saxons, Bavarians, Hessians, Hanoverians, Danes, Russians, Prussians, Hungarians, to the King of Sardinia, the Duke of Wolfenbuttle, and to God knows who besides? All of whom had taken British pay, within sixty years past, without enabling us to humble one enemy, or to secure a firm, lasting and equitable peace: or to strike such terror into our enemies, that they durst not invade our property, plot against our liberty, or to interrupt our trade, and without recovering the balance of Europe, or putting our allies out of the power of the common enemy. What then is Britain to expect from numerous and still more expensive subsidiary treaties? but a national debt, which, if not timely prevented, would in the end, reduce us to beggary and contempt. Every one knows that our land forces, whether mercenaries or subsidiaries, have no influence upon the councils of our enemies. It is our naval force they are afraid of. It is the number of our squadrons of ships of war, when they are well manned and appointed, under brave, experienced and honest commanders, and not a standing army at home, nor a subsidiary army abroad, that gives us a due influence at foreign courts. Such was the language and sentiments of the nation at this time.

The

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Address of
the city of
London.

The parliament being summoned to meet on the 13th of November, the city of London addressed his Majesty, not with the flattery of a ministerial faction, to deceive and poison the ear of the Sovereign; to smother the complaints and prayers of the people, to palliate the national distresses, and to screen our enemies from just revenge; but with language and sentiment, that flowed from hearts replete with truth and liberty, and intended to rouse the British lion from a state of dangerous security, by making a tender of their lives and fortunes, to enable his Majesty to begin and carry on a just and necessary war against an enemy, that is not to be bound by treaties; nor to be satisfied with any thing less, than our ruin: but who may at any time be humbled by a proper exertion of that naval force, with which Providence has blessed and distinguished this nation, and enabled it, above all others, to defend itself. This was followed by addresses of the same import from the whole nation.

His Majesty met his parliament on the 13th of November, and opened the sessions with the following speech.

His Majesty's
speech at
opening
the parliament.

My Lords and Gentlemen! The present critical conjuncture of affairs, and my constant inclination to have the advice and assistance of my parliament on all important occasions, have made me desirous to meet you here as early as possible. Since your last session I have taken such measures as might be most conducive to the protection of our possessions in America, and to the regaining such

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such parts thereof, as had been encroached upon, and invaded, in violation of the peace, and contrary to the faith of most solemn treaties.—For this purpose, the maritime power of this kingdom has been got ready with the utmost application and expedition, and been principally employed. Some land forces have been sent from hence to North America; and all proper encouragement has been given to the several colonies there, to exert themselves in their own defence, and in the maintenance of the rights and possessions of Great Britain.

With a sincere desire to preserve my people from the calamities of war, as well as to prevent, in the midst of these troubles, a general war from being lighted up in Europe, I have been always ready to accept reasonable and honorable terms of accomodation; but not such have hitherto been proposed on the part of France. I have also confined my views and operations to hinder France from making new encroachments, or supporting those already made; to exert our right to a satisfaction for hostilities commenced in a time of profound peace; and to disappoint such designs, as, from various appearances and preparations, there is reason to think have been formed against my kingdoms and dominions.—By these methods I have pursued the plan, which I formerly pointed out to you, and for which I had the satisfaction to receive the strongest assurances of your vigorous support.—What other power can object to proceedings so absolutely necessary to our own de-

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fence and security? My good brother, the King of Spain, sees with concern these differences; and the part which he generously takes in the common welfare of Europe, makes him earnestly wish the preservation of the public tranquillity. He has also given assurances, that he will continue in the same pacific sentiments.—In pursuing these great ends, I make no doubt of the vigorous and chearful support of my parliament: and that while I am engaged in this just and national cause, the affectionate assurances, which they gave me the last sessions will be effectually made good. In consequence thereof, I have greatly increased my naval armaments, augmented my land forces in such a manner, as might be the least burdensome; and have concluded a treaty with the Empress of Russia, and another with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, which shall be laid before you. His Majesty concluded with observing that the services would require large supplies: declaring that he asked no more than should be requisite for the effectual carrying on of those measures, which would be necessary to support what has been begun, according to their inclination, for the security of his kingdoms and dominions, and for the purposes already mentioned, of an extraordinary expence made this year by him, in pursuance of the power given him by parliament; and promising that whatever should be granted, should be applied with the strictest oeconomy to those uses only, for which it shall be given.

This

This speech met with uncommon opposition in both houses of parliament, which appeared in the formation of the address from each house. The ministerial party amongst the Lords had inserted in their address, 'That they looked upon themselves as obliged by the strongest ties of duty, gratitude, and honour, to stand by and support his Majesty in all such wise and necessary measures and engagements, as his Majesty might have taken in vindication of the rights of his crown, or to defeat any attempts, which might be made by France, in resentment for such measures; and to assist his Majesty in disappointing or repelling all such enterprizes, as might be formed, not only against his kingdoms, but also against any other of his dominions, *though not belonging to the crown of Great Britain*, in case they should be attacked on account of the part, which his Majesty had taken for maintaining the essential interests of his kingdoms.' The other Lords in the opposition, headed by Lord Temple, would not agree to this insertion; because, in the first part of it, the wisdom of the house was prostituted, by engaging to approve of the treaties with Russia and Hesse Cassel, which they had not seen, and which they apprehended could be of no use to Great Britain; and, in the second part, they would be guilty of the greatest indiscretion, by consenting to measures, which manifestly engaged this nation in a continental connection for the defence of

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Debates
upon the
address to
this speech.

In the
House of
Lords.

Amongst whom, it is said, were Lord Halifax, Lord Talbot, and Earl Pomfret.

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Hanover, that could not be supported by Great Britain, and would be so far from being of advantage to us at sea, or in America, that, it was to be feared, might, in the end, disable the nation from defending itself in other parts of the world.—But the court party, upon putting the question, carried their address with this insertion, by a great majority of voices against the weight of argument.

His Majesty's answer to the address of the Lords.

His Majesty received this address with the following most gracious answer:—‘ My Lords! I give you my thanks for this dutiful and affectionate address. I see with the greatest satisfaction the zeal you express for my person and government, and for the true interest of your country; which I am determined to adhere to. The assurance, which you give me for the defence of my territories abroad, are a strong proof of your affection for me, and regard for my honour. Nothing shall divert me from pursuing those measures, which will effectually maintain the possessions and rights of my kingdoms, and procure reasonable and honourable terms of accommodation.’

Debates on the address in the House of Commons.

The address in the House of Commons was dressed up with the same zeal, gratitude and warm assurances to support his Majesty and his foreign dominions; and with their approbation of the treaties he had made; but not yet laid before that house; and was carried, upon a division, by a great majority, though strenuously opposed by several gentlemen in high posts under the government; amongst whom Henry Bilson Legge, Esq; the

the Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of his Majesty's Exchequer, and William Pitt, Esq; Pay-Master of his Majesty's forces, are said to have distinguished themselves, on the part of their country.

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His Majesty, when he received the address of the House of Commons, gave the following answer. "Gentlemen! I thank you for this dutiful and loyal address. You may be assured, although I wish for nothing more than a safe and honourable accommodation, I am determined to protect and maintain the valuable and undoubted rights and possessions of my crown. Your assurances, that you will assist me in the defence of my foreign dominions, if they should be attacked, on account of the measures I am pursuing for the true interest of these kingdoms, are such proofs of your affection to me, and of your regard to my honour, as give me the greatest satisfaction."

His Majesty's answer to their address.

How triumphant soever the court enjoyed this advantage by a majority in parliament, the country conceived a very mean opinion of the ministry, especially of Henry Fox, Esq; who, three days before the session was opened, had succeeded Sir Thomas Robinson, in the office of one of his Majesty's principal Secretary's of State, and was empowered by his Majesty to manage his interest in parliament. The nation's attention was immediately fixed upon this new minister, and made him responsible for the addresses above-mentioned, and for an intention to involve his country in a continental war, to the prejudice of our national interest. Which discontent was heightened very

National disgust.

Mr. Fox
Secretary
of State.

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soon after by a draught from Russia, for a part of the subsidy agreed for in the late treaty with the Czarina; and not yet provided for by parliament: and therefore it was refused by part of the ministry.

The minister took uncommon pains, even from one member's house to another, to divide the country party, and even to condemn in private conversation the measures he was pursuing in parliament, and to pledge his honour for the uprightness of his intentions, and his aversion to continental connections. But, when no art was powerful enough to conceal the falacy of his heart, he was resolved to try what might be done by removing the patriots from all share and posts in the government. Accordingly Henry Billon Legge, Esq; and William Pitt, Esq; were dismissed from their employments, for distinguishing themselves on the part of their country, in the late parliamentary debate; and Sir George Lyttleton was made Chancellor of the Exchequer*. But, neither

* There was a new commission for the Treasury, consisting of the Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Darlington, Sir George Lyttleton, Thomas Hay and Robert Nugent, Esq; But such was the fickleness of the times, that on the 15th of November the Earl of Darlington and Mr. Hay were removed from the Treasury, and appointed Pay-Masters-General in the room of Mr. Pitt. Earl Gower was sworn of the Privy-Council and made Keeper of the Privy-Seal; the Duke of Marlborough made Master-General of the Ordnance. Lord Anson, Sir William Rowley, William Pantonby, Thomas Villiers, Edward Boscawen, Richard Edgcumbe, Esq; and Lord Bateman, were constituted Lords of the Admiralty.

This

did this violent scheme answer his expectations. Neither places, pensions, nor power were the objects of a patriotic heart. The great men, displaced for their virtue, persevered in their endeavours to prevent the fatal consequences of a war, on the continent, prejudicial to our national interest. So that, when the treaties of Russia and Hesse came before parliament, they did not receive the sanction of those houses, without very warm debates; and seem to have received the approbation of the house of commons, only to preserve his Majesty's honour, and to defend those countries, which might be attacked merely on account of our quarrel with France.

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Patriotism
revived.

Without doors the nation rang with these or the like expressions.—The quarrel with France, at present, is not for any of those ruinous motives, which have kindled so many bloody wars, in support of foreign states; nor for dominion, nor extent of territory; but for extent and protection of trade: It is whether the trading genius of Great Britain or France shall prevail. It is whether Great Britain or France shall rule the main,

Their ar-
gument.

France has taken measures to ruin our trade and navigation. They have usurped upon those territories, by which our naval power and our trade are supported. What therefore have we to do? But to prepare in time for a vigorous, and, perhaps, a long war; to keep our fleets out con-

This was called the ministry, with Mr. Fox at the head; but few of them were consulted in the administration of the most important affairs.

stantly; to supply our people abundantly with provisions, stores, and money; a great deal of which must be wanted to carry on a war in America; and therefore, it is to be hoped, that we shall not wantonly and unprofitably squander it away in Germany. It is not meet we should take the childrens bread and cast it to the dogs. What, then, in the name of common sense, can be the meaning of hiring troops in Germany, or Russia? To pretend that they are for our assistance, is an imposition upon the common understanding of mankind.

How evaded.

In order to quiet these clamours, the march of a large body of French troops down to their coasts, furnished the ministerial agents, with an artificial argument, to terrify the people into a better opinion of the subsidiary treaties. They ventured to say, that these subsidiary troops were not only intended originally, but would soon be found necessary, and imported, for the defence of our island, against a French invasion, to be carried into execution by flat-bottomed boats, and such ridiculous, incredible vessels. But, arguments, that work only on our fears, and don't conciliate a confidence and affection, seldom prevail in settling the mind.

Supplies raised by parliament.

Yet, while the nation was agitated by the terrors of an invasion, and by the apprehensions of a war in the hands of a ministry, obnoxious for their flattery about the throne, and for their attachment to continental measures, the house of commons agreed to the supplies for the ensuing year, and

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and provided for the deficiencies of the provision for the former year. The house voted 50,000 seamen, including 9,138 marines, and 34,263 soldiers. In January following they voted ten new regiments of foot, and 11 troops of light dragoons, besides the former. They likewise voted 298,534 l. 17 s. 10 d. $\frac{1}{2}$ for the maintenance of forces already in our American colonies; and 79,915 l. 6 s. 0 d. for six regiments of foot from Ireland, to serve in North America and the East Indies. 15,000 l. gratuity to New England for faithful services, and 5000 l. to Sir William Johnson in particular. 20,000 l. to the King of Prussia; 121,447 l. 2 s. 6 d. for Hanoverian forces.

The warlike preparations in South France began about this time to attract the attention of all Europe. And it was with some degree of confidence represented to be intended against Minorca. But this information was totally disregarded by our ministry, which affected to interpret all the motions of the French in every part of their kingdom, to be destined either against the British isles, or America, or against Hanover. By inculcating and persuading the first report amongst the well-meaning people, they prepared them to acquiesce to the measures of the court; and by the second they endeavoured to reconcile the dislike the

On the 24th of November 1755. About this time the *Esperance* man of war sailing from Rochfort to Brest, to be completely manned was taken, with 300 men on board, and 79 guns, by the *Orford*. Captain Stevens, after three hours engagement, and brought into Plymouth.

English

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Ministerial
conduct.

A danger-
ous clause
added to
the navy
bill.

English had to the subsidiary forces to cover his Majesty's electoral dominions.

The minister drove on Jehu-like by his majority in the house, and, to give the better proof of his principles, he carried such affairs, as under another ministry would have given him a real cause to inveigh against their arbitrary proceedings. For, in the act for the more speedy manning of his Majesty's navy, he had this clause added, That the commissioners impowered under this act might order, wherever and whenever they pleased, a general search to be made for such persons (*there described*) in order to their being brought before them to be examined: that the parish and town-officers might, *without any such order*, search for and secure such persons, in order to convey them before the said commissioners to be examined: and that when such person or persons were judged by the recruiting officer to be fit for his Majesty's service, he or they should be deemed a listed soldier, and committed to a place of safety or to a public prison. By a new clause added to the act for extending the maritime laws to America, a recruiting officer was impowered to enlist and detain an indented servant, though his master should reclaim him, upon paying so much as two justices of the peace should allow. Both which clauses in the hands of a wicked and enterprizing administration might have been made such use of, as would have undermined the bill of rights, and been inconsistent with that security, which is pro-

vided by our happy constitution for the liberty of the subject.

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But this was not all! the very minister, who pleaded the support of Hanover and our German allies for taking German and Russian troops into British pay, made the terrors of an invasion, industriously propagated for ministerial purposes, the prop of that disgraceful, and dangerous measure of calling over Hanoverian and Hessian troops to defend England from the attempts of the French: by which Hanover and Hesse were left exposed to the danger of the French army, as had been suggested both from the throne and in the debates for the subsidiary treaties: and England, with a powerful army of her own children, was put under the protection of foreign troops. Mr. Fox, by a message from his Majesty, got both the houses to approve of his requisition and bringing over a body of Hessian troops*, and then to address his Majesty to bring a body of Hanoverians over also, into this kingdom. And accordingly these foreign troops, notwithstanding all the pretended fears of some people for Hanover, &c. were landed in England*, within the course of one

Foreign
troops
brought
into Eng-
land.

French
court.

* The parliament granted for the charge of 6544 foot, with the general officers and train of artillery from Feb. 23, 1756, to Dec. 24 following, together with the subsidy pursuant to treaty, 163,357 l. 9s. 9d.

^ The parliament granted for the charge of 8605 foot with the general officers, train of artillery and hospital, from May 11, 1756, to December 24 following, 121,447 l. 2s. 6d.

* 8000 Hessian foot and 900 horse, landed at Southampton, on the 15th of May. 10,000 Hanoverians landed the 21st of May at Chatham.

month.

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1755.Creates
great unca-
siness.

month. Such expedition, and so little need of foreign troops to guard our coasts, created great jealousies; and made the people of England more afraid of their military friends, than the hostilities of an open enemy; dreading, from the specimen of those acts, which struck at the root of the subjects liberty, that these forces might be called in to enable the ministry to proceed to more violent measures. But under so good and gracious a King, as then reigned, his subjects had reason to hope for better things, and these despotic acts served only to bring such an odious administration to a sudden end.

Pacific
measures
pretended
by the
French
court.

Several passages both in his Majesty's speech, and his answers to the addressees of his parliament, seemed to leave the French some hopes of success by way of negotiation; if not to settle affairs amicably, yet to amuse the British court, till they might be perfectly prepared to execute their important schemes. We are indulged in this supposition by that extraordinary correspondence carried on between the two crowns, during the recess of parliament, at Christmas; which produced the following letter, from M. Rouille minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, to Mr. Fox, secretary of state to the King of England; dated Versailles, 21st of December.

S I R,

M. Rou-
ille's letter
to M. Fox.

By command of the King my master, I have the honour to send your excellency the following memorial, &c.

The

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“ The King is able to demonstrate to the whole universe, by authentic proofs, that it is not owing to his Majesty that the differences relating to America, have not been amicably accommodated.— The King, being most sincerely desirous to maintain the public peace, and a good understanding with his Britannic Majesty, carried on the negotiation relative to that subject, with the most unreserved confidence and good faith. The assurance of the King of Great Britain’s disposition to peace, which his Britannic Majesty and his ministry were constantly repeating both by word of mouth and in writing, were so formal and precise, that the King could not, without reproaching himself, entertain the least suspicion of the sincerity of the court of London’s intentions. It is scarce possible to conceive how these assurances can be reconciled with the orders for hostilities, given in November 1754, to General Braddock, and in April 1755, to Admiral Boscawen.—The attack and capture, in July last, of two of the King’s ships in the open sea, and without a declaration of war, was a public insult to his Majesty’s flag; and his Majesty would have immediately manifested his just resentment of such an irregular and violent proceeding, if he could have imagined that Admiral Boscawen acted by the orders of his court. For the same reason the King suspended, at first, his judgment of the piracies, that have been committed for several months by the English men of war, on the navigation and commerce of his Majesty’s subjects, in contempt of the law
of

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of nations, the faith of treaties, the usages established among civilized nations, and the regard they reciprocally owe to one another. The sentiments of his Britannic Majesty gave the King room to expect, that at his return to London, he would disavow the conduct of his admiralty and naval officers, and give his Majesty a satisfaction proportionate to the injury and the damage. — But seeing that the King of England, instead of punishing the robberies committed by the English navy, on the contrary encourages them, by demanding from his subjects fresh supplies against France; his Majesty would fall short in what he owes to his own glory, the dignity of his crown, and the defence of his people, if he deferred any longer the demanding of a single reparation for the outrage done to the French flag, and the damage done to the King's subjects.

His Majesty, therefore, thinks proper to apply directly to his Britannic Majesty, and demand from him immediate and full restitution for the French ships, as well men of war, as merchantmen, which, contrary to all law, and all decorum, have been taken by the English navy; and of all the officers, soldiers, mariners, guns, stores, merchandize, and in general of every thing belonging to these vessels.

The King will always chuse to owe to the King of England's equity, rather than to any thing else, that satisfaction, which he hath a right to demand: and all the powers in Europe will undoubtedly see in this step, which he hath deter-

mined

mined to take, a new and striking proof of that invariable love of peace, which directs all his counsels and resolutions.—If his Britannic Majesty orders restitution of the vessels in question, the King will be disposed to enter into a negotiation for that further satisfaction, which is legally due to him, and will continue desirous, as he hath always been, to have the discussions relating to America, determined by an equitable and solid accommodation. But if, contrary to all hopes, the King of England shall refuse what the King demands, his Majesty will regard this denial of justice, as the most authentic declaration of war, and as a formed design in the court of London, to disturb the peace of Europe.”

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Mr. Fox sent to M. ROVILLE the following answer^y, dated at Whitehall, January 13, 1756, by his Majesty's command.

S I R,

I Received on the 3d instant, the letter dated the 21st past, with which your excellency honoured me, together with the memorial subjoined to it. I immediately laid them before the King my master; and by his command I have the honour to inform your excellency, that his Majesty continues desirous of preserving the public tranquillity: but though the King will readily consent to an equi-

Mr. Fox's
answer.

^y In French, ill becoming the first minister of state in the British court.

table

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table and solid accommodation, his Majesty cannot grant the demand that is made of immediate and full restitution of all the French vessels, and whatever belongs to them, as the preliminary condition of any negotiation; his Majesty having taken no step, but what the hostilities begun by France, in a time of profound peace, (of which he hath the most authentic proofs) and what his Majesty owes to his own honour, to the defence of the rights and possessions of his crown, and the security of his kingdoms, rendered just and indispensable. I have the honour to be, &c.

Remarks
on this cor-
respon-
dence.

The incongruity of this correspondence between two nations so far engaged in hostilities, as Great Britain and France were at this time, would not permit his Britannic Majesty to answer M. Rouille's letter otherwise, than by his secretary of state, and required some method to take off the disagreeable apprehensions, which it began to diffuse amongst the people, already dissatisfied with the pacific conduct of the ministry, and to expose to the several courts of Europe, the falshood of the imputations and facts therein contained. Therefore the ministry caused remarks to be made on the principal articles of its contents; which were published and dispersed at all the courts of Europe.

The British
ministry's re-
marks on
M. Rouille's
memorial.

In the first place, it is therein remarked, That whatever may have been, or are now, the sentiments of the most Christian King, with regard to the differences concerning North America, it is
unlucky,

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unlucky, that the conduct of the court of Versailles, towards Great Britain, should correspond so ill to the disposition, which M. Rouille's memorial ascribes to his most Christian Majesty, and to the professions of good faith and unreserved confidence, with which, it was pretended, the negotiation was, on their part, carried on^b. And if it be from the course of this negotiation, "that the authentic proofs, are to be drawn, by which the most Christian King is able to demonstrate to the whole world; that it is not owing to him, that the differences in question have not been amicably accommodated," it may not be improper to touch upon some parts thereof, and shew that every fact bears witness to his Britannic Majesty's moderation.

For, in the month of January 1753, the French Ambassador returned to London, and made great protestations^c of his court's sincere desire, finally and speedily to adjust all disputes between the two crowns concerning America: and notwithstanding the extraordinary preparations, which were known to be making at that time in the ports of France, her ambassador proposed, "That before the ground and circumstances of the quarrel should be enquired into, positive orders should be immediately sent to our respective governors, forbidding them to undertake any new enterprize, or proceed to any act of hostility; and enjoining

^b See the proofs produced by the commissaries, on p. 49, &c. and p. 84, &c.

^c See page 121.

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“ them, on the contrary, to put things, without
“ delay, with regard to the lands on the Ohio,
“ on the same footing that they were, or ought to
“ have been, before the late war, and that the
“ respective claims should amicably be referred to
“ the commissioners at Paris, that the two courts
“ might terminate the differences by a speedy
“ accommodation.”

The court of London immediately declared its readiness to consent to the proposed cessation of hostilities, and that all the points in dispute might be discussed and terminated by the ministers of the two crowns: but on this special condition, That all the possessions in America should previously be put on the foot of the treaty of Utrecht, confirmed by that of Aix-la-Chapelle. Wherefore, the King of Great Britain proposed, “ That
“ the possession of the lands on the Ohio, should
“ be restored to the footing it was on, at the conclusion of the treaty of Utrecht, and agreeable
“ to the stipulations of the said treaty, which
“ was renewed by that of Aix-la-Chapelle; and
“ more over that the other possessions in North
“ America should be restored to the same condition, in which they actually were at the
“ signing of the said treaty of Utrecht, and agreeable to the cessions and stipulations therein expressed; and then the method of informing
“ the respective governors, and forbidding them
“ to undertake any new enterprize or act of hostility, might be treated of; and the claims of
“ both parties reserved to be speedily and finally
“ adjusted in an amicable manner between the

“ two

"two courts." That is to say, the French should repair the injury done by open force, before the parties should enter into treaty about the claim of right; after which the possessions of both parties might be settled on the foot of a definitive agreement.

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To this equitable expedient to divert the horrors of an open war, the French ambassador was so far from agreeing, that he seriously delivered a kind of reply, which at bottom was only a repetition of his first proposal. However, to soften the affair, he produced, at the same time, full powers from his court to treat, conceived in very specious and polite terms: though the effects were as little correspondent thereto, as before. France, likewise, soon after delivered a draught of a preliminary convention, which was nothing more than the first proposal enlarged. This, added to what was doing on the coast of France, was too plain to deceive any. Therefore, England would by no means agree to a convention, which should leave France in possession of all she had acquired by her violences and usurpations; the precise grievance Great Britain complained of: and, after the expiration of which, we should have been just where we were, when that convention was signed.

A draught of a counter-convention was afterwards delivered to the ambassador, containing an offer of the most moderate terms, being confined to those points only, which were his Majesty's indispensable right, and essential to the security of his colonies.--To this France did not vouchsafe

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to make any answer, and her ambassador was authorised only to hear what was said to him about the affair, but to make no proposals. In fine, after a long series of evasions, in which the cessation of hostilities was continually recurred to, the ambassador instead of receiving instructions to enter into a negotiation upon the counter-convention above-mentioned, was ordered to demand, as a previous condition, that England should desist from three points, which made a principal part of the subject in dispute, viz.

I. The south part of the river St. Lawrence, and the lakes, that discharge themselves into that river.

II. The twenty leagues of country demanded along the bay of Fundi: and,

III. The lands between the Ohio and Oubecho. The discussions, with which this extraordinary piece was followed, and during which France shuffled, at every turn, concluded with a memorial presented by the French ambassador, in which was treated the affairs of the islands, as well as that of North America. This also was answered by a very ample piece, that refuted the memorial article by article, and fully justified the terms of the counter-convention. But the French ambassador's sudden departure, about this time, prevented any reply.

Secondly, it is remarked, that notwithstanding the measures taken to defend our rights and property in North America, both by sea and land, and the captures, which were made in July last, pursu-

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purſuant thereunto, his Britannic Maſteſty's aſſurances, of his pacific diſpoſition, given to France, were as honeſt and ſincere, as they were formal and precise: and he muſt have condemned himſelf, had he carried them ſo far, as to endanger the poſſeſſions of his crown, and the ſafety of his people, to purchaſe the friendſhip of France.

It is to no purpoſe that France gives the epithet of *hoſtile* to the orders and inſtructions given to General Braddock and Admiral Boſcawen. She would be glad to draw a veil over the hoſtilities committed by France in America, from the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle to the date of thoſe orders. For almoſt from the very inſtant of ſigning that treaty ^d, and even at the opening of the commiſſion ^e, which in conſequence of it was eſtabliſhed at Paris, for the affairs of America; France diſtrufteſt before hand her right; and, ſetting up for the judge, as well as the party, in her own diſpute, cauſed the province of Nova Scotia to be invaded, and, after a ſeries of open hoſtilities againſt the inhabitants, the King's ſubjects erected three forts in the heart of that province; and, if ſhe had not been prevented, was prepared and ready to deſtroy the new ſettlement at Hallifax. The like hoſtilities were committed, at the ſame time, againſt his Maſteſty's lands and ſubjects on the Ohio and the Indian lakes; where, France, without any ſhadow of right, forbid the Engliſh to trade, ſeized them by force, and ſent them

^d See p. 22, 25, 41.^e See p. 28, 33, 43, 45, 49.

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prisoners^f to France; invaded the territories of Virginia, attacked a fort, which covers its frontier, and to secure their usurpations, erected, with an armed force, a chain of forts on the lands they had invaded.

If his Majesty could have thought, that the governors of Canada acted by orders of their court, he would have been intitled to repel these hostilities with that vigour, which the case required. He contented himself with complaining to the court of France! but with so little effect, that the French ministry, not satisfied with not answering, gave on this occasion a very singular instance of their honesty: for in spite of these complaints made by the Earl of Albemarle, (in consequence of an order from his Majesty) particularly by an express memorial delivered in May 1752^g, France had afterwards the modesty to alledge, that England had never complained of these proceedings, and consequently had nothing to find fault with.

At last the King's patience being worn out by the continuance of these violences, he found himself obliged to provide for the security and defence of his subjects. Yet, notwithstanding the just reasons he had for proceeding to extremities, he added, to his many years forbearance, a signal proof of his moderation in the smallness of the succours he sent to America, which consisted only of two battalions of 500 men each, escorted by

^f See p. 45,^g See this memorial at large on p. 45, &c.

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two frigates : and in the orders given to the commanding officer, which were to dislodge the invaders of the King's territories, there is nothing in these facts irreconcilable with the assurances given of his Majesty's disposition towards peace. It is the invasion made by France, and the violences that attended it, which are *hostile* : and it never can be unlawful to repel an aggressor..

Therefore to make out the pretended insult offered to his most Christian Majesty's flag, France is obliged to invert the order of things. She affects to take the consequence and effect for the cause ; and alledges, as the principal affair, what was only accessory, and proceeded from it ; taking occasion from the small succours General Braddock carried to America, to make the sending of those succours, the rise of the troubles in that part of the world. France equips a fleet of a very alarming force, and the King, in consequence thereof, is obliged to make proportionable armaments. France sends that fleet to North America, (with three times the number of troops carried to the same continent by General Braddock) in order for her commanders to support the acts of violence already committed, and to add new ones.

Now the same law, the same principle of defence, which authorises the resistance of an invader, equally authorises the preventing of the part attacked, from being over-powered by so formidable a reinforcement : it was therefore very natural to expect, that the King would provide for the

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protection and safety of his subjects, by hindering the landing of so powerful an armament in North America, and endeavour to preserve his American settlements from total ruin.

The same motive of self-defence hath forced the King to seize the French ships and sailors, in order to deprive the court of France of the means of making a descent; with which their ministers in all the courts of Europe have threatned England. A menace, which is the most significative to England, as it hath been accompanied or preceded by the precipitate recall of the ministers of France at London and Hanover; by the march and cantonment of large bodies of troops on the coasts of Flanders and the channel; and they publicly avowed the re-establishment of the port of Dunkirk^h.

For the rest: it is hard to imagine why the French should conceive the King ought to disavow

^h In August 1755, the Risbank, a very strong battery, on the right hand side going into the harbour, was restored to its original strength, or better fortified, though expressly contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle. It was built entirely new in form of a half moon, mounting 22 cannon, facing the mouth of the harbour, with embrasures for several more; and many men were still employed on that part of the fortification. On the other side of the harbour, they were erecting a large rampart for a battery of 50 or 60 cannon, facing the sea: 2000 men were then employed to finish it with all expedition, and was to be called the Bavarian Battery. They were also repairing the sluices, in order to form a back water for cleaning and deepening the harbour.

the

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the conduct of his officers, who acted by his orders; or why they should wonder at his Majesty's demanding the necessary supplies from his subjects to enable him to frustrate the ambitious and unjustifiable views of France.

How can that court pretend to be surpris'd at the acts of violence it complains of, after the court of Great Britain had, during the whole course of the negociation, constantly rejected the proposals made by France for a suspension of arms, unless it were preceeded by a restitution of the possessions taken by open force from England? A condition, to which the court of Versailles would never agree. This was informing that court very plainly, what method the King proposed to take, in order to obtain his just right.

For these just and valid reasons the King rejected the peremptory demand contained in the memorial signed by M. Rouille: and to avoid taking notice of the terms made use of in it, which shock common decency, his Majesty caused a short and negative answer to be made to it, in the form of a letter, written by Mr. Fox, his secretary of state: and he is the more determin'd not to admit what France demands, as a preliminary condition, prior to any negociation, as it appears from this very memorial, that after granting it, he would be as far as ever from obtaining an equitable and solid accommodation with respect to the injuries he has suffered for several years. And it does not appear how his Majesty's resolution to defend his American dominions, and hinder France from

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from insulting his kingdoms, can be construed in France to be a denial of justice, and a formed design in the King of Great Britain to disturb the peace of Europe.

British sub-
jects order-
ed to de-
part from
France.

However, in consequence of that memorial and Mr. Fox's answer, the French King's orders were published, at Dunkirk, for all British subjects to leave his dominions, before the 1st of March, except such as might obtain his permission to remain. Another edict was published at the same time, inviting his most Christian Majesty's subjects to fit out privateers, promising a premium of forty livres for every gun, and as much for every man, they might take on board the enemy's ships; with a further promise, that in case peace should be concluded soon, the King would purchase his said privateers at their prime cost.

Privateers
ordered
and en-
couraged
by France.

British
ships seized
in port.

Pursuant to the above orders, the English vessels in the several ports of France were seized, and their crews sent to prison.

Remarks
on the se-
veral pieces
of intelli-
gence con-
cerning an
invasion.

Whatever might be the real motive for this correspondence, it outwardly appeared, on the part of Britain, to be countenanced by the apprehensions the ministry had all along entertained, and affected to entertain, of an invasion; and, on the part of the French to prolong our neglect of armaments for the Mediterranean; where now they had determined to strike that great blow, so long threatened against Great Britain. For, though our Agents, Consuls and Ambassadors at Paris, Carthagena, Turin, &c. perpetually represented in the strongest terms the naval and military preparations

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parations at Toulon; though Mr. Banks at Carthage had informed the ministry, on the 27th of August, that these preparations were expressly making against *Minorca*: the French, by their emissaries in Holland, &c. and by their movements on the coast of the British channel, and sometimes by counter orders at Toulon, endeavoured to draw off their attention from the main object. The French knowing the foible of their neighbours, to be terrified with every motion, they should make on the coast of the Channel, played off their old political engine of an invasion so effectually; that they damp't the British fire, which a few months before had threatened destruction to the navigation of France; and made the ministry so cool, that they seem'd unconcerned, what became of the important tenures of their master's crown in the Mediterranean.

It is true that there was a reportⁱ of the Pretender's being at Paris: but the same advice remarked, that it wanted confirmation: that an embarkation was intended for Scotland: that the Brest squadron was ordered to continue in the road: that the French ministry were extreme busy in repairing the fortifications of Dunkirk, and that there were sixteen battalions in and about that town, besides seven companies of marines. But there could be nothing so terrible in all these appearances, as to engage the whole attention of the British ministry, and our chief strength at sea,

Dunkirk
repaired.ⁱ 16th of September, 1755.

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No signs of
an inva-
sion.

to wait upon their motions. For, other letters on the 30th of the same month informed, That though all the grenadiers in the Flemish garrisons had orders to be ready to march, and the troops at Dunkirk were still encamped, the infantry, which are the only troops for an expedition against this island, had begun their march into winter quarters, and the cavalry were gone to Britany, French-Comte and Burgundy. A natural disposition for covering their own coasts against a descent from Britain; but very improper to be interpreted a disposition for invading an island, whose bulwarks are the ocean, and whose cities and towns are without walls and fortifications. Had the French ever intended to invade us, they would have kept their infantry, and not their cavalry upon the coast.

Arma-
ments at
Toulon,
and their
destina-
tion.

The advices in the course of the month of October, confirm the armament's destination from Toulon against Minorca or Gibraltar. And from those advices it appears, with great perspicuity, that the French observed an exact uniformity of conduct in their ports of the Mediterranean; sometimes in a hurry; at other times shewing by way of feint, a slackness in their armaments, or a distant intention; but never losing sight of their real object, and making as much dispatch, as the nature of their expedition and the season of the year would permit. In which they discovered great policy and oeconomy; confounding our intelligence, and expending no more of the public money than was necessary, till the time of action should

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should discover their real design; while in the northern provinces they industriously kept up the report and appearance of an embarkation. But how could people be so infatuated with such an improbability, weighing all circumstances? Besides the most penetrating intelligence received on the 20th of October, by Lord Holderness, ought to have rectified all such vague^k suppositions, founded on no better authority than hearsay, “No court, said that correspondent, was ever in a more cruel situation than that of France, they have been led into a war by the repeated assurances given them by the Duke de Mirepoix, That however angry the English nation was, the King and his ministry would not enter into a war. As this was credited by

^k Is it not amazing, that a person in the capacity of Admiral Smith, than whom nobody could be supposed to understand the requisites for embarkation and convoying troops, destined for a descent upon an island better, should hearken to, and transmit to the admiralty, his own apprehensions of the truth of, a report, which some French emissary had imposed upon him, That the descent was to be made with 100,000 troops: which would require more vessels to bring them over, than all their nation could then furnish; and a better stationed and equipped navy to convoy them, than the few ships of war at Brest and Rochfort, whose course down the channel to Calais and Dunkirk, must be exposed to the British fleets at Plymouth, Portsmouth, and at the mouth of the Thames. How Admiral Smith could be so credulous on this occasion is beyond comprehension: for, about a month after, he assures the Lords of the Admiralty, That there was no movement in the French ports of Dunkirk, &c. that indicated an embarkation.

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1756.

“ the French council in general, they took their
“ measures, in consequence, and were never more
“ surprized than when the news came of our
“ taking the two French ships in America.”

No fear of
an inva-
sion.

That the French King and his ministry were greatly enraged there is not the least doubt. Neither shall it be denied that an invasion of Ireland and Scotland was proposed. But upon examination, so many difficulties arose that it was laid aside. However it was resolved to strike some stroke of great consequence, to indemnify the French merchants for the loss of their ships : not by a new embarkation for America, where their force was already greatly superior to ours, and which could not be undertaken with bad ships, and scarcity of artillery, men and provisions ; nor by invading Britain or Ireland ; because they had neither transports for such an undertaking, nor were making other dispositions in the northern provinces of their country, that could induce us to give credit to such a report ; but by some action in the Mediterranean against some place left unguarded.

Invasion
propagated
by the mi-
nistry.

Without
sufficient
grounds.

In the course of the next month, the alarm of an invasion increased, and was rung in every body's ears by the ministerial agents and emissaries, who in this particular joined heartily in the delusive pretences of the enemy. It appears by the intelligence received at the proper offices, that this terror of an invasion was founded upon no better authority yet, than trite accounts of the Irish brigade being quartered on the French coast ;

of a few merchantmen detained or laid up in Dunkirk and Calais; of seven frigates lying under sailing orders in Brest Road, for the protection of their mercantile navigation, and a gasconade to invade England with a fleet not in their power to send to sea, and at the same time to attack Hanover. Whereas the most punctual and intelligible correspondents declared, That there did not appear the least disposition, nor was there any talk of an embarkation. For, though different plans had been proposed, they had all been rejected: because, in the first place, it was impossible for them to collect a sufficient number of transports in one or two harbours, as would be necessary: and because the Brest fleet, was it in a condition to put to sea, could not pretend to convoy them; for should that fleet meet the English, either in going or returning, it would be risking the whole trade of their country, and exposing both their fleet and forces to ruin.

Still our ministry kept the greatest part of their naval force inactive, to watch the event of uncertain, contradictory, and improbable, reports, and paid no regard to the real armaments making at Toulon; except we may admit an order for General Stuart to repair to his command in Minorca, given this month, to be an indication of their first glance towards the defence of the important fortress of Mahon: but even this was done with so little grace, that the General could not procure a passage to his command till he sailed with Admiral Byng.

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1756.

Naval force
kept in-
active.

General
Stuart or-
dered to
Minorca.

As

A. D.
1756.

State of the
armaments
at Toulon,
in the win-
ter.

As the winter advanced, the diligence in the port of Toulon slackened; and this furnished various conjectures, as if the French were inclined to pacific measures, and to lay the intended expedition aside in the Mediterranean. But yet it plainly appears, in the midst of that uncertainty, that the Toulon squadron, of twelve ships of the line, were in such forwardness as required no greater expedition at that season, and might be easily put to sea, early in the spring: that, in the mean time, all diligence was used to recruit the land forces in Provence, and in the neighbouring provinces: that contracts were made for transports, and that a strict watch was kept to secure a sufficient number of sailors against the time of action¹. Nay, our admiralty received letters from Marseilles, dated the 24th of December 1755, which expressly said, That five frigates were ready to put to sea, and that twelve ships of the line were under orders to be equipped with all expedition, and would be ready to sail in *three weeks*, under the command of M. de la Galiffionere, all the officers being appointed: which is generally the last step in the equipment of a French squadron.

Its destina-
tion how
to be col-
lected.

Thus every particular, but the positive destination of the Toulon squadron was known; and the intention to attack Gibraltar or Mahon was easily collected from their victualling, for a short time, the number of troops to be embarked, and

¹ See Mr. Banks's Letter of the 7th of December 1755. and several other correspondents.

the variety of small vessels taken up for transports, which were not fit to pass into the ocean.

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However our ministry continued to give credit to, and to fix their whole attention upon the advices of the transactions in the north of France; from whence Lord Holderness produced letters, dated from the 5th to the 15th of December, that mentioned great augmentations made to the militia of Normandy and Picardy, which already consisted of twenty-two battalions each, and that nothing was talked of but a declaration of war, and a resolution to fix the Pretender on the throne of England, in the March following: that 70 or 80,000 land forces were expected to arrive, and to be cantoned in the towns and villages near Dunkirk, to favour a squadron to be commanded by M. Bart, to scour the north seas.

Neglected
by the mi-
nistry.

Vain pre-
tences of
an inva-
sion.

Whence was a squadron to be expected sufficient to face the British navy? It could not be from Toulon, for obvious reasons. It could not be from Brest, nor from Rochfort; because advices of the first of December, to that same noble Lord, expressly declared, that the squadron in those ports, under M. Conflans went on very slowly; that the squadron under M. Perrier consisted only of five ships of the line, and four frigates, when completely equipped; that there was but one ship fitting at Dunkirk; and that there was no other maritime disposition in that, or in its neighbouring ports.

It must be confessed that some advices, of the ninth of this month, related a design in France, to fit out every ship, that could be made capable

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to keep the seas, and to divide the whole into two fleets, one at Toulon, the other at Brest; to fall with force on the British squadrons dispersed in small numbers; and in the mean time to make a powerful invasion with 50,000 men. But, next day, this formidable gasconade was knocked on the head by fresh assurances, That France had no other views than to gain time: that there were no dispositions on the coast of the British channel for an embarkation: that eight frigates had sailed from Brest, but were employed only as convoys to merchantmen: and that there was nothing to be apprehended of immediate danger or trouble from the French on that coast.

Remarks
on all the
intelli-
gence.

Sum up the whole intelligence, which brings us to the conclusion of the year 1755, you will not be able to find any ground for the ministerial pannic continually dreaming of, and alarming the people with the dread of an invasion. How then ought we to account for that passage in his Majesty's speech, where he informs his parliament, "That from various appearances and preparations there was reason to think, there have been formed designs against his kingdoms and dominions;" except, as a noble Peer, many years at the head of the law, has taught us, We consider such speeches as the language of the ministry, rather than the sentiments of their royal master: and then it may create a suspicion, that this alarming invasion was a pure ministerial bubble, grafted upon the political conduct of the enemy, in order to raise a prodigious sum of money out of the fears of the people.

On the 4th of February 1756, Mr. Fox received advice, dated the 17th of January, from Mr. Birtles, Consul at Genoa, a port greatly connected with Toulon, That the Dukes of Richelieu and Mirepoix were nominated to command in Provence, and that it was whispered, they intended to make a descent from Toulon, with a body of troops^m, to surprize the island of Minorca. The Lords of the admiralty, on the 20th, received an account of the state of the French marine as follows,

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1756.

The invasion of Minorca ascertained.

At Brest — 2 ships of 80 guns

1 — of 74

2 — of 70

3 — of 64

3 — of 50

1 — of 34

8 — of 30

4 — of 24

In all 24

State of the
French marine.

At Rochfort 2 ships of 74 guns

1 — of 70

3 — of 64

7 — of 30

In all 13

^m Sixty battalions under the command of the Duke of Richelieu. As the same gentleman wrote on the 26th of January.

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At Toulon 1 ship of 80 guns

3 — of 74

7 — of 64

1 — of 60

4 — of 30

2 — of 24

In all 18

At Havre 2 ships of 32

Total 57

Minorca
still neglected.Reports of
the invasion
refuted.

The state of Minorca did not yet seem to be rightly considered and attended to by the British court, who suffered themselves to be deluded, or were willingly engaged in the deception of a French invasion, which after Christmas revived with stronger symptoms of a determinate resolution. It was currently reported from the Hague, that the troopsⁿ were to be transported in ° flat-bottomed boats; that M. de Bellisle was to command the expedition, who was already with the Prince de Soubise making their circuit along the French coast: that 80,000 men were marching to Dunkirk, and that M. Perrier's squadron was falling down into Brest Road. But Mr. Joseph Cockburn, of the Hunter cutter, having ventured

ⁿ One hundred and forty battalions, said Lord Bristol in his Letter from Turin.

° Seven or eight hundred said M. Villetes at Bern.

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1756.

into Brest water in his row boat, could see no more than nine men of war of 50 guns, and under, and six sail of large merchantmen. Consequently all this talk was calculated by the enemy only to alarm and distress us. For at this very juncture the Brest Squadron above-mentioned sailed with a convoy of troops for Canada^p, and not upon that silly ineffectual errand to cover a fleet of flat-bottomed boats in defiance of the British navy.

The month of February increased the light into the destination of the Toulon armament. Positive advice was received^q, that preparations were making to embark 25,000 men, with a train of artillery, designed against Minorca: that the ships were hove down, and that they would be ready to put to sea the middle of March^r. The same advice was confirmed very strongly from the Hague^s. And Sir Benjamin Keene, the English minister at Madrid, who having given General Blakeney, the commanding officer at Mahon, notice of the French armament, and his apprehensions concerning its destination, writes to Mr. Fox^t in these pathetic terms: "The uneasiness, I feel, comes from the approach of an intended attack

Certain
advice of
an intended
invasion
of Minor-
ca.

From Sir
Benjamin
Keene, &c.

^p See Letter in Lord Holdernesse's office, dated January 31, 1756.

^q On the 26th of February, by the Admiralty from Matfeilles.

^r Ibid. and Consul Birtles, from Genoa.

^s So early as the 14th of February.

^t On the 24th of February.

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From Cap-
tain Har-
vey.

From Gen.
Blakeney.

“ on his Majesty’s dominions in the Mediterra-
“ nean.—I mean the island of MINORCA in par-
“ ticular; being forced to this idea by repeated
“ accounts of numbers of troops assembled at
“ Marseilles, and on the coasts of the Mediter-
“ ranean, to be easily transported in small vessels,
“ under the convoy of twelve capital ships ready
“ to sail from Toulon.” Captain Harvey, of the
Phoenix, then at Mahon, gave notice “ of the
same to the Admiralty, and to Lieutenant-Gener-
al Fowke, commanding at Gibraltar, That the
Toulon expedition was certainly intended against
Minorca; that there had been a council of war
called at Mahon, and resolutions taken to prepare
for defence; but adds, in his letter to General
Fowke, We can do nothing if you do not send
us some beef speedily; and that the garrison was
then in great distress. This intelligence was fol-
lowed by a letter to Mr. Fox, from General
Blakeney himself, in these terms, “ I can’t be too
early in acquainting you, Sir, that by different
informations from France and Spain, there is
great reason to believe the French intend very
shortly to make an attack upon this island.—In
consequence I’ve called a council of war—and we
were unanimously of opinion, that considering who
these informations came from, and the reports
every where about, which seemed to tally with
them, this island ought, with the greatest speed,
to be put in the best state of defence it can :—

“ February 7. received March 6th.

and

and I am accordingly applying myself to every measure, I think, for the safety and defence of this place." A. D. 1756.

Yet nothing seemed to awaken the attention of the ministry for Minorca. The nearer the danger of that island approached, the more determined the French endeavoured to make us believe they intended to invade Britain, thereby to keep our navy in a state of inactivity, till the blow was struck in the Mediterranean. Bellisle's plan was magnified, which was to assemble 100,000 men between Cherburg and Dunkirk, in order to give an equal uneasiness to the south and west parts of England, and to oblige us to separate our forces: to bring twelve ships of the line and as many frigates from Brest, to facilitate an embarkation of 600 sail of transports, each to carry 100 men, to be piloted by smugglers of Kent, Sussex and Hampshire, to three different attacks; two of which to be only feints, the real one to be commanded by the Marshal in person. All which it was alledged was feasible in a fresh south-easterly wind, a dark night, a fog, or a stark calm: because in any of these cases, the English fleet could not come to prevent their passage.

Neglected
by the mi-
nistry.

Terrified
by chime-
rical inva-
sion.

It was further said, That there were already collected 140 vessels of different burdens at Dunkirk; a great convoy of provisions and ammunition sent to Calais, Dunkirk, &c. from Douay and other places: that there were 600 flat-bottomed boats in the ports of Britany and Normandy for the same service; that the Pretender had

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been at Versailles some time, and was to embark with the M. Bellisle: that the train of artillery was prodigious, and the preparations both for defence and offence were immense: that they were determined to execute Bellisle's plan, though they were sure to lose all their vessels employed, and risk their whole kingdom: but that they hoped, by their number of boats, and superiority of fire from the heavy cannon, they were to carry, they might form a safe passage, notwithstanding they should meet with the English fleets; and that, in case they could land their whole force, they would march directly to London; and secure Portsmouth, with the battering train and the ships from Brest and Toulon.

Refuted.

Yet if we attend to the following intelligence, it will be found that all these preparations and gasconades, were no other than feints on the part of France: it will appear that there was not near the like certainty of a resolution to make a descent on Great Britain, as there was on Minorca.

The bugbear of the squadrons sitting out at Brest was known on the first of February to amount to no more than a squadron under M. Perrier, to sail to St. Domingo; another under M. Beaufremont, to guard the coasts, and a third under M. Conflans, to protect the French colonies. So that nothing was to be feared from the naval power of France in the Channel. The very mention of 100,000 men for the service of a maritime expedition was enough to deprive it of credit; and the same correspondents, who transmitted that intel-

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intelligence, shewed that they did not believe it to be serious. 'It is believed, said one, that their motion to the sea coast is nothing but an affected parade of marches and counter-marches.' Or, as another of the same date, 'An army to screen their own coasts from a descent, and to intimidate England.'

On the sixth of February it was assured, from undoubted correspondents, that neither armament, nor embarkation was then ordered: that the troops, ordered from the interior parts of France to the sea coasts, had received counter-orders: that every thing for the present seemed quiet at Calais: that neither troops nor vessels of any sort were collecting at Havre: that all reports of such armaments, as above-mentioned, on that coast, were false, and that there were no more than fourteen or sixteen sail of shipping in that port, including two frigates on the stocks, ready to be launched, and two others of 30 and 40 guns, sent from Brest, a few days before, to be refitted.

It is, therefore, very extraordinary that his Majesty was advised to send a message to the House of Lords, on the 23d of this month, signifying, That he had received repeated advices from different places and persons, that a design had been formed by the French court, to make an hostile invasion upon Great Britain or Ireland, and that the great preparations of land forces,

His Majesty's message to the parliament concerning an invasion.

* Captain Whitwell's Letter to the Admiralty, on the 24th of February.

ships,

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1756.

Takes no
notice of
the intelli-
gence con-
cerning
Minorca.

Officers or-
dered to
Minorca.

Duke of
Richelieu
declares his
service a-
gainst Mi-
norca.

ships, artillery, and warlike stores, were then notoriously making in the ports of France, opposite to the British coasts, left little room to doubt of the reality of such a design: that he had not only augmented his forces by sea and land, to put his kingdoms into a posture of defence; but that he had ordered transports to bring over hither a body of Hessian troops, in order further to strengthen himself; without taking the least notice of the advices of the intelligence concerning the hostile preparations for invading Minorca; which had been repeated uniformly, continually, and with greater certainty than any of the advices about the imaginary invasion of Great Britain or Ireland; and without mentioning any measures taken, or intended, by his ministry, for its defence.

The time of action drawing nigh, and no preparations of a fleet, nor of an army by the English, except an order * for all the absent officers from Minorca, but General Huske, to oppose the grand enterprize undertaken at Toulon; the Duke of Richelieu, on the road, to take the command of the embarkation, declared openly, at Lyons, that its destination was against Minorca, and to besiege Mahon.

This intelligence was immediately transmitted from Bern, by M. Villettes, who had all along discouraged the thoughts of such an expedition; but now adds, That the armaments, then carrying on in the neighbouring provinces of Spain

* Dated 3d of February 1756, in the war office.

with

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1756.

with great activity, gave him room to think that the two courts would join their force against Minorca and Gibraltar. He particularly observed, That Galiffionere was arrived to take upon him the command of the fleet: that seven ships of the line and five frigates were in the road^y: that they were shipping 6000 bombs and 30,000 weight of biscuit^z: that twelve ships of the line and five frigates would be ready to sail by the beginning of April: that four gallies, four xebecks and seven or eight other vessels, fit for such a service, were ordered to attend the fleet, and to carry the ammunition and provisions, &c. viz. 2500 oxen, 6000 rations of hay, 6000 fascines, 1000 barrels of gunpowder, 12 cannon 36 pounders, 24 of 24 pounders, 8 of 12 pounders, 8 mortars of 12 inches, 6 of 8 inches, besides petards, fuses, &c. that cloth had been bought at Marseilles for 350 tents: that they stript the sea and land, and the islands, of their artillery and ammunition, to arm the fleet at Toulon; and that all these steps, and more, left no doubt, but that an attack would be made on Mahon; and that the whole embarkation of twenty-three battalions of foot and one of artillery would be in readiness to sail on the fifth of April. All which was literally true, and confirmed from all quarters.

The readiness and appointments for the Toulon expedition.

In this situation what did the British ministry do? They had evidence, from most unexceptionable authorities, that there was a real armament at

Remarks on the conduct of the British ministry.

^y On the first of March.

^z On the eighth of March.

Toulon

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1756.A squadron
ordered un-
der Adm.
Byng, for
Minorca.

Toulon of twelve men of war of the line, five frigates, &c. ready to convoy a powerful army, openly acknowledged by the enemy to be designed against Minorca: and they could not be ignorant of the distress Mahon was in for officers, for men, for provisions, and almost every necessary to defend such a fortress against so powerful, skilful and enraged an enemy; and, consequently, of the danger of its falling a prey to such a powerful attack, for want of a superior fleet, to cover the island from such an attempt. Yet this could work no further upon the ministry than to procure an order on the 8th of March for ten ships of the line to hold themselves in readiness for the Mediterranean. Which squadron, on the 11th, was put under the command of Admiral Byng, a good disciplinarian, but never proved by any severe service, where he had the chief command; with an order for him to take on board the Earl of Effingham, General Stuart, and other officers, to the number of forty-two, and some private men, ordered to their respective posts and corps at Minorca and Gibraltar. These ships were,

The Ramillies	of 90 guns
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Culloden	— 74
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Buckingham	— 70
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Captain	— 70
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Revenge	— 70
---------	------

Trident	— 64
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Intrepid	— 64
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Lancaster	— 66
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Kingston	— 60
----------	------

Defiance	— 60
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But

But the equipping of these ten ships was attended with such directions, that their departure was delayed till the 6th of April, for want of men^a; Mr. Byng being directed to hasten the fitting out of the Stirling Castle, and to complete her complement of men in preference to any other ship; and restrained from meddling with the men on board the Nassau, Torbay, Essex, Prince Frederick and Greyhound, which the Secretary of the Admiralty said, were wanted on the *most pressing service*, viz. to try to intercept four frigates and a convoy of 40 merchantmen, drove into Havre by the Windsor; a service no ways so pressing, as the relief of Minorca.

What adds to the negligence of the British ministry, in regard to his Majesty's dominions in the Mediterranean, is, that no advices, ever so well attested and confirmed, could prevail with them, in the course of years since the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to send into those seas, for the protection of Minorca, and the lucrative trade carried on by our merchants through the Streights, more than

^a Admiral Byng writes to Mr. Cleveland, Secretary to the Admiralty, April 1st, ready for sailing in every respect, except want of men: will take 336 men, now the regiments are all on board, to complete them. My own ship wants 222, 183 of them being lent to the Ludlow Castle. The Trident had 78 lent to the Hampton Court and Tilbury, which ships we are likely to meet with. April 3d, Intrepid, Ludlow Castle and Cambridge came but yesterday to Spithead—ordered men immediately.—Hope to settle to-day, to be able to set sail to St. Helen's. April 4th, wind west, disappointed to find the Intrepid short of complement 150 men.

three

A. D.
1756.

How delayed.

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1756.

State of the
navy, and
how em-
ployed.

three ships of 60, one of 50, three of 44, and a sloop, to cruise on that extensive station.

Our navy, at home, within this period, (from the 1st of August 1755, to the 30th of April 1756^b;) when the French carried on their armaments both by sea and land, in their south and north provinces, was employed only to reinforce Admiral Hawke, cruising off Cape Finisterre; to form a squadron of observation in the Downs, under Vice Admiral Smith; another squadron, as noted above, to cruise to the westward of Ushant, under Admiral Byng: and in another squadron of 13 ships of the line, and one frigate, ordered on the 9th of January 1756, under the command of Vice Admiral Osborne, to convoy a grand fleet of merchantmen, and to cruise to the westward^c. So that the whole maritime strength of the nation, which in the open seas would be a match for all the ships of war in Europe, was detained from its necessary service, by the policy of France and the fears of our own ministry.

Continental
affairs
in Europe.

Here let us leave Admiral Byng upon his voyage to Minorca, and enquire into the negotiations carrying on between Great Britain and the

^b According to the admiralty account of the state and condition of the fleet, in the several ports of Great Britain in January 1756, there were 21 ships of the line, and 24 frigates, ready to put to sea; and 32 ships of the line, and five frigates fitting, which were very forward: and there was actually mustered on board those ships 20,541 seamen, and borne upon the books 24,853.

N. B. Exclusive of what were at sea.

^c He returned on the 16th of February.

Powers on the Continent, in the beginning of this year. We have already cited the correspondence between the secretaries of the two crowns of Great Britain and France. Which put an end to any further overtures from that insidious enemy.

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1756.

Upon this, the face of affairs began to bear an hostile aspect, threatening not only this nation, but the King of Prussia with the most powerful efforts of arms, from France and her interest upon the continent of Europe; the conduct of the court of Vienna having convinced his Majesty, before he left Hanover, that there was a secret intrigue between that court and Versailles.

Hostile appearance in Germany.

As his Britannic Majesty was anxious for the safety of his electoral dominions, and they were specifically threatened by France, it was natural for him to provide, the best way in his power, to defeat the intentions of his enemies, and to cover his German dominions from surprize and invasion.

Hanover threatened by France.

On the other side, his Prussian Majesty, without ally, and fully informed of the secret practices and destructive intentions of the Czarina, and the Empress Queen, and their allies on the continent, against him; and far from being pleased with the French conduct in case of an open rupture between him and those powers: these motives had, in the latter end of the year 1755, brought about a negociation for a treaty between England and Prussia, to keep all foreign troops from entering the empire of Germany, as a measure necessary for the safety of their respective dominions; which treaty

Motives for the treaty with Prussia.

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1756.

treaty was concluded and signed, on the 16th of January 1756, and contained in substance,

The Prussian treaty.

I. That Great Britain with her allies, and Prussia, shall mutually assist each other, in endeavouring to keep all foreign troops from entering the Empire.

II. That Great Britain shall pay 20,000 l. as an indemnification for the captures of that merchandize, which was taken on board Prussian bottoms, and sold during the last war; and in return, that Prussia shall pay the Silesia loan.

Remarks thereon.

Whoever compares this treaty, with that made a few months before with Russia, though they are quite opposite to each other, will find that they are not contradictory, but very consistent: for, whatever they may appear in terms; it is manifest, that they are both formed to answer one intention, on the part of his Britannic Majesty. The King of Prussia's martial spirit; his disgust for a long time with the house of Hanover; his general attachment to the interest of France, which might dispose him to become a proper instrument to execute the projects of the French ministry, already provided for, against the electorate of Hanover, and its dependencies; put the King of Great Britain, Elector of Hanover, upon measures to defeat any attempt to his prejudice by the aid of Prussia. Which could not be done so effectually by any other means, than engaging a power sufficient to deter him, and to keep him quiet, with an army hovering over, and ready to break in upon his regal dominions, the moment his Prussian Majesty dared

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1756.

clared to join France in the execution of the invasion of Hanover. This was certainly a good reason for the Russian treaty; and would not only have answer'd the end proposed by his Britannic Majesty, but completed the ruin of his Prussian Majesty, under the specious appearance of maintaining the liberties of the Empire, which was then resolved by the confederacy against Prussia, though not come to the knowledge of his late Majesty. But when his Majesty discovered an inclination in the King of Prussia to shake off his French connections, and to become sincerely an ally to Great Britain, and was from thence thoroughly persuaded, that his Electoral dominions had nothing to fear from his arms, it made the treaty with Russia useless; the power, whose motions the Russian army was hired to watch, having become a friend. The only dread, that now appeared, was an invasion by the French; whose entrance into the Empire was become the sole object of those councils, which were held for the protection of Hanover. The best means to preserve Hanover, was to seek for, and gain an alliance capable of resisting any foreign power, such as the French, from entering the Empire. This could not be done by the Russian troops, which were cantoned in Lithuania and other distant stations: but might be effectually undertaken with the aid of the King of Prussia. Therefore as the safety of Hanover was the chief object of these two treaties; and that safety could be more effectually maintained by making the enemy, of

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1756.

whom we were jealous, a friend and ally, and to join in keeping the French from entering the Empire, it was a wise and good measure.

The Prussian treaty
the seeds
of a German war.

This treaty was soon perceived to contain the seeds of a German war: for, should the French persist in their resolution to invade Hanover, Hesse, Hanover and Prussia would be obliged to oppose them.

His Britannic Majesty demands
an aid of
6000
Dutch.

In Holland, the ministers of Great Britain and France, used their utmost endeavours to secure an interest with the States, for their respective masters. The Honourable Colonel York, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at the Hague, delivered a memorial on the 13th of February, importing, "That although his master had convinced all Europe of his desire to maintain the general peace, that had lately subsisted; yet he found himself threatened with a war being kindled in his own dominions. That France was at that time making immense preparations of all kinds, particularly on the northern coast, which were evidently designed against Great Britain; and which the French ministers at the several courts of Europe had confirmed by their declarations: that it was the interest of their High Mightinesses to defend Great Britain, and the protestant succession in his Majesty's illustrious house: that his Majesty was not frightened by those threatening appearances; but was determined to take every precaution to prevent their effect: and that the love he bore to his people, his attention to their safety, and to

the

“ the preservation of their liberty and religion,
 “ and his desire to protect all his coasts from the
 “ ravages of the enemy, were motives, which
 “ obliged him to demand the 6000 men, to be
 “ sent over to his assistance, which the Republic
 “ was bound to do by treaty; and that the neces-
 “ sary shipping for their embarkation would be
 “ got ready immediately.”

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But the French ambassador presented a memo-
 rial, in which he insisted that Great Britain was
 the aggressor; and threatened the States with the
 high displeasure of his royal master, in case they
 complied with the requisition of 6000 men made
 by England; putting them in mind of their ex-
 pence and losses in the last war: and seconded his
 menaces with shewing them, that there were
 40,000 French troops in Flanders ready to invade
 their provinces. This threatening and the weight
 of the French pensioners in the councils of the
 United Provinces, who are well paid, furnished
 the Dutch with excuses for refusing, or, at least,
 for procrastinating their answer to this federal
 demand; till the court of Great Britain, rather
 than be obliged to resent such a breach of treaty
 in a national way, delivered them out of the em-
 barrassment, by ordering Mr. York to acquaint
 the Princess Regent, That his Majesty would not
 insist upon his demand.

The
 French am-
 bassador at
 the Hague
 opposes
 that requi-
 sition.

We must not quit the Dutch on this occasion,
 without some remarks on a conduct, which shews
 that there can be no dependance on their covenant-
 ed faith, nor any expectations of grateful returns

Remarks
 on the con-
 duct of the
 Dutch.

A. D. 1756. for the innumerable favours they have received from England.—The dread of the French arms, and their inability to defend themselves against so powerful an invader was their plea, to make void their engagement by treaty. But, if we search the hearts of these politicians, it will be found, that, if France had not been so kind as to furnish them with this excuse, they were determined to find some other means to evade our demand. Could the Dutch, that in the year 1745 picked out 6000 men, who, they knew, were under a capitulation not to fight the French, and sent them, at our great expence, to defend this island against that very foe, landed in North Britain, be expected to act with sincerity and fidelity on any other like occasion? Their dependance is entirely upon trade: and as their expectations to increase their trade were to be attained only by an exact neutrality, it was resolved, from the moment a war between Great Britain and France was certain, to sacrifice faith, gratitude, and every public virtue to procure a neutrality: and that they would have acted no otherwise is evident from the resolutions, previous to Mr. York's declaration to the Princess Regent, delivered to the States of Holland, by the towns of Amsterdam, Dort, Haerlem, Gouda, Rotterdam and Enckhuysen, which flatly declared that England was uncontrovertibly the aggressor in Europe, by seizing a considerable number of French vessels; that the threatened invasion of Great Britain did not affect the Republic's guarantee of the protestant succession,

sion, inasmuch as it was only intended to obtain reparation for the injury sustained by the subjects of his most Christian Majesty; finally, that the succours demanded could not be of any advantage to the King of England; as it appeared by the declaration of his most Christian Majesty, that their granting these succours would immediately lay them under a necessity of demanding, in their turn, assistance from Great Britain.

Such sentiments destroy all thoughts of any foederal aid from the Dutch, however strictly bound by treaty and gratitude. If in cases of such emergency our nearest allies can deny their assistance upon the bare excuse of convenience to their own interest; it is time for Great Britain to withdraw its dependance from all foreign connections, and instead of relying on the forces provided by treaties, to place its strength in a regular and well-disciplined militia, which we shall find wisely and honestly established under the next administration; and, if kept up under due regulation, will always relieve us from the necessity of calling in a foreign mercenary army to defend us from invasions.

The Empress Queen had set the Dutch an example of the same kind of disregard to treaties and of ingratitude, as observed before. But not content with departing so much from the interest of that ally, which had so often, and to its own great detriment, saved her house from ruin; she, on the 1st of May, signed a treaty with France, our natural enemy, and then in arms, and threatening us with destruction. By which extraordinary

A. D.
1756.

Austria
joins with
France.

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1756.

New system of politics in Europe.

Its causes.

Silesia ceded to the King of Prussia, and its importance.

Queen of Hungary's practices to recover it.

Her treaty with Russia.

King of Poland.

revolution in the interests of Europe, its whole political system assumed a new face; and we find it necessary to shew the causes which produced it.

The reigning King of Prussia having, in the course of the last war, taken advantage of the weakness, to which the house of Austria was then reduced, made good the claims of his family to the most considerable part of the dutchy of Silesia, by force of arms; and, by the treaty of Dresden, obliged the Queen of Hungary to cede and guarantee to him his conquests in Silesia; a fine country, extending 200 miles in length, along the course of the large and navigable river Oder: a country of the most exquisite fertility and best cultivation, abounding with men, abounding with valuable manufactures, and yielding a clear yearly revenue of 800,000*l.* sterling. The peace was scarcely signed, before this Austrian heiress set on foot practices to recover, what she had ceded in December 1745. For on May the 22d 1746, she entered into a league with the court of Peterfburg, one of whose secret articles provides, That in case his Prussian Majesty should attack her Majesty the Empress Queen, or the Empress of Russia, or even the Republic of Poland, that this attack should be considered as a breach of the treaty of Dresden: that the right of the Empress Queen to Silesia, ceded by that treaty, should revive; and that the contracting powers should mutually furnish an army of 60,000 men to reinvest the Empress Queen with that dutchy. The King of Poland was invited to accede to that treaty: and he

he did so far accede to it, as to shew he perfectly agreed in his sentiments, and was willing to co-operate with the two Empresses. But, his situation in the jaws of a formidable enemy, should any thing perspire too soon, and the experience of past misfortunes, had rendered him so wary, that he declined signing the treaty, with the consent of the parties concerned; who agreed with his request, that he should have a share of the spoil, on the footing of a treaty (the 18th of May 1745,) for the eventual partition of the King of Prussia's dominions. So that though the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, was excepted, he was, to all intents and purposes, a party to the treaty of Petersburg.

From this time every device was practised to embroil the King of Prussia with the northern powers; and especially to render him odious to the Czarina in person. This being fully effected, magazines and armies were prepared in Bohemia and Moravia; and the King of Poland, under the pretence of a military amusement, raised an army of 16,000 men, to secure the important and strong post of Pirna. The Empress Queen went so far, as to try her interest with Great Britain, whether she might depend upon any support from thence in case of need, depending much upon the differences, which had some time subsisted between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Prussia. But they that were most ready to help her and her family in distress, could not be brought to do any thing for her ambition and revenge. This re-

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1756.

Intrigues
and prepa-
rations for
war against
the King
of Prussia.

A. D.
1756.

Why the
Queen of
Hungary
deserted
Great Bri-
tain.

Her prac-
tices disco-
vered by
the King
of Prussia.

Why the
King of
Prussia had
recourse to
arms.

buff in England threw her into that humour, which made her refuse her aid, when demanded, by virtue of treaty, by Great Britain: and the British alliance with Prussia soon after furnished her with a reason for throwing herself into the arms of France ^d.

Those treaties could not be carried on without the knowledge of his Prussian Majesty, who jealous of the Queen of Hungary's sincerity at the time of her ceding Silesia, watched all their motions, and spared no cost to gain perfect intelligence of their most hidden designs. Therefore, when he saw that the Empress Queen was resolved to avail herself of her alliances and her armaments, by means of the troubles between England and France, his Majesty ordered his minister at Vienna, to demand a clear explication and proper assurances concerning the preparations then making within her dominions: and being answered very dryly, That she was only taking measures for her own security, and that of her allies and friends; the King believing himself no longer obliged to preserve any terms with one, that was preparing for his ruin; sensible of the advantage it would be to keep a ruinous war out of his own territories, and well prepared for action, he entered Saxony with a powerful army. Where we shall leave him, till we have taken a further view of our own affairs.

^d Some think that this was done in revenge for our making a separate peace at Aix-la-Chapelle, and making Austria the victim. See p. 2.

The Squadron under the command of Admiral Byng being fitting out, the lords of the admiralty^e sent him these instructions for his conduct. "Whereas the King's pleasure has been signified to us by Mr. Fox, one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, that upon consideration of the several advices, which have been received relating to the supposed intention of the French to attack the island of Minorca, a squadron of ten ships of the line do forthwith sail for the Mediterranean, under your command : and whereas we have appointed the ships named in the margin^f for this service, you are hereby required and directed immediately to put to sea with such of them as are ready, (leaving orders for the rest to follow you, as soon as possible) and proceed with the utmost expedition to Gibraltar.

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1756.

Admiral
Byng's in-
structions.

Upon your arrival there, you are to enquire, whether any French squadron is come through the straits; and if there is, to inform yourself, as well as possible, of their number and force; and if any of them were transports. And, as it is probable they may be destined for North America, and as his Majesty's ships named in the margin^g, are either at, or going to Halifax, and are to cruise off Louisbourg, and the mouth of the

^e March 30, 1756, signed Anson, Villiers, Rowley, Boscawen, Bateman, Edgecumbe and J. Cleland. N. B. The Admiral did not receive them till April the 1st, at 10 in the morning.

^f See before, p. 252.

^g Grafton, Sterling Castle, Fougueux, 4th, Nottingham, Lichfield, Centurion, Norwich, 6th, Success, Vulture sloop.

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1756.

Gulph of St. Lawrence, you are immediately to take the soldiers out of so many ships of your Squadron as, together with the ships at, and going to Halifax, will make a force superior to the said French Squadron, (replacing them with landmen or ordinary seamen from your other ships) and then detach them, under the command of Rear Admiral West, directing him to make the best of his way off Louisbourg; and taking the afore-mentioned ships, which he may expect to find there, under his command, to cruise off the said place, and the entrance of the Gulph of St. Lawrence; and use his utmost endeavours to intercept and seize the aforesaid French ships, or any other ships belonging to the French that may be bound to, or returning from, that part of North America.

If upon your arrival at Gibraltar, you shall not gain intelligence of a French Squadron having passed the Straits; you are then to go on, without a moment's loss of time, to Minorca: Or, if, in consequence of such intelligence, you shall detach Rear Admiral West, as before directed, you are to use equal expedition in repairing thither, with the ships, which shall remain with you; and if you find any attack made upon that island by the French, you are to use all possible means in your power for its relief. If you find no such attack made; you are to proceed off Toulon, and station your Squadron in the best manner you shall be able, for preventing any ships getting out of that port; or for intercepting and seizing any, that may get out; and you are to exert the utmost vigilance

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vigilance therein, and in protecting Minorca and Gibraltar, from any hostile attempt.

You are also to be vigilant for protecting the trade of his Majesty's subjects from being molested, either by the French, or by cruisers from Morocco, or any other of the Barbary States; and for that purpose to appoint proper convoys and cruisers.

You are likewise to be as attentive, as possible, to the intercepting and seizing, as well ships of war and privateers, as merchant ships, belonging to the French, wherever they may be met with, within the limits of your command. But in pursuance of the King's order in council, you are not to suffer any of the ships of your Squadron to take any French vessels out of any port belonging to the Ottoman Empire, upon any pretence; nor to molest, detain or imprison, the persons of any of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire; and also not to seize and detain any French ship or vessel whatsoever, which they shall meet with in the Levant Seas, bound from one port to another in those seas, or to, or from any ports of Egypt, having any effects of Turks on board.

Upon your arrival in the Mediterranean, you are to take under your command his Majesty's ships and vessels named in the margin^h, which are at present there.

If any French ships of war should sail from Toulon, and escape your Squadron, and proceed out of the Mediterranean; you are forthwith to

^h Princess Louisa, Portland, Deptford, Chesterfield, Dolphin, Phoenix, Experiment, Fortune sloop.

send,

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1756.

send, or repair yourself to England, with a proportionable part of the ships under your command: observing that you are never to keep more ships in the Mediterranean, than shall be necessary for executing the services recommended to you.

To enable you the better to perform the above-mentioned services, you are to take care to keep the ships and vessels under your command in constant good condition, and to have them cleaned as often as shall be requisite for that purpose."

More instructions.

By further instructions¹ it was ordered, that, (whereas the King had been pleased to direct that the royal regiment of Fuzileers, commanded by Lord Robert Bertie, should serve on board his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean, and that the said regiment should be landed in Minorca, in case the governor, or commander in chief of that island, shall think it necessary for its defence; and the governor of Gibraltar having orders, in case a further reinforcement shall be necessary at Minorca, to make a detachment equal to a battalion, from his garrison; which detachment, the admiral, or commander in chief of his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean, is to convoy to Minorca, on board the men of war, or such transport vessels, as he shall be able to provide for that purpose;) he should pay due obedience to his Majesty's aforesaid directions, by landing Lord Robert Bertie's regiment, in case the said island of Minorca should be

¹ Dated the 31st of March 1756, signed by Anson, Villiers, Rowley and J. Cleland.

attacked,

attacked, and, upon consultation with the governor, the same should appear to be necessary; and not to confine himself to the landing that regiment only, but also to assist with as many gunners and men from his squadron, as might be serviceable, and the ships could possibly spare; and that he likewise should pay due regard to his Majesty's aforesaid pleasure, in relation to transporting a battalion from Gibraltar to Minorca.

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1756.

Before we proceed with the expedition, it will be proper to spend a little attention upon these instructions, of whose breach, the Honourable Mr. Byng is accused. There is but one article in the set of instructions, so far as they regard the operations of the enemy, that can be accounted positive: which is the order that requires him to put to sea as soon as possible, &c. For, though it is admitted in the introductory clause, That several advices had been received concerning the supposed intentions of the French to attack the island of Minorca; the next supposes, that their real design was, to slip through the Straits of Gibraltar, and direct their course to North America; and makes a suitable provision for separating the squadron, and sending off such a part of it, under Rear Admiral West, together with such a proportionable number of the soldiers on board, as, added to the ships, he was supposed to find there, would render him superior to the enemy: and all the other articles hanging in like manner upon events, were accordingly to be observed, or not, as circumstances agreed, or otherwise. And as the
Admiral's

Remarks
on instructions.

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1756.

Admiral's instructions were, in general, founded on a persuasion, that the French armament at Toulon was destined to North America; so it was declared with the utmost confidence, by those, who ought to have known better, that, for want of seamen, six or eight ships of the line at most, was the greatest number the enemy could possibly put to sea from that port.

Hence it is manifest, That, as there was no want of early intelligence of the nature and destination of the armament at Toulon, the ministry gave no credit to it: that instructions unprecise in their nature, being founded on mistakes and uncertainties, accompanied with orders, yet more unprecise and embarrassing, could not but be productive of perplexities and difficulties in every question, they gave rise to; consequently of snares and dangers in every resolution taken upon them: and that from the very different aspect of things on the admiral's arrival at Gibraltar, from that, which they had been made to wear in England, a difference of conduct became absolutely necessary: and thenceforward, he was either to proceed discretionally, or not proceed at all.—Instead of six or eight ships of the line, he had been informed were the most the enemy could send to sea on the 13th of April, just a week after Admiral Byng sailed from St. Helens; he now found their Toulon squadron to consist of 12 ships, from 64 to 84 guns; four frigates, from 24 to 46; besides sloops, five bomb vessels, &c. which had already

already got possession of all Minorca, except Fort St. Philip.

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1756.

This difference in the real state, as well as in the aspect of things, will, in some measure, account for part of that conduct, for which Admiral Byng was so severely treated afterwards.

However, thus armed and instructed, the Admiral sailed for Gibraltar in his way to Minorca, on the 6th day of April: but was kept at sea by calms and contrary winds, till the 2d day of May, on which he arrived at Gibraltar, where he received an information of the enemy's operations and strength on the island of Minorca, and on that coast, very different from what he had been made to expect: and, without delay^k, issued his orders accordingly, on the very day of his arrival, for all the ships of his squadron to complete their provisions and water with the utmost expedition. On the 3d the Admiral went ashore to communicate to the governor of Gibraltar his orders, relative to a battalion, to be detached from the garrison, and to be embarked on board the squadron for the relief of Fort St. Philip.

Admiral
Byng sails
for Gibraltar.

Arrives at
Gibraltar.

His conduct there.

But General Fowke the governor of Gibraltar, having also received instructions or orders upon this head from the war office, in three several let-

General
Fowke's
conduct.

^k The first resolution of the court martial unanimously declares, "It does not appear that any unnecessary delay was made by Admiral Byng, in the proceedings of the squadron under his command, from the time of their sailing from St. Helens, on the 6th of April, till the time of their arrival off Minorca, on the 19th of May."

ters,

A. D.
1756.

Consults
Engineers.

Their opi-
nion.

Calls a
council of
war.

ters, which either did not appear so intelligible to him, as to warrant a precipitate compliance with the admiral's demand; or, perhaps, new matter had arisen, which had not been so much as supposed at the time of penning them, and such as was productive of difficulties hardly to be surmounted, he thought it his duty, in the first place to take the opinion of the Engineers best acquainted with the works of Fort St. Philip, (the principal of whom had been in service there, and enjoyed his present post, on the merit of bringing home a model of that fortress) concerning the possibility of relieving the same. Who, the same day, signed an opinion, That all circumstances considered, it would be extremely dangerous, if not impracticable, to throw succours into it.

Next day, the 4th of May, this opinion was submitted to a council of war, composed of the governor and all the field officers of the garrison, assembled to take into consideration the several orders above-mentioned. Those to Admiral Byng, have been recited at length. General Fowke produced Lord Barrington's letters to him, who in his first letter, dated March 21, 1756, writes, "That the King has ordered the royal regiment of Fusiliers to embark immediately for Gibraltar, and that upon their arrival, he is to make a detachment from the four regiments then in garrison, to Minorca:" which implies, That if the detachment was to go, the regiment was to stay. But least this should not be clear enough, the next paragraph adds, "That together with the recruits for the

corps

A. D.
1756.

corps in his garrison, the said regiment was to be disembarked and quartered in the garrison under his command: upon which said disembarkation, he, the said General, in obedience to his Majesty's further pleasure, was to cause a detachment, equal to a battalion on the present British establishment, to embark for Minorca." The next letter, without the least reference to, or appeal of, any part of the former, repeats the order for causing a battalion to embark on board his Majesty's fleet for the relief of the island of Minorca, in case there should be any likelihood of its being attacked." And the third letter, dated April 1, only directs him, "to receive such women and children belonging to the royal regiment of Fusiliers, as Admiral Byng should think fit to land there."

As it was impossible to form any absolute judgment upon these inconsistencies; they had recourse to the Admiralty instructions delivered to Admiral Byng, dated March 31, for an explanation of their intention. Wherein it is not only signified, That the King had been pleased to direct, that the royal regiment of Fusiliers should serve on board his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean, and also be landed at Minorca, in case the said island was attacked, and upon a consultation with General Blakeney, it should be found necessary: but moreover that the governor of Gibraltar had orders (only those above-mentioned) to make a detachment, equal to a battalion, from his garrison, in case of a like necessity for a further reinforcement:

A. D.
1756.Their re-
solutions.

ment: and this detachment, together with the said regiment, the Admiral was required to land in Minorca, under the restrictions before specified; together with what other assistance of gunners and men his ships could possibly spare.

But after mature deliberation upon these letters and instructions, and upon the written opinion of the engineers, and the situation of his Majesty's garrisons and forces in the Mediterranean, the council came to this resolution, That the sending such a detachment, equal to a battalion, would evidently weaken the garrison of Gibraltar, and be no ways effectual for the relief of Minorca: assigning for the grounds and reasons of this resolution, the impracticability of introducing any succours into the place; the insufficiency of the number proposed, if thrown in, for the defence and preservation of the island in its present condition, which they apprehended to be the meaning of the letters and orders before them; and the imprudence of weakening the garrison of Gibraltar, unnecessarily risking the loss of an additional number of his Majesty's troops, without any reasonable prospect or hope of their being any assistance to Minorca: concluding with the following reason:—"Because
 " the Toulon Squadron, by the best accounts the
 " council have received, is at least equal in force,
 " if not superior to that under Admiral Byng:
 " and should the British fleet be any way weaken-
 " ed by any engagement, or any other accident,
 " the garrison of Gibraltar would be exposed to
 " imminent danger; and as the garrison stands

"at present, it is not more than sufficient to the
"common duty of the garrison."

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1756.

Though these considerations prevailed with the council not to come into any measures, which would have exposed Gibraltar, without preserving Fort St. Philip; they nevertheless discovered a laudable disposition to do whatever could be prudently done for the good of the service, which was to furnish one captain, six subalterns, nine serjeants, eleven corporals, five drums and 235 private men, to supply the deficiency of those soldiers, miners and seamen, put ashore at Fort St. Philip by Captain Edgumbe, and without which reinforcement his ships¹ could not be of any service in an engagement.

A supply
granted.

Let us now revert to the conduct of Admiral Byng on this occasion. Having now, for the first time, one positive fact to reason upon, namely, That Fort St. Philip was actually besieged, by a great force completely furnished with all manner of necessaries for such an undertaking, and that the siege was covered by a squadron abundantly stronger and better appointed, than had been conceived by those, who dictated his instructions: His first concern was to consider in what manner he might conduct himself for the better fulfilling his orders.—The American *if*, on which his instructions seemed to lay the greatest stress of probability, with respect to the design of the French armament at Toulon, was now out of the

Admiral
Byng pre-
pares to
sail for
Minorca.

¹ The Deptford, Princess Louisa, and the Fortune sloop.

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1756.

question. And the *if*, referring to the French fleet's being still inactive in their port, and in that case, directing him to station his squadron in the best manner to prevent their getting out, was also made void : so that his present duty was confined to *use all possible means in his power*, for the relief of the place ; at the same time to take proper care to protect Gibraltar from any hostile attempt ; to protect the trade of his Majesty's subjects in the Mediterranean, and to annoy the enemy within the limits of his command ; except, &c. therefore Admiral Byng, having received on board the 267 men from Gibraltar garrison, on the 6th, and being joined by the Experiment, the Portland and the Dolphin, and having done all in his power to supply the wants of his squadron, though not fully supplied with water, a deficiency entirely owing to the insufficiency of the springs ; he set sail on the 8th of May at eight in the morning, the wind easterly. But it continuing variable, and often interrupted by calms, this squadron could not reach the height of Palma, the capital of Majorca, till the 16th, where the Phoenix had been shut up, almost three weeks by two French men of war, that cruised off that port, and retired immediately on sight of the British squadron in the Offing. The Experiment was sent in with a letter from the Admiral to the English consul for intelligence, which returned with the Phoenix, Capt. Harvey, who in the course of this war has acquired great honour to his country by his naval conduct and personal courage ; by whom he received
advice,

Arrives off
Majorca.

advice, that the Toulon fleet, under the command of M. de la Galiffionere, consisting of 10 ships of the line, five frigates, and 180 transports, with 11000 land forces, had sailed from that port on the 12th of April; and landed in Minorca, at Ciudadella on the 18th of the same month. The French fleet consisted of,

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1756.

Gets intelligence of the French fleet, &c.

Line of battle ships.

Le Foudroyant	84 guns.
La Couronne --	74
Le Guerrier —	74
Le Redoutable	74
Le Temeraire --	74
L'Hippothame	64
Le Fier —	64
Le Triton —	64
Le Lion —	64
Le Contant —	64
Le Sage —	64
L'Orphée —	64

Frigates.

La Juno	46 guns.
La Rose	30
Gracieuse	30
La Topaze	24
La Nymph	24

The Admiral before he sailed for Minorca, dispatched a letter by express to the lords of the admiralty; in which, though it might contain no-

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1756.

Admiral
Byng's
first letter
from Gib-
raltar to
the lords
of the Ad-
miralty.

thing but truth, his zeal for the service, and chagrin at the many disappointments and delays he had met with, prompted him to expostulate too freely with those, he knew, could have dispatched him with more advantage and credit. He begins with a kind of accusation against their dilatory orders for fitting out his squadron: "If, said he, I had been so happy, as to have arrived at Mahon, before the French had landed, I flatter myself, I should have been able to prevent their getting a footing on that island. He complained that there were no magazines in Gibraltar for supplying his squadron with necessaries; whose necessities had not been fully supplied at the time he was obliged to sail from England, and had been greatly multiplied in a long and tedious voyage. In particular, he observed, that the careening wharfs, pits and storehouses were entirely decayed, so that he should find the greatest difficulty in cleaning the ships that were foul: and this was the case, not only of those that here joined him from a cruise in the Mediterranean, under Commodore Edgumbe; but even of some of those carried out from Portsmouth. He then very impolitically gave his opinion, that, if it should be found practicable, it would be very impolitic to throw any men into St. Philip's castle; which could not, he said, be saved without a land force sufficient to raise the siege: and therefore, that a small reinforcement would only add so many men to the number, which must fall into the hands of the enemy. He further said, That it was the joint opinion of
such

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1756.

uch engineers and artillerymen in Gibraltar, who had been at Minorca, that it would be impossible to throw any number of men into St. Philip's, if the French had erected batteries on the two shores near the entrance of the harbour, so as to bar all passage up to the sally-port of the fortress; and concluded, that his own sentiments were agreeable to their opinion."

This letter consists of two parts: the former is a positive impeachment of the ministry, for their not sending a fleet to the assistance of Minorca sooner, and better provided; and for neglecting, and suffering the magazines and wharfs at Gibraltar, the only place for the King's ships to careen at, and to be supplied with necessaries, when Mahon was invested, run to decay and ruin.—The latter part does as good as tell them, that they had sent him upon an impracticable service, and that if it miscarried, as in all probability it was like to do, it must be laid to their charge, who had not sent a land force to raise the siege, as well as a fleet, that was inferior to the enemy's.

Remarks
thereon.

The gentlemen in the administration not being used to be rallied by their officers, and foreseeing that Minorca must fall a prey to the French force upon it, and that its loss would be attended with a general clamour against themselves, should they not be able to fix the blame elsewhere; it seems most probable, that from this moment, they united to throw the miscarriage, if it should so happen, upon Byng alone: for which purpose they

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they could collect matter enough from this letter, where he doubts of the success of his expedition. Which they interpreted, and had it propagated, to be a certain sign that Mr. Byng would not endeavour to relieve Fort St. Philip: and this was so well improved from Byng's future conduct, that they effectually transferred the blame of the loss of Minorca from themselves to the person, who had taken upon him, so unseasonably, to hint a disapprobation of their conduct. This served to amuse the people, and made a sacrifice of Byng; yet, the most sensible and impartial part of the nation saw through the artifice, and could not acquit the ministry of misconduct, delays and neglect, though they could not entirely approve of the conduct of Admiral Byng, on the day of battle; for which he suffered death; yet his crime was no more, than *not having done all that was in his power to do* in the time of action; a crime, if deserving of death, that involved many more, even every one, through whose delay, impediment, or neglect, that expedition was put off to the 6th of April, and was so badly fitted out.

Arrives on
the coast of
Minorca.

It appears by the journals of this voyage, that the wind continued easterly until the 18th, at nine at night, when a fine breeze sprung up northerly, and the squadron sailed large all night, and found itself on the coast of Minorca at break of day, on the 19th. The Admiral, about five in the morning, dispatched Captain Harvey, in the Phoenix, with the Chesterfield and Dolphin a-head of his fleet,
to

to reconnoitre, as close as possible, the harbour's mouth, at Mahon, and the situation both of the enemy and their batteries; as also to observe whether it were practicable, and where, to throw any succours into the castle; to look out for the French squadron, and to pick up, if possible, any of their small craft, for intelligence, with proper signals for all these purposes.

Captain Harvey was also charged with the following letter to General Blakeney.

Ramillies, off Minorca, May 19.

S I R,

I Send you this by Captain Harvey, of his Majesty's ship Phoenix, who has my orders to convey it to you, if possible, together with the inclosed packet, which he received at Leghorn.

His letter
designed
for General
Blakeney.

—I am extremely concerned to find that Captain Edgecumbe was obliged to retire to Gibraltar, with the ships under his command, and that the French are landed, and St. Philip's Castle is invested; as I flatter myself, had I fortunately been more timely in the Mediterranean, that I should have been able to have prevented the enemy's getting a footing on the island of Minorca.

I am to acquaint you, that General Stuart, Lord Effingham and Colonel Cornwallis, with about 30 officers, and some recruits belonging to the different regiments now in garrison with you, are on board the ships of the squadron; and shall be glad to know by the return of the officer, what place you will think proper to have them landed at,

The

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The royal regiment of English fuziliers, commanded by Lord Robert Bertie, is likewise on board the squadron, destined, agreeable to my orders, to serve on board the fleet in the Mediterranean, unless it should be thought necessary, upon consultation with you, to land the regiment for the defence of Minorca: But, I must also inform you, should the fuziliers be landed, as they are part of the ships compliments, the marines having been ordered by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, on board of other ships at Portsmouth, to make room for them, that it will disable the squadron from acting against that of the enemy, which I am informed is cruising off the island: however, I shall gladly embrace every opportunity of promoting his Majesty's service in the most effectual manner, and shall assist you to distress the enemy, and defeat their designs, to the utmost of my power.

Please to favour me with information, how I can be most effectual of service to you, and the garrison; and believe me to be, &c.

Captain Harvey had orders to deliver this letter, if possible, to the General; and as with a view to some such service as this, a private signal had been agreed upon between him and Captain Scroope, of the Dolphin, who was in the castle, and had kept his boat, in order to come off, upon occasion, it was expected that the letter would have been safely delivered.

The

The frigates above dispatched got round the Laire of Mahon, a small island, about half an hour before nine o'clock, and, though they met with light airs of wind, and sometimes a stark calm, they continued to make the best of their way for the harbour's mouth.

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About half an hour past nine the whole squadron got round the Laire also, with a fresh gale; but soon fell in with light airs and calms, at about three miles from St. Philip's Castle.

In the mean time Captain Harvey, standing on for the harbour's mouth, made his private signals, but without the desired success. No return was made: no boat was seen to come off: and the enemy's squadron appearing at the same time in the south-east quarter, the Admiral thought it adviseable to call in the Phoenix, and the other frigates; bore away for the enemy, and made the general signal to chase.

What prevented its delivery.

Enemy's fleet appears.

Both squadrons made sail to each other, and about two in the afternoon the Admiral made the signal for the line of battle a-head, which for want of sufficient wind, could not be form'd so properly, as otherwise it might have been. His next care was to furnish such of his ships, as were sickly and ill-manned (which was the case of several) with seamen from the frigates^m. He or-

Byng prepares for battle.

^m Thirty out of the Phoenix into the Revenge; and twenty into the Deptford. Forty out of the Experiment into the Captain, and twenty into the Lancaster: and out of the Dolphin twenty into the Intrepid, twenty to the Defiance, and seventeen to the Portland.

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dered the Phoenix, which had long before been reported unfit for service, and was furnished with proper materials for such a purpose, to be converted into a fire-ship. He also disposed his squadron in line of battle, as you'll find it in the note at the bottomⁿ, according to the order he had made on the 3d of May, while he laid in the Bay of Gibraltar.

The enemy
advances.

Tacks.

About six in the evening the enemy advanced in order, with twelve large ships and five frigates; but in an hour's time, at two leagues distance, they tacked, as it did seem, to gain the weather-gage; an advantage, which Mr. Byng would have committed a great error to lose, and therefore this obliged him to tack also, and to secure the land-wind in the morning; being then about five leagues from Cape Mola, having stood towards the enemy^o, from the time of their first disco-

ⁿ The line of battle,—The Kingston to lead with the star-board and the Defiance with the lar-board tacks on board.

Frigates	Rates	Ships	Commanders	Number of		Division
				Guns	Men	
	4	Kingston	Capt. Perry	60	400	Admiral of the Blue.
	4	Deptford	Amhurst	50	280	
Chesterfield	3	Culloden	Ward	74	600	
Phoenix to repeat signals	2	Ramillies	Hon. J. Byng, Esq;	90	780	
Fortune sloop	3	Trident	Capt. Gardiner	64	500	
	4	Prfs Louisa	Durell	60	400	Rear-Admiral of the Red.
	3	Revenge	Noel	64	480	
Experiment	3	Intrepid	Cornwall	64	480	
Dolphin to repeat signals	3	Captain	Young	64	480	
	3	Buckingham	Catford	64	480	
	3	Lancaster	Temple West, Esq;	68	535	
	4	Portland	Capt. Everitt	66	520	
	4	Defiance	Hon. G. Edgcombe	50	300	
			Capt. Baird	60	400	
			Andrews			

^o See the third and fourth Resolutions of the court-martial.

very

very, with calms and little wind; which conduct was afterwards approved of by the court-martial ^P.

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The enemy on shore, having got sight of our fleet, were not negligent in contributing all in their power to encourage and strengthen their fleet for engagement; and for this purpose they dispatched 600 soldiers in two tartans to reinforce Galiffionere, in the night. The two tartans, appearing close to the rear of the English fleet, were chased, and one of them, with two Captains, two Lieutenants, and about 100 soldiers, rank and file, fell into the hands of one of our frigates, that gave them chase: the other escaped.

Is reinforced from the island.

Lost a tartan with soldiers.

The 20th, in the morning, proving hazy, the enemy's squadron was not to be seen at day-break; But soon after the taking of this tartan, it came in sight, to the south-east; and Admiral Byng, about two o'clock, threw out a signal to bear away two points from the wind, and engage ^q. Thus, from the time of first seeing the French fleet in the morning of the 19th of May, till our fleet weathered the French about noon the 20th, the Admiral took proper measures to gain and keep

Byng's signal to engage.

^P Fifth resolution of the court-martial.

^q See twelfth and thirteenth resolutions, where it is said, That soon after the fleet was upon the lar-board-tack the Admiral made signals for leading two points to star-board, which brought the wind upon or abaft the beam, and the ships continued that course nearly a-head of each other, till the Admiral made the signal for battle, about twenty minutes after two o'clock.

the

A. D. 1756. the wind of the enemy, and to form and close the line of battle ¹.

Admiral West's conduct in the engagement.

But Rear-Admiral West perceiving it impossible, at so great a distance as they were then from the enemy, to comply with both orders, bore away with his division seven points from the wind, and closing down upon the enemy, attacked them with such vigour, that the ships, which opposed him were presently driven out of the line ². This seems to have been the critical moment, that decided the fate of Minorca, and furnished matter for Byng's ruin. For, the other division not bearing down, and the enemy's centre keeping their station, Rear-Admiral West durst not pursue his advantage, lest his communication with the rest of his fleet should be entirely cut off.

Errors of Admiral Byng.

What Admiral Byng was particularly blamed for, was his order for the Deptford to quit the line, before the engagement, and for all his division to fall a-back in the beginning of the action, when the Intrepid's fore-topmast was shot away ³. For his order to the Deptford the Admiral said, it was to make the English fleet exactly equal to the enemy's, which consisted of twelve ships of the line and five frigates: as for the other point,

¹ See the eighth resolution of the court-martial.

² The five headmost ships of the enemy went away to leeward, out of gun-shot. Ibid. resolution fifteenth.

³ A little before three o'clock. Ibid. resolution sixteenth.

though

though it shewed a good deal of care of his Majesty's ships, to prevent their running foul or damaging one another, it was ill-timed, and gave the censorious world too much ground to question his courage, and to cast the whole blame of the miscarriage of this day upon him alone; and an opportunity for Gallionere to retreat with his fleet, and repair his damage; and as his ships were clean, they were soon out of reach of our ships, which gave them chase, being very foul and unfit for the pursuit of a nimble enemy.

In this action it appeared, by the resolutions of the court-martial, That the van-division bore down properly for the ships opposed to them in the enemy's line, and disabled five of them: that the Intrepid, the sternmost ship of our van-division, after an engagement of about a quarter of an hour, lost her fore-topmast a little before three o'clock: that the Revenge, the headmost ship of the rear-division bore down, after the ships of the van bore down, for the ship opposed to her in the enemy's line, and that she brought up upon the weather-quarter of the Intrepid, upon the Intrepid's fore-topmast going away; and that she quickly afterwards, upon the Intrepid's setting her fore-sail, bore down under the Intrepid's lee-quarter and brought up there: and that upon the signal being made for battle, and the van putting before the wind, the Admiral in the Ramillies edged away some points; and the Trident and Princess

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The court-martial's resolutions concerning this action.

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Princess Louisa thereby coming to windward of him, the Admiral thereupon hauled up his fore-sail, backed his mizentop-sail, and endeavoured to back his maintop-sail, to allow of their getting into their stations, and continued in that situation for five, six or seven minutes. Upon which that court gave it as their opinion, That the Admiral, after the signal was made for battle, separated the rear from the van-division, and retarded the rear-division of the British fleet from closing with and engaging the enemy, by his shortning sail, by hauling up his fore-sail, backing his mizentop-sail, and backing or attempting to back his maintop-sail, in order that the Trident and Princess Louisa might get a-head again of the Ramillies: And further, that instead of shortning sail the Admiral ought to have made the Trident and Princess Louisa's signals to make more sail; and that he ought also to have set so much sail himself, as would have enabled the Culoden, the worst sailing ship in his division, to have kept her station, with all her plain-sail set, in order to have got down, with as much expedition as possible, to the enemy, and thereby have properly supported the van-division^a.

Galiffionere's conduct censured.

Having lost sight, and all hopes of seeing the French again under M. Galiffionere, whose behaviour on this occasion seems more unpardonable than Admiral Byng's; his ships being clean, bet-

^a See fifteenth to twentieth resolution of the court-martial.

ter manned, carrying a greater weight of metal^w, and encouraged by a place of retreat, in case of a defeat; the want of which was certainly a grand consideration with an Admiral, who had no other relief in case of a misfortune, than to return to Gibraltar, where there were neither stores, conveniencies, nor yet provisions to supply the wants of such a squadron, if disabled from keeping the sea; Admiral Byng brought to about eight o'clock at night, to join the Intrepid, disabled and left to

Admiral Byng's conduct after the engagement.

* The Hon. Admiral Byng's squadron, when he engaged M. De la Galiffionere's off Cape Mola, 20 May, 1756. M. De la Galiffionere's squadron, when he landed the troops at Minorca 18 April, and at the engagement with Admiral Byng's squadron off Cape Mola, 20 May, 1756.

Ships Names	Guns	Wt of metal on the			men.	Ships Names.	Guns	wt. of mt. on the			Number of		Total men on board each ship.
		low dec.	mid dec.	upp dec.				low dec.	mid dec.	upp dec.	Sea men.	Sol. diers.	
		lb.	lb.	lb.			lb.	lb.			250	950	
Ramillies	90	32	18	12	780	Foudroyant	84	52	24	700	150	800	
Culloden	74	32		18	600	La Couronne	74	42	24	650	150	800	
Buckingham	68	32		18	535	Le Guerrier	74	42	24	650	150	800	
Lancaster	66	32		18	520	Le Temeraire	74	42	24	650	150	800	
Trident	64	24		12	500	Le Redoutable	74	42	24	650	100	600	
Intrepid	64	32		18	480	L'Hippothame	64	36	24	500	100	600	
Captain	64	24		12	480	Le Fier	64	36	24	500	100	600	
Revenge	64	24		12	480	Le Triton	64	36	24	500	100	600	
Kingston	60	24		9	400	Le Lion	64	36	24	500	100	600	
Defiance	60	24		12	400	Le Content	64	36	24	500	100	600	
Prfs Louisa	56	24		12	400	Le Sage	64	36	24	500	100	600	
Portland	48	24		12	300	L'Orphée	64	36	24	500	100	600	
	778				5875		828			6800	1550	8350	
Frigates						Frigates							
Deptford	48				280	La Juno	46			300		300	
Chesterfield	40				250	La Roze	30			250		250	
Phoenix	22				160	Gracieuse	30			250		250	
Dolphin	22				160	La Topes	24			200		200	
Experiment	22				160	La Nymphe	24			200		200	
Total	932				6885	Total	982			8050	1550	9600	

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the care of the *Chesterfield*, and to refit his ships, as fast as possible, and continued so all night. But next morning the enemy was quite gone, and Mahon was north-north-west about ten or eleven leagues. He then sent cruizers in quest of the *Intrepid* and *Chesterfield*, which had parted from the rest of the squadron in the night; and joined him next day; and having, from a state and condition of the squadron, brought him in by the proper officers, found that the Captain, the *Intrepid* and the *Defiance*, (which latter had lost her Captain) were very much damaged in their masts, the Admiral thought it proper, on the 24th, to call a council of war on board the *Ramillies*, before he went again to look for the enemy.

A council
of war.

This council, besides the proper naval officers*, who by right are consulted upon such occasions, consisted also of several land officers, by the Admirals particular request. For he desired General Stuart, Lord Effingham, Lord Robert Bertie and Colonel Cornwallis to attend, that he might collect their opinions, upon the present situation, and concerning the future operations of the fleet under his command. And the questions debated, and the resolutions in this council were, as follow:

Questions
debated.

I. Whether an attack upon the French fleet gives any prospect of relieving *Minorca*. *Ans.* It would not.

II. Whether, if there was no French fleet cruising off *Minorca*, the English fleet could raise the siege. *Ans.* It could not.

* The Admirals and Captains of all the ships.

III. Whe-

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III. Whether Gibraltar would not be in danger by any accident that may befall this fleet? *Ans.* It would be in danger.

IV. Whether an attack with our fleet, in the present state of it, upon that of the French, will not endanger the safety of Gibraltar, and expose the trade of the Mediterranean to great hazard.

Ans. That it would.

V. Whether it is not most for his Majesty's service that the fleet should immediately proceed for Gibraltar. *Ans.* That it should proceed for Gibraltar.

At this council, says the Admiral, in his letter to Mr. Cleland, Secretary to the Admiralty, dated on board the Ramillies off Minorca, May the 25th, 1756, not the least contention or doubt arose. In the same letter he informed the Lords of the Admiralty, that he was making the best of his way to Gibraltar.

In this action the killed and wounded on our side were, Loss in this action.

On board the Buckingham,	wounded	7	killed	3
Captain	30	6		
Lancaster	14	1		
Intrepid	39	9		
Princess Louisa	13	3		
Defiance	45	14		
Portland	20	6		
Total		168	42	

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The only person of distinction amongst the slain was Captain Andrews of the *Defiance*, whose ship the Admiral gave to Captain Harvey. The killed and wounded on the side of the French were, on board the

	wounded	10	killed	2
Foudroyant	_____	3	_____	_____
Le Redoutable	_____	3	_____	_____
La Couronne	_____	15	_____	_____
Le Tameraire	_____	43	_____	_____
Le Guerrier	_____	7	_____	2
Le Lion	_____	8	_____	_____
Le Sage	_____	9	_____	10
L'Orphée	_____	19	_____	5
Le Content	_____	14	_____	5
Le Triton	_____	10	_____	2
L'Hipopothame	_____	4	_____	_____
Le Fier	_____	_____	_____	_____
Total	145	_____	26	_____

Minorca being thus given up by our fleet upon the coast, let us turn our attention to what was doing upon the island.

The
French in-
vade Mi-
norca.

The Marshal Duke de Richelieu, who commanded in chief by land, on this expedition, and Count Galiffionere, who commanded the fleet, attended by the principal officers of the army, had entered the city of Ciudadella without opposition. The English garrison, not able to dispute the disembarkation of the troops, retired: and the magistracy received the French officers with great ceremony

remony at their entrance;—the Marshal telling them, That he was not come to attack them: but that he was sent thither for no other reason than to obtain satisfaction for the insults and injuries done the King his master by the English. He promised them his protection, and assured them that he would take particular care of the behaviour of his troops, so that they should commit no sort of violence, and pay for what they should buy. But he added: “beware of carrying on any correspondence with the enemy; for, “if you do, you shall be treated with the utmost “severity.”

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Duke de
Richelieu's
speech.

This was upon the 18th of April; and on the 19th the Marshal took possession of a small fort, abandoned also by the English, which served to cover Fornelles, a small port, situate on the east side of the island, at the point of a bay near a cape of the same name.

On the 20th, the Marquis du Mesnil and the Marquis de Monteynard, two Lieutenant-Generals, were detached from the army with twenty-four companies of grenadiers and a royal brigade, to encamp at Mercadel, from whence they were to advance towards Mahon, in order to block up that port on the eastern side of the bay, whilst the main body of the army invested Fort St. Philip, and the French fleet under Galiffionere blocked up the entrance of the bay of Port Mahon, with orders to give Admiral Byng's squadron battle, in case it should attempt to relieve the fort.

March forward to
Mahon.

Supported
by a fleet.

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Condition
of Fort St.
Philip.

Governor
Blakeney
censured.

We have already seen that many of the principal officers were absent from Fort St. Philip: for, though they had been sent on board Admiral Byng's fleet, they were not landed. The garrison also was thought to be too weak for a long and vigorous defence of a fortress surrounded with such numerous works, against an army, so easily supplied and recruited from the south of France: for which reason a reinforcement had been ordered from Gibraltar, but without its proper effect. For, the siege was begun some weeks before our fleet appeared upon the coast; and it returned to Gibraltar, with the troops on board, designed to reinforce the garrison of Fort St. Philip. Yet Governor Blakeney has been greatly blamed for his conduct. It has been said, that he neglected his post, by shutting himself up in his own house during the whole siege, regardless of the command entrusted to his care: that he ought to have broke up the roads from Cuidadella and Fornelles, and pulled down the houses in St. Philips's town: that he ought also to have compelled the natives to go into the castle to ease the foldiers, by doing the labour of the garrison: and that the fortress was not, in the whole, properly defended; and at last, given up without necessity^y.

This is the substance of the charge; which, after the Governor's return to England, was an-

^y See a letter to the Right Hon. Lord B——y, being an enquiry into his defence of Minorca.

swered



LORD BLAKENEY.



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swered minutely by a principal officer, with the concurrence of the other officers under his command during the siege. In which answer the public are informed, That, as there was not one Colonel to take the chief command, in case of an accident; nor an officer between him and a Lieutenant-Colonel; and that there were forty-one Captains and Subaltern-officers belonging to the four regiments in garrison, absent, the Governor thought it most adviseable, and best for the service, to appoint one fixt place or station for him to receive intelligence from the officers commanded to go the rounds, or from any others, as circumstances and the exigencies of the service might require; laying it down as a maxim, That it should always be known, during a siege, where to find the Commander in Chief; and that the Governor of a fortification, who, out of vain curiosity, when the immediate service does not require his presence, goes to view the out-works, or hazards his life, when there is no need of his attendance, is guilty of great imprudence. He kept two Lieutenant-Colonels, and the Aid-de-Camp to one of them constantly going the rounds: for which they were excused all other duty; that they might have no excuse for remissness in this. Besides, the Fort-Major and Fort-Adjutant attended the Governor as often as they could be spared: the Captains, at every post, had orders

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Defended
in his conduct.

* See a full answer to an infamous libel, &c. Printed for W. Reeve, 1757.

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to inform the Governor, by a Subaltern-officer, or a serjeant, immediately, of every proceeding or accident that might happen under their respective commands: A report was made every morning to him, by the Field-officer of the day, of the particular incidents within the twenty-four hours of duty: with an account of the shot and shells fired during that time, describing their particular directions: and his own Aid-de-Camp was always ready to carry his orders when and where-ever required.

The circumference of the works being about a mile, wholly invested by sea and land, and the approaches carried on every where, it might have been a fatal consequence, had the Governor, through a vain curiosity or imprudent bravery, gone to view one part of the fortifications, while another remote part of it had been attacked; or had he thereby lost his life. Therefore, it was thought most prudent, under these circumstances, to fix upon the castle for his station to receive intelligence, and to give his directions and orders. Not that the castle could be supposed exempt from danger: on the contrary, the Governor was here much exposed to the fire of the enemy's cannon and mortars; who in a particular manner were observed to level their shot and shells at the body of the castle and the Governor's house: But, it was from the top thereof, as from the centre of the fortress, he could best and almost instantaneously view all the works and posts under his command,

and

and the operations, batteries, movements and approaches of the besiegers.

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During the whole siege of seventy days, the Governor never went into a bed nor undressed himself. Every one had access to him at all hours, night and day: and in the day-time he exercised the serjeants and soldiers himself, on the public parade, in the manner of defence upon any attack of the fortifications, or subterraneans; until it became dangerous for the men, from the enemy's shot and shells; and after that he continued their exercise in his own apartments, when time would permit. Thèreby discharging the duty of a good Governor, with an attention and application seldom to be met with in a man of eighty-two years of age.

When a place on the Continent is threatened with a siege; the advance of armies, and the necessary preparations to carry the design into execution cannot be secreted: they soon grow notorious, and furnish the Governor with time to break up roads, and to remove all buildings that may either obstruct the execution of his own batteries, or favour the approaches of the enemy. But in this case all the intelligence, that could be obtained by the Governor, shut up in an island, was, that great preparations were making in the south of France, which sometimes were said to be intended against Gibraltar, or Minorca, and sometimes against Corsica, or against our plantations in North America, or to join the Brest squadron in the invasion of Great Britain or Ireland.

In

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1756.

In which uncertainty, having no advice, nor orders for his conduct from England, he would have acted very improperly to brake up roads and to remove buildings before the enemy's motions should put their intentions out of all doubt to be levelled against his government; and then Governor Blakeney did all that was in the power of one in his circumstances, to do. For, as soon as it was certain ^a that the French were making good their landing at Ciudadella, the Governor, with the advice of the chief engineer, pulled down the engineer's own house, which was a fine modern building, and four windmills; these being the only erections, supposed to be of service to the enemy, during a siege; there being such an esplanade between the village and the fortifications, that the houses in St. Philip's town could do no harm to the besieged, but, on the contrary, they did great mischief to the French, when beat about their ears by the cannon-balls and shells from the castle. As to the roads; the difficulty both in regard to time, and to the nature of the ground, might be admitted in excuse. The French landed on the 17th, and meeting with no opposition from a land force ^b, that was obliged to shut themselves up

^a General Blakeney had no certainty of this intended invasion of Minorca, till two days before they landed, which advice he received by a packet-boat dispatched on purpose. From which time he made the best preparations he could for the defence of the castle.

^b There was a small redoubt, with one company, at Fornelles, and a post with five companies at Ciudadella, which the

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up in the fort, they took possession of Mahon on the 19th of the same month. Which was a space of time too short for removing the buildings of St. Philips town, had it been necessary; or to break up the roads effectually, had they been ever so easy to dig up. But, the surface of the whole island of Minorca is such a hard rock, that the French could not sink entrenchments for about a mile round the fort, with the labour of their whole army: How then was it possible for Governor Blakeney to break up the roads for thirty miles with his small number of men in three days, and when they had other work and duty upon their hands, which could not be left undone. Yet, even under these difficulties, the Governor gave a sample of his attention to this part of duty. He did order the bridges to be broken down, and the roads to be broken up: and they were actually spoiled, as much as the shortness of the time, and the few men, that could be spared, were able to execute his orders. In which, or any other labour or service, the Governor could depend upon no assistance from the islanders. The Spaniards, upon this occasion, refused to join in any act against the French. The more sensible part of them would frequently acknowledge, that their condition was greatly bettered, since the English had possession of the island; and that their govern-

the Governor recalled, as he did all his advanced parties, as soon as the enemy began to disembark.

Major Cunningham was charged with this part of the

ment

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ment was mild and good: but such was the influence of the priests, over the lower class especially, by representing the English to be enemies to their religion, and in a state of damnation, or devils upon earth; that it got the better of all other considerations, and kept up their aversion to us, even to the last. For, though the Governor issued out a proclamation, with a promise of pay and other encouragements, to as many as would voluntarily enter the fort, only thirteen gentlemen gave in their names; only three of them entered the castle with the Governor; and one of them deserted afterwards. And of twenty-five bakers and artificers, whom the Governor hired, at a high price, to serve in the castle, and gratified with a priest at the public expence, for their spiritual duties; such was the disaffection, that five or six of them deserted over the pallisadoes; neither could the rest have been restrained without a proper guard always to watch them.

All that the Governor could do was actually performed with great diligence and circumspection. He destroyed all the wine in the cellars of St. Philip's town, to prevent any miscarriage in his own men by drunkenness; and he carried the butts into the castle to serve for gabions and traverses. He drove all the cattle he could meet with into the fort, for the benefit of the garrison, and made such a provision of wine, that there was no want of these necessities at the time of their capitulation. He, not in a condition to give the invaders battle, walled up his ports; he assigned

every

every party their posts; placed centinels; and ordered every other precaution becoming the best commander in his circumstances.

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At this time Commodore Edgcumbe laid at anchor close under the walls of St. Philip's Castle, with several rich merchant ships; which must have all followed the fate of the fortress, had the French fleet, as it might, have blocked them up in the harbour of Mahon. But, they were permitted to escape; upon a supposition, that their crews would be too considerable a reinforcement to the garrison, whose weakness the French Marshal was perfectly acquainted with. However, when Edgcumbe sailed with his squadron, he left behind him all his marines, a detachment from Gibraltar, the whole crew of the Porcupine sloop, and the greater part of the Dolphin's, as a reinforcement to the fort, under the immediate direction and command of Captain Scroop of the Dolphin, who voluntarily offered himself for that service, and signalized himself for his conduct and bravery during the siege.

As soon as this little squadron had sailed for Gibraltar, the Governor sunk a sloop in the channel leading to the harbour. But the French fleet never attempted to approach the fort.

On the 22d of April Governor Blakeney sent a letter by a drum to Marshal Duke de Richelieu, demanding the reasons for such a hostile invasion of that island; to which he received for answer, That he was come with intention to reduce the island under the dominion of his most Christian

Majesty,

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Majesty, by way of retaliation for the conduct of the King of England, who had seized and detained ships belonging to the King of France and his subjects.

It was conjectured by the French Commander in Chief, that he should have very little trouble in the reduction of a fortress, which, to all appearance, was not provided with sufficient strength to hold out a regular siege: and therefore he himself did not come so well provided with engineers, as the service afterwards did require; and, as if the bare sight of his army had been enough to strike terror into the handful of men immured by their Governor in Fort St. Philip, he erected his batteries at Cape Mola, at such a distance, on the other side of the harbour, that they could do no execution, and at the same time were most exposed to the fire of the castle; which was so well served, and so continual on this quarter, that it soon convinced the enemy of the vanity of their sanguine hopes of an easy conquest, and of the necessity of changing their plan of attack, and to make their approaches on the side of St. Philip's town. Where, on the 12th of May, and near the site, from whence the Governor had removed the wind-mills, they, about nine at night, opened two bomb batteries, with great fury. The fire was incessantly kept up on both sides, from mortars and cannon; and the French raised new batteries continually, where they discovered the least advantage against the fortress.

In

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In this precarious situation Governor Blakeney took the direction of the whole defence upon himself. His order in writing was, "That no officer, of what rank soever he might be, should direct a measure of any consequence to be taken, without being first communicated to him for his approbation." Which was punctually observed.

As the works were extensive, the besiegers much too numerous to be opposed by open force, and the garrison not half the number requisite for the defence of the fort, the Governor could make no sallies; and was confined to such operations, as would annoy the enemy from his batteries, and to save his people for the defence of the place, in the last extremity. Thus he made as much use as he could of the subterraneans to shelter his men: he ordered the guards to parade in them, and to march to and from the several posts assigned them, under their covers by the communications: and that part of the garrison, not upon duty, was ordered to continue always under those covers. By which prudent disposition the garrison was saved, and the posts constantly supplied; and it was in a great measure owing to the obedience both of officers and men under this wise disposition, that five thousand of the enemy were cut off, with a small loss on our side.

Having seen that all dispositions were made for defence, that providence could suggest, or the nature of the place could admit of;—let us add,

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That the Governor, upwards of a year before the siege, had ordered a survey to be taken of the ordnance and of the stores; found forty cannon and upwards defective, and had them replaced by the Board of Ordnance. He also had the shot and shells carefully surveyed and gaged; and finding the fuzees in store unserviceable by length of time, he ordered an equal number of empty ones to be drove; and by ordering a number of soldiers to be disciplined in the management of the artillery, many of them became expert gunners, and did good service in the defence of the place. —All which were proper attentions of a good Governor.—In the time of the siege councils of war were frequent, and the engineers always attended. The batteries of cannon and mortars were well served, and did great execution: but he had no miners, except six or seven coal-heavers, or such like men, picked out amongst the regiments.

On the 19th day of the month the brave garrison exulted with joy at the sight of Admiral Byng's squadron; and Mr. Boyd, Commissary of stores, ventured in an open boat with six oars, down a creek called St. Steven's Cove, on the west side of the castle, through a shower of musket and cannon-balls, from the enemy's post on the other side, to join the British squadron, and to inform the Admiral of the condition of the garrison. This boat actually reached the open sea, but was obliged to put back by the same way he came out, not being able to reach the fleet, which

was

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was too far distant, and then stretching to the southward, and also chased by two light vessels from the enemy. But no tongue can express the surprize they met with next day, when the French fleet returned to their station, off Cape Mola; no English squadron was to be seen, and a general discharge or feu-de-joye, in the French camp, confirmed the report of a deserter, that Admiral Byng's fleet had been worsted, and obliged to retire by the French squadron under M. de la Galiffionere.

How far Galiffionere could pride himself, or the French were intitled to the claim, of a victory over the English fleet, by the action on the 20th of May, is beyond all conception: for, it is notorious, that Galiffionere ran away from Admiral Byng. The misfortune on our side was the permitting the French fleet to retreat, without a general engagement, and to flee without being pursued, and to resume their station to block up Mahon by sea, without being molested. All which circumstances, duly considered, answered the purposes of the greatest victory to the enemy: because the sea was shut to the besieged, and open for every necessary purpose to the besiegers.

These were, no doubt, severe trials: but the garrison, in no wise degenerated from their courage: though they found themselves abandoned by the English fleet, they resolved to exert their utmost in their own defence, and for the glory of their country; not without hopes, that the fleet might be reinforced, and return with sufficient

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strength to their relief. With such spirits they sustained and returned the enemy's fire without ceasing, always ready to maintain the post of honour, and to seek for a station where they could do most execution. Neither did their vigour abate, but rather increased with their labour and danger; when their embrasures and parapets were demolished, and they stood exposed to every ball and shell from the enemy, encompassing them on every side; who at last were augmented, by reinforcements, to twenty thousand men, and were incessantly carrying on their approaches with sixty-two battering cannon, twenty-one mortars, and four howitzers, besides small arms.

There was no resisting such a formidable army, without further aid. And a well appointed fleet was the only effectual means to snatch the prey out of the enemy's hands: which, as it was in our power to send, might be expected in a very short time: And the French Marshal having intelligence, that the court of Great Britain had dispatched a strong addition of one eighty gun ship, three of sixty-four and one of fifty guns to join the squadron under Admiral Byng: as he could not but foresee his own disgrace in the consequences of a defeat of his fleet, which would infallibly lock his army up in an island where he could not find support of any kind, and oblige him to surrender prisoners of war: and the prolongation of the siege being so far beyond the time, his court was taught to expect a surrender of Fort St. Philip's; that his enemies about the King had

made use of it to lessen his abilities in their royal master's esteem, and were upon the point of getting him recalled: therefore M. Duke de Richelieu pushed matters with the utmost vigour; and having made a practicable breach in one of the ravelins, and considerably damaged the other out-works on the 27th day of June, it was resolved to try the effects of a general assault, in that very night.

The garrison was reduced to two thousand five hundred men at the time the general attack was made: on the contrary, the enemy's army, which had been continually reinforced by a regiment of artillery and supplies of troops, ammunition, &c. was stronger than at the beginning of the siege.

State of the garrison at the general attack.

On the evening of the 26th the Duke de Richelieu called a council of war, at which were present all the general officers, to whom he imparted the whole project, and received their approbation. He then proceeded to settle their respective charges for the execution of the plan; and took his own post in the centre of the attacks on the left, with orders for the Count de Maillebois, the Marquis de Mifnil, and the Prince of Wirtemberg to attend him, to give the necessary directions for the support and success of the attacks. It was likewise agreed, That the signal, for the beginning of the attack, should be given by firing a cannon and four bombs, from the battery near the signal house.

The plan for the attack.

Things being thus disposed, the artillery continued to batter the forts till the 27th at ten o'clock in the evening, when they all on a sudden

The signal.

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ceased firing. Immediately the signal of a cannon shot and four bombs thrown into the castle, was given, according to orders; and M. de Monty marched against Strugen and Argyle, and Messrs. de Briqueville and de Sades, advanced successively against Kane and the Queen's redoubt. The men of wars boats, with troops and scaling ladders, went up St. Stephen's Cove, at the same time, and attempted to carry Charles's Fort, but were bravely repulsed.

The storm.

The besiegers behaved like heroes, disputing the ground inch by inch; but after much execution, by the fire on both sides, the Strugen or Anstruther Redoubt was taken by assault, and the Argyle and Queen's Redoubt by escalade.—The Argyle was blown up: and three mines were sprung under the Queen's redoubt, the glacis of the Anstruther and Kane's Lunette, with such execution, that they blew three companies of French grenadiers into the air. But the loss on this occasion to the garrison was much more fatal. For, Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffries, of Lord Effingham's regiment, the second in command, and, indeed the principal acting man in the fort, was taken prisoner, between the Strugen and Argyle, as he was hurrying with a hundred men to their relief. When he found the French in possession of the redoubt, he endeavoured to retreat: but was surrounded and obliged to surrender, with fifteen of his men. Here also Major Cunningham, who was in his company, though he had the good fortune to preserve his liberty, was so disabled by a wound through

through his right hand with a bayonet, and by having his arm shattered with a musket ball, that he was no longer able to continue on duty.

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These three redoubts being taken, and the enemy in possession of the cannon and mortars found in them, made a lodgment instantly in that part, which was the principal attack, and carried on the other attacks with vigour. At the same time, the Prince de Beauveau, to whose charge was committed the attack against the western and Caroline lunettes, got possession of the covert way; but, as Kane's lunette was not taken, he was obliged to retreat, having nailed up twelve pieces of cannon, cut down the pallisadoes, destroyed the gun carriages, and maintained this as long as he could, in order to favour the principal attack.

A lodge-
ment
made.

The impracticability of maintaining a fortress of such an extent, by such a thin garrison, against all these firings, and the combination of all these various attacks, so animated the French Commander, that he made sure of success on the left; and by break of day, his men being totally masters of the Queen's redoubt and the forts Strugen and Argyle, they posted 400 in the former and 200 in the latter: M. Richelieu and his noble attendants, above-mentioned, continuing all the time, as had been concerted, in the center of the attacks on the left.

The brave Governor and garrison defended themselves with all the intrepidity that is natural to Englishmen in time of danger. But none distinguished themselves more than those in the

Bravery of
the besieged.

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western and Caroline Lunettes, where each officer and foldier, emulous of glory, maintained their ground with exalted courage and exerted bravery, under the greatest fatigue, against a vast superior number of the enemy.

A parley,
and its bad
effects.

At day break on the 28th, the besiegers, famous for stratagem, to accomplish what they can't perfect by force, beat a parley, and obtained a cessation of arms under colour of burying their dead, which indeed laid in heaps about the places of action. But the principal view of the enemy was, to snatch an opportunity to secure the lodgments they had made, by introducing into them a considerable number of troops, through a subterranean passage, which had been opened by a shell, and not discovered by the besieged, till the day cleared up; and then it was too late to dispute its possession with the enemy.

A council
of war in
the castle.

When this was discovered, and it was known that, by this passage under the Kane, the enemy might proceed to all the other communications of the subterraneans communicating with all the out works, which the garrison was not in a condition, for numbers, to defend; the governor, during the cessation of arms, held a council of war; who having duly considered the circumstances of the garrison, and of the measures properest to be taken, the majority declared for a capitulation. Then the governor consulted the officers of artillery: who all declared, that the works were in a shattered, ruinous condition, and irreparable in the present state of the garrison. He also sent for all the

Bad state
of the gar-
rison.

the
office

the captains not upon duty; who all agreed, that the garrison was not in a condition to sustain another general attack: that the body of the castle was greatly shattered: the embrasures were beat down: that the pallisadoes were in many places broken to pieces; that the garrison was worn out with incessant duty and watchings; and that the enemy, being in possession of the subterraneans, which communicate themselves under all the castle, the governor must be obliged to defend these also, should he stand another storm, or leave the body of the place exposed to the enemy, without resistance: for which there was not a sufficient force under his command.

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These considerations and the want of intelligence, after the disappearance of the English squadron under Admiral Byng, prevailed on the governor to propose terms of capitulation, in order to preserve the remains of his brave garrison, and the lives of a considerable number of his Majesty's subjects, that were in the fort; and which, without distinction, might have been thrown away in case of a general storm: and it was happy for them that he did capitulate; for the enemy, the very next day after the capitulation, landed 4000 men more with ammunition at Ciudadella.

Surrenders
by capitulation.

Yet this measure has not escaped censure: there was an opposition even in the council of war. For, some officers argued that, as the garrison was very little^d diminished, was still in high spirits,

Objections.

^d The loss of the English amounted to no more than three officers killed, five wounded, and 71 private men killed, and

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rits, and in want of nothing: that, as there was no breach made by the enemy in the body of the castle, nor a single cannon erected to batter in breach: that, as the loss of an outwork was never deemed a sufficient reason for surrendering a fortress of such a strength and importance: that, as the counterscarp was so well secured by its rocky foundation, as not to be taken, otherwise than by assault, which would cost the enemy more men, than in their last attempt: that, as the counterscarp must be taken before the enemy could attack the ditch, or batter in breach, and they must have recourse to galleries, before they could pass the fosse, which was furnished with mines and counter-mines: and that, as they might hope for relief from the English fleet when properly reinforced, they could not see the necessity of capitulating; especially, as they held it to be the duty of a governor to defend his castle to the last extremity, without paying any regard to consequences.

The capitulation^e did great honour to Governor Blakeney; Marshal Richlieu declaring, in his answer

326 wounded (25 of which died of their wounds) 10 died of diseases, and 17 were missing.

^e *Articles of capitulation proposed by Lieutenant General Blakeney, for his Britannic Majesty's garrison of the castle of St. Philips's, in the island of Minorca.*

Article I.

THAT all acts of hostility shall cease, until the articles of capitulation are agreed upon and signed,

Richlieu]

I.

Granted.

II.

swer to the second article, that he had been induced by the brave defence made by the governor and garrison,

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II.

That all the honours of war shall be granted the garrison on their surrender, such as, to march out with their firelocks on their shoulders, drums beating, colours flying, 24 charges for each man, match lighted, four pieces of cannon, and two mortars, with 20 charges for each piece, a covered waggon for the governor, and four others for the garrison, which shall not be searched on any pretence.

Richlieu]

II.

The noble and vigorous defence which the English have made, having deserved all the marks of esteem and veneration, that every military person ought to shew to such actions; and Marshal Richlieu being desirous also to shew General Blakeney the regard due to the brave defence he has made, grants to the garrison all the honours of war that they can enjoy, under the circumstance of their going out for an embarkation, to wit, firelocks on their shoulders, drums beating, colours flying, 20 cartouches each man, and also lighted match; he consents likewise, that Lieutenant General Blakeney, and his garrison, shall carry away all the effects that shall belong to them, and that can be put into trunks. It would be useless to them to have covered waggons; there are none in the island, therefore they are refused.

III.

That all the garrison, including all the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, as well civil as military, shall have all their baggage, and effects secured, with liberty of removing and disposing of them, as they shall think proper.

Richlieu]

III.

Granted, except to the natives of the island, upon condition that all the lawful debts of the garrison to the Minorquins, who are to be considered as French subjects, shall be paid.

IV.

That the garrison, including the officers, artificers, soldiers, and other subjects of his Britannic Majesty, with their fami-

lies,

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garrison, to grant them such generous terms,
 which intitled them to march out with all the
 honours

lies, who shall be willing to leave the island, shall be provided with proper vessels, and conducted to Gibraltar by the shortest and most direct navigation: that they shall be landed immediately upon their arrival, at the expence of the crown of France, and that they shall be supplied with provisions, out of those that may yet be remaining in the place, at the time of its surrender, as long as they shall remain in the island, and during their voyage at sea, and that in the same proportion that they receive at present. But if a greater quantity should be wanted, that they should be furnished with it at the expence of the crown of France.

Richlieu]

IV.

Transport vessels shall be furnished from among those which are in the pay of his most Christian Majesty, and proper for the military and civil garrison of Fort St. Philip, and their families. These vessels shall carry them by the safest navigation to Gibraltar, with the shortest delay possible, and shall land them immediately, upon condition, that after their being landed, these ships shall be provided with sufficient passports, that they may not be molested on their return to the port of France they shall be bound for: and hostages shall be given for the safety of the transport vessels and their crews, who shall embark in the first neutral ship that shall come to fetch them, after the said vessels shall be returned in the port of France.

The garrison shall also be supplied with provisions as well during their stay in the island, as for twelve days voyage, which shall be taken from those that shall be found in the Fort St. Philip, and distributed on the footing, that they have been usually furnished to the English garrison; and if more be wanted, it shall be furnished, paying for it as it shall be agreed by commissaries on both sides.

V.

That proper quarter shall be provided for the garrison, with an hospital fit for the sick and wounded, whilst the transports
 are

honours of war, and to be conveyed by sea to Gibraltar. And his Majesty, our late sovereign, who

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are getting ready, which shall not exceed a month, to be reckoned from the day of signing this capitulation; and with regard to those, who shall not be in a condition to be transported, they shall stay, and care shall be taken of them, 'till they are in a condition to be sent to Gibraltar by another opportunity.

Richlieu]

V.

The vessels being ready for the transporting the garrison, the providing quarters, as demanded, becomes unnecessary; they shall go out of the place with the least delay, in order to proceed to Gibraltar; and with regard to those, who cannot be embarked immediately, they shall be permitted to remain in the island, and all the assistance they shall want, shall be given them for their going to Gibraltar, when they shall be in a condition to be embarked; a state of them shall be drawn up, and the necessary passports shall be left, for a ship to go and return; and an hospital shall also be furnished for the sick and wounded, as shall be settled by the respective commissaries.

VI.

That the governor shall not be accountable for all the houses that shall have been destroyed and burnt during the siege.

Richlieu]

VI.

Granted for the houses destroyed or burnt during the siege; but several effects, and titles of the admiralty court, which have been carried into the fort, shall be restored, as well as the papers of the town house, which have been carried away by the receiver; and the papers and titles relating to the ladings of the French merchant-ships, which have been also retained.

VII.

When the garrison shall come out of the place, no body shall be permitted to debauch the soldiers, to make them desert from their regiments; and their officers shall have access to them at all times.

Richlieu]

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who could not be supposed to be ignorant of any part of the attack and defence of Fort St. Philip,

not

Richlieu] VII.

No soldier shall be excited to desert, and the officers shall have an entire authority over them to the moment of their embarkation.

VIII.

An exact discipline shall be observed on each side.

Richlieu] VIII.

Granted.

IX.

That such of the inhabitants of the island, as have joined the English for the defence of the place, shall have leave to remain, and to enjoy their goods and effects in the island without being molested.

Richlieu] IX.

General Blakeney, and Marshal Richlieu, cannot fix or extend the authority of the Kings their masters, over their subjects; it would be setting bounds to it, to oblige them to receive in their dominions, those whom they should not think proper to have settled there.

X.

That all prisoners of war shall be restored on each side.

Richlieu] X.

All the prisoners that have been made during the siege shall be restored on each side, so that when the French return those they have, the piquets, which were taken going to join the French fleet, the day Admiral Byng appeared before Mahon, shall be restored.

XI.

That Mr. Cunningham the engineer, who acted as a volunteer during the siege, shall have a passport, and leave to go wherever his affairs require.

Richlieu] XI.

Granted.

XII.

not only approved of General Blakeney's conduct; but, upon his arrival in England, ennobled him; and distinguished him with other particular marks of his regard and favour.

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This brave commander, General William Blakeney, was a native of Ireland, and born at mount Blakeney, in the county of Limerick, A. D. 1672,

XII.

Upon the foregoing conditions, his excellency the lieutenant general governor consents, after the hostages shall have been exchanged for the faithful execution of the above articles, to deliver up the place to his most Christian Majesty, with all the magazines, ammunition, cannons, and mortars, except those mentioned in the second article, and to point out to the engineers all the mines, and subterraneous works. Done at the castle of St. Philip, the 28th of June 1756.

Richlieu]

XII.

As soon as the foregoing articles shall have been signed, the French shall be put in possession of one of the gates of St. Philip's castle, as well as of the Forts Malborough and St. Charles, upon the hostages being sent on both sides, for the faithful execution of the foregoing articles.

The stoccado that is in the port shall be removed, and the going in and the coming out shall be left open, at the disposition of the French, until the whole garrison has marched out, in the mean time, the commissaries on both sides shall be employed, those on the part of his excellency General Blakeney, in making an estimate of the effects in the military magazines, and others: and those on the part of his excellency the Duke of Richlieu, in receiving them; and to deliver to the English such part thereof, as has been agreed upon. Plans shall also be delivered of the galleries, mines, and other subterraneous works. Done at St. Philip, the 29th of June, 1756.

* By the title of Lord Blakeney, of mount Blakeney in the kingdom of Ireland.

the

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the ancient seat of his family. He entered into the land service in the beginning of Queen Ann's war, and was made an ensign by Lord Cutts at the siege of Venlo. But he was long overlooked and neglected, till he found a friend in the late Duke of Richmond, by whose interest he was promoted to a regiment. He served against the Spaniards at Carthagená, and recommended himself to his late Majesty by his courage and conduct in the defence of Sterling castle, against the rebels and their French auxiliaries in 1745. Yet his great merit and unblemished character could procure nothing better for him in the decline of life, when old age bore hard upon him, than a command on the island of Minorca, where he was obliged to reside several years as lieutenant governor.

The castle,
&c. sur-
rendered.

The articles of capitulation being signed, and the hostages given, M. de Richlieu entered Fort St. Philip, on the 29th of June at noon: where he found 240 cannon fit for service; besides 40 ruined or nailed up during the attack, 70 mortars, 700,000 lwt. of gunpowder, 12,000 cannon balls and 15,000 bombs. The garrison consisted of 2963 men, about 2300 of whom were military, (the rest labourers, &c.) commanded by three lieutenants colonels only, 23 captains, and a very few subalterns. In the defence of this fort there were expended, 27,018 shells of different sizes, 1032 hand granades, 32,706 round shot, 332 double headed shot, 959 grape shot, 353,639 pounds

Ammuni-
tion ex-
pended
during the
siege.

13 ounces of gunpowder, 73 carcasses of 12 inches, 41 of 10 inches, and 86 fire balls.

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Admiral Byng, agreeable to the last resolution of the council of war, which was held on board the Ramillies, on the 24th of May, gave orders for the ships under his command to stand to the westward; and they accordingly did so, in the afternoon of the same day. But, what by contrary winds, and what by the detention occasioned by the care necessary to be given to the crippled ships, the Intrepid being sometimes forced to be taken in tow, the squadron did not arrive at Gibraltar till the 19th of June; where the Admiral found Commodore Broderick, who had arrived four days before, with five ships of the line^f, to reinforce his squadron.

Admiral
Byng's re-
turn to Gi-
braltar.

Reinforce-
ed.

By the date^s of Commodore Broderick's instructions or orders, it is evident, that this reinforcement was ordered, before it was possible for the ministry to have received any advice from Admiral Byng himself, or any authentic intelligence relating to his squadron: and by the letter sent by the Admiralty, and delivered by Captain Broderick, to Admiral Byng, at Gibraltar, which you have at the bottom of this page^h, it is also evident,

Remarks
on this re-
inforce-
ment.

^f The Prince George of 80 guns, Hampton Court, Ipswich, and Nassau of 64, and the Isis, of 50 guns.

^g May the 17th.

^h Admiralty office, May 21, 1756.

S I R,

MY lords commissioners of the admiralty having received certain intelligence, that the French are fitting out more ships at Toulon, they have thought proper to reinforce the squadron

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evident, that the necessity of reinforcing the Admiral was known soon after his sailing from England; and therefore that, had those very five ships been originally added to, instead of following, his squadron, too late, it would have given Admiral Byng such a superiority in the Mediterranean, that the French admiral would not have dared to wait for him.

Admiral
Byng
prepares to
seek the
enemy.

Thus reinforced, Admiral Byng resolved to return in quest of the enemy, and once more to give them battle; with this resolution, he gave immediate orders to remove the sick men in his squadron, amounting to near 1000, into the hospital; for all the captains to refit their ships for sea with all possible expedition, to complete their ships with water, to assist the master-shipwright and store-keeper, with as many hands as possible, from every ship, to carry on the service of the fleet; and for the agent-victualler to furnish all the ships with wine and provisions.

All those, with several other duties and services, were forwarded with the utmost diligence; and the Admiral resolved to put to sea, and to attempt the relief of Fort St. Philip, which according to

squadron under your command with the ships named in the margin, by whom this is sent to you.

These ships carry out a regiment of soldiers, and will probably take more on board at Gibraltar, if they can be spared.

I am, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

J. CLEVELAND.

To the Hon. Adm. Byng, Mediterranean.

the

the intelligence he had received, continued still to hold out.

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Admiral Byng also dispatched a letter to the admiralty, containing the particulars of the late action, and of the resolutions of the council of war concerning his present motions. But the contents were not made public, for several days after its arrival, and then garbled in such a manner, as to throw the odium of the miscarriage upon him, and to suppress those passages, which tended to his own justification, or reflected upon the conduct of the ministry; especially in the department of the admiralty. For which partiality they were much blamed by the friends of the admiral, and censured by the generality of the people. Because it exposed the commander in chief entirely to the resentment of the public, without a possibility of exculpating himself; and suggested strong suspicions against the integrity of those, who durst not trust the people with a sight of these passages in the admiral's letter, that regarded their own conduct, in the affair of Minorca. But this will best appear from the entire letter, as it was afterwards published by the admiral in his own vindication, as follows:

Ramillies, off Minorca, May 25, 1756.

S I R,

I Have the pleasure to desire you will acquaint Admiral-
Byng's letter of the
25th May, their lordships, that having sailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 19th, having been joined by his Majesty's ship Phoenix, off ^{1756.}

VOL. I.

Y

Majorca,

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Majorca, two days before, " by whom I had confirmed the intelligence I received at Gibraltar, " of the strength of the French fleet, and of " their being off Mahon. His Majesty's colours " were still flying at the castle of St. Philip, and " I could perceive several bomb batteries playing " upon it from different parts; French colours we " saw flying on the west part of St. Philip's. I " dispatched the Phoenix, Chesterfield and Dolphin a-head, to reconnoitre the harbour's mouth, " and Captain Harvey, to endeavour to land a " letter for General Blakeney, to let him know " the fleet was here to his assistance, though every " one was of opinion, we could be of no use to " him, as by all accounts no place was secured for " covering a landing, could we have spared any " people. The Phoenix was also to make the " private signal between Captain Harvey and " Captain Scrope, as this latter would undoubtedly " come off, if it were practicable, having kept " the Dolphin's barge with him; but, the enemy's " fleet appearing to the south-east, and the wind " at the same time coming strong off the land, " obliged me to call those ships in, before they " could get quite so near the entrance of the harbour, as to make sure what batteries or guns " might be placed to prevent our having any " communication with the castle." Falling little wind, it was five before I could form my line, or distinguish any of the enemy's motions, and not at all to judge of their force more than by their numbers, which were seventeen, and thirteen appeared

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peared large. They at first stood towards us in a regular line, and tacked about seven, which I judged was to endeavour to gain the wind of us in the night; so that being late, I tacked, in order to keep the weather-gage of them, as well as to make sure of the land-wind, in the morning, being very hazy and not above five leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards the enemy at eleven; and at day light had no sight of them. But two tartans with the French private signal being close in the rear of our fleet, I sent the Princess Louisa to chase one, and made the signal for the rear admiral, who was nearest the other, to send ships to chase her; the Princess Louisa, Defiance, and Captain, became at a great distance; but the Defiance took her's, which had two captains, two lieutenants, and 102 private soldiers, who were sent out the day before with 600 men on board tartans to reinforce the French fleet, on our then appearing off the place. The Phoenix, on Captain Harvey's offer, prepared to serve as a fire ship, but without damaging her as a frigate, till the signal was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her decks, every thing else being prepared, as the time and place allowed of. The enemy now began to appear from the mast head; I called in the cruisers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the enemy, and formed the line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me: they were 12 large ships of the line, and five frigates. As

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soon as I judged the rear of our fleet to be the length of their van, we tacked all together, and immediately made the signal for the ships that led, to lead large, and for the Deptford to quit the line, that ours might become equal in number with theirs. At two I made the signal to engage, as I found it was the surest method of ordering every ship to close down on the one that fell to their lot. And here I must express my great satisfaction at the very gallant manner in which the rear admiral set the van the example, by instantly bearing down on the ships he was to engage with his second, and who occasioned one of the French ships to begin the engagement, which they did, by raking ours as they went down; I bore down on the ship that lay opposite me, and began to engage him, after having received the fire for some time in going down. The Intrepid "unfortunately" (in the very beginning) had his fore-top-mast shot away, and as that hung on his fore-sail and backed it, he had no command of his ship, his fore tack and all his braces being cut at the same time, so that he drove on the next ship to him, and obliged that, and the ships a head of me to throw all aback; this obliged me to do so also for some minutes, to avoid their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our adversary out of the line, who put before the wind, and had several shot fired at him from his own admiral. This not only caused the enemy's center to be un-attacked, but left the rear admiral's division rather uncovered for some little time. I sent and
called

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called to the ships a-head of me to make sail on, and go down on the enemy, and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Deptford to supply the Intrepid's place. I found the enemy edged away constantly, and as they went three feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took the advantage of destroying our rigging; for though I closed the rear admiral fast, I found I could not again close the enemy, whose van was fairly drove from their line; but their admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this time 'twas past six, and the enemy's van and ours were at two great a distance to engage; I perceived some of their ships stretching to the northward, and I imagined they were going to form a new line; I made the signal for the headmost ships to tack, and those that led before with larboard tacks, to lead with the starboard, that I might by the first keep (if possible) the wind of the enemy, and by the second, be between the rear admiral's division and the enemy, as his had suffered most, as also to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in a very bad condition, and whose loss would very greatly give the balance against us, if they had attacked us next morning, as I expected. I brought to about eight that night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our ships as fast as possible, and continued so all night. The next morning we saw nothing of the enemy, though we were still lying to; Mahon was N. N. W. about ten or eleven leagues. I sent cruisers out to look for the Intrepid and Chesterfield,

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field, who joined me the next day; and having, from a state and condition of the squadron brought me in, found that the Captain, Intrepid and Defiance (which latter has lost her captain) were much damaged in their masts, “so that they were
“endangered of not being able to secure their
“masts properly at sea; and also that the squadron
“in general were very sickly, many killed and
“wounded, and no where to put a third of their
“number, if I made an hospital even of the 40
“gun ship, which was not easy at sea;” I thought it proper in this situation, to call a council of war before I went again to look for the enemy. I desired the attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their opinions upon the present situation “of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make sure of protecting the latter,
“since it was found impracticable to either succour or relieve the former with the force we
“had; for though we may justly claim the victory, yet we are much inferior to the weight of
“their ships, though the numbers are equal; and
“they have the advantage of sending to Minorca
“their wounded, and getting reinforcements of
“seamen from their transports, and soldiers from
“their camp; all which, undoubtedly has been
“done in this time that we have been laying to rest, and often in sight of Minorca; and their
“ships have more than once appeared in a line
“from our mast-heads, I send their lordships
“the resolution of the council of war,” in which

there

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there was not the least contention or doubt arose.
 "I hope indeed we shall find stores to refit us at
 "Gibraltar, and if I have any reinforcement,
 "will not lose a moment's time to seek the enemy
 "again, and once more give them battle, though
 "they have a great advantage in being clean
 "ships, that go three feet to our one, and there-
 "fore have the choice how they will engage us,
 "or if they will at all, and will never let us close
 "them, as their sole view is the disabling our
 "ships, in which they have but too well succeeded,
 "though we obliged them to bear up." I do not
 send their lordships the particulars of our losses
 and damages by this, as it would take me much
 time, and that I am willing none should be lost in
 letting them know an event of such consequence.
 "I cannot help urging their lordships for a rein-
 "forcement, if none are yet failed, on their know-
 "ledge of the enemy's strength in these seas, and
 "which, by very good intelligence, will in a few
 "days be strengthened by four more large ships
 "from Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not now
 "failed to join these." I dispatch this to Sir Ben-
 jamin Keene, by way of Barcelona, and am mak-
 ing the best of my way to "cover" Gibraltar;
 from which place I propose sending their lordships
 a more particular account. I am, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

JOHN BYNG.

To the Hon. John Cleveland, Esq;

Y 4

When

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Remarks
on the mu-
tilated pas-
sages,
marked
with “.

When this entire letter was published by Mr. Byng's friends, it was accompanied with some remarks very disadvantageous to the ministry; wherein it is observed, That the first mutilation concealed an allusion made to his former letter from Gibraltar, which it was apparently the interest of the ministry to keep in darkness. It seems likewise intended by this omission, to insinuate that Byng never came within sight of Minorca, and that he was caught *unexpectedly* by the French. The words *could we have spared any people* would have discovered the weakness of the armament; and the opinion of the officers that the *landing place was covered*, would have shewn the folly of those, who contrived the expedition, and sent out a weak fleet, when they might have made it stronger by adding the ships of which the crews were uselessly devouring their provisions at Spithead; and amused the nation with an attempt to relieve Minorca, while they sent no land forces, or none proportioned to the purpose, and sent them out at a time, when they could not be landed.

The next omission was likewise equally unfair, and equally malignant, and appears designed partly to cast reproach on the admiral, and partly to hide the faults of the ministry. To conceal the fitness of Byng's retreat, they suppress the damage done to the ships; to conceal their own negligence, they omit the mention of the wounded, and the want of an hospital ship for their reception.

This

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This is the first time that a fleet was fitted for such an enterprize, without store-ships, fire-ships, hospital-ships, or tenders; and why this fleet was thus imperfectly furnished, what reason can be given, if the relief of Minorca was intended.

The intent of this omission being principally to fix upon Byng the reproach of returning without necessity, it may now be enquired, whether it was proper to have hazarded a second engagement? No man was ever expected to fight without hope of victory, or without prospect of advantage, proportionate to the danger of defeat. Hope of victory he could have none; the French fleet was at first superior, and was far more superior after the battle; prospect of advantage was now at an end, for he could not now relieve St. Philip; though Galiffionere had delivered up his ships without a shot, it was already invested by an adequate force, and though the siege might have been prolonged it could not have been raised.

It is much harder to discover why Galiffionere suffered our shattered ships to escape.

The next mutilation suppresses the account of the enemies superiority. The French had an army from which the fleet was supplied with fresh men: Byng had more than 1000 sick, without an hospital ship for their reception.

The next passage omitted describes another advantage enjoyed by the French, that their ships were *clean*, to which it might have been added to the honour of our ministers, that *their ships were better*. A clamour was raised by the assertion, that they

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they failed *three feet to one*: a seaman's phrase, never designed to be understood literally, nor ever interpreted literally before; by which nothing is implied but that they failed faster, and had great advantage by superior celerity.

He *hoped* to find stores to *resist him* at Gibraltar; where, in effect, from the state, in which he had left it, and which was carefully concealed from the public, he had *little hopes* of finding them: yet this delay, which the ministers knew to be unavoidable, was imputed to him, as a new crime.

The next paragraph omitted, is the "urging the admiralty to a speedy reinforcement, if none was already sent;" a request which he had before made; at the same time "acquainting them with the increasing strength of the enemy at Toulon, by four large ships;" which circumstance, though it tends not to justify the admiral's behaviour, gives a favourable idea of his zeal for success, and a contemptible one of those, who, presiding at the head of affairs, had been totally ignorant of what was preparing at Toulon, and negligent at best of what happened to Minorca.

The last paragraph has but one word omitted, which, instead of "making the best of my way to Gibraltar, is to *cover* Gibraltar;" a very material alteration; the going to cover a place, being very different from going to a place; the one signifying an act of prudence, and of a soldier; the other, in such instances, of flight, and of a fugitive. Was not this word premeditatedly

tately left out, to prevent the asking what danger Gibraltar was in, and to what part of the letter this referred?

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But, the court of London had received advice of the action of the 20th of May by the way of France, with some hints very disadvantageous to the character of Admiral Byng, and greatly improved afterwards to his destruction: though it must not be forgotten, that the French Admiral Galiffionere, was as highly censured by his court, for his conduct on the same day; and was superseded, recalled, and put under arrest; and, if he was not disgraced with the ignominy of a public execution, he disappear'd soon after, not without suspicion of a violent death, upon the road to Paris.

Upon these advices, every instrument of the ministry was employed to degrade the unfortunate admiral, to represent him to be the *sole* cause of the national disgrace in the Mediterranean, and to prepare them to cast the *whole* blame of the loss of Minorca upon him, should it be forced to surrender to the French.

The whole
blame cast
upon Ad-
miral
Byng.

The importance of Minorca, which had been so much slighted by the British ministry, was now rung in every ear. It was now represented to be the most happy for us in its situation: to be capable of vast improvements; to have the two best ports in the Mediterranean sea; which might make that island a magazine of British commodities, and the center of a most extensive commerce. This island, said they, who took no effectual measures for its defence, before it was too late, so
justly

Import-
ance of
Minorca.

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justly the object of our hopes; the trophy of our victories; which drew to Great Britain, the respect of Spain; the confidence of Italy; and the submission of the pyratrical states of Barbary; is not only lost, but lost in such a manner, as should give every Briton a manly, rational and patriot concern.

Descrip-
tion of
Minorca.
Its situa-
tion.

Extent.

Division.

Inhabi-
tants.
Mahon.

Before we quit this island it may be agreeable to the reader to give a description of it, for which we are chiefly obliged to John Armstrong, Esq; engineer in ordinary to his Majesty. This gentleman informs us, that the island of Minorca lies in the Mediterranean sea, about 60 leagues S. of the coast of Catalonia, and is one of those islands that constituted the ancient kingdom of Majorca; cut and indented with a prodigious variety of creeks and inlets on the north side, occasioned by frequent and violent northerly winds. It is upwards of 33 miles long, and varies in breadth from eight to twelve miles, and in some parts more: computed to contain 236 square miles, and 151,040 square acres. It is 62 miles in circumference, and divided into four terminos or districts; the termino of Mahon, of Alajor, the united termino of Mercadal and Fererias, and the termino of Ciudadella: which together contain about 28,000 inhabitants.

Mahon is the seat of government, in the neighbourhood of St. Philip's castle, the only fortress of any consideration in the island. This city is built on an elevated situation, and the ascent from the harbour is steep and difficult. It was formerly

surrounded


Harbour of MAHON, & S. Philip's Castle, & FOR TIFICATIONS

1763

British Statute Miles 69 to a Degree.



- References to the PLAN
- a S. Philip's Castle
 - b Royal Counterguard
 - c S. George's D.
 - d Hammer D.
 - e Welsh D.
 - f Whistman's Ravelin
 - g Charlotte D.
 - h New Lunette
 - i West D.
 - k South West D.
 - l South Lunette
 - m Carolina Redoubt
 - n Queens D.
 - o Corn Magazine
 - p Powder D.
 - q Grand Store House
 - r Timber Sheds
 - s The Gunner's
 - t Vaulting Office for Navy
 - u Carmelite Convent
 - w Carriage Sheds



Scale of one Mile.



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surrounded with a wall, but at present the buildings have extended themselves into large and elegant suburbs, beyond those limits. The buildings are universally of free stone, either covered with tiles, or flat-roofed and terraced. The streets are not paved, the native rock appearing almost every where: and they are generally very narrow. At the foot of the hill, on which Mahon stands, is a fine wharf of great extent in length, and proportionably broad. The whole western end thereof, was set apart for magazines of naval stores, and other uses of his Majesty's ships. The water at the key is deep enough for any ship to come as near, as it has occasion. The eastern part of the dock is set apart for the merchant's service.

A little out of the town, in the way to St. Philip's, stands a small convent of Carmelite friars: and about a mile below the town is English Cove, the general watering place for the navy: where there is a plentiful supply of sweet water. The harbour at this place, is near a mile over; which is almost its greatest breadth: half a mile lower, and about a mile short of St. Philip's, lies Bloody Island, whose area contains about 12 acres, making almost an equal division of the harbour, leaving the greatest breadth and deepest water next Mahon. On this island stands a capacious hospital belonging to the navy, with convenient apartments for the proper officers.

Bloody
Island.

Almost opposite to this island, on the Mahon side, lies the Oyster Cove. This cave or cove is
scooped

Oyster
Cove.

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scooped out of the rock, with a north-east aspect, and takes its name from an oyster-fishery, managed by Spanish divers, who venture ten or twelve fathoms, with a hammer to break oysters from the bottom of the rock.

Quarentine
Island.

From hence, on the left hand, in the way to St. Philip's, by water, is the Quarentine Island; which is less than Bloody Island, and nearer to Cape Mola shore. Here all vessels from Barbary and the Levant, when those parts are visited by the plague, are obliged to perform quarantine.

St. Philip's
Castle.

St. Philip's Castle next presents itself at the entrance of Mahon Harbour; and is situate on a neck of land between Mahon Harbour and St. Stephen's Cove. Its numerous works extend themselves to the shore on both sides. The body of the place consists of four bastions and as many curtains, surrounded with a deep ditch, hewn out of the solid rock, which furnished free-stone for the walls. The area is surrounded with the Governor's house, a chapel, guard-room, barracks, &c. and in the center there is a pump to supply the troops with rain-water from a cistern; and the whole square is paved.

Over the flat-roof of the arched buildings is a spacious rampart, affording an extensive prospect, and the bastions are mounted with guns. The communication from the lower area to the top of the rampart is by a pair of stairs, made likewise of stone, and so wide, broad and easy of ascent, that mules and asses can carry burdens up to any
apart-

apartment, and great guns can be drawn up them, when wanted.

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The whole body of the place is undermined; and very serviceable subterraneous works are contrived in the rock, and communicate with one another, where necessary.

Before the entrance of the Castle is a horn-work, with other out-works to this and the rest of the front; which works are better conceived by the eye from the plan, than any words would be able to describe them.

There is a great number of large guns mounted towards the entrance of the harbour, besides those that point to the land, which would require the service of a vast many artillery-men on occasion; as indeed the various works demand a very considerable garrison to dispute them with an enemy.

The capacious galleries, that are cut out of the rock, and extend themselves throughout all the works, are of the utmost advantage: for here the people are secured from the splinters of stone, which in time of action would tare them to pieces, as well those off duty, as those obliged to expose themselves. These subterraneans afford quarters and shelter to the garrison, impenetrable to shot and shells, and not to be come at, but by cutting a way to them through the living rock; against which a number of countermines are provided, at proper distances, and in such places as are most exposed by their situation.

In the main ditch is a small powder magazine: there is a much larger under the Covert-way of the

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the place: where also there are store-houses sufficient for every occasion, with an hospital near St. Stephen's Cove. Besides the cistern, which is liable to many accidents, there are several wells within the works: and a quantity of every species of provisions is constantly kept up, to support the whole soldiery of the garrison, in case of a siege.

On the point of land, east of the Castle, stands Charles Fort, of little use. The grand battery lies down at the water-edge, and has a high stone wall to cover the gunners, who play their ordnance through a long range of embrasures. This is the common burial-place of the garrison.

The Queen's Redoubt is the most advanced of all the works towards the country, on the side where it stands: Between it and the harbour are two other works. On the other side of St. Stephen's Cove stands the Marlborough.

The Araval, or Suburb of St. Philip's, consists of quarters for officers, of barracks for soldiers, a church, and, at one time, of so many houses inhabited by Spaniards, that the glacis of the fortrefs almost reached those buildings; which being foreseen to be favourable to an enemy, in case of a siege, the houses were cleared away to such a distance as to leave a sufficient esplanade between the village and fortifications.

St. Stephen's
Cove.

St. Stephen's Cove is a small inlet of the sea, easily admitting boats with fish and provisions, when the circumstances of a siege shall render it
diffi-

difficult to approach the garrison by way of the harbour. A. D. 1756.

The Laire of Mahon, otherwife Coney-Island, is separated from the main land by a sound about two miles over, and very dangerous to ships of burden, on account of its shoals and foul ground. Here are a multitude of rabbits, and no inconsiderable quantity of salt. Laire of Mahon.

There is a good key at St. Philip's for ships; and on the other side of the harbour, a little lower down, on the narrowest place, stands Fort St. Philipet, in which is a small magazine of powder, and a guard, with a battery of guns, on a level with the surface of the water, for the defence of the harbour. Fort Philipet.

Cape Mola is a high land, severed almost from the island by Philipet Cove and a small bay on the north side, and is universally esteemed capable of being rendered an almost impregnable fortress, at a moderate expence. On the elevated top of this cape is the signal-house, to give the garrison due warning of ships and vessels approaching from the sea. A bush hung out denotes a small vessel, a ball a ship, two or three balls two or three ships, and a flag a fleet: these signals are hoisted on the quarter the ships are discovered. Cape Mola.

Pursuing the great road to Ciudadella, made by Governor Kane, and called after his name, we meet with the shire town of Alajor, and the next in goodness to Mahon and Ciudadella. This town stands high and airy, and is tolerably well built.

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built, with a handsome Gothic free-stone church on an eminence. The buildings are of stone also; and the streets very narrow and not paved. Here are also quarters for a regiment of soldiers; but the garrison usually consists of no more than nine companies, the other being sent to the castle of Fornelles. There is only one convent in this town, which is of Franciscan friars.

Mercadal.

Mercadal, the next shire-town, is situated on a hill about the center of the island, is a very poor place, and meanly built. A little to the east of which is Mount Tor or Toro, the highest ground in the island: on whose eminence stands a convent of Augustine friars, in a most agreeable situation.

Mount
Toro.

Fornelles.

About six miles north of this mount is the castle of Fornelles, built on the western side of the entrance of a large harbour of the same name. This fort is square, faced with hewn stone, and consists of four bastions, and as many curtains, a very little ditch, and no out-works before it. The square within is filled with houses for the troops, and for laying up provisions and ammunition; which are all strongly vaulted and covered with ramparts. The signal-house is situated at Athalia, upon a high land on the opposite side of the harbour. But the duty of this fort is done by one company only, detached from Alajor. The port is large and spacious; but the shoals and foul ground make it very hazardous for ships of burden.

Mount

Mount Agatha, so called from the chapel situated on its summit, dedicated to St. Agatha, stands about four miles north-west of Mercadal, is a very high barren rock: on the top of which the Moors fortified themselves, and held out against a numerous army, long after the Christians had driven their countrymen from the lower parts of the island. The ruins of which works are still to be seen; and within their limits there still continue two remarkable rain-water cisterns entire, containing together 2173 tons, or 547,596 wine gallons, which, at the allowance of one gallon a day would furnish 1500 men with water for one year.

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Mount
Agatha.

Ciudadella is the next place worthy of our attention. It was the antient capital of Minorca, till the seat of government was removed by the English to Mahon. By this means it has declined in its trade and wealth. This town is surrounded by a wall, bold and of great height, built by the Moors upwards of six hundred years ago, next the Baranco. The rest is more modern, and consists of a rampart, with a great many bastions and curtains, all of squared free-stone. Though the rampart is narrow at the curtains, the bastions are roomy enough; and the parapets are all of stone. A good ditch has been laid out, and cut to a considerable depth in the solid rock, in some places, with the parapet of a covered-way before it; but it is little more than marked in other places. These works, says Mr. Armstrong, have been slighted ever since Minorca has been in

Ciudadella.

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our hands, and the garrison, upon an alarm, is to make the best of its way to St. Philip's Castle, (as was the case in 1756) driving before it all the cattle, that are to be easily found; and spoiling the roads, the better to obstruct the enemy on his marchⁱ. This antient town is built at the head of a little harbour, where coasting vessels find shelter in a sufficient depth of water, close to the very walls of the town. The garrison, which consists of a regiment of soldiers, find the best quarters in the island here. The chief buildings are the exchange, an antient structure, raised on Gothic arches of a considerable height: The Governor's house, a large irregular fabric, built in the gorge of a bastion. Divine service is performed for the garrison in the great hall of this house. Here is the cathedral of the whole island. It stands near the center of the town, is the largest church in the island, and a noble Gothic building. Here is also another neat church at a little distance. Near Mahon-gate stands a convent of Austin friars, a large edifice, with a handsome church within it. Fronting the great parade there is a Franciscan convent of friars. This building is large, but irregular. The nuns of St. Clara have also a convent in this town. Near the entrance of the harbour, which is about a mile from the town, stands another chapel, dedicated to St. Nicholas, the Popish patron of seafaring people; adjacent to which are the ruins of

ⁱ See page 300.

a small

a small castle, intended formerly, but very unfit, to defend the entrance of the harbour. And a little without Mahon-gate is a convent of the order of St. Antonio; it is a small house, but well endowed. The signal on the light-house for this fortress stands about two miles north-west, and is called Torre del Ram: from whence, if a fleet, in time of war, approaches, the country is alarmed by a great smoak in day-time, and by a great fire in the night.

As for the court of France; their King's mandate to the Archbishop of Paris to sing *Te deum* upon the conquest of Minorca, and his rewards bestowed upon the officers concerned in the reduction of Fort St. Philip, give a full idea of their sentiments and rejoicing on that occasion. In the mandate the French King tells the Archbishop, That after having waited too long in vain for the satisfaction he had promised himself from the King of England's equity, as a reparation for the outrages committed by his navy upon the French ships, to the great scandal of all Europe; he found himself obliged to have recourse to arms, in order to avenge the honour of his crown, and to protect the commerce of his dominions. " It is, said he, from such just motives, that in the month of April last I sent a body of troops into the island of Minorca, under the command of my Cousin, the Marshal Duke de Richelieu, with a squadron commanded by the Marquis de la Galiffionere, Lieutenant-General of my naval armies, to drive the English from a port,

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Rejoicings
in France.

King's
mandate to
the Arch-
bishop of
Paris.

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“ which they had seized upon through the spirit
“ of general domination, which they want to ex-
“ tend over the two worlds. After a dangerous
“ and toilsome siege, during which the English
“ squadron, that came up to relieve Minorca,
“ was repulsed by mine; and Marshal Richelieu,
“ in consequence of a disposition, as boldly con-
“ trived, as it was to be rapid in its execution,
“ at last gave French valour its full swing; and
“ whilst the enemy trusted to the strength of their
“ ramparts, my troops carried the out-works of
“ Mahon by assault, in the night between the 27th
“ and 28th of last month: terror did the rest:
“ the garrison was forced to capitulate, and retire
“ to Gibraltar; abandoning about 200 pieces of
“ cannon and 80 mortars. The success of so
“ important an enterprize, wherein my troops
“ were to surmount all the obstacles, which art,
“ assisted by nature, can contrive for the defence
“ of a place, must be attributed to nothing, but
“ the favour, which the Lord of Hosts is pleased
“ to grant to the justice of my cause: and there-
“ fore, to render him a public homage of my
“ thankfulness, and to beseech him to continue
“ unto me his divine protection, I write you this
“ letter, to acquaint you, that it is my intention,
“ that you cause *Te deum* to be sung in the me-
“ tropolitan church of my good city of Paris,
“ &c.” And the vanity of the French nation was
fed so highly with this unprecedented and unac-
countable success over the English, their antient
conquerors, and the present obstacle to those vast
schemes

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schemes of universal monarchy, for many years carried on by Gallic councils; that the people immediately conceived, either that the British courage was degenerated into cowardice, or that the British ministry had drank so deeply of the fountain of corruption, as to become indifferent, and insensible of their national interest.

However, to efface such disagreeable imputations, the first accounts of this disaster, brought the British ministry to a resolution to supersede, and to put under arrest the two Admirals, Byng and West, charged with misconduct on the day of action, and General Fowke, Governor of Gibraltar, for not obeying his orders, which were to embark 700 men on board of the fleet sent to relieve Minorca. For which purpose the Antelope of 50 guns, was ordered to sail immediately for Gibraltar, with Admiral Hawke, Admiral Saunders, several navy captains; also the Earl of Panmure and the Lord Tyrawley. The two Admirals had orders to supersede, to put under arrest, and to send home Admirals Byng and West: and Lord Tyrawley had the like orders in regard to General Fowke. The Antelope sailed from Portsmouth on the 16th of June, and arrived at Gibraltar on the third of July, when Admiral Byng was preparing, and was very near to sail for the relief of Port Mahon. Admiral Hawke obeyed his orders, and sent the state prisoners to England on the 9th, in the same man of war that brought him to Gibraltar.

Resolutions of the privy council.

Admiral Hawke, &c. sent to Gibraltar.

To supersede and arrest Byng, &c.

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Letter to
superfede
Admiral
Byng.

On this occasion the Secretary of the Admiralty wrote this letter to Admiral Byng, to acquaint him with his Majesty's pleasure.

" S I R,

" HIS Majesty having received an account
" that the squadron under your command,
" and that of the French under the command of
" Monsieur Galiffionere, came to action off the
" harbour of Mahon, the 20th of last month,
" and that the French (though inferior to you in
" force) kept before the harbour, and obliged you
" to retreat; I am commanded by my Lords
" Commissioners of the Admiralty, to send you
" herewith an extract of Monsieur Galiffionere's
" letter to his court, giving an account of the
" action, and to acquaint you, that his Majesty
" is so much dissatisfied with your conduct, that
" he has ordered their Lordships to recal your-
" self and Mr. West, and to send out Sir Edward
" Hawke, and Rear-Admiral Saunders, to com-
" mand the squadron.

" I am extremely sorry to be obliged to inform
" you of such a disagreeable event, being with
" great regard,

S I R,

" Your most obedient humble Servant,

Admiralty-Office,
June 8, 1756.

J. CLEVELAND.

To

To this he returned a letter, which neither betrayed consciousness of guilt, dread of resentment, nor confusion of mind.

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Gibraltar-Bay, July 4, 1756.

“ S I R,

Admiral
Byng's an-
swer.

“ **B**Y Sir Edward Hawke I have received their
“ Lordships orders, and your letter of the
“ 8th of June, which I have immediately com-
“ plied with, and have only to express my sur-
“ prize at being so ignominiously dismissed from
“ my employment, in the fight of the fleet I had
“ commanded, in fight of the garrison, and in
“ fight of Spain, at such a time, in such a man-
“ ner, and after such conduct, as I hope shall
“ shortly appear to the whole world. 'Tis not
“ now for me to expostulate; I flatter myself
“ that Mr. West and I shall make evident the in-
“ jury done to our characters, which I know of
“ nothing in the power of any being whatever
“ that can atone for; so high an opinion I have
“ of that, which was ever unsullied before, and
“ which I hope to make appear, has been most
“ injuriously and wrongfully attacked now, on
“ the grounds of a false gasconade of an open
“ enemy * to our King and country, and which
“ would


* Galiffionere's letter, dated the 22d of May, in which he writes: The 19th in the morning we descried the English squadron from the top-masts-head, and the two squadrons drew pretty near each other that day, but never were within gun-shot; which was not our fault, as the English were to wind-

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“ would have evidently appeared, had the possible time been allowed for my own express’s arrival, in which there was nothing false, nothing vaunting, nothing shameful, nor any thing, which could have prevented our receiving his Majesty’s royal approbation, for having, with a much inferior force, fought, met, attacked, and beat the enemy : of this, it is needless for me to say more at present, than that I am sorry to find Mr. West, with the Captains, Lieutenants, and officers of the ships, we had our flags on board of, are to be sufferers for what I alone, as Commander in Chief, am answerable : But it is so much of a piece with

windward of us. The 20th the French admiral worked about so as to gain the wind ; but just as he had got into a favourable position for it, the wind shifted in such a manner as still left this advantage to the English squadron. At half an hour past two in the afternoon, the two squadrons were in line of battle, and began the engagement. The English consisted of eighteen sail, of which thirteen were of the line ; and ours of twelve ships of the line and four frigates. The action lasted above three hours and a half, but was not general all the time. The English ships that suffered most from our broadsides got to the windward again out of gun-shot ; they all along preserved this advantage, that they might keep clear of us as they pleased. After having made their greatest efforts on our rear-division, which they found so close, and from which they were so furiously canonaded, that they could not break in upon it, they resolved to sheer off, and did not appear again all the next day, being the 21st. In general, none of their ships long stood the fire of ours. The ships of our squadron suffered but little ; they were repaired in the night, and ready to fight the next morning.

“ the





12

12

OF M A S H U I

A New & Accurate Map of the Seat of the late War on the Coast of CHOROMANDEL in the East Indies.

1763.

11

11

TRANGBABURI or TRANGBABUR.
Danesburg Cast.

EXPLANATION.

City or considerable place	Patnam a Town in General
Indian Temple or Pagoda	D Danes
Residence of a Nawab or Mogol Governor	E English
Residence of a Pillai-gar or Indian Prince	F French
Choultry, Inn or Lodging Place	H Dutch
Kotta, Kottay or Kotta a fortified place	P Portuguese

Scales.

Eng: Marine Leag: 20 to a Degree
English Miles 69 1/2 to a Degree.

8'

80 Long: Meas: from London

79

78

MARAWA

MADUREY PART OF

PART OF



“ the whole unheard of treatment I have met
 “ with, that neither they, the fleet, or myself
 “ can be more astonished at that particular, than
 “ at the whole.

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J. BYNG.

The Captains and others, who were superseded and ordered home, on this account, were, Rear-Admiral West, Captain Gardiner of the Ramilies, the Admiral Byng's six Lieutenants, Gunner and Purser, and his Master and Surgeon; and Captain Gough of the Experiment, and Captain Bassett of the Fortune-sloop, who had been appointed by him to those commands, occasioned by the death of Captain Andrews and Captain Noel.

Prisoners
 sent to
 England.

Here we will leave Admiral Byng and his fellow-prisoners to meet their destiny; and defer the narrative of the effects, this miscarriage in the Mediterranean produced at home, till we shall have drawn a concise representation of the operations and transactions performed by our arms in distant parts of the world.

In the East Indies we left the British fleet at Bombay, preparing for an expedition against Angria, the scourge of those seas; whose territories, from a nest of pyrates, was become a sort of empire, and subsisted much in the same manner, on that coast, as the states of Barbary, which sprang from a like original, make themselves formidable in Europe.

Affairs of
 the East
 Indies.

Expedition
 against
 Angria.

The

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His origin.

The origin of this Eastern pyratial government, was laid by one Conogee Angria: who having been advanced by Saha Raja, from the station of a private Maratta to the post of General and Admiral in his wars with, or rather rebellion against the Mogul, about one hundred years ago, and rewarded for his service with the government of Severndroog, he soon threw off the yoke, and seized upon several of his Prince's vessels, which he had commanded, and with which he turned an arch pyrate. His first care was to fortify himself on that island, and to ruin the Marattas fleet, that they might have no way to attack him. However the Marattas built three forts upon the main, within less than point-blank shot of his little territory, which was not above a mile in circumference, but a rock of stone by nature and well fortified by art. This did not answer their expectations to reduce Angria to obedience, or to restrain him from encroaching upon their dominions, and interrupting the trade and navigation of that coast. For, having the sea open, and much superior to his country men in maritime affairs and in bravery, he left them to pursue a fruitless attempt against his fortifications, and surprized several of their sea-ports, and carried his conquests from Tamana to Rajapore, containing sixty leagues of sea coast, including several commodious harbours; and a district of inland country from 20 to 30 miles backward; which he secured by forts properly disposed on such eminences, as commanded the narrow passes and defiles. But

His territories.

what

what made all his forts more formidable, they were receptacles for fugitives, renegadoes and vagrants of all nations.

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The Marattas despairing of success by their arms, proposed to his successors terms of accommodation, for Angria to keep possession of his acquisitions, on condition that he should acknowledge the sovereignty of the Raja, and pay him an annual tribute. To which Angria, then upon the throne of this pyratrical state, agreed.

Becomes
tributary to
the Marat-
tas.

Angria's armaments having now no employ against his countrymen, he bent all his force towards the sea, and fitted out a fleet, that made several considerable captures both from the English, French and Dutch. Amongst them were the *Darby*, an English East-Indiaman, richly laden from Europe, with one hundred and fifty men; and the *Jupiter*, a French ship of 40 guns, with 400 slaves on board. The Prince of Geniah, as Angria was then called, grew so insolent at last that he dared to attack Commodore Lisle, in the *Vigilant* of 64 guns, the *Ruby* of 50 guns, and several other ships in company, as the Commodore was departing from the Malabar coast. He stood a siege by seven armed ships and two bomb-vessels, sent by the Dutch from Batavia, with a number of land forces, and obliged them to retire without success; and then brooking no kind of subjection, and presuming on his own strength, he threw off his allegiance to the Raja of the Marattas; and by way of contempt ordered the ears and noses of the messengers sent by his

Turns his
armed ves-
sels against
the Eng-
lish, &c.

Holds out
a siege.

Rebels a-
gainst the
Marattas.

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his Sovereign to reclaim him to his obedience, to be cut off. Such a provocation inspired the Marattas with a spirit of vengeance, and drove them to a resolution to solicit the government of Bombay for assistance, to attack him with their marine force, while he should press him close by land. Which ended in a treaty signed by the Nanna or Chief of the Marattas, and by the Governor of Bombay, on the part of the company. But before the confederates were ready for action, which was more than a year, occasioned by the backwardness or dilatory proceedings of the Marattas, Angria was so elevated with his success against three Dutch ships, one of fifty guns, one of thirty-six, and one of eighteen guns, the two former of which he burnt, and took the last; that he had the vanity to declare his expectations to be soon superior to any force, that could be brought against him in the Indian seas; and accordingly continued to augment his marine with several vessels, and one that was to carry 40 guns.

League between the English and Marattas against him.

His success against the Dutch.

Expedition against him from Bombay.

This shewed the necessity of more activity on the part of the confederates, to humble this common enemy, already too formidable on the Malabar coast: Accordingly, the Marattas being ready, the Protector of 40 guns, the Swallow of 16 guns, and the Viper and Triumph bomb-vessels sailed on the 22d of March from Bombay, under the command of Commodore James, then Commander in Chief of the company's maritime force in India. This small squadron fell in, next day, with seven sail of Angria's grabs, and eleven

galli-

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gallivats, off Rajapore, and chased them to the southward. On the second day, still continuing the chase, Commodore James was joined off Choule by seven Maratta grabs and sixty gallivats. But, as soon as this fleet got the length of Comoro Bay, the Marattas, under pretence of performing some religious acts, not practicable on board of ship, according to their superstition, went ashore, where they dallied away thirty hours. In the mean time Angria's Squadron got into the harbour of Severndroog. But upon the approach of Commodore James, who with much difficulty brought up his dilatory allies, the enemy slip their cables and put to sea, the gallivats towing their larger vessels; and, as there was but little wind, that gave them considerable advantage over the English ships of war. So that, though the Commodore gave them chase it was all in vain. For the enemy threw out every thing to lighten their vessels with amazing industry and dexterity, and not only spread their yards with all the sail they had, but they tried to catch every breath of air by fastning their garments, quilts, and even their turbants extended on the flag-staves. By this manœuvre they gained their point; whilst our allies, the Marattas, whose ships are light, and built floaty for sailing large and in light gales, kept all astern. Which obliged Commodore James to give over the chase, and to return to Severndroog; a fortress on an island within musket-shot of the main land, with no more than two fathom and a half in the Firth; strongly, but not regularly fortified; the greatest part

The escape
of his fleet.

Severn-
droog.

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part of the works being cut out of the solid rock, and the rest built with stones ten or twelve feet square; and mounts fifty-four guns on the bastions. On the main land there are three forts, one, the largest, is called Fort Goa, built in the same manner, with large square stone, and mounts 40 guns. The other two, built with stones of an irregular shape, mount about 20 guns each.

Besieged.

The Commodore began to cannonade and bombard the Island Fort on the 2d of April 1755. but not being able to penetrate the walls, which were fifty feet high and eighteen thick, on the side where he made his first attack, he moved his station so, as to reach Fort Goa with his lower deck guns, while he plied Severndroog with his upper tier. By this prudent disposition and a vigorous fire, the north-east bastion of Severndroog and part of the parapet, were laid in ruins, about noon; when a shell set fire to the houses, and the English from the round-tops, with an incessant fire, prevented the garrison's extinguishing it: and the wind being northerly spread the flames all through the fort, blew up one magazine, and caused a general conflagration. A multitude of men, women and children, ran out and endeavoured to escape, on the other side of the island, in boats; but they were taken up by the Swallow sloop, stationed to the southward to prevent the throwing in of succours on that side. This enabled the Commodore to turn all his fire thenceforward upon Fort Goa: which was served with such a severe cannonade, that the enemy was soon obliged

to

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to hang out a flag of truce; But the Governor, without waiting the event of a capitulation in his necessitous circumstances, crossed over with some chosen Sepoys to Severndroog, where he seemed determined to maintain his ground, till he should receive succours from Dabul, trusting in the natural strength of the place, notwithstanding the ruin it had sustained in its walls and magazines by the bombardment. This being evident from all his answers to the summons and messages sent him, the Commodore increased his fire, both from the ships and from the three forts on the main, now in his possession: under which firing a number of seamen were landed, with a determination to carry their point, who ran up resolutely to the gates of the fortress, and with axes opened to themselves an entrance through the sally port without much loss.

Stormed.

This conquest was followed by the surrender¹ of Bancote, now called Fort Victoria, the most northern port of any consequence under the dominion of Angria, which submitted upon the Commodore's summons. The harbour is commodious for a trade in salt and other goods, which are sent thither from Bombay in great quantities; and was therefore preferred in the choice of the English in the distribution of the conquests with the Marattas; who consented that our East-India company should quietly possess this fort and port for the future. The Commodore delivered^m up

Surrender
of Ban-
cote.

¹ On the 8th of April.

^m On April 11th.

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the other fortresses, he had reduced, to them; and on the 15th he was recalled, as he was anchored before, and was preparing to attack Dabul; the season for action at sea being too far advanced. However, the Governor and Council of Bombay conceived such an high opinion of Commodore James's conduct and courage, and were so animated by the success under his command, that they prepared to follow the blow, in due time, against their troublesome and dangerous neighbour, whose destruction was resolved upon.

Admiral
Watson
arrives at
Bombay.

In this situation stood affairs between the English and their allies, and Angria, in November, when Rear-Admiral Watson arrived with his squadron at Bombay. While these ships were cleaning and repairing, Commodore James was dispatched in the Protector, with the Revenge and Bombay frigates, to reconnoitre Geriah, the capital of Angria's dominions, and to sound the depths of water at the entrance of the harbour: and upon his return and report, on the last day of December the Admiral ordered the Bridgwater and Kingfisher's sloop, and some of the Company's armed ships, to proceed to the port of Geriah, and to cruise off it. These were joined on the 27th of January 1756, by Commodore James in the Protector and Guardian frigate: and on the 11th of February, by the Admiral and his whole squadron.

Sails a-
gainst An-
gria.

Angria dis-
pirited flies
to the Ma-
rattas

Such a formidable fleet, so far beyond the apprehensions of Angria, struck him with such terror, that he abandoned his fort and threw himself entirely

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entirely upon the mercy of the Marattas, with whom he saw it was necessary for him to purchase a peace at any rate. And they, without regard to their treaty with the English, preferred the advantages, that they hoped to reap from his riches, to every other consideration; and agreed to receive him under their protection, on condition, that they might be immediately put in possession of the fort of Geriah, in which he had hoarded up all his riches. To which Angria submitted, and even signed an order for that purpose to his brother, whom he had left in command. Yet this clandestine treaty was not carried on so secretly, but the Admiral got information of it: and, in order to defeat their union, he next day, in the morning, sent a summons to the fort, and, receiving no answer, in the afternoon he marched, ^{His fort} and stood in to the harbour in two divisions, the ^{besieged.} Bridgwater leading his Majesty's ships the Tyger, Kent, Cumberland and Salisbury, and the company's ship, Protector of 40 guns: the other division was made up of the company's ships, the Revenge, Bombay grab and Guardian frigate; the Drake, Warren, Triumph and Viper bomb-ketches, led by the King's-fisher. When this fleet had taken its station there began such a fire, as presently silenced both the grabs and batteries. About four in the afternoon the Restoration, an armed ship, taken by Angria some time before, from the East India company, was set on fire by a shell, which communicating to his whole fleet, they very soon shared the same fate.

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Surren-
ders.

In the night, having no enemy to disturb them by sea, the Admiral ordered Colonel Clive to land with all the troops, to prevent the Marattas entranceⁿ into the fort: and next morning the Admiral sent a message to the Commander in Chief, declaring, that he would give no quarter, in case he would not surrender, and admit the English troops into the fort, in an hour's time. Which not being complied with, the attack was renewed with such vigour, about four in the afternoon, that the garrison, in less than half an hour, hung out a flag of truce. However, the Commandant neither hauled down his colours; nor admitted the English troops. This obliged the Admiral to repeat the attack, which was carried on with so terrible a fire, that the garrison cried out for mercy, and let in our troops; being subdued only by the terror of so unusual a fire; it being impossible for the heaviest metal to make a breach in the walls of that fortress, whose height and thickness were extraordinary; either hewn out of the solid rock, or built of stones ten feet in length laid endways.

Loss of the
English.

The strength of these walls, within which the enemy was safe, after they were driven from the ramparts, accounts for the smallness of the num-

ⁿ This was proved to be their design, by an offer they made to the Captains Buchanan and Forbes of 50,000 rupees, if they would suffer them to pass their guard; which they rejected with indignation, and disclosed it to Colonel Clive; whose vigilance the Marattas found it impossible to elude.

See Cambridge's account of the war in India, p. 129.

ber,

ber, that were killed: and the inconsiderable loss of the English must be attributed to their own bravery and spirit, which soon drove the enemy from their works by the briskness of their fire.

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But the loss to the enemy was irrecoverable. There were found in the place 200 cannon, six brass mortars, and a very large quantity of provisions of all kinds, besides 120,000*l.* and upwards, in money and effects. There were eight ketches, one ship, a great number of small vessels called Gallivats, and two large ships upon the stocks, one of 40 guns; without any possibility of recovering that power, by which Angria had for so many years reigned a terror to the maritime powers of Europe, frequenting those seas, as well as to his neighbouring states. Amongst the prisoners were the wife, children, and mother of Angria; who received the admiral with a flood of tears, and on their knees, with their faces to the ground. Mr. Watson comforted them with assurances, that he would be to them a friend and a father. Upon hearing of which, the youngest son seized the admiral's hand, and sobbing, said, "Then you shall be my father." Three hundred Europeans, and as many Sepoys were left to guard the fort, and four of the company's vessels to defend the harbour.

Our success on this coast was greatly checkered with our losses in other parts of the East Indies. We left^o the M. Legrit and M. Buffy seeking a

^o See page 198.

A. D. 1756. pretence for rekindling the war, on the coast of Coromandel.

M. Buffy's
scheme to
seize Gol-
conda,

M. Buffy not getting his ends of Salabatzing, from whom he demanded the possession of the fort of Golconda, under pretence of security for the expences he had been at in his cause against the rebels; the haughty French man behaved at last with such an air of arrogance, that the Moorish Prince ordered him immediately to return to Pondicherry, with his handful of Europeans. But Buffy did not depart from the Moorish army without giving strong hints of his intentions to accomplish that by force, which he was not able to acquire by intrigue and solicitation.

Salabat-
zing applies
for aid to
the Eng-
lish,

His march for Massulipatam, by the way of Hyderabad, the capital of Golconda, alarmed Salabatzing, who immediately wrote to the governor of Madras for an aid of troops to prevent any insults from this enraged and perfidious Frenchman, who committed some disorders in the countries through which he passed with his forces: tho' narrowly watched by a party of Maratta horse, which hovered about his little army all the way.

Buffy rein-
forced.

Buffy had with him 400 Europeans, about as many Seapoys, and he had ordered the governor of Pondicherry to reinforce him with 400 or 500 more Europeans, to be landed at Massulipatam, about 15 days march from Hyderabad; where he arrived with a large stock of provisions of all sorts, which he took by violence from the Bazars in his march.

At

At Hydrabad Buffy converted a large house into a fort; whereon he mounted some great guns, and prepared to defend himself, and to maintain that station, in case of an attack; which he had reason to expect from his injured ally, the Viceroy Salabatzing.

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Fortifies
himself at
Hydrabad.

The governor of Madras having nothing to fear from the side of Pondicherry, so much weakened by the large supplies sent to Mr. Buffy from thence, agreed to assist Salabatzing with 400 Europeans, including a train of artillery, and 400 Sepoys; which joined to 50,000 Moorish horse in the Viceroy's pay, were thought sufficient to defeat the attempts of Buffy's whole army, that did not exceed 1000 men. But when every thing was settled for their rout and subsistence, the loss of Calcutta and all the subordinate English settlements or factories in the kingdom of Bengal, obliged the governor and council to drop this expedition, and do the utmost in their power to re-establish those settlements.

Aid pro-
mised Sala-
batzing.

How dis-
appointed.

How far the French may be suspected to have favoured or suggested that fatal catastrophe at Calcutta has not yet transpired: but, as it had such an influence upon our affairs at this critical conjuncture, it will be proper to give the following account.

Bengal is the most easterly province of the Mogul's dominions in India, lies upon the mouth of the Ganges, extending near 400 miles in length, from E. to W. and 300 in breadth, from N. to S. annually overflowed by the river Ganges, which

Bengal, its
situation
and extent.

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makes it one of the richest and most fruitful provinces in that quarter of the globe.

Bay of
Bengal.

The Bay of Bengal is the largest and deepest in the known world; extending from the south part of Coromandel to the river Huguley. In which space it receives the great rivers Ganges, and Guena from the west side, and the Aracan and Menamkiori or Avat river from the east side. But Bengal, as a coast, is supposed to extend only from Cape Palmiras on the N. of the coast of Galconda, to the entrance into the Ganges; which rises in the mountains of Nigracut, part of Great Tartary, receives many other rivers, and after a course of 3000 miles falls into the Gulph of Bengal by so many mouths, that travellers are not agreed in the number of them. However the common passage for European shipping is up the river Huguley, one of the most western branches.

Ganges river.

Importance of
Bengal.

The richness and fertility of the country, and the extensive and safe navigation of this large river, shew the importance of the settlements, within these limits; and have engaged the trading companies of the maritime nations in Europe to establish factories upon the banks of the Ganges: which will be better described by the following survey of the villages, &c. on each shore, so far, as they serve to convey an idea of the interest of the English united East India Company.

Description of
Culculla.

The first town worthy observation on the side of the river Huguley is Culculla, a good market for coarse cloth, and for corn, oil, and other produce of the country. A little higher is the Dutch Bankshall,

Bankshall, or place, where their ships ride, when the currents prevent their getting up the river.

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From Calculla and Juanpardo two large deep rivers run to the East; and on the west side there is another that runs by the back of Huguley island to Radnager, famous for manufacturing cotton, Radnager. cloth and silk romaals, or handkerchiefs: and on the same river is grown the greatest quantity of sugar in Bengal.

Ponjelly, a little market town for corn, stands Ponjelly. a little higher on the east bank of Huguley river, and exports more rice than any place thereon. About a league above Ponjelly stands a pyramid, which serves for a landmark or boundary of the English East India company's settlement of Calcutta, that is about a league higher.

At Calcutta, when this disaster happened, there Calcutta. was a fort, in which stood the governor's house; and convenient apartments for the factors and writers; magazines for their ammunition, and store houses for goods and provisions; garrisoned by two or 300 soldiers; who were generally employed in conveying the company's ships from Patana, or Patna, loaded with salt-petre, piece goods, opium and raw silk: for, as the company hold the colony of Calcutta in fee tail of the Mogul immediately, they were under no apprehensions of being dispossessed by an enemy; tho' the Rajas, whose governments extend along the Ganges, between Patana and Cassimbuzzar, had sometimes interrupted that navigation, and endeavoured by force of arms to exact the payment of certain duties for all merchandize,

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chandize, that passed on the coast, by or through their dominions; which extend upwards of 1000 miles.

Trade of
Bengal.

The trade of Bengal supplies rich cargoes for fifty or sixty ships yearly: besides what is carried in small vessels to the neighbouring countries: and the article of salt-petre only is become of so great consequence to the European powers, that every thing has been attempted by the French and Dutch to deprive the English of that advantage. For which reason it was greatly to be suspected that these rivals in trade, that were always seeking an opportunity to ruin the English interest in the East Indies, had spirited up a new Nabob of Bengal to extirpate the English factories within his dominions, under various slight pretences; of being treated with disrespect by Governor Drake; of a right to certain duties, which were refused by the company, and for giving protection to such person or persons, that had fled to him for sanctuary.

The Eng-
lish attack-
ed by the
Nabob of
Bengal.

Why

Whatever might be the real cause it does not so much concern, neither does it appear, as yet, with any certainty. Intrigue on the part of the French and Dutch; avarice and ambition of the Nabob; and some indiscretions and neglect on the part of the English, are the most reasonable conjectures.

His army
and pro-
ceedings.

About the end of May 1756, Saradjot Dollah, the new Nabob, immediately upon his establishment, took the field, with an army of 30,000 horse, 30,000 foot, and between three and 400 elephants. He

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He detached about 600 men to reduce Cassimbuzzar^p, which fort^q he summoned to surrender; assuring them that they should have cause to repent their resistance: which not being complied with, and expecting a resolute and powerful opposition, the cunning Nabob had recourse to stratagem to facilitate his intentions. He ordered 20,000 men to join the 600, and proposed a truce for an amicable determination of the subject of complaint. By this means he inveigled Mr. Watts, the chief of this factory, to his tent, under promise of a safe conduct: but Mr. Watts was no sooner in his power, than he was obliged, by threats, to sign an acknowledgment of a debt to the Nabob in a large sum of money. He then insisted upon Mr. Watts's sending for Messrs. Collet and Batson, two of the council; which being complied with also, the Nabob detained both Watts and Batson, and sent Collet to prevail on

^p Cassimbuzzar, about 100 miles above Huguley, and 20 leagues west from Dacca, are factories both English and Dutch, of which, by their company's orders, the seconds of the council ought to be the chiefs. It is a large town, much frequented by merchants, and stands in a very healthy and fruitful island of the Ganges, whose inhabitants are employed in many valuable manufactories, especially muslins and silks, which are naturally yellowish, till the natives whiten them with the ashes, which they call there, of Adam's fig-tree. Tavernier says, that the Dutch export 7000 bales of them from hence annually; and, except what the natives keep for themselves, the Tartar and Mogul merchants ingross the rest, which is about 15,000 bales.

^q Was small, regularly built, mounted 60 cannon, and had about 300 men in garrison.

the

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the factory to surrender, threatening death to his two prisoners, whom he treated with the utmost indignity, and hurried them away to Moxoudavat, or Muxedabad; and destruction to them all, if they would force him to take it, by assault.

Cassimbuz-
zar surren-
ders.

This was opposed warmly by several of the gentlemen in the company's service: but the majority of the people prevailed; and accordingly on the 4th of June, the factory of Cassimbuzzar was surrendered to the Nabob of Bengal: which was so far from delivering the English out of their distress; that it encouraged the haughty eastern Prince to proceed with all his force against our principal settlement at Calcutta. The Moors having thus got possession of the fort at Cassimbuzzar without exchanging a single shot, seized upon every thing; ill treated the people; left them scarce a shirt to their backs, and, a few days after, sent them also to Moxoudavat, the capital of Bengal, to be confined in different prisons and dungeons.

Calcutta
besieged.

The Nabob dispatched near 60,000 troops, 300 elephants, and 500 cannon to reduce Calcutta, charging the commander in chief with a letter for Governor Drake; in which he offered to accommodate matters with the English on condition, that he would pay the arrears of his duty on trade, for 15 years past; to defray the expence of his army, till it should return to Moxoudavat, as well as what it had cost him already, and to deliver up some Moorish nobles, which had taken shelter from his tyrannies, with all their effects, in that factory.

To

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To which Mr. Drake made no reply; but on that letter's being repeated twice, thrice and four times, he tore it to-pieces and trampled upon it. This so exasperated the Nabob, that he came in person with the residue of his army, and arrived by long marches on the 17th, before Calcutta, having driven the advanced guards from the passes into the fort. The Moors were permitted to commit the greatest excesses in the town, which they plundered for 24 hours, and stript not only the houses, but the inhabitants, without distinction of age or sex, and left them naked.

The enemy then threw up a small breast work opposite to the fort, and mounted two twelve pounders upon it; which fired twice or thrice in an hour; and so badly served, that it was impossible for them to make a breach: however, long before any real attack had been made, Mr. Drake, who declared himself a quaker, resigned the fighting-post to his second, and under the favour of a thick smoak, occasioned by the store-houses and magazines set on fire by the Moors, conveyed all the treasure he could collect from the merchants, &c. and the company's books, and carried all the ladies, and the counsellors, with him on board the ships, which laid off in the Ganges; leaving Mr. Holwell behind, who said he would stay and defend the place to the last extremity; though the party that fled on board had carried 100 soldiers from the garrison with them.

The governor flies to the ships.

Mr. Holwell thus left with only a few gentlemen and some military officers, called a council of

The fort how defended.

war :

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war: after which, to appease the grumbling of the soldiers, left in the fort, he divided three chests of treasure amongst them; made them large promises for their fidelity and courage; secured the keys of the gates himself; and next morning stood to the defence of the place gallantly.

The attack was made very brisk; the Moors having got possession of the counsellors houses, which were built close and round the fort, galled the English much, and drove them from the bastions: but they were several times dislodged by the fire from the fort; which killed upwards of 12,000 Moors, with the loss of only five or six English, the first day: but on the third day, most of the English soldiers being either killed or wounded, and Mr. Holwell seeing himself deserted by almost every body, attempted to make an honourable and safe retreat on board the ships. For this purpose, he is said to have hung out a flag of truce, and to have demanded a capitulation, to amuse the enemy, till he could carry his retreat into execution. But the ships were now fell several miles below the fort, without leaving a boat to assist the besieged in their escape; which defeated all expectations of safety, that way; and, it is very probable the same circumstance giving the Nabob reason to think the fort would surrender at discretion, when thus deserted, without hopes of succours and relief, he would attend to no terms of capitulation.

The

The soldiers despairing of success, and quite disabled with their continual service, in the evening of the 19th, knocked off the lock of the Little Gate and let in the Moors; who killed several that first presented themselves; stripped all naked, and loading them with irons, crammed 146 into a dungeon, called the black hole, of about 18 foot square, with only two windows to the westward, at eight in the evening; out of whom next day, there were no more than twenty three left alive, at six in the morning; the rest being smothered by the excessive heat: and their release was owing more to the avarice of the Nabob, than to any bowels of compassion. For, being informed that there was a considerable treasure secreted in the fort, entrusted to the confidence of Mr. Holwell, the barbarous tyrant was moved to order him and his companions out of the black hole. Yet this was not the end of Mr. Holwell's misery. He, not privy to any such treasure, as the Nabob questioned him about, and three of his companions, were loaded with irons, and conveyed three miles, in a putrid fever, to the Indian camp, and there exposed to a heavy rain all night; next day brought back to Calcutta, under the intense heat of the sun, and embarked in an open boat, for Moxoudavat, not only without help for people in their distress; but treated in a

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How delivered up.

Miseries of
Mr. Hol-
well, &c.

Occasioned by a profuse sweat on every individual, attended with an insatiable thirst; and at last by the intolerable steam that arose from the dead bodies, as well as the living, as pungent and volatile as spirits of hartshorn.

manner,

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manner, that would shock a merciful reader. Arrived at the city of their destination; they were lodged in a stable, led captives in chains through the streets, and treated as the worst of criminals; till released by the pity and intercession of the Nabob's grandmother. Mr. Watts and his companion in slavery received the same grace. But having received advice, that the English ships were making some motions to recover their settlement and to revenge themselves, he ordered that all the inhabitants of Calcutta should withdraw and quit the country within three days, under pain of having their noses and ears cut off: sent pioneers to raze the town to the ground; and wrote to the governor of Madras, that no English subject should thence forward settle within his territory of Bengal.

This was the case, that so immediately required all the aid of the government of Madras to prevent the English being driven out, and extirpated for ever from the most lucrative trade in salt-petre and the other produce, and the manufactures of those countries watered by the Ganges; and to give this service the preference to any other.

Aid sent to
Bengal.

Accordingly it was resolved to drop the agreement with Salabatzing*, and to dispatch 600 Europeans, and 1000 Sepoys, under the command of Captain Clive, against the Nabob or Suba of Bengal, in order to restore the company's factories and commerce.

* See before, p. 359.

In consequence of this resolution, Salabatzing was under necessity to hearken to the French terms of accommodation, and to receive them into his service: and Buffy, reinforced by 500 Europeans, under Mr. Law, began the new year (1756) with the conquest of Ingeram, Baudermalanka and Vizagapatam, factories belonging to the English. This having been foreseen, the greatest part of the company's effects were shipped off, from the two former places, immediately upon the first alarm of hostilities. And as the latter was in no condition to withstand 600 Europeans, 6000 Sepoys, 4000 Pikemen, and 30 pieces of cannon, which M. Buffy brought against it, whose garrison consisted of no more than 140 Europeans, and 420 Sepoys and Topasses, it surrendered by capitulation; in which it was agreed, "To deliver up the place, the fortifications, the artillery, marine and military stores, arms, ship-stores, &c. to the company of France; as also all that should be found in the different magazines belonging to the English company; that the chief, the council, and all those employed in the English company's service, the officers and all others, both civil and military, to be prisoners of war, on their parole: that all the soldiers, sailors and other Europeans should be prisoners, as long as the war should continue between the King of France and the King of England, or till they should be exchanged." Besides the capture of this place gave the French the entire possession of the coast from Ganjam to Messulapatam.

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The bad effects of his agreement with the French.

Capitulation of Vizagapatam.

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Revolt and
usurpation
of Mau-
phus
Cawn.

Affairs did not succeed much better in the southern provinces of the Indies. The governor of St. George resolved to send 1000 Sepoys and the Coffee company from Trichinopoly, under the command of Mahomed Iboof Cawn, to reduce the rebel Polygars, who, by the instigation of the French, had united against the Nabob's brother Mauphus Cawn; had obtained several advantages over his troops, and had blocked up a large party in a strong fort, between Madura and Tinevelly. But the day before these troops began their march, advice came that Mauphus Cawn, had not only obtained a complete victory over the rebels, killed the general and 2000 colleries, and taken 300 horse, and all their baggage, guns, and some elephants, in a battle fought within seven miles of Tinevelly; but that he had usurped and seized upon his brother's country; having first under false and frivolous pretences, prevailed with our Sepoys to quit the fortress of Madura.

Affairs of
North A-
merica.

In North America the losses and disappointments of the expeditions, for the defence of the Ohio, the territories yet uncultivated, and the settlements made by the British subjects on the back of our provinces, on the south of the bay of St. Lawrence, exposed our colonies to the inroads and barbarities of the French and their Indian confederates, during the winter; and were chiefly ascribed to the appointment of improper commanders on that continent. For, it must be confessed, that there was a great oversight in the ministry; first, to chuse a man for that service, who was

totally

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totally unacquainted with the country, to which he was sent, and with the service, which he was to perform: and one, whose rash and precipitant temper made him unqualified for a service, whose success depended upon the most cool, wary and circumspect attention and foresight: and then to send him without a companion, equal to the post, and to succeed him in the chief command, in case of death, or other fatal accident. By the first fault, we have seen that Braddock's expedition was rendered unsuccessful; and the territory on the back of Virginia and Pennsylvania was particularly left exposed to the ravages of a cruel enemy: and by the second mistake, the chief command, upon the death of General Braddock, devolved on General Shirley, a man, who had been worn out in the practice of the law, as a barrister; who was naturally diffident, slow, and inert; who had never seen battle, or siege, and who had, nevertheless, been made commander in chief of the King's armies in North America, with the appointments and pay of the great Duke of Marlborough. This points out the erroneous conduct of the ministry; but in no wise intended, as a slur on the character of Mr. Shirley, who obtained the government of Boston by his merit; was reckoned an able politician; understood the interest of his country well; had the honour of his Majesty and the welfare of his country very much at heart; was employed in the commission to settle the limits between

General
Shirley's
character.

* See page 145, &c.

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England and France in North America, &c. in which great trust he acquitted himself with honour; and from his thorough knowledge of his Britannic Majesty's title to that continent, he seems to have been entrusted with the affairs thereof.

The miseries, to which the back settlements were exposed, by several miscarriages of the expeditions carried on last summer, against Fort du Quesne, Niagara and Crown Point, and the fatal consequences, which were foreseen would follow a want of a superior force, to oppose and repel the French, and to drive them off from the British territories; and that disunion and disagreement, which still continued amongst the provinces, about raising necessary supplies of men and money, for the common safety, greatly alarmed those, who were nearest the seat of danger, and produced several spirited remonstrances to their rulers, and instructions to their representatives, setting forth, That when they saw the views of an ambitious potent Prince, extended in defiance and in open violation of the most solemn treaties with the native Indians, and the crown of Great Britain; and his subjects seizing lands undoubtedly within his Majesty's grants, fortifying themselves thereon, assisted by all the native forces of Canada, and large numbers of veteran soldiers from France, opening thereby a short and easy passage to our own back settlements: that, when they reflected, that these intruders are the avowed enemies of our trade, liberty, property, laws and religion, the utter extirpation of which, can only satisfy them!

Remonstrances of the provinces most exposed to danger.

when

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when they considered that this appears to be the grand leading stroke in all their ambitious views, and the only way to bring about an arbitrary and tyrannical empire, and introduce a bloody and persecuting religion, throughout all the continent of North America: to succeed in which they observed them to act in one uniform manner, guided by one ready council, all directed to one fixed and unalterable point; their strength consisting in union, and their prospect of success founded on the present unhappy disjointed state of our colonies; which appears so evident to our Indian allies, that self-preservation has induced many of their warriors to go over to the French, believing either that our circumstances are desperate, or that we are an easy, effeminate and dastardly people, and consequently not to be relied on, being doubtful that the English would not make any provision against the impending dangers. They could not forbear being alarmed at a situation so shocking to every true subject of Great Britain: and that it was with the utmost concern they had seen those evils, from small beginnings, rise by degrees to the most threatening dangers; and that they could not help attributing their monstrous growth to the private views, inaction, irresolution, and disunion of the several legislative powers of British America: So that, an invasion, which the natural strength of the colonies united, and an easy expence, might have once repelled, is now become matter of serious concern and importance to their mother country, and calls for a

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provincial assistance in arms and money; and must cost immense sums to those colonies, which a friendly union and care might have saved.

Had no effect upon the quakers in the assembly of Pennsylvania.

Solemn and well grounded as these remonstrances were, the spirit of opposition still continued, especially in the assembly of Pennsylvania; in which the leading men, amongst the quakers, did all in their power to obstruct the passing any bill for raising money, and for establishing a militia; and some of them went so far as to vindicate the enemy, and to advise forbearance, as the best means to secure their liberty and property. To confirm this delusion, which had seized upon the majority of the representatives, many preachers, or speakers, both men and women, ran about with more than common assiduity, declaiming against all preparations for war, and declaring, "That whatever evil might come upon our provinces, it was of their own seeking: that the French were settled on their own lands, and that the defeat of the King's troops was a judgment for disturbing the enemy in their peaceable habitations: that their colony was under the immediate protection of heaven; and that it was in vain to endeavour to drive the French out of their forts; and particularly, that it was unnecessary for the Pennsylvanians to take up arms." This doctrine had such effect, that the unhappy Pennsylvanians despised all military arts and military officers, and were deaf to all measures towards maintaining the common safety; till the French themselves, by pushing on their encroachments upon this province,

after the defeat of Braddock, so as to threaten their very capital with desolation; and the incontestable proofs, that daily arrived from the back settlements, of the barbarities exercised by the enemy upon men, women and children, gave the assembly a more natural turn to acknowledge the necessity of preparing for the defence of their province.

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On the 3d of November, the assembly sitting, the governor informed them, by a message, that he had received intelligence of the encampment of 1500 French and Indians^u on the Susquehanna, within 80 miles of Philadelphia; that they had gained the Delawares and Shawanese to their interest^v: that he could have put the province into a posture of defence to prevent the mischiefs, already committed by this party, had his hands been properly strengthened; but that he had neither money, nor arms, nor ammunition at his disposal; that there was no militia, and that it was not possible for him to form the backsettlers into such regular bodies, as the present exigence required; and he earnestly entreated them to grant proper

Several
messages
from the
governor
concerning
the im-
pending
danger.

^u A body of 1400 Indians and 100 French, who marched from the Ohio, with an intention to divide into separate parties, when they came near to the frontiers; viz. 40 to go against Shamakin, 40 against Juniata, and 40 against Harris's Ferry; and thus to spread themselves in small parties quite over the province of Pennsylvania, taking up their winter quarters at Lancaster.

^v These two tribes of Indians declared that they had received a hatchet from the French, and were determined to use it against the English, as long as any of us were alive.

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supplies of money, and to prepare a bill to establish a militia, excepting such as are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, it being impossible without such law to prevent confusion and disorder, and to answer the purposes of government, whatever money might be raised.

The assembly admitted that the back-settlers had been greatly alarmed, and that great cruelties had been committed by the Delawares and Shawanese: but instead of proceeding immediately to enable the governor to repress and avenge these incursions by the bill desired, they requested him to inform them, whether he knew of any disgust or injury the Delawares and Shawanese had received, or by what means their affections had been alienated from the province; and put other queries of like tendency to avoid coming to an explicit answer to the governor's message.

Just as this answer was dispatched, the assembly received another message, acquainting them with the utter destruction of the settlers at the Great Cove. Which had no effect towards facilitating resolutions for the common safety. On the 10th of November, the governor acquainted the assembly, that the Indians had publicly demanded the assistance of the province, and had declared, that unless they should be immediately supported, they must in their own defence take part with the French, whom they were not able to resist alone: and further, that he was determined, with the advice of his council, to set out in person to succour the back-settlers by his presence, and to put them

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them into the best order he could, despairing now of doing any thing in consort with the assembly. This menace did not produce its desired effect: eight days more were trifled away in fruitless and disagreeable messages about the supplies. On the 18th the governor acquainted the assembly, by message, that the Indians had destroyed and driven away the inhabitants of Tulpehocken; and observed, that the means they had under consideration for raising money were too dilatory; that, as no money could be issued thereby, in less than six weeks, in which time a great part of the province might be laid waste, he urged them for an immediate supply, and a law to regulate a militia, and to submit them to discipline. This brought on farther delay. But next day, November the 19th, many hundreds of the back-settlers arrived at Philadelphia, and in a body demanded that relief, to which they were intitled by the laws of God and nature, and under the protection of government. These unhappy and deserted people applied themselves first to the governor, who pitied their distress; told them that he had done all in his power to gain from the assembly the relief they solicited, and shewed them the order for 5000 l. from the proprietaries, to be laid out as a free gift in defence of the province. Upon which they hurried to the Stadt-house with a waggon loaded with the dead bodies of their friends, who had been scalped about 60 miles off, by the Indians; threw them down at the door of the assembly house; cursing the quakers principles, and bid

The back
settlers
come to
Philadel-
phia.

Demand
relief and
protection.

Bring
down their
murdered
friends.

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Attend-
ed with
threats.

bid the committed of assembly behold the fruits of their obstinacy, and confess that their pretended sanctity would not save the province without the use of means; at the same time threatening, that if they should come down on the like errand again, and find nothing done for their protection, the consequences should be fatal *. And this was declared with such marks of grief and misery in their faces, who had lost their wives, their children, and the labour of their whole lives, that they, either moved by the distress, or over-awed by the threats of the injured people, immediately dropped all their disputes; passed the money-bill for 60,000*l.* on the same terms offered to them in August last; and also passed a militia-bill, by

* The quakers, lest the assembly should waver in their opposition, solemnly conjured them, in a public address, not to grant any money for purposes inconsistent with the PEACE-ABLE TESTIMONY they professed, as it would destroy the *religious liberties* and the fundamental part of their constitution; for which their forefathers left their country, and settled that, then a wilderness; declaring also, that if a tax should be granted to raise money for any *unpeaceable purposes*, many would be under a necessity of *suffering*, rather than consent thereto, by the payment of it.—The other inhabitants of the province addressed them in the strongest terms, to come into contrary measures. “We hope, said they, that we shall always be able to preserve that respect for you, which is due to the faithful representatives of *freemen*; but on the present occasion you will forgive us, if we assume characters higher than that of *humble suiters*, PRAYING for the defence of our *lives* and *properties*, as a matter of GRACE: you will permit us to make a positive and absolute DEMAND of it, as a matter of perfect and unalienable RIGHT by the laws of God and man.

which

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which those, who bear arms, might be formed into regular bodies, subject to discipline, and rendered more able to serve their country, and more terrible to their enemies. Which being the first militia-act ever passed in Pennsylvania, and containing some very remarkable passages, in regard to the scrupulosity of those, who refuse to bear arms for the defence of their country and of their own liberty, property and religion; the reader will find it at the bottom of the page.

In

An Act for the better ordering and regulating such as are willing and desirous to be united for military purposes within the province of Pennsylvania, passed Nov. 25, 1755.

Whereas this province was first settled by (and a majority of the assemblies have ever since been of) the people called Quakers, who, though they do not, as the world is now circumstanced, condemn the use of arms in others, yet are principled against bearing arms themselves; and to make any law to compel them thereto, against their consciences, would not be only to violate a fundamental in our constitution, and be a direct breach of our charter of privileges, but would also in effect be to commence persecution against all that part of the inhabitants of the province: and for them by any law to compel others to bear arms, and exempt themselves, would be inconsistent and partial. Yet forasmuch as by the general toleration and equity of our laws, great numbers of people of other religious denominations are come among us, who are under no such restraint, some of whom have been disciplined in the art of war, and conscientiously think it their duty to fight in defence of their country, their wives, their families, and estates, and such have an equal right to liberty of conscience with others. And whereas a great number of petitions from the several counties of this province, have been presented to this house, setting forth,

that

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF

In Virginia the government, prevailed upon by the miseries suffered by the back-settlers, who had been

that the petitioners are very willing to defend themselves and country, and desirous of being formed into regular bodies for that purpose, instructed and disciplined under proper officers, with suitable and legal authority; representing withal, that unless measures of this kind are taken, so as to unite them together, subject them to due command, and thereby give them confidence in each other, they cannot assemble to oppose the enemy, without the utmost danger of exposing themselves to confusion and destruction.

And whereas the voluntary assembling of great bodies of armed men from different parts of the province on any occasional alarm, whether true or false, as of late hath happened, without call or authority from the government, and without due order and direction among themselves, may be attended with danger to our neighbouring *Indian* friends and allies, as well as the internal peace of the province.

And whereas the Governor hath frequently recommended it to the Assembly, that in preparing and passing a law for such purposes, they should have a due regard to scrupulous and tender consciences, which cannot be done where compulsive means are used to force men into military service; Therefore, as we represent all the people of the province, and are composed of members of different religious persuasions, we do not think it reasonable that any should, through a want of legal powers, be in the least restrained from doing what they judge it their duty to do for their own security and the public good; we, in compliance with the said petitions and recommendations, do offer it to the Governor to be enacted, And be it enacted, by and with the advice and consent of the representatives of the freemen of the said province in general assembly met, and by the authority of the same, That from and after the publication of this act, it shall and may be lawful for the freemen of this province to form themselves into companies, as heretofore they have used in time of war

without

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been killed or taken, to the number of 70 persons, ordered the militia of the counties of Dumfries,

Prince

without law, and for each company, by majority of votes in the way of ballot, to chuse its own officers.——

And that as soon as the said companies and regiments are formed, and their officers commissioned, it shall and may be lawful to and for the governor, or commander in chief, by and with the advice and consent of the colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors of all the regiments, to form, make, and establish articles of war, for the better government of the forces, that shall be under their command, and for bringing offenders against the same to justice; and to erect and constitute courts-martial, with power to hear, try, and determine any crimes or offences by such articles of war, and inflict penalties by sentence or judgment of the same on those, who shall be subject thereto, in any place within this province.——

Provided always, that the articles so to be made and established, shall contain nothing repugnant, but be as near as possible conformable to the military laws of *Great Britain*, and to the articles of war made and established by his Majesty in pursuance of the last act of parliament for punishing mutiny and desertion, the different circumstances of this province compared with *Great Britain*, and of a voluntary militia of freemen, compared with mercenary standing troops, being duly weighed and maturely considered.

Provided also, that nothing in this act shall be understood or construed to give any power or authority to the governor or commander in chief, and the said officers, to make any articles or rules that shall in the least affect those of the inhabitants of the province who are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, either in their liberties, persons or estates; nor any other persons of what persuasion or denomination soever, who have not first voluntarily and freely signed the said articles after due consideration as aforesaid.

Provided also, that no youth, under the age of twenty-one years, nor any bought servant or indented apprentice, shall be admitted to enroll himself, or be capable of being enrolled

in

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Prince William and Fairfax to be draughted; and that 160 of them should march out of Winchester towards the south branch of the river Potomac, where several late murders had been committed: and 500 more were draughted about the middle of October, from the regiments at other places, and ordered to rendezvous at Fort Cumberland, to prevent further excesses from the French and Indians in those quarters, who had depopulated five or six counties, and cut off the correspondence with Fort Cumberland and Wills's Creek, for a time.

The Moravian settlement at Guaden Hutten, or Mohony Creek, about 85 miles from Phila-

in the said companies or regiments, without the consent of his or their parents or guardians, masters or mistresses, in writing under their hands first had and obtained *.

Provided also, that no enlistment or enrollment of any person in any of the companies or regiments to be formed and raised as aforesaid, shall protect such person in any suit or civil action brought against him by his creditors or others, except during his being in actual service in field or garrison; nor from a prosecution for any offence committed against the laws of this province.

Provided also, that no regiment, company, or party of volunteers, shall, by virtue of this act, be compelled or led more than three days march beyond the inhabited parts of the province; nor detained longer than three weeks in any garrison, without an express engagement for that purpose, first voluntarily entered into and subscribed by every man so to march or remain in garrison.

This act to continue in force until the 30th of October next, and no longer.

* See how this agrees with the clause in the act passed in November last at Westminster, page 212.

delphia,

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delphia, was destroyed by the Indians, led on by the French, only two persons escaping alive; who continued burning and destroying every thing they met with, and barbarously murdered all, without regard to age or sex. Which had such an effect that the settlers at Bethlem and Nazareth, amongst whom were many Moravians, formed themselves into bodies, to oppose and defend themselves against the enemy, and thereby prevented the like outrages for the future in those parts.

These, and an infinite more calamities, were daily reported from the western frontiers of our colonies; where the French were in possession of the vast country on the Ohio, secured for the present by Fort du Quesne; and had cut off the Indian nations from our colonies by Crown Point and Fort Cohasset, Niagara and Frontenac, and a multitude of small forts, on the back of New England and New York, that commanded all the passes and the lakes; and by Fort Condé, and its commandaries, properly established behind the Carolina's, to finish that chain, intended to girt all the English colonies from Nova Scotia to Georgia: and the French in Canada employed the whole winter in preparations for the siege of Oswego, and to complete their operations on the Ohio; placing strong garrisons at Crown Point and Ticonderoga; from whence, and other stations, they sent out small parties to distress the English out-settlements.

Strength of
the French.

On our part, General Shirley exerted the utmost of his skill and interest to unite the Provinces

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vinces in vigorous measures for the next campaign; and was so successful, as to effect in some measure the long-wished for union of the Governors of New England and New York, in the common cause of defence against the encroachments of the enemy; in particular, to avenge the destruction of their back-settlements, and to attack Crown Point with 8000 New Englandmen and 1,300 men from New York; and to conciliate many of the Indians to the British interest, who had gone over unto, or had given great suspicion of their intentions to join, the French. But he was recalled before an opportunity served to carry his winter councils into action; being superseded in his chief command, at Albany, by Colonel Webb, who delivered to him his Majesty's orders to repair to England without delay, dated the 31st of March; his Majesty having, on the 17th day of February preceding, appointed John, Earl of Loudon, General and Governor in Chief of Virginia; and on the 20th General and Commander in Chief of all his forces in North America.

Affairs in
Nova Scotia.

In Nova Scotia matters did not favour the enemy at all. General Lawrence pursued his success, and was obliged to use much severity, to extirpate the French neutrals and Indians, who refused to conform to the laws of Great Britain, or to swear allegiance to our Sovereign, and had engaged to join the French troops in the spring, expected to arrive from Old France, as early as possible, on that coast, or at Louisbourg; some of which, with ammunition, stores, &c. fell into the hands

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hands of our cruizers off Cape Breton. General Lawrence did not only pursue those dangerous inhabitants with fire and sword, laying the country waste, burning their dwellings, and driving off their stock; but he thought it expedient for his Majesty's service, to transport the French neutrals, so as entirely to extirpate a people, that only waited an opportunity to join the enemy.

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This measure was very commendable. But the execution of it was not quite so prudent. The method taken by the General to secure his province from this pest, was to distribute them, in number about seven thousand, among the British colonies, in that rigorous season of winter, almost naked, and without money or effects to help themselves. In which distribution too many were transported to those colonies, where they might with great ease get to the French forts, or might facilitate any enterprize from those forts, on the back of our provinces on the south of the Bay of St. Lawrence. Besides it was exercising a power he had no right unto. For his command reached not beyond the limits of Nova Scotia: and this was loading each government, into which those neutrals were transported, with an arbitrary and great expence.

French
neutrals
how dis-
posed of.

This may be exemplified in the case of Pensilvania. The quota imposed upon that province were 415, men, women and children. They landed in a most deplorable condition at Philadelphia, to be maintained by the province, or turned loose to beg their bread: and this city not

In Pensil-
vania.

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being above two hundred miles distant from Fort du Quesne, it was very probable, the men might endeavour to get unto, and join their countrymen at that fort; or to strengthen the parties, which hovered about the frontiers, and were continually laying waste the back settlements.

The government, in order to get clear of the charge, such a company of miserable wretches would require to maintain them, proposed to sell them, with their own consent: but when this expedient for their support was offered to their consideration, the transports rejected it with indignation, alledging, That they were prisoners, and expected to be maintained, as such; and not forced to labour. They further said, That they had not violated their oath of fidelity, which, by the treaty of Utrecht, they were obliged to take; and that they were ready to renew that oath, but that a new oath of obedience having been prescribed to them, by which, they apprehended, the neutrals would be obliged to bear arms against the French, they could not take it, and thought they could not be compelled to do it. Thus General Lawrence cleared the country of the French neutrals; and the Indians in their interest, who had been very troublesome, being most of them Roman catholicks, retired to Canada for protection. Which established peace and tranquillity throughout the province of Acadia or Nova Scotia, according to its antient limits, as ceded to Great Britain by the treaty of Utrecht; till February 1756, when a party of 300 French and
Indians

Indians returned to make inroads about Chienecto, and to cut off the English wood-cutters, as they lived in a state of security from an enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, having intelligence of this party, marched with 300 provincials in quest of them, came up with them, killed eight Indians on the spot, and wounded a considerable number of the enemy; as was conjectured from the vast quantity of blood, which the English saw, in the pursuit after those invaders.

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French and
Indians re-
enter Nova
Scotia.

Let us hence return to Europe, and resume the affairs on the continent. The treaty concluded between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Prussia, furnished the court of Vienna with a pretence to form an alliance with the court of Versailles, in order to facilitate a much further view, which it had been watching an opportunity to effect, against the King of Prussia. In consequence of this alliance treaties were drawn up, between those two courts, under the name of treaties of friendship and neutrality², with a formal

Affairs of
Europe.

Treaty of
alliance
between
France and
Austria.

² By which the contracting parties reciprocally obliged themselves to the guarantee of all their dominions in Europe: and to furnish each other with 18,000 foot, and 6000 horse; or with a proportionable sum of money, viz. 8000 German florins for 1000 infantry, and 24,000 ditto for 1000 cavalry, in case of any attack from any power whatever.

This treaty was preceded by the following convention of neutrality, which was signed the same day.

The differences between his most Christian Majesty and the King of Great Britain, concerning the limits of their respective possessions in America, seeming more and more to

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Its inten-
tion.

mal invitation to neighbouring powers to accede thereunto; and solemn assurances that the contracting parties had no other view than to preserve the general tranquility of Europe, and to prevent the flames of war, already kindled between Great Britain and France, from spreading to other countries. But, notwithstanding these pacific declarations, the King of Prussia soon discovered, that the principal end proposed by the Empress Queen, in this alliance, was the recovery of Silesia; in

threaten the public tranquility, his most Christian Majesty, and the Empress Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who equally desired the unalterable duration of the friendship and good understanding that now happily subsists between them, have thought it necessary to take proper measures for that purpose.

To this end the Empress Queen declares and promises, in the most solemn and binding manner, that she will not, either directly or indirectly, take any part in the above differences, in which she is now no way concerned, but on the contrary she will observe an exact and perfect neutrality during the whole time of the war that may be occasioned by the said differences between England and France.

His most Christian Majesty on his part, far from desiring to engage any other power in his private quarrel with England, reciprocally declares and promises, in the most solemn and binding manner, that he will, on no pretext or reason whatsoever, attack or invade the Low Countries, or any other kingdoms, states or provinces, under the dominion of her Majesty the Empress Queen; as likewise neither directly nor indirectly injure her possessions or rights; which her Majesty the Empress Queen doth in the same manner promise with respect to the kingdoms, states, and provinces, of his most Christian Majesty. This convention or act of neutrality shall be ratified by the Empress Queen within the space of six months, or sooner if possible.

which

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which France, who had assisted him in the conquest thereof, a few years before, did now concur with her new ally; it being, at this time, the interest of the French court to reduce the power of one, who is no longer to be made their tool in the ruin of Germany. His Prussian Majesty was further confirmed in his opinion concerning the hostile intentions of those powers towards him, by the intercourse of these two courts with Petersburgh. To which first Vienna, and then Versailles sent a special minister. From thence he concluded that a project was carrying on, by those three courts, against him; because his power was obnoxious to them all. And he was soon convinced of the truth of these conjectures: for, early in the spring of this year, he received certain intelligence, that the two imperial courts had agreed upon a plan to unite their forces, and to invade his dominions. In this situation, he took every measure, that could be suggested by the utmost vigilance and magnanimity; as will soon appear in the course of this history.

The actual invasion of Minorca, at last, drew on that open and formal declaration of war from Great Britain, which had been provoked, and ought to have been done long before; as we have shewn by sufficient evidences, in the course of this history; wherein almost every page exhibits some breach of faith, hostile intrigue or open hostility of the French, from the very signing of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; and which is confirmed

Domestic
affairs.

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by his Majesty's declaration published on the 18th of May, 1756, in this form and these words.

His Majesty's declaration of war against the French King.

GEORGE REX.

Declara-
tion of war
against the
French
King.

THE unwarrantable proceedings of the French in the West Indies and North America, since the conclusion of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the usurpations and encroachments made by them upon our territories, and the settlements of our subjects in those parts, particularly in our province of Nova Scotia, have been so notorious, and so frequent, that they cannot but be looked upon, as a sufficient evidence of a formed design, and resolution in that court, to pursue invariably such measures as should most effectually promote their ambitious views, without any regard to the most solemn treaties and engagements. We have not been wanting on our part, to make from time to time the most serious representations, to the French King upon these repeated acts of violence, and to endeavour to obtain redress and satisfaction for the injuries done to our subjects, and to prevent the like causes of complaint for the future: but though frequent assurances have been given, that every thing should be settled agreeable to the treaties subsisting between the two crowns, and particularly, that the evacuation of the four neutral islands in the West Indies should be effected, (which

was

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was expressly promised to our Ambassador in France) the execution of these assurances, and of the treaties, on which they were founded, has been evaded under the most frivolous pretences: and the unjustifiable practices of the French Governors, and of the officers acting under their authority, were still carried on, till, at length, in the month of April 1754, they broke out into open acts of hostility, when in time of profound peace, without any declaration of war; and without any previous notice given, or application made, a body of French forces, under the command of an officer bearing the French King's commission, attacked in a hostile manner, and possessed themselves of the English fort on the Ohio in North America.

But notwithstanding this act of hostility, which could not but be looked upon as a commencement of war; yet, from our earnest desire of peace, and in hopes the court of France would disavow this violence and injustice, we contented ourselves with sending such a force to America as was indispensably necessary for the immediate defence and protection of our subjects, against fresh attacks and insults.

In the mean time great naval armaments were preparing in the ports of France, and a considerable body of French troops embarked for North America; and though the French Ambassador was sent back to England with specious professions of a desire to accommodate these differences, yet it appeared, that their real design was only to gain

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time for the passage of those troops to America, which they hoped would secure the superiority of the French forces in those parts, and enable them to carry their ambitious and oppressive projects into execution.

In these circumstances we could not but think it incumbent upon us to endeavour to prevent the success of so dangerous a design, and to oppose the landing of the French troops in America; and in consequence of the just and necessary measures we had taken for that purpose, the French Ambassador was immediately recalled from our court; the fortifications at Dunkirk, which had been repairing for some time, were enlarged; great bodies of troops marched down to the coast, and our kingdoms were threatened with an invasion.

In order to prevent the execution of these designs and to provide for the security of our kingdoms, which were thus threatened, we could no longer forbear giving orders for the seizing at sea the ships of the French King, and his subjects: notwithstanding which, as we were still unwilling to give up all hopes that an accommodation might be effected, we have contented ourselves hitherto with detaining the said ships, and preserving them and (as far as was possible) their cargoes entire, without proceeding to the confiscation of them; but it being now evident, by the hostile invasion actually made by the French King, of our island of Minorca, that it is the determined resolution of that court, to hearken to no terms of peace, but to carry on the war, which has been long begun

on

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on their part, with the utmost violence, we can no longer remain, consistently with what we owe to our own honour, and to the welfare of our subjects, within those bounds, which, from a desire of peace, we had hitherto observed.

We have therefore thought proper to declare war, and we do hereby declare war, against the French King, who hath so unjustly begun it, relying on the help of Almighty God in our just undertaking, and being assured of the hearty concurrence and assistance of our subjects in support of so good a cause; hereby willing and requiring our Captain-General of our forces, our Commissioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of Great Britain, our Lieutenants of our several counties, Governors of our forts and garrisons, and all other officers and soldiers under them, by sea and land, to do and execute all acts of hostility, in the prosecution of this war, against the French King, his vassals, and subjects, and to oppose their attempts; willing and requiring all our subjects to take notice of the same, whom we henceforth strictly forbid to hold any correspondence or communication with the said French King, or his subjects: and we do hereby command our own subjects, and advertise all other persons, of what nation soever, not to transport or carry any soldiers, arms, powder, ammunition, or other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations, or countries of the said French King; declaring, that whatsoever ship or vessel shall be met withal, transporting or carrying any soldiers,
arms,

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arms, powder, ammunition, or any other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations or countries of the said French King, the same, being taken, shall be condemned as good and lawful prize.

And whereas there are remaining in our kingdom, divers of the subjects of the French King, we do hereby declare our royal intention to be, that all the French subjects, who shall demean themselves dutifully towards us, shall be safe in their persons and effects.

Remarks
on the de-
claration of
war.

Certainly the sound of war never echoed with more satisfaction, than at the present conjuncture. It was the general request of the nation; especially of them who were to fight our battles, and of those who, by their fortune and condition in life, were likely to contribute most to the expence thereof. For, they reasoned thus; can a declaration of war, to oppose French hostilities by open force, and to treat the French King and his subjects as our avowed and irreconcilable enemies, be attended with more calamitous circumstances, than to be continually alarmed with invasions and other attempts upon the British dominions and trade? Is it not as expensive to be driven to the necessity of maintaining an army on our coasts, and a fleet in a capacity to sail upon the first orders, as to ferret the enemy out of their lurking holes, from whence they are continually making new encroachments; and to repel force by force? War is the only remedy against injuries in times
of

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of peace. But there was another sort of men, who, on this occasion propagated very industriously a disagreeable representation of this measure, as if the ministry had been forced to adopt it, not by choice, but in order to stop the mouths of a people ready to exact an account of the money already expended in the greatest armaments ever known in Britain, both by sea and land, and at the same time permitting France to invade our territories. And these insinuations gained too much upon the timorous and avaricious.

However, national virtue made a strong push against every effort of the ministry to render this just and necessary war unsuccessful. The friends of our king and country could not help their doubts of the sincerity of the court, and their fears for the fatal consequences of a collusive war. "Should this war, said they, prove to be a ministerial collusion, only a measure to facilitate the raising new taxes; or an expedient, after the people have been fleeced full as much as they are able to yield at one shearing, to frighten them into an insidious peace; what would become of Britain? And to relieve the nation from these apprehensions, it is incumbent upon those in power, not only to conduct the war with integrity, prudence and vigour; but to patch up no peace till the just cries of the nation shall be satisfied for losses and damages, and upon such terms, as no free parliament can disapprove.

"A war

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“ A war committed to the management of
 “ such, whose integrity does not stand in the
 “ best light; or whose abilities in martial affairs
 “ have been suspected to favour the enemies escape,
 “ rather than of that inviolable secrecy, with which
 “ the councils of our King and country ought to
 “ be kept, would be far from answering the end
 “ of his Majesty’s declaration, or obtaining for
 “ Great Britain and its dominions, security from
 “ injuries in time of peace. Nothing less than
 “ pursuing every measure with fidelity and vigour,
 “ and opposing, counteracting and distressing the
 “ enemy in every place and attempt, according
 “ to the supplies granted by the people, can quit
 “ the ministry from the guilt of pusillanimity,
 “ ignorance, or corruption. Nor can the war
 “ procure for us the desirable security of a last-
 “ ing and peaceable possession of our rights and
 “ property, should it be protracted with other
 “ views than to force the enemy to equitable
 “ terms.

“ A peace, worded in a dark, ambiguous man-
 “ ner, can never guard us against cavils and dis-
 “ putes: it would expose us to the artifices of
 “ those, who are not in a capacity to decide the
 “ right in the field. It is by those kinds of peace,
 “ Great Britain has so often been obliged to re-
 “ turn to arms. Had there been no claims left
 “ undetermined at Aix-la-Chapelle: had the
 “ peace-makers, on the part of Britain, insisted
 “ upon the evacuation of Crown-Point, of the
 “ encroachments and fortresses on the Ohio, and
 “ in

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“ in Nova Scotia or Acadia, there would have
 “ been no pretence left for this French after-
 “ game. If this was an oversight, now is come
 “ the time to rectify the mistakes of former mi-
 “ nisters, and to restore the honour and welfare
 “ of Britain and her colonies. The sword is
 “ drawn: and it is drawn to defend our property,
 “ and to punish the usurpations, encroachments
 “ and perfidy of France; and it is the hearty wish
 “ of all good subjects, that it may never be
 “ sheathed till the enemy shall make full satis-
 “ faction, and be disabled from giving Great
 “ Britain any further reason to lie upon her arms
 “ in time of peace.
 “ Can there be too much caution in giving
 “ peace to a people, who are infamous for their
 “ breach of faith? for embroiling all nations by
 “ their intrigues; and noted for risking the event
 “ of a war, rather than yield any point by nego-
 “ ciation. Whose quiet consists in the trouble of
 “ all others; and whose advantage always takes
 “ root in the public calamities of their neigh-
 “ bours.
 “ Let us then pursue the war with that vigour
 “ and fidelity, which have so often made the Gallic
 “ throne to shake. Let all factions subside, and
 “ all parties unite in such measures, as will best
 “ coerce that power, which has broke through
 “ all treaties and promises, and under the sanction
 “ of peace was carrying on war secretly into our
 “ bowels. May all the secret instruments (if there
 “ be any) of that perfidious power be discovered
 “ and

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“ and brought to condign punishment : and may
“ heaven direct our councils, and inspire us with
“ a resolution never to accept of any terms of ac-
“ commodation, which might affect either our re-
“ ligion, reputation, peace, trade, or naviga-
“ tion.

“ Should these be neglected, it would be dif-
“ ficult to persuade a Briton that the times are
“ mended, or that more salutary measures are
“ pursued, than when they had reason to com-
“ plain of those traitors to their country so often
“ mentioned in history, who joined with the
“ prince in the spoil of the subjects, or kept him
“ under such restraints, as obliged him to be
“ content with their misrepresentations of facts, in
“ order to extort from him unjust orders to justify
“ or to screen their wicked counsel. They will
“ look upon this declaration of war to be only a
“ scheme to keep the minds of the people under
“ constant fears and alarms, in a constant hurry
“ and agitation about their own safety, to pre-
“ vent their looking into public frauds ; and to
“ reduce them to such a low state, as to render
“ them incapable of punishing those, who under
“ the name of peace, attempt to enslave the peo-
“ ple, impoverished by the excessive burden of a
“ collusive war.”

Engage-
ment be-
tween two
English
and two

On the 17th of May, 1756, the very day that
his Majesty signed this declaration of war, there
happened a very warm engagement off Rochfort,
between the Colchester of 50 guns, Captain Obrian,
with the Lime of 20 guns, and two French men
of

of war, the Aquilon of 48 guns, M. de Maurville, with the Fidelle of 36 guns, M. de Litar-dais : an action that begun at six in the evening, and lasted till half an hour past eleven between the Lime and Fidelle, and till half an hour past twelve between the Colchester and Aquilon, when distress and the darkness of the night obliged them to part honourably.

They engaged so close and warmly, that the foresail of the Lime was set on fire by the wads of her adversary, soon after the fight began. Which being extinguished, the Lime returned to the charge, and continued the battle, till the Frenchman slackened his fire, and she was obliged to bear away, to stop the holes received between wind and water, having three feet and a half of water in the hold ; in about twenty minutes returned a second time to the charge : but the Fidelle, though she fired the signal of distress, made shift to escape ; the Lime being in no condition to give chase, all her rigging, main, fore, and mizen stays, all her main shrouds, being shot away, except two on a side, and every mast and yard in the ship wounded and rendered unserviceable ^a. The Colchester never quitted her adversary till she took fire, occasioned by red-hot bullets fired by the Aquilon, as supposed ; which obliged her to bear away ^b.

On

^a Eighty-six shot went through the maintop sail, fifty-four through the main sail ; every sail looked like a sieve ; and a great number of shot went through the hull.

^b About this time the admiralty received advice of the loss of the Warwick of 60 guns, Captain Shouldham, taken by the

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French
men of
war off
Rochfort.

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On the 27th of May the parliament, after granting all that the ministry asked, to enable his Majesty to carry his declaration of war effectually into execution against France, was adjourned, by his Majesty's command, to the 18th of June: upon which occasion the Speaker, when the money bills were presented for the royal assent, addressed his Majesty in the following remarkable speech.

May it please your Majesty,

The
Speaker's
address to
his Majesty.

YOUR faithful commons, justly sensible of the blessings they have enjoyed under your happy reign, in just indignation at every attempt to disturb it, have exerted themselves to the utmost of their abilities, to support your Majesty in the just war, which the ambition and perfidy of France have obliged you to enter into, by giving, for the service of this year, ordinary and extraordinary, ten millions, besides a vote of credit to answer any unforeseen emergency.

They beg leave most humbly to say—they hope the sword you have so bravely drawn, and they so effectually supported, will be entrusted only in brave, capable, and honest hands; that so the naval, the natural strength of England, will make

the Prudent man of war of 74 guns, who had in company with her a 60 gun ship, and a frigate of 36 guns, off Martinico. The Warwick perceiving herself over matched, endeavoured to get clear by a running fight; and had actually got clear of the large ships, but the frigate got under her stern, and raked her so terribly that the Prudent came up again, and the Warwick struck; having lost the captain and a great number of men.

a figure, will do service, as much greater, as it is exalted higher than ever before.

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They apprehend; the present critical juncture convinces, that alliances on the continent, as they are unnatural, so they must ever be prejudicial to the true interest of England; that there is no gratitude to be expected from, no dependance to be had on, such allies: allies, who though saved, supported, subsisting by the blood and treasure of this kingdom for more than an age, have taken the opportunity of the first prospect of present profit, to break through every tie.

Not discouraged by the ingratitude of allies, nor the ambition of enemies, they have with pleasure beheld the sword drawn to vindicate your honour, the honour and interest of England; convinced, and proud to let all the world see, that England is able to fight her own battles, to stand by her own natural strength, against all her enemies.

Though ever attached to your Majesty's person, ever at ease under your just government, they cannot forbear taking notice of some circumstances in the present situation of affairs, which nothing but the confidence in your justice, your love to the people devoted to you, could hinder from alarming their most serious apprehensions; and to whom should they make their fears known, to whom should they complain, but to their protector, their guardian, and their father?—Subsidies to foreign Princes, when already burdened with a debt scarce to be borne, cannot but be

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severely felt; an army of foreign troops, a thing unprecedented, unheard of, unknown, brought into England, cannot but alarm: but still they depend, still they confide in your Majesty, and only beg leave most humbly to say, they hope that their burden may be lightened; their fears removed, as soon as possible; and in the mean time, that the sword of these foreigners shall not be entrusted a moment out of your own hand, to any other person whatsoever.

His Ma-
jesty's
speech.

His Majesty then closed the sessions with a most gracious speech, thanking the members of both houses for their unwearied application to public business, and for their vigorous and effectual support in maintaining the just and national cause.—He acquainted them, that as the injuries and hostilities, which have been, for some time, committed by the French, were now followed by the actual invasion of Minorca, an island guaranteed to Great Britain by all the powers of Europe, and and in particular by the French King; he had therefore found himself obliged to declare war in form, and relied on the divine protection, and the vigorous assistance of his faithful subjects.—Then addressing the commons, his Majesty particularly thank'd them for their readiness and dispatch in granting the large supplies; and gave his royal word that they should be strictly applied to the good purposes for which they were granted.—Then speaking to both houses, he concluded with these words: Nothing has given me more inward satisfaction, than

than the confidence which you repose in me. It is the most acceptable return you could make to me; and you may be assured, shall be made use of only for your good: the preservation of your religion, liberties, and independency, is, and always shall be, my great aim; and I trust you will not be wanting to yourselves.

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In this sessions of parliament a bill for establishing a regular and well-disciplined militia passed the house of commons; and though it did not meet with the same success in the house of lords, who threw it out at the third reading; it was recommended to the members of both houses to take the sense of the people on it, in their respective neighbourhoods, during the recess of parliament, that an effectual act might pass for that purpose at their next meeting.

Soon after^b the French King thought proper also to make a formal declaration of war; in which he concealed and evaded all the hostilities committed by his governors and commanders in the distant parts of the world, and fully set forth in this history, before the year 1754: which take in his own words.

The French King's declaration of war against Great Britain.

IT is known to all Europe, that the King of French England, in the year 1754, was the aggressor in the contests concerning the settlements in North America; and that in the month of June last, the

King's declaration of war against Great Britain.

^b On the 9th of June.

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British fleet, in contempt of the laws of nations and the faith of treaties, began to commit the most violent hostilities against the ships of his Majesty, and the navigation and commerce of his subjects.

The King, justly offended by this perfidious conduct, and the many insults that were offered to his flag, would not have suspended his resentment, and with-held what he owes to the dignity of his crown for eight months, if he had not been unwilling to expose Europe to the calamities of a new war. It was upon this salutary principle, that France behaved with the utmost moderation, during the most injurious proceedings of England.

While the British fleet, sometimes by the basest artifices, and sometimes by the most outrageous violence, were seizing the vessels of France, which were sailing without suspicion of danger, under the common safeguard of public faith, his Majesty sent back to England a frigate which had been seized by the French fleet, and suffered the British merchantmen to continue trading without interruption in the ports of France.

While the French soldiers and sailors, captives in the British islands at a time of peace, were treated with a severity by which the bounds that the laws of nature and the common principles of humanity have set to the rights of war, were exceeded, the English lived and traded without molestation in France, under the protection of that
reci-

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reciprocal kindness and respect, which civilized nations owe to each other.

While the British ministry, under the appearance of sincerity, imposed upon his Majesty's ambassador by false protestations, they caused orders, directly contrary to the deceitful assurances they had given of an approaching reconciliation, to be executed in all parts of North America.

While the court of London was exhausting all the subtilties of intrigue, and all the subsidies of England, to engage the other powers of Europe to act offensively against France, his Majesty did not demand even the succours which guarantees, or defensive treaties, authorized him to require of them, but advised only such measures as might best conduce to their peace and security.

Such has been the conduct of the two nations; and the striking contrast of their proceedings cannot but convince all Europe of the jealousy, ambition, and unreasonable desires of the one, and the honour, justice, and moderation of the other.

His Majesty hoped that the King of England, acting upon principles of natural equity and the true interest of his honour, would at length have disavowed the scandalous excesses, which the officers of his fleet continued to commit; especially as his Majesty gave him an opportunity of doing it with equal justice and decorum, by demanding a speedy and complete restitution of all the vessels of France, which had been taken by British ships; and had offered, upon this preliminary condition, to enter into a negotiation concerning other satisfactions,

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which his Majesty had a right to expect, and readily to concur in an amicable accommodation of the differences concerning America.

The King of England having rejected this proposition, his Majesty could not but consider his refusal as the most authentic declaration of war, as his Majesty had said he should do in his requisition.

The British court therefore might have dispensed with a formality, which was become needless; the manner, in which she had already declared war, was a better reason than any that was explicitly assigned, why she would not submit, to the judgment of Europe, the pretended grievances, which were alledged against France in the written declaration of war, that was published at London.

The vague imputations, which that writing contains, have not the least foundation in truth, and the very manner, in which they are set forth, would have confuted them, if they had not been demonstrated to be false in the memorial, which his Majesty has caused to be remitted to all the courts of Europe, containing an exact state of all the *facts* relative to the present war, and the negociations that preceded it, supported by incontestible evidence.

There is however one fact of great importance, which is not mentioned in that memorial, because it was not possible to foresee that England would carry her indelicacy, in the choice of the means of illusion, so far, as she now appears to have done.

She

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She talks much of the military works carrying on at Dunkirk, and of the troops which his Majesty has caused to assemble upon the coast; and it might fairly be concluded from her declaration of war, that these works and these troops have alone determined her to seize whatever she finds at sea belonging to his Majesty, or his subjects.

It is however universally known, that the works at Dunkirk were not begun till after the capture of two of his Majesty's ships, which were attacked in a time of profound peace by an English squadron of 13 men of war. It is equally notorious, that the English fleet had been making prizes of French vessels more than six months, when the first battalions, which his Majesty ordered to the sea-coast, began their march.

If the King of England should ever reflect on the falshood of the reports, which have been made to him concerning these facts, he will not surely forgive those, who have betrayed him into the assertion of what is so far from being true, that it cannot by any artifice be rendered specious.

That which his Majesty owes to himself and to his subjects, has at length obliged him to repel force with force; but being still steady to his favourite principles of justice and moderation, he has directed his military operations to be carried on only against the King of England, his aggressor; and all his political negociations have been intended merely to justify the confidence, which has been placed in his friendship, and the integrity of his intentions, by the other nations of Europe.

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It is not necessary to assign more particularly the motives which have induced his Majesty to send a body of his troops into the island of Minorca, and which have at length obliged him to declare war against the King of England, as the King of England has declared war against him both by land and sea.

His Majesty thus acting upon principles so worthy to determine his resolutions, doubts not but to find, in the justice of his cause, in the valour of his troops, and in the love of his subjects, such assistance, as they have always hitherto afforded him: but above all he relies for protection upon the Lord of Hosts.

This declaration concludes with a severe prohibition of all communication, commerce, and intelligence with the subjects of Great Britain, upon pain of death.

Remarks
thereon.

In this declaration the most Christian King lays aside that politeness, for which his court take great pains to adopt in all their transactions, and that veracity, on which the French monarch endeavours to avail himself in all negociations and communications. He, forgetful of that decorum, which is due to sovereign Princes, like a man raving with despair, charges his Britannic Majesty with piracy, perfidy, inhumanity, and deceit, even against the conviction of his own conscience; which told him that the very acts, falsely imputed, in the declaration, to the King of Great Britain, were practised continually by himself and his ministers: as
has

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has been proved at large by the facts so often produced in the course of this history, and summed up in the declaration of war, made by his Britannic Majesty. Besides this farago of abuse and scurrillity, there is nothing more than an accusation of our making reprisals, and opposing an open force to the French hostilities, without the ceremony of an open declaration of war: which, though it is not justified strictly in point of formality, or usage between nations at peace with each other; yet it can never make that Prince the aggressor, who is obliged through necessity to defend himself and his dominions, against one, that in time of peace invades and destroys his property, and seizes, imprisons, and murders his subjects; as the French had done, with impunity, for several years in America.

As the success of this war seems to depend chiefly on a naval force, it will be proper to give the following list of the royal navy of Great Britain, at the time it was declared.

FIRST RATES.

900 *Men*, 100 *Guns*.

Royal Ann
Britannia
Royal George
Royal Sovereign
Royal William

Saint George

Namur

Prince

Ramillies

Princess Royal

Union

List of the
royal navy
of Great
Britain,
1756.

SECOND RATES.

750 *Men*, 90 *Guns*.

Blenheim
Duke

THIRD RATES.

600 *Men*, 80 *Guns*.

Barfleur

Boyne

Princess Carolina

Cambridge

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Cambridge	Stirling-Castle
Cornwall	Suffolk
Prince George	Somerset
Marlborough	Vanguard
Neptune	Yarmouth
Newark	Swiftsure
Norfolk	Magnanime
Ruffel	

600 Men, 74 Guns.

Culloden	Princess Amelia
Invincible	Cumberland
Monarque	Devonshire
Terrible	Lancaster

Torbay

Fougueux

600 Men, 70 Guns.

Bedford
Berwick
Buckingham
Burford

Captain
Chichester
Dorsetshire
Edinburgh
Elizabeth
Essex
Prince Frederick
Grafton
Hampton-Court
Kent
Lenox
Monmouth
Nassau
Northumberland
Royal Oak
Orford
Princessa
Revenge

600 Men, 66 Guns.

600 Men, 64 Guns.

Ipswich
Intrepide
Trident

FOURTH RATES.

400 Men, 60 Guns.

Saint Alban's
Anson
Augusta
Canterbury
Defiance
Dragon
Dreadnought
Dunkirk
Eagle
Exeter
Greenwich
Jersey
Kingston
Lion
Medway
Princess Louisa
Princess Mary
Prince of Orange
Montague

THE LATE WAR.

411

Montague
Nottingham
Pembroke
Plymouth
Rupert
Rippon
Strafford
Sunderland
Superbe
Tilbury
Tyger
Vigilant
Windsor
Weymouth
Worcester
York

300 Men, 50 Guns.

Advice
Assistance
Antelope
Bristol
Centurion
Chatham
Colchester
Chester
Deptford
Falkland
Falmouth
Gloucester
Guernsey
Hampshire
Harwich
Isis
Litchfield
Leopard
Newcastle
Nonfuch
Norwich

Oxford
Portland
Preston
Panther
Ruby
Rochester
Salisbury
Severn
Sutherland
Tavistock
Winchester

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FIFTH RATES.

250 Men, 44 Guns.

Adventure
America
Anglesea
Ambuscade
Chesterfield
Crown
Diamond
Dover
Eltham
Prince Edward
Expedition
Enterprize
Gosport
Glory
Prince Henry
Humber
Hastings
Hector
Jason
Kinsale
Launceston
Ludlow-Castle
Lark
Liverpool

Looe

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Looe
Lynn
Mary Galley
Pearl
Penzance
Pool
Rainbow
Roebuck
Romney
Saphire
South Sea Castle
Thetis
Torrington
Woolwich

SIXTH RATES.

130 Men, 20 and 24 Guns.

Amazon
Alderney
Aldborough
Arundel
Bellona
Biddiford
Boston
Bridgewater
Blandford
Centaur
Deal Castle
Dursley Galley
Dolphin
Experiment
Flamborough
Fowe
Fox
Gibraltar
Greyhound
Garland
Glasgow
Grand Turk
Hinde

Inverness
Kennington
Leostoffe
Lively
Lys
Lyme
Margate
Mercury
Mermaid
Nightingale
Phoenix
Portmahon
Queenborough
Renown
Ranger
Rose
Rye
Sea-Horse
Shoreham
Squirrel
Seaford
Sheerness
Syren
Sphinx
Surprize
Success
Scarborough
Solebay
Tartar
Triton
Unicorn
Winchelsea
Wager
Royal Caroline

B O M B S.

Firedrake
Furnace
Granado

S L O O P S.

THE L A T E W A R.

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S L O O P S.

Albany
Badger
Baltimore
Cruizer
Dispatch
Falcon
Ferret
Fly
Fortune
Grampus
Happy
Hazard
Hornet
Hound
Jamaica
Kingfisher
Otter
Peggy
Peregrine
Porcupine
Ranger
Raven
Saltash
Savage

Scorpion
Shark
Speedwell
Swallow
Swan
Swift
Trial
Viper
Vulture
Wasp
Weazle
Wolf

Y A C H T S.

Catherine
Charlotte
Dorset
Fubbs
Mary
William and Mary
Bolton
Chatham
Drake
Portsmouth
Queenborough.

* * There were also a number of fire-ships, hoys, transports, smacks, lighters and hulks.

Besides these ships of war, his Majesty ordered that a commission should be prepared to empower the lords commissioners of the admiralty to grant letters of mark, or commissions to privateers for seizing ships and goods belonging to the French King and his subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories or dominions, and such other ships and goods, as are or shall be liable

Letters of
mark
granted.

to

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to confiscation, pursuant to the respective treaties between his Majesty and other Princes, States and Potentates.

Encour-
agement
for Privateers.

There was also a proclamation issued by his Majesty for the encouragement of privateers, and for regulating prizes, &c. by which the sole interest in, and property of, every ship and cargo, was given to the flag-officers, commanders and other officers, seamen, mariners and soldiers on board his Majesty's ships, from and after the 17th of May 1756, during the continuance of the war with France: and further allowing to them, and to privateers, the sum of five pounds for every man alive at the beginning of the engagement, on board of any ship taken, sunk, burnt, or otherwise destroyed.

Clause re-
lating to
neutral
ships.

By the British declaration of war it is manifest that our court was determined to seize and condemn as good and lawful prize, any ship or vessel, of what nation soever, that should be found transporting or carrying either soldiers, arms, ammunition, or other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations or countries of the French King: accordingly we find that his Majesty's ships of war kept an immediate look out for Dutch ships, and brought a number of them into the Downs, in the beginning of June, from off the coast and ports of France; and one into Portsmouth; some of which were laden with masts and yards, from Riga for Brest; of which the Dutch complained as a hardship: and the magistrates of Rotterdam proceeded so far as to lay a tax, equal to four guineas a week, upon every English ship that should

should take in lading at that port; and even in a manner prohibited our ships taking goods in there at all. But of this affair more hereafter, when, in the course of this work, we shall have occasion to shew the iniquitous practices of the Dutch carriers for the French, and to confute their claim of right by treaties, to such a trade and navigation, in a state of strict neutrality.

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These were measures perfectly agreeable to the inclinations of the people; yet England never wore a more melancholy aspect. The loss of Minorca raised a clamour not only against Byng, but against the ministry, in every corner of the nation; so much as to address his Majesty, from every quarter, in the strongest terms, to remove the ministers of state; and to change those measures, which had brought such a disgrace upon Great Britain, and exposed us to derision and ruin.

National
discontent.

The voice of the nation was collected, as it were, and handed up to the citizens of London; amongst whom every art was tried, to dissuade them from that part, which they had always taken, in any public calamity, or danger, to lay the national grievances before the throne, and to sue for redress. “ In the time of the most alarming “ circumstances, the whole kingdom, said the “ common voice of the people, flies to the ancient and famous city of London for safety: “ upon her it casts her eyes for deliverance: to “ her it will impute its destruction, if it should “ become (which heaven forbid!) a province to “ France.

The voice
of the na-
tion, by
way of pe-
tition to the
city of
London.

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“ France. The city of London is still able to
 “ save three kingdoms; to save millions and mil-
 “ lions from French tyranny and popish supersti-
 “ tion. O let not the Syren luxury, let not a
 “ mean selfish spirit, the bane of every virtuous
 “ action, lull you into indifference! consider po-
 “ sterity, and hand down to them that freedom
 “ and happiness, which were delivered to you,
 “ for that purpose, by your forefathers. Provi-
 “ dence often sends great evils upon nations to
 “ rouse them from a state of indifference and in-
 “ activity, and thereby to save them from utter
 “ destruction. If this has no effect, a total disso-
 “ lution and ruin must follow: this has always
 “ been the case under every government. Angels
 “ as well as men are witnesses, ye honourable ci-
 “ tizens, that ye are now publickly told this im-
 “ portant truth: angels and men will bear wit-
 “ ness against you, if you do not regard it. Long
 “ has it possessed your minds, that England has
 “ an invincible fleet, that we are entirely secure
 “ in these wooden walls; but the experience of
 “ late affairs has shewn, that without some confi-
 “ derable amendments, you trust in that, which
 “ may fail you.

“ Deceive not yourselves by thinking (though
 “ he deserves your highest resentment) that ONE
 “ man ONLY is faulty; but, remember, and let it
 “ strike deep on your minds, that a whole council
 “ of war approved of your fleets flying before the
 “ enemy, inferior in number and strength;—Think
 “ not yourselves safe, because you surpass in num-
 “ ber of ships; for if you are not equal in cou-
 “ rage,

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“rage, skill, and conduct, you will soon become
 “inferior in number, or your number will be of
 “no service. The divine Providence has, per-
 “haps, permitted the shameful disgrace, which
 “has befallen us, to awaken you from a false se-
 “curity. Hear, O citizens, the divine voice call-
 “ing to you from your fleet fleeing before the
 “enemy: a sight never beheld before! awake,
 “or you, and we all, are undone.”

“Our wars of late years having been chiefly
 “on the continent, and our fleets almost excluded
 “from any share in them; it has been a received
 “opinion, that we were possessed of an immen-
 “surable superiority over our dangerous rival
 “upon the sea, which nature has bestowed upon
 “this island for our security: a bulwark in which
 “all our safety consists. But now the time is
 “come, that our despised rival in this element,
 “defies us upon it; and strives, as much as we
 “ourselves have done, to confine the contest for
 “dominion and trade to a sea-war. Which side
 “has shewn superior conduct, skill and courage,
 “the annals of the times will tell. But this is
 “plainly evident, that unless some considerable
 “reformation; unless some new laws and regula-
 “tions are made; unless posts of command are
 “made the rewards of merit only; unless an
 “higher sense of honour, love and glory be
 “lighted up; unless an improvement in know-
 “ledge be made the study of our navy, we shall
 “in a few years become the scorn of our enemies,
 “and must live in perpetual dread of them.”

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“It

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“It is, then, your duty, O citizens! as the metropolis of the kingdom, to have your eyes open to these plain truths: to unite in one body (calling on the other chief cities, &c. in the kingdom to do the same) and address our sovereign to inquire into the causes of our miscarriages: to exert our naval and natural strength; and to displace and punish bad ministers and officers.”

Address to
the King
by the city
of London.

The city of London, accordingly, in common council assembled, presented their humble address to his Majesty, “humbly begging leave to approach his sacred person, and with hearts full of gratitude for his Majesty’s paternal care of the true interest of his people, to express their sorrow and apprehensions, from the disquietudes, which the late losses and disappointments must have created in his royal mind.” Then they signified their fears, “That the loss of the important fortresses of St. Philip, and island of Minorca, (possessions of the utmost consequence to the commerce and naval strength of Great Britain) without any attempt, by timely and effectual succours, to prevent or defeat an attack, after such early notice^d of the enemy’s intentions, and when his Majesty’s navy was so evidently superior to theirs, would be an indelible reproach on the honour of the British nation. They expressed their apprehensions for the great danger his Majesty’s possessions in America were in, by the mismanagement and delays, which had attended the defence

^c On the 20th day of August.

^d See page 235.

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of those invaluable colonies, the object of the present war, and the principal source of the wealth and strength of these kingdoms. They begged permission to lament the want of a constitutional and well-regulated militia, which they accounted to be the most natural and certain defence, under Providence, of his Majesty's sacred person and government, against all invaders whatsoever; because thereby his fleets and armies might be more securely employed abroad, to the annoyance of the enemy; assuring him, that they were ready and willing, whenever called upon by his Majesty, to shed the last drop of their blood in his service. They signified their hopes, that the authors of the late losses and disappointments would be enquired into and punished: that his Majesty's known intentions of protecting and defending his subjects in their rights and possessions, might be faithfully and vigorously carried into execution; and, that the large supplies, so necessarily called for, and so chearfully granted, might be religiously applied to the defence of these kingdoms and colonies; and to their commerce; and to the distressing of our inveterate and perfidious enemies; as the only sure means of obtaining a lasting and honourable peace: concluding with the utmost sincerity of heart, to assure his Majesty, that his loyal city of London would, at all times, readily and chearfully contribute to whatever might be necessary for the defence of his Majesty, and his illustrious family, and towards the attainment of these great and desirable ends." To which

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his Majesty answered, That his concern for the loss of Minorca was great and sincere: that he would maintain the honour of the nation and the commerce of his subjects with the utmost care and vigilance: That nothing should be wanting, on his part, towards carrying on the war with vigour, in order to a safe and honourable peace, and for recovering and securing the possessions and rights of his crown: and that he would not fail to do justice upon any persons, who might have been wanting in their duty to him and their country; to enforce obedience and discipline in his fleets and armies, and to support the authority and respect due to his government.

Instruc-
tions to the
representa-
tives of the
city of
London.

The citizens did also instruct their representatives in parliament, “ calling upon them most earnestly to exert their utmost ability towards procuring a strict and impartial parliamentary enquiry into the causes of so many late national calamities. An almost total neglect of our important fortresses in the Mediterranean, of such inestimable consequence to the trade and power of these kingdoms; and the permitted absence of their principal officers, many months after the commencement of hostilities; the actual loss of Minorca, and apparent danger of Gibraltar, are circumstances that filled them with amazement and concern. But when they reflected on the great preparations for an embarkation of troops and artillery, and the equipment of a powerful fleet publicly known to be carried on at Toulon, whose neighbourhood to Minorca was sufficiently alarming, they could not impute

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impute those fatal events to neglect alone; and therefore conjured them to enquire, why a respectable fleet was not immediately sent from hence? and why, at last, so small a squadron was ordered upon this important service, without any frigate, fire-ship, hospital-ship, transport, or troops beyond their ordinary compliment? and this at a time when the British naval force was confessedly superior to the enemy's. As the cruelties suffered and losses sustained by their fellow-subjects in North America, had long called for redress; whilst the mismanagements in the attempts for their support, and the untimely and unequal succours sent to their relief, have only served to render the British name contemptible; they therefore required them, to use their utmost endeavours for detecting all those, who by treachery or misconduct, have contributed to those great distresses. They added their pressing request, that they would use their earliest endeavours to establish a well-regulated and constitutional militia, as the most honourable defence of the crown, and the most consistent with the rights of the people: And this, they said, they were more anxious to recommend to their particular care and attention, as every apprehension of danger has furnished a reason for increasing the number of regular forces, and for the introduction of foreign mercenaries; the expence of which is insupportable: trusting that they would pursue this measure before they should consent to the grant of supplies; experience having convinced them, that their laudable endeavours afterwards might prove abortive. They hinted at some viola-

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tion of the Bill of rights, by a suspension or interruption of the ordinary form of justice in favour of the foreign troops, then in England; and desired that they would endeavour to bring to justice the advisers and instruments of such an insult offered to our laws. They intreated them, at all events, to oppose the continuance of any foreign troops within the kingdom; a circumstance, which would ever be considered as a reproach to the loyalty, courage and ability of this nation. They expressed their hopes, that they would endeavour to limit the number of placemen and pensioners, that had of late so remarkably increased; and at a proper season to restore triennial parliaments; as they conceived it to be the only means to obtain a free representative of the people. The immense sums so chearfully paid, when almost every measure reflects national disgrace, they said, called upon them strictly to enquire into their application; and they expressed their dependance upon their wisdom and integrity to prevent all unnatural connections on the continent, in order to preserve the independency of these kingdoms."

Followed
by all parts
of the na-
tion.

This example was speedily and strongly copied by the most respectable parts of the nation; all of them breathing a true patriotic and loyal spirit, and some of them so truly British, that it would be doing injustice both to those patriots and to posterity, should we pass them over in silence.

South-
wark's ad-
dress.

The borough of Southwark, after assurances of loyalty and readiness to support his Majesty, &c, begged permission "to express their deep sorrow

" and

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“ and amazement at the loss of Minorca, at a time
 “ when our naval power so eminently exceeded
 “ that of our enemies, and the destination of
 “ theirs had been so long apparent. But, they
 “ added, stedfast in our allegiance, unalterable in
 “ our loyalty, unanimous in the defence of your
 “ Majesty’s sacred person and government, and
 “ animated with a just sense of your Majesty’s
 “ martial virtues, if supported by a well-regu-
 “ lated militia, we fear not the vain threats of fo-
 “ reign invaders, and most humbly beg leave to
 “ assure your Majesty, with the greatest sincerity,
 “ that we will chearfully devote the utmost ex-
 “ ertion of our abilities to crush all impious at-
 “ tempts, either foreign or domestic, to subvert
 “ our present happy constitution; and also to
 “ support and invigorate those measures, which
 “ your Majesty’s great wisdom shall dictate, in
 “ conducting the scenes of this most necessary
 “ and important war, and for bringing to justice
 “ those, however dignified and exalted, who by
 “ their bad counsel, or misconduct, have occa-
 “ sioned this our present and ignoble distressful
 “ situation.”

The county-palatine of Chester addressed his Majesty in these terms.

“ We, your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal
 subjects, the High Sheriff, Grand Jury, Gentle-
 men and Freeholders of the county-palatine of
 Chester, most humbly beg leave, at this very
 extraordinary juncture, to address your sacred
 person

Address of
 the county
 of Chester.

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person with hearts firmly attached to the preservation of your Majesty's government, and the liberties of our country; which we apprehend to be so closely connected, that they must mutually depend on the existence of each other.

Conscious, therefore, of your Majesty's wanted justice and paternal affection for your people, we dutifully hope, that your Majesty will kindly, and duly, consider the present unhappy situation of these once flourishing kingdoms.

We are too apprehensive, from many alarming circumstances, that the supplies, so chearfully and liberally given, for the support of your Majesty's British dominions, have been fatally misapplied.

We reflect, with the utmost concern and abhorrence, that our fleets and armies have been rendered ineffectual by ignorance, cowardice, or treachery: That our American plantations, by which our trade principally flourishes, are shamefully torn from us, notwithstanding the large sums allowed for their defence: And that Minorca, once gloriously acquired, and since, no less valiantly defended; an island so essential to our commerce, and a jewel, so conspicuous in your Majesty's crown, has been unaccountably abandoned, to the perpetual disgrace of this nation and your Majesty's glory, to our perfidious enemy; an enemy we have hitherto never feared, but have often humbled.

Our concern naturally increases, when we reflect farther, that the taxes are grievous, the national debt immense; that our trade daily lessens, though they

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they multiply ; by which, we fear, we may be too soon disabled from raising the necessary supplies for the support of your Majesty's and our country's rights.

We behold also, with the deepest sorrow, foreign troops unavailingly imported, and expensively maintained within this kingdom, while your Majesty's faithful subjects are unarmed and rejected ; who, innately brave, and cordially interested, would strenuously defend your sacred Majesty, and their now endangered country.

These melancholy reflections fill us with fear and amazement ; and our allegiance to your Majesty, and love of our native country, once the arbitress of Europe, induce us to unbosom our thoughts to your royal consideration ; not doubting redress of our grievances from a King, who loves to be esteemed the father of his people.

Permit us, therefore, most humbly to represent to your Majesty the absolute necessity of having our natural guards, a well-regulated Militia, upon the footing of the English constitution : and we likewise most humbly hope, from your Majesty's known justice and goodness, that you will be pleased to direct such a speedy and strict enquiry into the conduct of all those, who, when it was in their power, did not prevent our losses ; but have conduced, or conspired, to overwhelm this nation, and your Majesty's crown, with reproach and dishonour ; that they may receive their due punishment, which they so justly deserve."

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Instruc-
tions of the
county of
York.

In the instructions from the gentry, clergy and freeholders of the county of York, are the following remarkable passages. “ We most earnestly

“ recommend to you a diligent attendance on
“ parliament, and an active scrutiny into all those
“ dire and fatal springs of our military disasters
“ and perplexed negotiations, which have brought
“ such indignity and burden upon these abused
“ realms.

“ The extremity long predicted seems now to
“ advance with much hasty strides. It is, alas!
“ a truth, which every voice authenticates; and,
“ therefore, your constituents conjure that you
“ will be the faithful and honest counsellors of
“ royalty, and be no longer amused with the
“ futile projects and venal speeches of self-design-
“ ing men, who, in proportion as they promise
“ and dispense, only attempt to enslave, and be-
“ come the prodigal spendthrifts of our patrimo-
“ nies and acquirements.

“ That the welfare of this country may not be
“ totally unhinged, either through our crimes, or
“ the abuse of secondary means, we hope, that
“ you will not only endeavour to introduce a
“ change of men, but of morals and measures;
“ that the rank enormities, which deluge this land,
“ may not be laid to the charge and example of
“ its magistrates and senators: That venality and
“ gaming, the bane of business and the ruin of
“ integrity, may, in particular, no longer make
“ their proselytes to servile dependence, or press
“ into

“ into their service advocates for foreign and pernicious systems.

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“ We farther lament, for the sake of ourselves, and the illustrious family on the throne, that when, through the fate of human nature, his most gracious Majesty shall be demanded to other glory, that the heir apparent must succeed to so disadvantageous a prospect: We mean, to so immense a debt, as makes each proprietor tremble and each neuter sad.

“ Let it then be your constant endeavours, by all equitable means, to make this burden light, and the yoke easy: And, if a continent must be supplied, if our spoils must be shared, let America partake, rather than ungrateful Germany, the sepulchre of British interest.

“ It is with no little concern we find those to be the open tenets now, which formerly were, with some modesty and address, concealed. But we apprehend, and it is hoped you will also conceive it, that where the interest of two estates, centering in the same person, interfere, that the lesser should give way, and be subservient to the greater. This is the manifest rule of right, the most usual and natural expectation.

“ This loyal and martial county, the leader in a late season of danger, the first in rank for opulence, extent, and natural advantages, presumes farther to advise, that you will oppose (unless exigencies change,) all future schemes of receiving foreign mercenaries into this land; and

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“ and that a constitutional militia, with our own
“ troops, may supply the occasions, for which
“ aliens were imported; and that we may have
“ no further cause to fear and say, with Matta-
“ thias, *God forbid that we should forsake the law*
“ *and the ordinances.*”

Of Somers-
setshire.

The constituents of the Knights of the shire of the county of Somerset applied to their representatives with the like zeal, and amongst other particulars referred them to the perfidy of France, and the misconduct of the British ministry, ever since the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle: “ How unhappy,
“ say they, must it make every honest and gene-
“ rous Briton, to find, that notwithstanding the
“ treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, our trade, rights,
“ and our most invaluable privileges are not ef-
“ fectually secured to us? for no sooner were we
“ pleasing ourselves with the thoughts of peace
“ and tranquillity, but we were alarmed with the
“ augmentation of the naval force of our ene-
“ mies, and our colonies in America were claimed,
“ encroached upon, and hostilely invaded; and
“ all this permitted without the least inquiry made,
“ or resentment shewn, by those who had the
“ conduct of our public affairs.—*A supineness*
“ *unaccountable and unparalleled!*”

Of the city
of Bristol.

In the instructions from Bristol, the gentlemen, clergy, merchants, and other principal inhabitants observe, that “ there is nothing so reason-
“ able or so just, as the desire, universally expressed
“ by the nation, that a clear and full account
“ may be obtained, of the immense supplies
“ given

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“ given by their representatives in, and raised
“ upon the people, since the last sessions of par-
“ liament. The motives on which, and the ends
“ for which, those vast sums, in our present cir-
“ cumstances especially, were so readily voted,
“ and so chearfully paid, were sufficiently divulged,
“ and therefore the manner in which they have
“ been applied, ought to be no secret. The *Ar-*
“ *cana Imperii* are well suited to despotic go-
“ vernments, but are inconsistent with, and dan-
“ gerous to, the liberties of a free people. Be-
“ sides, it is no way reconcileable to the nature of
“ our constitution, which is founded on reason
“ and equity, the liberty of the subjects persons,
“ and the security of their properties.

“ We find some additional reasons to strengthen
“ the people's claim, which we could wish, tho'
“ warm friends to it, that they had rather wanted.
“ These additional reasons consist in disappoint-
“ ments and losses. In reference to the former,
“ we had felt something of them before, and
“ experienced them abundantly in the last war;
“ witness our attack on Carthagena, our invasion
“ of Cuba, our descent upon Bretagne, and many
“ others. However, we must allow our present
“ disappointment to be of quite a new species,
“ and yet much more galling and provoking than
“ all the rest put together.—For, notwithstanding
“ all our liberal grants, and the sanguine known
“ expectations of those who gave, at least of those
“ who paid them,—we have attempted nothing.

“ Our losses are to the full as wonderful, and
“ rather

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“ rather more affecting. In the West Indies our
 “ enemy has a confessed superiority, which has
 “ been augmented by the capture of almost the
 “ single ship of force we had then cruizing in
 “ those seas. In North America our colonies
 “ have been ransacked for many months, by the
 “ most barbarous nations, almost without de-
 “ fence. We have been deprived of Minorca in
 “ a manner, which does as little honour to the
 “ French as to us. Our navy has been disgraced
 “ in the Mediterranean. If this, instead of a
 “ public, were a private case, on such suggestions
 “ as these, a court of equity would, beyond a
 “ question, decree an account.”

Of the
county of
Essex.

The county of Essex, in their representa-
 tion of the grievances on this occasion, observe,
 That “ standing armies and foreign troops
 “ have not heretofore been thought the proper
 “ means to repel an invasion : They are grievously
 “ burdensome to the subject, always dangerous to
 “ the constitution, and in every respect disagree-
 “ able to the nation, as well as every way inade-
 “ quate to the real service against our enemies,
 “ without the assistance of a greater part of our
 “ fleet, than ought to be confined for that pur-
 “ pose. Therefore, when a truly loyal, brave,
 “ and generous people, from every quarter, ar-
 “ dently desire that arms may be put into their
 “ hands for the defence of themselves, their fa-
 “ milies, their King and their country, against
 “ the encroachments and attacks of a perfidious
 “ and dangerous enemy, it was hoped, that they
 “ would

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" would do all in their power to prevent the denial
" of so natural a right to a free people.

" They the more earnestly requested their assiduity
" in promoting a constitutional militia for these
" good purposes, from a thorough conviction
" that it would have as certain a tendency to-
" wards the securing the crown to his Majesty and
" his heirs, as the preserving the liberties and
" properties of the subjects."

In these acts of the people, it is clear that they were ready to support his Majesty in the just and necessary war he had been forced into by the obstinacy, perfidy and hostilities of France, after very long and fruitless negotiations and forbearance: even almost to the irreparable injury of our national interest: But that they were discontented with, and diffident of the ministry, and unwilling to trust the national money, or that the conduct of the war should be committed to them, who had given such umbrage for suspicion of their abilities and neglect in the service of their country: who, they prayed, might be removed out of the administration: whose measures they requested might be scrutinized: and that the foreign forces should be sent home; a national militia established, and the authors of our late miscarriages might be brought to condign punishment.

Remarks
on these ad-
dresses, &c.

His Majesty, ever attentive to his faithful subjects, had already pledged his royal word for a strict application of the supplies, granted in the last session of parliament; and now, he not only promised to redress their grievances and com-
plaints,

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plaints, but commanded an immediate examination into the causes of the loss of Minorca: and, as we shall find, proceeded to satisfy them in every other part of their petitions.

Admiral
Byng ar-
rested.

Admiral Byng and the other state prisoners arrived on the third of July, at Portsmouth. Where the said Admiral was immediately put under arrest, and escorted some time after from thence to an apartment in Greenwich-Hospital, there to be kept close prisoner to prepare for his trial: which was delayed by the absence of many evidences, in the Mediterranean, required both in his favour and against him.

Admiral
West, &c.
go to Lon-
don.

Lieut. Gen.
Fowke to
be tried.

Admiral West and Lieutenant-General Fowke were ordered up to London. Where the Admiral was graciously received by his Majesty; but Lieutenant-General Fowke was ordered to take his trial, for disobeying his Majesty's orders transmitted to him from the secretary of war, relating to the embarkation of a battalion of troops to be sent by Mr. Byng to reinforce Fort St. Philip.

His court-
martial.

The court-martial commissioned to try Lieutenant-General Fowke, consisted of two Generals, eleven Lieutenant-Generals, and three Major-Generals. The Judge-Advocate read the letters,

• Gen. Sir Robert Rich, president—Gen. Sir J. Ligonier—Lieut. Gen. Hawley—Lieut. Gen. Lord Cadogan—Lieut. Gen. Guise—Lieut. Gen. Onslow—Lieut. Gen. Pulteney—Lieut. Gen. Huske—Lieut. Gen. Campbell—Lieut. Gen. Lord de la War—Lieut. Gen. Charles Duke of Marlborough—Lieut. Gen. Wolfe—Lieut. Gen. Cholmondeley—Major Gen. Lascelles—Major Gen. Bocland—Major Gen. Lord George Beauclerk.

which

which you have at the bottom of the page^t, and were said to contain the instructions broken, or

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^t To Lieutenant General Fowke, or, in his absence, to the Commander in Chief in his Majesty's garrison of Gibraltar.

S I R,

War-Office, March 21, 1756.

I am commanded to acquaint you that it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you receive into your garrison Lord Robert Bertie's regiment; to do duty there; and in case you shall apprehend, that the French threaten to make any attempt upon his Majesty's island of Minorca, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you make a detachment out of the troops in your garrison, equal to a battalion, to be commanded by a lieutenant and major, such lieutenant and major to be the eldest in your garrison, to be put on board the fleet for the relief of Minorca, at the disposition of the admiral,

I am, Sir, your humble Servant,

BARRINGTON.

To Lieutenant General Fowke, or, in his absence, to the Commander in Chief at Gibraltar.

S I R,

War-Office, March 28, 1756.

I am commanded to acquaint you, that it is his Majesty's pleasure, in case you shall apprehend, that the French threaten an attempt upon Minorca, that you make a detachment from the troops in your garrison equal to a battalion, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel and major, for the relief of that place, to be put on board the fleet at the disposition of the admiral; such lieutenant-colonel and major to be the eldest in your garrison.

BARRINGTON.

To Lieutenant General Fowke, or, in his absence, to the Commander in Chief in his Majesty's garrison in Gibraltar.

S I R,

War-Office, April 1, 1756.

It is his Majesty's pleasure, that you receive into your garrison the women and children belonging to Lord Robert Bertie's regiment.

BARRINGTON.

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not

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not fulfilled by Lieutenant-General Fowke, as Governor of Gibraltar. To this accusation the prisoner delivered a written answer by way of defence; and he desired that the Judge-Advocate might read it, and that he might be allowed to ask such questions, as should necessarily arise from the nature of the case.

The defence set forth, "that he had received those three letters together, by the same hand; and must therefore take them together:" that his orders were *confused* at least, if not *contradictory*: "that if they were confused, then he could not know when he had executed them; and if they were contradictory, they could not be executed at all."

Here the Secretary of War being asked several questions by the prisoner, he candidly acknowledged, that he apprehended the second letter superseded the first; that he ought to have said in his second letter, *notwithstanding my former orders*: and that the reason for his incorrectness was his little experience, having been only about four months in that office.

Then the judge proceeded with the written defence, in which the defendant said, "My orders being confused and contradictory, I called a council of war, not to deliberate whether I should obey my orders, or not, but only to take their sense, what was the meaning of them."

Mr. Fowke here, and frequently, urged, that his orders were not absolute, but discretionary; and that the execution of them was left to his

and

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and Mr. Byng's discretion and judgment; for which he particularly referred to a letter from the Secretary of War to the Commander in Chief at Gibraltar, which throughout supposes a discretionary power in the execution of former orders ⁵.

He proceed to defended the measure itself, even if the orders had not been inconsistent and contradictory. "The whole number, said he, which I had then in garrison was but 2,700 men. I had spared to Mr. Edgcumbe's ships 230, which with 40 of my men, left by him in St. Philip's, made 270: the ordinary duty of the garrison required, in workmen and guards, eight hundred men, so that I had then only 130 men more than three reliefs. If I had made the detachment of a battalion, and put it on board the fleet, I should not then have had much more than two reliefs, and this at a time, when I believed the place was in danger of being attacked, for good reasons, which I don't think myself at liberty to mention."

The Lieutenant-General having explained himself in this particular, returned to exculpate him-

⁵ For in the Secretary's letter it was said, "if that order has not been complied with, then you are now to make a detachment of 700 men out of your own regiment and Guise's, and also another detachment out of Poultney's and Panmure's regiments, and send them on board the fleet for the relief of Mahon. But if that order has been complied with, then you are to make only one more detachment of 700 men, to be commanded by another lieutenant colonel and major, and to send it to Mahon."

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self upon the doubtfulness of his orders: and adding, that he knew very well that his duty did not allow him to hold a council of war, to deliberate upon the obeying of the orders; and that he had summoned that council only to assist him in the understanding of them, the Judge-Advocate rested the whole proof upon this concession, and observing that his own letter, and the minutes of the said council plainly implied, that they had no doubt at all about their meaning, the court found him guilty of the charge, and adjudged that he should be suspended for the space of one year^a. His Majesty did not only confirm this sentence, but dismissed him from his service. To which he was never restored; but was, not long after, favoured, as we are informed, with a handsome pension.

Arts made
use of to
injure Ad-
miral
Byng.

In the mean time every thing seemed to inflame the public against Mr. Byng. His character was artfully delivered over to the populace, to gratify upon it the worst passions, that the worst artifices and instruments could raise. There was not a species of libelling in prints, in verse, or in prose, that was not exhausted to render him odious: the very ghost of his honourable father was raised, advising him to lay violent hands on himself—Last-dying speeches and confessions were prepared in his name—Mock executions were spirited up,

^a When the question was put, to quit or suspend for a year, the voices were equal: but the president being, in such cases, vested with the casting vote, he gave it against the prisoner.

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to make the way easy for a real one—These sanguinary discourses and practices pointed out the prisoner to be the stricken-deer, which all the dependents and followers of his prosecutors were to unite in goring out of the herd, and to represent him to be the *sole* cause of the disgrace and loss sustained by this nation in the Mediterranean.

A letter was published, and said to be dated at Gibraltar 24th of June, in which it was affirmed, Letters to his prejudice. Mr. Byng might have several times sent letters, and whatever he pleased into Minorca, but that he had never attempted it: that private signals had been appointed, by which the fleet and garrison might have understood each other; but that the Admiral, when in sight, did not return one signal. That he shewed no inclination, in any one instance, of coming near the object he had to relieve: that every thing shewed, the enemy knew their man; and the plan of his operations: that he had formed his own division with the strongest ships in the fleet, but would not suffer one of them to assist the wing that was engaged: that he fired six barrels of powder, but a great deal of it was in signals to hinder others from doing their duty: and he kept at so great distance from the enemy, that the balls directed against the French fell short of their ships 500 yards at least.

Another was dated from the same port on the 4th of July, under the description of a sailor, who delivered himself thus: “on the 20th of May, “it was in our power to finish the war, and make “ourselves gentlemen: but the Lord knows if

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“ we ever shall have the chance again. We engaged and disabled the French Admiral, a brave 80 gun ship; which fell to our lot in the line; and we should certainly have made her our prize, if we had been permitted so to do. We broke our line to run through the French and pick her up, but were immediately ordered to keep our station. We set her on fire twice on the quarter; likewise drove two ports abaft into one; besides carrying away her maintop-sail yard, and her top-sail sheets fore and aft, and her sails also; so that she could not escape at any rate, if we only had the liberty to have gone after her. And if she had struck, being the chief, no doubt but the rest would have followed her example; for if seven sail beat off twelve, what must our thirteen have done, if they had all played their part.”

Hanged
and burnt
in effigy,

There was scarce a village in the nation, but dressed up a man of straw, and committed him to the gallows and to the flames, under the execrated name of one, that had betrayed his country. London and its environs exhibited many of these scenes. The populace at Greenwich were permitted to insult the prisoner in the most outrageous manner, by executing him in effigy even before the windows of the quarter, in which he was confined. And, what is most unaccountable, a Byng, as the children were taught to call it, with indignation, was, at an extraordinary expence, brought by day-light upon Tower-hill, dressed in the regimentals of an Admiral escorted

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escorted by a file of mercenary wretches hired for that purpose, with muskets on their shoulders; and, after parading several times round that area, with drums beating, under the walls of the Tower of London, he was hanged upon a gallows, there erected, twenty foot high; cut down and burnt in the sight of 10,000 people, with strong imprecations, to the prejudice of his future defence.

It is not collected only from the principal actors at the popular bonfires and incendiary executions, how to form an idea of the secret springs of such actions, promoted and conducted chiefly by the understrappers of great men, and inferior officers under the crown: but from the correspondence between Admiral Byng and the Admiralty, in which, during his confinement, he could not forbear complaining of being put under an arrest, after an unprecedented manner, without any reason assigned, which every criminal has a right to be acquainted withⁱ: of being treated with greater severity and stricter confinement, than other officers; who, when their conduct was doubted of, were ordered to prepare for their trials, and were indulged with leave to regulate their affairs on shore, at large^k: that his conduct had been placed in England, before his arrival, in an odious light by the industry of some, as yet invisible persons, who were indefatigable in pro-

To whom
to be as-
cribed.

His com-
plaints.

ⁱ See Byng's letter, dated Antelope, Spithead, July 27, 1756.

^k See ditto, 30th of July 1756.

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pagating falsehoods to his dishonour. Being told of the tenderness and indulgence shewn to him by the Lords of the Admiralty, this unhappy prisoner could not contain himself. "What, says he, with astonishment, can being kept moving backward and forward, from one place of confinement to another, for near three weeks after my arrival in England, so as to make it impossible for me to prepare any thing relating to my defence, be called by either of these names? or, can my close confinement at Greenwich, without suffering even my menial servants to remain in the house after dark, be called so? And I think I have a right to complain of that cruel countenance and belief, which seems to be given to a groundless report of my having attempted to make my escape, and the rigid

¹ See Byng's letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated Greenwich, September 6, 1756.

^m This was the shameless forgery of his attempting to make his escape in his sister's cloaths, an invention calculated by somebody to countenance more appearance of guilt, and authenticated to the public by an order for additional bolts and bars, additional guards of soldiers; and, as if all were not sufficient, a boatswain and twelve men of the hospital, by way of suppliment, were appointed to watch in the court below. Then an alarm was given, that four men were seen at his window, in the upper story, and in the middle of the night; but they could not be found, though strict search was made by the officer on duty; nor could they find any trace of such an attempt, yet this fiction was propagated for an infallible truth, by an addition of a number of smiths and bricklayers to wall up the doors (except one) to bar up all the windows, and the very chimnies.

orders

“orders given in consequence of it, *as if intended*
 “to confirm it; a report so injurious to me, and
 “so absolutely without foundation.—And I can-
 “not here avoid observing, that all charge of
 “keeping me in custody seems to be taken from
 “the marshal, and committed to the governor of
 “the hospital, who seems diligent in distinguish-
 “ing himself in the service of his country, by
 “imposing upon me all the indignities and incon-
 “veniences, that power can enable him to do;
 “being—restrained and distressed by all the
 “methods power can impose, and personally dis-
 “turbed day and night, with unparalleled treat-
 “ment and unprecedented hardships and incon-
 “veniences.” And being denied the right of
 sending for an additional number of witnesses, he
 writes, “My case is very sufficiently hard, if in-
 “dulged with every legal advantage: for I have
 “too much reason to believe, that my prosecution
 “is carried on by persons too powerful for me to
 “contend against, whose influence must add great
 “weight to their accusations against me.”

After the whole art of political necromancy had
 been exhausted, in conjuring up alarming spectres

* See Byng's letter to the secretary of the admiralty, dated
 September the 14th 1756.

° D^o. October the 17th 1756. *N. B.* When he was brought
 to Greenwich hospital; though he was an admiral, the son
 of a peer, and a member of parliament, he was hoisted up to
 the top of the hospital, into an apartment, where people were
 in bed, after midnight, and was obliged to lay himself down
 on the floor, with his portmanteau for a pillow, for refresh-
 ment, the remainder of the night.

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of

A. D. 1756. of cowardice, treachery and treason, and the witnesses were arrived from the Streights, the admiral was ordered to prepare for his trial; in which his fate seems at last, to be determined upon a disputable point of discipline only, or by a law quibble, upon the words of the 12th article of the statute 22 Geo. II. But this will best appear from the proceedings of the court martial.

Ordered
for trial.

Where and by whom. The place appointed for this trial was on board his Majesty's ship the St. George, in Portsmouth harbour, and the court was composed of four admirals and nine captains^p. They sat one and thirty days, Sundays excepted^q, examining witnesses, and hearing the prisoner's defence; which he made in the following words, or to that effect:

GENTLEMEN,

Admiral
Byng's de-
fence.

“THE articles of the charge exhibited against me, are of such a nature, that every thing which can be supposed interesting to a man, is concerned in the event of this cause. My character, my property, and even my life are at stake; and I should indeed have great reason

^p Thomas Smith, Esq; Vice Admiral of the Red, President—Francis Holburne, Esq; Rear Admiral of the Red—Harry Norris, Esq; Rear Admiral of the White—Thomas Brodrick, Esq; Rear Admiral of the Blue—Captain Charles Holmes—Captain William Boys—Captain John Simcoe—Captain John Bentley—Captain Peter Dennis—Captain Francis Geary—Captain John Moore—Captain James Douglass—The Honourable Captain Augustus Keppel.

^q From the 28th of December 1756, to the 27th of January 1757.

“ to



A. Walker sculp.

The Hon.^{ble} JOHN BYNG Esq^r

Admiral of the Blue .



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“ to be alarmed, were not I conscious of any in-
“ nocence, and fully persuaded of the justice and
“ equity of the court.

“ It is no new thing, gentlemen, to be ac-
“ cused : court martials have of late, been very
“ frequent. I have been a long time under the
“ disagreeable situation of a confined prisoner, of
“ a man accused, and consequently condemned
“ by many. *No means, no artifice has been omitted*
“ *by my enemies, to injure my reputation.* However,
“ I will not take up your time with a detail of
“ these matters, but beg leave to observe, that
“ the nature of a sea service is complicated, de-
“ pending on so many circumstances, and subject
“ to such variety of accidents, that for a com-
“ mander even of the greatest capacity, to pro-
“ vide against all contingencies, is impossible.
“ But to set upon a soft chair and censure, and,
“ after the event of an action, to point out how,
“ and by what means it might have succeeded bet-
“ ter, is extremely easy. This sort of science re-
“ quires no other abilities, than a great deal of
“ ill-nature and little wit. Even those actions,
“ which have been attended with the greatest suc-
“ cess, and reflected the greatest glory on this na-
“ tion, have not escaped the venom of these ma-
“ licious critics ; and, perhaps, there never was
“ an action so complete, but it might have been
“ better conducted, were it possible to have fore-
“ seen all circumstances attending it. But I con-
“ fide in the candour and the equity of this court,
“ that my enemies will be disappointed.

“ As

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“ As to the article exhibited against me, relating to my making any unnecessary delay in failing of the fleet from St. Helen’s to Gibraltar, and from thence to Mahon, the testimonies of the evidence have, doubtless, sufficiently proved the contrary; I shall therefore trouble the court with nothing further on that head.

“ As to the other articles exhibited against me, I hope to make my innocence appear, by a concise relation of the whole of my conduct.” Which he began with the account, as related above, on page 276 to 283, and then, added:

“ This behaviour will, I hope, appear to the court to be suggested by prudence, all that could have been attempted in the space of an hour, and the most advantageous step, which could have been taken on that occasion. It proves that I did not depend on the hear-say evidence which I had received even from the best authorities at Gibraltar, nor on the united opinion of every officer at that place; but that I was determined to be certified of the true state of the harbour and citadel from General Blakeney himself, as I expected that Captain Scroop, who, together with all the soldiers and marines of Mr. Edgcumbe’s ships, and 100 seamen, had been left to reinforce the garrison, would come off in his barge, and bring me a just relation of every circumstance necessary to be known; and though I mentioned in my letter of the 25th of May, ‘ That it was the opinion of all the sea and land officers, that they could
“ render

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“ render no service to the garrison, as no place was
 “ covered for the landing of any men, *could they*
 “ *have spared any;*’ in this I only gave my opinion
 “ agreeable to that of all the other officers. Their
 “ opinion had no influence on my conduct, and
 “ was only meant to signify what might have
 “ been the event supposing the French fleet had
 “ not appeared at that time.

“ So far then I hope it will appear to the court,
 “ that neither knowledge in my profession, pru-
 “ dence in conducting the expedition, or duty to
 “ my King and country, appear to be deficient
 “ in me.

“ My letter to General Blakeney, sent by Mr.
 “ Harvey, though never delivered, for reasons
 “ immediately to follow, will, I think, evince this
 “ truth.

“ My first care, after coming in sight of the
 “ port, was to know the true state of the harbour
 “ and garrison, to encourage the General and sol-
 “ diers, by acquainting him that I was arrived to
 “ his succour, and desiring to know how it might
 “ most effectually be put in execution.

“ Thus then I hope all things will appear to
 “ the court, to be well conducted to the time of
 “ the French fleet’s appearing in view; when, on
 “ seeing the enemy, considerations of another na-
 “ ture took place, and it became necessary to defer
 “ the execution of all resolutions, which I had
 “ taken since I saw Mahon, and to recall the men
 “ of war which I had dispatched to reconnoitre
 “ the harbour, and procure intelligence from
 General

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General Blakeney. It was now to no purpose
to know the state of the citadel and harbour,
before I had engaged the French fleet; I had
no soldiers to land, but what made part of the
complement of my ships, and served as marines;
and if I had been provided with them, it would
have been absolutely imprudent to have landed
them before the engagement with the enemy,
and thereby render that force less, which was
already too little, for the intent it ought to
have been sent upon. Landing the troops would
have rendered the fleet unfit for action, and ob-
liged it to flee before the enemy. Had I be-
haved in that manner, such a preposterous act
could not have failed rendering me justly delin-
quent, and unequal to the command I presided
in.

I was very sensible that if success was the con-
sequence of engaging the French, that I should
have it more in my power to relieve the citadel,
as far as landing the troops, which served as
marines, could effect it. But I suspected also,
and with reason, that I might probably be ren-
dered unable to keep the seas, though I obtain-
ed the victory, and therefore prevented from
effectually succouring the citadel.

So far all, I hope, will appear to the court
to have been conducted with knowledge and
prudence.

Am I deserving of blame for not seeking the
enemy in the disabled condition I was in after
the engagement?

To

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1756.

“ To what purpose would this second engage-
 “ ment have been attempted with a fleet originally
 “ so greatly inferior to the French, and now ren-
 “ dered much more so by the damages received in
 “ the late battle? A total defeat, in all probabi-
 “ lity, is the answer of reason; and if Mons. la
 “ Galiffionere had fought it, which providentially
 “ he did not, it is a reasonable presumption that
 “ the whole English squadron would have perish-
 “ ed, or fallen a prey to the French, since there
 “ was no port to shelter them. Whereas, had I
 “ been in the Mediterranean before the arrival of
 “ the French at Minorca, a defeat on my side
 “ even might have saved the island: I could have
 “ then saved my shattered remains in Mahon, and
 “ though conquered at sea, by means of the sailors
 “ and soldiers, have preserved St. Philip’s, and
 “ probably the island. Thus a defeat of our fleet,
 “ had it been timely set out, would have done more
 “ service than a victory, after St. Philip’s was in-
 “ vested.

“ It has been the settled rule of all generals,
 “ that no commander should ever risque an en-
 “ gagement, but when there is greater expecta-
 “ tion to gain by a victory, than to lose by a de-
 “ feat.

“ When then, from the inferiority of the English,
 “ nothing could be reasonably expected but mis-
 “ fortune and disgrace; or if, by the greatest
 “ efforts of good fortune, victory should declare
 “ for our fleet, that no advantage could be drawn
 “ from it; when the risque of losing the whole
 “ fleet

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“ fleet was the result of an unanimous council of
 “ war; and the nation, considering the real state
 “ of the English and French navies, so little able
 “ to sustain a loss of that kind; when Gibraltar
 “ would have been left defenceless, and fallen of
 “ course to the enemy; could the seeking the
 “ French admiral, by a commander who foresaw
 “ these probable consequences, with not only an
 “ inferior, but a shattered fleet, and no other
 “ ships in the Mediterranean to reinforce him,
 “ have been justified in the judgment of men,
 “ who have studied the nature of military at-
 “ chievements, or according to the rules and ob-
 “ servations of ancient and modern writers on this
 “ head?

“ The utmost advantage could have been but
 “ a prolongation of the siege, without the least
 “ probability of raising it; because the fleet, un-
 “ able to keep the sea, must have retreated to Gi-
 “ braltar, the port of Mahon being still command-
 “ ed by the enemies batteries.

“ Are commanders then at all events to show
 “ no other token of generalship, but what is to be
 “ learned from brutes? an excess of courage
 “ only? and are all who use the superior attributes
 “ of the human understanding, to be considered
 “ as delinquents in their duty to their King and
 “ country? What commander of common sense
 “ will serve his country under such discouraging
 “ conditions, where, unless he fights against all
 “ kinds of disadvantage, he is to be stigmatised
 “ with the eternal infamy of *cowardice*; and if he
 “ does

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“ does engage his enemy, and does not succeed
 “ against this great superiority of force, he is to
 “ be deemed a *coward* also, and be given up to the
 “ rage of the multitude? It appeared impractica-
 “ ble to relieve Mahon, and probable, that Gi-
 “ braltar would be attacked, and therefore the de-
 “ termination of proceeding thither, was become
 “ the most prudent decision, which could have
 “ been made; the most likely to conduce to the
 “ nation’s service, and a just resolution of the
 “ council of war.

“ It is a matter of consequence to consider, that
 “ though two fleets may be of equal number,
 “ they may yet be of unequal force, as it has hap-
 “ pened in this instance: and a sickly squadron,
 “ without means of providing for the diseased and
 “ wounded, or recruiting their seamen and soldiers,
 “ of which, more than a thousand sick, which at
 “ their return to Gibraltar, were sent to the hospi-
 “ tal, was a consideration that ought greatly to
 “ influence at that moment; especially when it
 “ was evident, beyond all contradiction, that
 “ the enemy possessed every advantage, which I
 “ was in want of, having a power of procuring
 “ recruits of seamen from the 200 transports, and
 “ soldiers from the camp of the besiegers.”

But Admiral West having deposed, That there
 appeared to him no impediment, why Admiral
 Byng and his division could have got up to the
 enemy, and engage them as close as the van

Evidences
 against
 him.
 Of Admi-
 ral West.

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G g

did;

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General
Blakeney.

Mr. Boyd.

Captain
Philips.

Captain
Bailie.

Captain
Ourry.

Captain
Young.

did^r; and that the signal for chasing was never made: Lieut. General Blakeney having deposed, That boats might have passed with great security on the 20th of May, between the garrison and the fleet; and that if the detachment ordered from Gibraltar had been landed, he could have held out till Sir Edward Hawke came with more effectual relief: Mr. Boyd having deposed, That the succours were wanted, and might have been certainly thrown in: Captain John Philips having deposed, That there was not sail enough made at the first; and that he never saw nor heard of any signal made by the Admiral for more sail: Capt. Thomas Bailie having deposed, That the admiral's division was never within a proper distance to engage: Captain Ourry having deposed, That there was wind sufficient to have carried the Admiral down close to the enemy, during the time of engagement: Captain Young^s having deposed, That he did not perceive the loss of his fore-top-mast occasioned any impediment to the rear division from going down and engaging; nor that it endangered any ship being on board him; that if the rear division had bore down as the van did, they might have come up as near the enemy, as if they had bore in a line of battle abreast; there would have been no danger of their being on

^r Confirmed by the evidence of Captain Everit, Lieutenant Bover, Lieutenant Higgs, Lieutenant Wood and Lieutenant Man, all of the Buckingham, Captain Gilchrist and the Hon. Captain Harvey.

^s Of the Intrepid.

board

board each other, as every ship appeared to him to have room to wear; that there was no possibility of bringing on a general engagement, without the admiral and the rear division going down right before the wind upon the enemy; that the spoiling of his ground-tier of powder, and his defect in men were no detriment to him in his engagement: and Captain Gardiner, of the Ramillies, having deposed, That he had advised the admiral to bear down, without being able to prevail with him so to do; that the admiral, on the 20th, took the whole command of the ship from him, and that nothing was done, that day, but what he ordered: the court, upon summing up the evidence, were of opinion^t. "That Admiral Byng did not do his utmost to relieve St. Philip's castle, in the island of Minorca; then besieged by the forces of the French King: That during the engagement between his Majesty's fleet, under his command, and the fleet of the French King, on the 20th of May last, he did not do his utmost to take, seize and destroy the ships of the French King, and to assist such of his Majesty's ships as were engaged in fight with the French ships: That the admiral^u, notwithstanding he did see the enemy's fleet approaching, ought to have left the frigate to endeavour to land the military officers: That when the British fleet, on the starboard tack, were stretched abreast, or about the beam of the enemy's line, the admiral should have tacked the fleet al-

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Captain
Gardiner.

Opinion of
the court.

^t Art. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37.

^u Art. 7 and 11.

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together, and immediately have conducted it on a direct course for the enemy; the van steering for the enemy's van, the rear for their rear, each ship for her opposite ship in the enemy's line, and under such a sail as might have enabled the worst sailing ship, under all her plain sail, to preserve her station: That the admiral, after the signal^w was made for battle, separated the rear from the van division, and retarded the rear division of the British fleet from closing with and engaging the enemy, by his shortning sail, by haling up his fore-sail, backing his mizen top-sail, and backing, or attempting to back his main top-sail, in order that the Trident and Princess Louisa might get a-head again of the Ramillies: That instead of shortning sail, the admiral ought to have made the Trident and Princess Louisa's signals to make more sail; and that he ought also to have set so much sail himself, as would have enabled the Culloden (the worst sailing ship in his division) to have kept her station with all her plain sail set, in order to have got down, with as much expedition as possible, to the enemy, and thereby have properly supported the van division: That^x after the ships, which had received damage in the action, were as much refitted, as circumstances would permit, the admiral ought to have returned with the squadron off St. Philip's, and have endeavoured to open a communication with that castle; and to have used every means in his power for its relief,

^w Art. 19, 20.^x Art. 32.

before

before he returned to Gibraltar." They then came to the following RESOLUTIONS^y, That the admiral appears to fall under the following part of the twelfth article of the articles of war: to wit, "Or
 "shall not do his utmost to take or destroy, every
 "ship which it shall be his duty to engage; and
 "to assist and relieve all and every of his Majesty's
 "ships, which it shall be his duty to assist and re-
 "lieve." And as that article positively prescribes death, without any alternative left to the discretion of the court, under any variation of circumstances, they adjudged him to be shot to death.—
 But as it had appeared by the evidence of Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Captain Gardiner and other officers of the ship, who were near the person of the admiral, "That they did not perceive any backwardness in him, during the action, or any marks of fear, or confusion, either from his countenance or behaviour; but that he seemed to give his orders coolly and distinctly, and did not seem wanting in personal courage; and from other circumstances, the court did not believe that his misconduct arose either from *cowardice* or *disaffection*; and did therefore unanimously think it their duty, most earnestly to recommend him as a proper object of mercy." So that when they made a report of this sentence of death, of which they found him guilty, these same members of the court martial, added the following remon-

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Resolutions of the court.

Sentence him to be shot.

Acquitted of cowardice and disaffection.

Recommend him to the admiralty for mercy.

^y Art. 36 and 37. See also the report made by the said court martial of their sentence.

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france, to the lords of the admiralty, in favour of the criminal.

“We the underwritten, the president and members
“ of the court martial, assembled for the trial of
“ Admiral Byng, believe it unnecessary to inform
“ your lordships, that in the whole course of this
“ long trial, we have done our utmost endeavours
“ to come at truths, and to do the strictest justice
“ to our country and the prisoner; but we cannot
“ help laying the distresses of our minds before
“ your lordships, on this occasion, in finding our-
“ selves under the necessity of condemning a man
“ to death, from the great severity of the twelfth
“ article of war^z, part of which he falls under,
“ and which admits of no mitigation, even if the
“ crime should be committed by an error in judg-
“ ment only; and therefore for our own consci-
“ ences sakes, as well as in justice to the prisoner,
“ we pray your lordships in the most earnest man-
“ ner, to recommend him to his Majesty’s cle-
“ mency.”

Lords of
the admi-
rality apply

The lords of the admiralty, in pursuance of this recommendation from the court martial, presented

^z *Twelfth article of war, 22 of Geo. II.*

“ Every person in the fleet, who through cowardice, *neg-*
“ *ligence*, or disaffection, shall in time of action, withdraw
“ or keep back, or not come into the fight or engagement, or
“ shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it
“ shall be his duty to engage, and to assist and relieve all and
“ every of his Majesty’s ships, or those of his allies, which
“ it shall be his duty to assist and relieve, every such person so
“ offending, and being convicted thereof by the sentence of
“ a court martial, shall suffer DEATH.”

a memo-

a memorial to his Majesty, in which after setting forth the proceedings and sentence of the said court upon Admiral Byng, and the representation of the said court, and the petitions of George, Viscount Torrington, Nephew to the unhappy Admiral, for his Majesty's mercy, say, That after their most serious and deliberate consideration of the proceedings of the court-martial, doubts had arisen with regard to the legality of the sentence, particularly whether the crime of *negligence*, which is not expressed in any part of their proceedings, can, in this case, be supplied by implication; and that they found themselves obliged to beseech his Majesty that the opinion of the twelve judges might be taken, whether the said sentence was legal.

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to his Majesty for
the opinion
of the 12
judges.

His Majesty not only referred the sentence to the twelve judges, to consider thereof, as requested; which was pronounced by them to be a legal sentence: but after a warrant had been signed by the Lords of the Admiralty, for carrying the sentence passed upon Admiral Byng into execution, certain members of the court-martial having expressed their scruples, alledging that they had something to disclose relative to the said sentence, which greatly affected their own consciences, and which, it was necessary, should be disclosed in order to do justice to the said Admiral John Byng; and one of them applying to the House of Commons, praying to be released, by act of parliament, from that part of the oath of secrecy

The sentence referred by the King to the judges. Declared to be legal. Execution suspended at the request of several members of the court-martial.

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relative to the subject in question; his Majesty, agreeable to his usual tenderness for the lives of his subjects, consented to the said act and respited his execution till the bill had passed the House of Commons, and the parties had passed a separate examination upon oath in the House of Lords, to find out what ground there was for that application.

Bill to absolve those members from the oath of secrecy.

The bill for this purpose passed the House of Commons with great rapidity; but in the House of Lords, at the second reading, each member of the said court-martial being called separately, was asked in substance as follows, “ Whether he knew any
“ matter that passed, previous to the sentence
“ pronounced on Admiral Byng, which might
“ shew that sentence to have been unjust; or to
“ have been given through any undue practice or
“ motive; and was desirous that the bill then under the consideration of the house, for dis-

“ I *A. B.* do swear, That I will duly administer justice, according to the articles and orders established by an act, passed in the twenty-second year of the reign of his Majesty King George the Second, for amending, explaining, and reducing into one act of parliament, the laws relating to the government of his Majesty’s ships, vessels, and forces by sea, without partiality, favour, or affection; and if any case shall arise, which is not particularly mentioned in the said articles and orders, I will duly administer justice according to my conscience, the best of my understanding, and the custom of the navy in the like cases; and I do further swear, That I will not, upon any account, at any time whatsoever, disclose or discover the vote or opinion of any particular member of this court-martial, unless thereunto required by act of parliament.”

“ pending

“penſing with the oath of ſecrecy, ſhould paſs
 “into a law; and whether he was of opinion,
 “he had any particulars to reveal, relative to the
 “caſe of, and the ſentence paſſed upon Admiral
 “Byng, which he judged neceſſary for his Ma-
 “jeſty’s information, and which he thought likely
 “to incline his Maſteſty to mercy?” but they
 ſeparately anſwering thoſe queſtions in the ne-
 gative; the ſaid bill was rejected; and the cri-
 minal ^b was accordingly executed on the 14th of
 March

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Rejected.

Admiral
 Byng exe-
 cuted.

^b During theſe proceedings to ſave the Admiral’s life, the
 public were preſented with the two following letters, one from
 the Marſhal de Richelieu to the celebrated M. de Voltaire,
 written originally in French; the other written in Engliſh, by
 M. Voltaire to Mr. Byng, under ſentence of death for that
 very conduct which extorted, the praiſe of a generous enemy.

Clux delices pres de Geneve.

S I R,

Though I am almoſt unknown to you, I think ’tis my
 duty to ſend you the copy of the letter which I have juſt re-
 ceived from the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu: Honour, hu-
 manity, and equity order me to convey it to your hands.
 This noble and unexpected teſtimony, from one of the moſt
 candid as well as the moſt generous of my countrymen, makes
 me preſume your judges will do you the ſame juſtice.

I am with reſpect, Sir, &c.

To the Hon. J. Byng, Eſq;

VOLTAIRE.

S I R,

I am very ſenſibly concerned for Admiral Byng; I do
 aſſure you whatever I have ſeen or heard of him does him
 honour. After having done *all* that man could reaſon-
 ably expect from him, he ought not to be cenſured for
 ſuffering a defeat. When two commanders contend for
 victory

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1756.

March 1757, on board his Majesty's ship *Monarque* in Portsmouth harbour, for the sake of justice, and of example to the disciplining of the navy, and for the safety and honour of the nation, as his Majesty's message to both houses of parliament on the 26th of February did signify.

A few minutes before he was called out of the cabin to die, the Admiral addressed himself to the Marshal as follows: " Sir, these are my thoughts
" on this occasion: I shall give them to you, that
" you may authenticate them, and prevent any
" thing spurious being published, that might tend
" to defame me. I have given a copy to one of
" my relations."

victory, though both are equally men of honour; yet one must necessarily be worsted; and there is nothing against Mr. Byng, but his being worsted; for his whole conduct was that of an able seaman, and is justly worthy of admiration. The strength of the two fleets was at *least* equal; the English had thirteen ships and we twelve much *better equipped* and *much cleaner*. Fortune that presides over all battles, and especially those that are fought at sea, was more favourable to us than to our adversaries, by sending our balls into their ships with greater execution. I am persuaded, and it is the generally received opinion, that if the English had obstinately continued the engagement, their whole fleet would have been destroyed.

In short, there can be no higher act of injustice than what is now attempted against Admiral Byng, and all men of honour, and all gentlemen of the army, are particularly interested in the event.

RICHELIEU.

I received this original letter from Marshal D. de Richelieu, the 1st of January 1757, in witness of which I have signed my name.

VOLTAIRE.

The

The paper was wrote in his own hand, and
contained as follows :

A. D.
1756.

On board his Majesty's ship Monarque in Portf-
mouth harbour, March 14, 1757.

His last
words de-
livered to
the Mar-
shal in
writing.

“ A Few moments will now deliver me from
“ the virulent persecutions, and frustrate the
“ farther malice of my enemies ;—nor need I
“ envy them a life subject to the sensations my in-
“ juries, and the injustice done me must create.
“ —Persuaded I am, justice will be done to my
“ reputation hereafter—The manner and cause
“ of raising and keeping up the popular clamour
“ and prejudice against me, will be seen through.
“ —I shall be considered, (as I now perceive
“ myself) a victim, destined to divert the
“ indignation and resentment of an injured and
“ deluded people, from the proper objects.—My
“ enemies themselves must now think me inno-
“ cent.—Happy for me at this last moment, that
“ I know *my own* innocence; and am conscious,
“ that no part of my country's misfortunes *can*
“ be owing to me.—I heartily wish the shedding
“ my blood may contribute to the happiness and
“ service of my country—but cannot resign my
“ just claim to a faithful discharge of my duty,
“ according to the best of my judgment, and the
“ utmost exertion of my ability, for his Majesty's
“ honour and my country's service.—I am sorry
“ that my endeavours were not attended with
“ more success, and that the armament under my
“ com-

A. D.
1756.

“ command proved too weak to succeed in an
 “ expedition of such moment.—*Truth* has pre-
 “ vailed over calumny and *falsehood*, and *justice* has
 “ wiped off the ignominious stain of my *supposed*
 “ want of personal courage, or disaffection—my
 “ heart acquits me of these crimes,—but who
 “ can be presumptuously sure of his own judg-
 “ ment? If my crime is an error in judgment or
 “ *differing* in opinion from my judges; and if yet,
 “ the error of judgment should be on their side,
 “ —God forgive them, as I do; and may *the*
 “ *distress of their minds, and uneasiness of their con-*
 “ *sciences, which in justice to me they have repre-*
 “ *sented, be relieved, and subside, as my resent-*
 “ *ment has done.*—The supreme Judge sees all
 “ hearts and motives, and to him I submit the
 “ justice of my cause.”

JOHN BYNG.

Thus ended the enquiry into the conduct of General Fowke and Admiral Byng, with the singular punishment of the Governor of Gibraltar broke and dismissed his Majesty's service, for not complying with instructions or orders he could not understand, and appeared to him inconsistent and contradictory: and of the Admiral for adhering to a council of war, and for not doing all that, in the opinion of others, was in his power to do, for distressing the enemy, and for the relief of Minorca.

We

We have thrown the proceedings of this remarkable case together, though they were, by several incidents, protracted nine months, or thereabouts, to prevent any unnecessary digressions: and we have been more particular in this narrative, because, on the part of the Commander in Chief, in this expedition to defend or relieve Minorca, it exhibits the best view of the causes of its loss; which he attributes, primarily to the neglect of the ministry; to the weakness of his squadron, and to a want of land-forces sufficient to raise the siege: and on the part of the ministry, it shews how far the influence of a court interest is able to screen men in power from the resentment of the nation; and how far they are able to expiate their own guilt with the blood of that servant, who dares to complain of their misconduct. But more especially, because this act of justice upon a person of a noble extraction; and this example, the disciplining of the navy in the person of an Admiral, the son of an Admiral enobled for his services, contributed greatly to convince the people that his Majesty would spare nobody, of what rank or degree soever, if found deficient in his duty; that he would do all, in his power, for the safety and honour of his people; and that he was determined to maintain discipline, as well as to punish cowardice and treachery in his navy. In the meantime his Majesty, by warrant dated November 22d, appointed Sir John Ligonier, General Huske and General Cholmondeley, to enquire why Major-General Stuart, and the Colonels Cornwallis,

and

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1756.

Reasons
for so cir-
cumstan-
tial an ac-
count of
Admiral
Byng's
case.

Enquiry
into the
conduct of
the land-
officers sent
to Minor-
ca.

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Their
pleas.

Acquitted.

Parlia-
mentary
enquiry in-
to the loss
of Minor-
ca.

How baf-
fled.

and the Earl of Effingham, did not join their respective commands in the island of Minorca? and whether they had used their utmost endeavours to throw themselves into Fort St. Philip's? and why, being only passengers, they assisted at the sea-council of war; which advised Mr. Byng to return immediately to Gibraltar? To which they pleaded, That it was not in their power to be at Minorca before Mr. Byng's fleet; that they were ready and willing to join their commands, but had no means to land them at Fort St. Philip: and that they assisted at the council of war by order of the Admiral, under whose command they thought themselves to be; and that they thought it their duty to co-operate with the sea-officers, to the utmost of their power, for the advancement of his Majesty's service. Upon which the Board submitted to his Majesty, That in their most humble opinion, the conduct of these three officers was clear from any suspicion of disobedience to orders, or neglect of duty.

When the parliament met, one of their proceedings was to enquire into the causes of the loss of Minorca, and they addressed his Majesty for all papers, that might explain that intricate affair. To which his Majesty condescended. But they whose safety depended upon intricacy, confusion and a majority, so managed, that this enquiry was committed to the whole House, and the papers were swelled into such a preposterous number, that it required more time to digest them, than a whole session of parliament

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1756.

liament would allow^c. However, though this method of enquiry may be said to deliver some people from the loud accusations of the people, under the protection of a parliamentary approbation of their conduct, which on this occasion declared that the ministry had done all in their power both by sea and land to save Minorca; yet it must be allowed, that it was this countenance and disposition of the King to gratify his faithful subjects with all the lights he could help them to, and to inflict exemplary punishment on delinquents, without distinction, that discouraged and terrified such, as knew themselves to be obnoxious and guilty, and brought about that grand change both of men and measures, which delivered the nation from a timorous and inactive ministry; and revived that courage and conduct, for which our progenitors had been universally esteemed, and without which not only Minorca, but our colonies, our allies, and these kingdoms, must have fallen a prey to an enemy, whose courage was founded upon our timidity, and whose success was owing to our negligence; as will more fully appear from a due attention to the facts in the sequel of this history, compared with those already published in this book.

Its effects.

^c The most material facts in those papers are to be found in page 234 to 254.

THE
GENERAL HISTORY
OF THE
L A T E W A R.

B O O K II.

Containing its progress in the East Indies and North America. Our operations by sea and land. The German war, wherein the Austrians, Russians, French, Swedes, Saxons, and Imperialists were confederate against the King of Prussia: And the French invasion of Hesse Cassel and the Electoral dominions of his Britannic Majesty: to the conclusion of the year 1757.

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1756.

THE voice of the people having prevailed with the Sovereign to resolve upon vigorous measures; and his Majesty provoked to declare war against the French, by an actual invasion of his dominions, and with threats to pour a numerous army into Great Britain; they omitted nothing that might convince him of their willingness to support him in so just and necessary a war. Great as the supplies were, granted by parliament, the national generosity discovered itself in many

many laudable affociations for the public good. The landholders and corporations, thinking that their property and rights were at stake, not only submitted with pleasure to the resolutions of their representatives; but raised great numbers of men, for the service of their country, by voluntary contributions and large premiums. Nay, some merchants of London, convinced, by the difficulties the state met with in manning the navy, upon such an immergency, that there was a necessity to train up a young nursery, from whence the government might always draw an immediate supply on any occasion, joined heartily in that extensive and most commendable plan, called the *Marine Society*; and by their exemplary subscriptions engaged such a fund, as, during the course of the war, equipped for the sea service on board his Majesty's ships many thousand orphans, friendless and forlorn boys; who were thereby rescued from misery, and made useful members of the commonwealth ^d.

A. D.
1756.Marine so-
ciety.

The

^d *Some account of the Marine Society, from a letter addressed by a member to the public.*

In order to make an account of the views of this society generally understood, it is necessary to premise that the officers of every ship of war, which carries 60 guns and 400 men, have a right to carry 30 servants, and to receive their wages, which wages are considered as part of the officer's pay.

These servants are generally boys between thirteen years of age and eighteen; for when they are at or near their full growth, as they can then rank as seamen, and receive pay in

V o l . I .

H h

that

A. D.
1756.First object
of the
court.

The first object of the court, after the loss of Minorca, (which the ministry could not but be sensible,

that class, it is not to be supposed they will be content to enter on board as an officer's servant, for fifty shillings a year, which is their stated wages.

The government therefore has allowed this number of boys to officers, not only because they are necessary in the ship; but because by this means every ship becomes a nursery of young seamen, who acquire skill and strength together, and are not only able, but expert sailors before they are one and twenty years of age.

These servants, however, it has been found very difficult to procure; the poor vagrants, who are covered with filth and rags, and subsist either by begging or by pilfering, had no immediate inducement, wretched as they were, to enter on board a ship, where they must at once renounce their lounging and idleness for constant activity and labour; and if they had at any time a transient wish for such a change of situation, they did not know how to apply to bring it about: the officers, who wanted them, had neither time nor opportunity to search and solicit them, and the gentlemen who reside in the country, though they might be inclined to render the children of the poor thus serviceable to their country, there being no establishment to which they could apply, had no means of putting their intention into practice.

But besides that it is desirable for every ship to have its complement of boys, it is desirable, in a time of war, that not more than one third of the number should be less than sixteen or seventeen; because it would be too long before those, that are younger, can be rated as seamen; nor can they create a quick succession of youth into the service of officers, as a state of qualification. It must also be observed, that the youth, that are procured, lose several advantages by the difficulty of procuring others; for an officer, when he loses a servant, loses his wages, and he will naturally be unwilling his servant should be rated as a seaman, when he knows not how to get another.

The

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1756.

sensible, had fallen to the French arms, through their neglect of that island, occasioned by too much attention paid to the French threats to in-

The view of this society, therefore, is to encourage the industrious poor to send their children to sea, and invite the vagabond and pilferer, not only boys and lads, but men, to become useful to the state by the following advantages.

1. They shall be received immediately upon application, and taken care of in a proper place, where they will be accommodated with fire and beds, and three meals a day, of good bread and broth, and roots, and meat, till they are sent on board.

2. If any that offer are distempered, they are immediately put under proper methods of cure, and when they are sent on board they are compleatly fitted out with cloathing and bedding.

Thus are men and boys stripped of their rags, cured of their distempers, and sent clean and well cloathed, with as good bedding and accommodations as any common seaman on board. As to the lads, if they are sixteen or seventeen, they are very soon qualified to receive wages as seamen; and as to the men, the distinction between landmen and seamen on board, which used to create animosity, and subject the landmen to some hardships, is lost, as they are no longer known by their apparel.

These accommodations, besides that they are an immediate inducement to lads and men to enter, are so necessary to health and life, that for want of them many have miserably perished, who might otherwise have been of singular service to their country.

The advantages are not less to the community than to the individual; for it procures a speedy supply of stout mariners in the room of those, who, in the prosecution of a war, must necessarily be cut off, at the same time that those evils are prevented, which the idle and dissolute poor of the rising generation would produce, if they had continued at home.

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1756.

Why Mi-
norca was
now disre-
garded.

vade these kingdoms) was the defence and security of our colonies and territories in North America. From which object it was very evident the French intended to draw the British councils, by attempting to carry the seat of war into the Mediterranean. For, there was nothing in the conquest of Minorca of that singular importance to the French, as to prefer it to the support of their American schemes; except we look upon it, as we ought to do, to be a feint to keep England employed in a contest for that island in the Mediterranean, while their marine from Brest, &c. might be at liberty to recruit and support their forces and encroachments in America.

Therefore Minorca was suffered to remain under the dominion of France, till a more proper time should favour our arms to retake it, or it should be restored at a peace.

Measures
pursued for
North A-
merica.

Lord Lou-
don ap-
pointed.
Comman-
der in
Chief.

His Majesty had promised to prefer the security of his American subjects, and the chastisement of the French usurpations and hostilities in North America, to all other considerations. For this purpose, it was thought necessary not only to send more troops, but to have the army, on that continent, better officered. We have seen that Lord Loudon was appointed Commander in Chief, with powers, that were supposed sufficient to remove all the delays, and the causes of those obstructions, which had defeated most of the former operations, and salutary measures, proposed for their common defence: and General Abercrombie was

sent

sent before ^fwith two regiments, and with orders to supercede General Shirley. A. D. 1756.

Every one wished for, and turned their thoughts towards an American war; and looked upon these measures to presage a vigorous effort to drive the French out of their usurpations, and to avenge the inhuman practices of their Indian allies. But, as if procrastination had been the favourite measure of that administration, his Majesty's good intentions, and the people's expectations were once more disappointed, by a detention of the Earl of Loudon, who was charged with the chief directions of the operations and plans in North America; but ordered to wait for certain foreign officers of experience, invited from Germany, to command in a royal American regiment, consisting of four battalions, to be raised in Virginia; and of which the Earl was to be Colonel. So that notwithstanding the preparations made by the provincials under General Shirley, to open the campaign early in the year, they were obliged to halt at Albany, for the arrival of a Commander in Chief, and of the regular forces from England, till the latter end of June, when General Abercrombie arrived there, and took the command of the two regiments led off by Dunbar, after the defeat of Braddock, two battalions raised in America, two regiments brought with him from England; four old independent companies belonging to New York, a New Jersey regiment,

Obstructions and delays in the North American measures.

General Abercrombie arrives in North America.

The number of forces.

^f In March 1756. It was the latter end of May before the Earl of Loudon sailed.

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1756

Resolu-
tions for
the opera-
tions this
summer.

four companies levied in North Carolina, and a body of provincials sent from New England only.

It had been resolved^s in the council of war held last year, at Albany, by Mr. Shirley, &c. to endeavour to cut off the French communication, between Canada and Louisiana, by the reducing of fort Niagara, situate between the lakes Ontario and Erie: which also would have obliged their new forts on the Ohio, to submit to the British arms, without much bloodshed; to cover the borders of New York, and secure the navigation of Lake Champlain, by the conquest of Ticonderoga and Crown Point: to besiege Fort du Quesne on the Ohio; and, while these several and distant services were carried into execution, to alarm the capital of Canada by a body of troops detached up the river Kennebeck^h.

Why not
executed,

But Abercrombie, though approving of the plan, thought it, by far, too extensive, for the forces under his present command, to be carried effectually into execution. Besides the season was too far advanced, to promise success. He therefore waited the arrival of Lord Loudon: and by that determination another year was lost; the provinces left exposed to the invasions and barba-

^s See page 166.

^h The troops destined for the campaign on Lake Ontario, were intended to march for Oswego, thence to be carried over in 200 whale boats, built long, round and light, last winter at Schenectady, on Mohawks river, and already brought into the lake.

rities of the enemy ; and the Frenchⁱ at liberty to strengthen their posts, and to distress the British settlements with impunity.

A. D.
1756.

During this state of inactivity, and of dependance upon reinforcements from their mother country, the army received the disagreeable news of the enemy's entering the country of the Five Nations, our ancient allies ; where they reduced a small fort, garrisoned by 25 English, whom they put to the sword, and butchered in a most barbarous manner.

Operations
of the
French.

The French improved the opportunity : they formed a camp at Ticonderoga of 330 tents and 70 log houses, with 3000 troops at that place and Crown Point, and daily increased their numbers. But the defence of this fort was not their only object ; and as they were perfectly informed of the orders for the English army not to undertake any expedition, till the arrival of Lord Loudon ; and that his lordship could not land in North America, before the time would be elapsed, either to attack Crown Point, or to prevent Oswego falling into their hands ; the enemy resolved upon the siege of Oswego : and in order to facilitate their operations against that fort, ambuscades were formed to harass and intercept any reinforcement, or convoy of provisions, &c. which might be sent to Oswego, from Albany, or from Schenectady.

ⁱ Who received a reinforcement of about 3000 men, under the command of M. Montcalm, from Europe, under a strong convoy of men of war.

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1756.

Colonel
Brad-
street's ad-
vantage
over the
enemy.

Loss of the
enemy.

However, a considerable convoy of provisions and stores was conducted thither very safely by Colonel Bradstreet, before the ambuscade was laid. But in his return down the river Onondaga, and stemming the stream with his battoes, formed in three divisions, he was saluted^k by a party of Indians, secreted amongst the bushes and trees, on the north shore, with the war-hoop and a general discharge of musquetry: which killed about 70 of the battoe men. Colonel Bradstreet landed his men immediately on the opposite bank, and took possession of a small island^l, where he with six men only, drove off 40 of the enemy, who forded the river to attack them. Then quitting the island, and collecting his whole strength of about 200 men, he marched to meet another party of French and Indians, who had forded the river a mile higher; whom he with only 40 men, fell upon, sword in hand, in a large swamp, and cut most of them in pieces or drowned them: then he boldly marched up and attacked the main body of the enemy, consisting of 660 men, which had passed at another ford, and entirely routed them also. This action lasted upwards of three hours. Our chief loss was amongst the battoe men, by the first fire from the bushes: but the enemy had about 200 killed and 70 taken prisoners; and had not the rest been favoured in their flight by a heavy rain, and the swelling of the waters, which put an end to Bradstreet's pursuit, it is very probable, that the whole

^k July 3, 1756.

^l About nine miles from Oswego.
detach-

detachment, consisting of 700 French and Canadians chiefly, would have been entirely cut off: for, Colonel Bradstreet was joined the same night by Captain Patten and his grenadiers, marching from Oneida to Oswego; and next morning by 200 men detached to his assistance from Oswego. So that these parties separated. Bradstreet made the best of his way to Schenectady: and the others marched together for Oswego.

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1756.

By the prisoners brought in by Colonel Bradstreet, General Abercrombie was informed that Oswego was the immediate object of the French arms, and that its siege was determined upon by a large body of Europeans, encamped on the eastern shore of Lake Ontario.

The siege
of Oswego
resolved
upon.

The importance of this place, to interrupt the commerce, as well as the motions of the enemy; and its being the only place to build vessels, for the navigation, upon that lake or inland-sea; and to secure an interest with the Indians, that had not declared against us; determined General Abercrombie to detach a regiment of regulars, under the command of Major General Webb, to its relief. But, notwithstanding the advantage, which the loss of Oswego would give the enemy in all their future operations, and measures; and altho' the English army at Albany could muster 2600 regulars, and 7000 provincials, or thereabout, under the command of General Winslow^m, besides a considerable number of battoe men; their

Its defence
how de-
layed.

^m At Fort William Henry.

A. D.
1756.

march was stopped by the arrival of Lord Loudon, while the necessaries were providing for their subsistence on the road. For, his Lordship, how much soever inclined to forward General Abercrombie's orders for the relief of Oswego, was so peremptorily and obstinately opposed, in that measure, by New England, New York and the adjacent provinces, which insisted upon the reduction of Crown Point previous to all other operations, that, although they were at last prevailed with to consent to the march of Major General Webb, with the regiment first ordered by General Abercrombie, it was the 12th day of August, before this supply could set out from Albany, and indulged the enemy with such an unaccountable opportunity to complete their plan against Oswego, that, by the time Major General Webb could reach the Carrying Place, between the Mohawk's river and Wood's Creek, he met with the disagreeable news, that the French were masters of Oswego, and had made the garrison, and 300 workmen and sailors, employed to defend the passes between the fort and Burnet's field, prisoners of war.

The siege
of the
Forts Ontario,
Oswego, &c.

By this misfortune the nation lost the two forts Ontario and Oswegoⁿ: Forts, that had been run up in a hurry, unfinished, and untenable against a regular force. The Marquis de Montcalm, an enterprising officer, and successor to Mr. Dieskau, was charged with this expedition, having under

ⁿ See page 164 and 165.

his command 1300 regulars, 1700 Canadians, and a considerable number of Indians. His first care was to prevent succours and intelligence between Oswego and Albany; which he effected by posting a strong body of Canadians on the road by land, and by blocking up Oswego by water with two large armed vessels. This done, he, without opposition, or danger of being disturbed, transported^o his stores and artillery over the lake to the Bay of Nixouri, appointed the place of general rendezvous for this expedition.

A. D.
1756.

Having proceeded with all the caution in his power to prevent a surprize; and, in case of a miscarriage, to secure a safe retreat, he made the necessary dispositions for the siege, and opened the trenches before Fort Ontario, with about 5000 men, and 32 pieces of cannon, from 10 to 18 pounders, besides several large brass mortars and hoyets (part of the artillery which had been taken from General Braddock) about midnight, on the 12th of August, at the distance of 90 toises (or fathoms, of six feet each) from the fosse of Fort Ontario, and like unto a parallel of about 100 toises in front, and in ground vastly embarrassed with trunks of trees, and such like obstructions. The parallel was finished at five in the morning, when the workmen began to erect the batteries in the midst of a hot fire, kept up by the garrison very briskly from day break to six o'clock at night, and killed their chief engineer in the trenches.

The approaches
of the
French
against
Fort Ontario.

^o From Fort Frontenac, where he had arrived on the 29th of July.

But,

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1756.

But, as Colonel Mercer apprehended, that the fort was not tenable against such a superior force, and several pieces of heavy cannon mounted on a battery at no more than 60 yards from it; he, about three in the afternoon, having received an account from the commandent, of his bad situation, ordered him to fire away all his shells and ammunition, to spike up the cannon, and to make the best retreat he could to Oswego. Which was punctually executed by destroying the cannon, ammunition and provisions, and passing the river so as to join the troops on the western shore, without the loss of a man.

Against
Oswego.

The French General, informed of this desertion of Fort Ontario, immediately took possession thereof, and ordered the communication of the parallel to be continued to the bank of the river; where, early in the same night, he began a grand battery, formed in such a manner, that it could not only batter Fort Oswego, distant about two miles English, and secure the way from thence to Fort George, situate on a hill, about four miles and a half up the river, but annoy the entrenchment of Oswego.

Behaviour
of the gar-
rison.

On the part of the English, the troops, to the number of 370, or thereabout, which had retreated from Fort Ontario, were ordered to join Colonel Schuyler immediately, who was charged with the defence of the fort on the hill to the westward of the Old Fort, under the direction of Mr. Mackellar the engineer. But the advantages, proposed by a communication between these two

forts,

forts, were soon frustrated; not so much by the fire from the enemy across the river, who at that distance could never have pretended to batter in breach, and to have reduced Oswego to the necessity of surrendering; but from a bold action of a body of 2500 Canadians and savages, who swam over the river in the night between the 13th and 14th, and cut off the communication between the two forts.

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1756.

At the same time the enemy were very busy in bringing up their cannon; and raising a battery of 10 cannon, 12 pounders, on the east side of the river, against the Old Fort: tho' there was kept up a constant fire of cannon and shells, from the Old Fort and works about it.

On the 14th day, General Mercer, informed that a large party of the enemy had crossed the river to fall upon him on the west side, ordered Colonel Schuyler to march against them with 500 men. But this order was annulled by a cannon ball, which, a few minutes after, killed Colonel Mercer.

Colonel
Mercer
killed.
Council of
war called.

Colonel Littlehales, who succeeded Mercer in the chief command, being better informed of the numbers of the enemy, that had crossed the river; that they were 2500 men; countermanded the detachment under Colonel Schuyler; and observing, that the enemy had, with great celerity, raised a battery of nine guns, and another of mortars ready to play: that there were 2500 irregulars and Indians on the back of his garrison, ready to storm them, on that side, and 2000 regulars ready to land

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1756.Resolved to
surrender.Not agree-
able to the
foldiery.Miscon-
duct in the
proposals.

land in front, under the fire of their cannon, and that all the places of defence, under his command, were either enfiladed or ruined by the constant fire of the enemy, he called a council of war; who, after taking the opinion of the engineers, were unanimously of opinion, that the works were no longer tenable; and that it was by no means prudent to risk a storm with such unequal numbers.

A capitulation was accordingly resolved upon; a white flag was hung out, and the chamade was beat, and the firing ceased on both sides; though not without great reluctance of the soldiery, who for some time kept and used their arms, declaring their resolution rather to die, than yield and surrender to the French. But the officers, though they had behaved like men, determined to dispute their post and liberty to the last extremity; yet, to prevent a mutiny, and any miscarriage, that might happen by the bad use the enemy could make of the interval of this cessation of arms, two of them are said to have been inconsiderately sent out to the French General, not with the conditions, a brave garrison has a right to demand, and seldom fail of gaining by a proper countenance in their distressed circumstances; but, — but to *know the terms he was willing to grant*: and the enemy were permitted openly to bring up more cannon; to advance the main body of their troops, within musket shot of the garrison; and, to prepare every thing for a storm, while the treaty for a surrender was carried on. The Marquis of Montcalm

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1756.

Montcalm informed by these officers of the difficulty, with which the garrison were brought to submit to a capitulation, answered, That the English were an enemy he esteemed; that none, but a brave nation, would have thought of defending so weak a place so long against such a strong train of artillery and superior numbers; that they might expect whatever terms were consistent with the service of his most Christian Majesty. But tied them down to the following proposals, *viz.*

“ The Marquis of Montcalm, Army and Field Marshal, commander in chief of his most Christian Majesty’s troops, is ready to receive (a capitulation) upon honourable conditions, surrendering to him all the forts: he requires them to be prisoners of war: they shall be shewn all the regard the politest of nations can shew: I send an Aid de Camp on my part, *viz.* Mons. de Bougainville, captain of dragoons; they need only send the capitulation to be signed: I require an answer by noon: I have kept Mr. Drake for an hostage.

The proposals for a capitulation.

“ MONTCALM.”

August 14, 1756.

And accordingly the following demand was made:

The

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1756.

The demand made by the commandant of Oswego from the Marquis of Montcalm, Army and Field Marshal to the King, commander in chief of his most Christian Majesty's troops in North America.

ARTICLE I.

The capitulation.

“**T**HE garrison shall surrender prisoners of war, and shall be conducted from hence to Montreal, where they shall be treated with humanity, and every one shall have treatment agreeable to their respective ranks, according to the custom of war.

“II. Officers, soldiers, and individuals shall have their baggage and cloaths, and they shall be allowed to carry them along with them.

“III. They shall remain prisoners of war until they are exchanged.”

To which the Marquis de Montcalm gave answer as follows :

“**I** Accept of the above articles in the name of his most Christian Majesty, under the condition of delivering up faithfully the fortifications, ammunition, magazines, barks and battoes, with their appurtenances.

“I give full power to Monsr. de la Pauze, Major-General, to reduce this present capitulation, and to agree upon the manner of becoming master of the said fort, of which our troops shall take possession, and to insure the garrison from receiving any insult.

“Given at the camp before Oswego, the 14th day (at eleven o'clock in the morning) of the month of August, 1756.

“MONTCALM.”

By

By virtue of this capitulation we lost Oswego, our only post on the Great Lakes; the garrison laid down their arms, and surrendered prisoners of war; and the French immediately took possession of Oswego and Fort St. George, which they entirely destroyed, agreeable to their orders, after removing the artillery, warlike stores and provisions; with the loss of no more than one engineer, one Canadian, one soldier and one gunner killed, and 20 slightly wounded, on the part of the enemy. Whereas we lost Shirley's and Pepperel's regiments, and part of Schuyler's militia, in all 1600 men, including 80 officers; 121 pieces of artillery, (seven were brass) 55 of which were cannon of different bores, and 14 brass mortars, 23000 wt. of powder, 8000 wt. lead and ball, 2950 bullets, 150 bombs of nine inch. and 300 of six inch. 1476 grenades, 730 fuzees for grenadiers, 340 common fuzees; 704 hogheads of biscuit, a very great quantity of pork, beef and meal.

A. D.
1756.The forts
destroyed
by the
French.Loss of the
French.Of the
English.

A magazine of so great importance, deposited in a place deemed altogether indefensible and without the reach of immediate succour, gave the nation great room to suspect the integrity or to impeach the understandings of those, who, for the sake of gain, by agencies and contracts, or through ignorance of its situation and strength, exposed so valuable a prize to the first invader.

Remarks
on this
magazine.

There were at Oswego seven armed ships, viz. one of 18 guns, one of 14, one of 10, one of eight guns, and three others mounted with swivels, besides 200

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1756.

battoes of different sizes, whose officers and crews were included in the capitulation.

Future
conduct of
the French.

As soon as the forts were demolished the French marched with the utmost speed, with their prisoners^a and booty, to join their army at Ticondoga, and to oppose the motions of the provincial army, of about 7000 men, which ought to have long before attacked Crown Point; but had laid idle, under General Winslow, till reduced by sickness and desertion to 4000, and till the French were now in a condition to hold them at defiance. The provincials deserted, because they were disheartened by an inactive campaign; and the new-raised troops contracted many disorders, for want of care and cleanliness. But no enemy appearing, they proceeded to Montreal, and thence to Quebec, where the prisoners were immediately embarked and sent to Portsmouth in a cartel ship.

Remarks
on this loss.

Thus within the space of four days, from the time the trenches were opened before Fort Ontario, we have seen the loss of the only post Great Britain had on the Great Lakes; much in the same way as Mahon was lost in the Mediterranean; though it was of as much or greater importance to maintain this post on the continent of North America, to overawe the wavering and hostile Indians, to protect our allies, to cover our settlements and to chastise our enemies; as to preserve

^a Such as were left alive; for, contrary to the faith of the capitulation, Montcalm not only suffered the garrison to be stripped and many of them to be murdered by his army; but he delivered twenty of them up to the mercy of the Indians, by way of atonement for the loss of their friends, that had fallen in battle.

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1756.

Fort St. Philip's in Europe. For, though the vast quantity of artillery, ammunition, stores, and provisions of all sorts, and the number of workmen employed in building, and of others in the navigation upon Lake Ontario, is a convincing proof that the persons concerned in the management of the American war, were not insensible of the importance of this post, both for defence and offence; yet nothing can appear more notorious, except the procrastination of the defence of Minorca; that this post was also lost by delays and neglect, and, at last, by not doing all that was in the power of a garrison to do; as will more fully appear from the following review of the state of Oswego for some time before; when there was the greatest reason to expect a visit from the French, who made no scruple to call it an encroachment, or an invasion upon the French King's territory, made in the time of a profound peace; and it was declared that they would attack, take and destroy it, as soon as opportunity would permit.

Nevertheless Oswego was so neglected, that the French might have executed their design upon it in the spring of the year 1755, when this fort was garrisoned only by 100 men, under Captain King, had no works but the Old Fort, mounting eight four pounders only, and so commanded by an eminence directly across a narrow river, whose banks were covered with a thick wood, that made it utterly incapable of defence; or to command any respect upon the Lake. As was the case on the 24th and 26th of May 1755, when 41 battoes, with 15 men in each, in all 600 men, passed in

How Oswego had been neglected.

A. D.
1756.

fight, and bid defiance to a fort, which they might then have reduced in a few hours with one single mortar.

A resolution was then taken to enlarge the fort, or rather to erect some additional forts, to build vessels upon the lake, to increase the garrison, and to provide every thing necessary to annoy an enemy, and to render the place tenable. Accordingly Captain Bradstreet was dispatched with a reinforcement of two companies, some swivel guns, and the first set of workmen to build vessels: but these men were employed in building such craft, that, when, soon after, 11 more French battoes, with troops on board passed by Oswego, and we had a greater number of those boats in the harbour, they were suffered to pass unmolested, to the great danger and terror of our back settlements; our battoes not being stiff enough for the soldiers to stand to fire off at sea, so ticklish that the inadvertent motion of one man would overset them, and so small, as not able to carry more than six men each. Yet, if that was the real case, no care was taken to build their boats upon a more serviceable plan, against any future emergency, and to maintain the dominion of the lake. But there was another most unpardonable oversight in those, who had the direction of these works. Capacious stout vessels require a considerable deal of iron work in their composition. The managers had provided smiths enough: but there was no more than one pair of bellows. So that the first accident, which might unavoidably happen to that necessary

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1756.

necessary instrument, would stop all the operations of the forge at once.

The next step, towards improving the naval force at Oswego, was a schooner of 40 feet in the keel, with 14 oars and 12 swivel guns, launched on the 28th of July 1755. This was the first vessel of force we ever had on this lake, and, with 320 men, was all the strength we had to defend this post in the beginning of July, that year: and the French were expected daily to attack it, on the 13th of the same month, when General Shirley, with all his forces, was 300 miles distant, without making all the expedition, the service required: for, it was the 8th of August before that General arrived at Oswego, and the 31st before the last division arrived under Colonel Mercer. Where this army, at that unseasonable time of the year, served only to eat up the provincial stores, and brought on such a scarcity of provisions, that they were almost famished, and the party, left to secure the important Carrying Place at Wood's Creek, were actually obliged to desert it for want of food.

About the middle of September four other vessels^o were got ready, as per margin, with which armed vessels, and a considerable number of those battoes, which had been reported unserviceable, or too small to live, and to dispute with an ene-

• A decked sloop, eight guns four pounders, thirty swivels.
A decked schooner, eight guns four pounders, twenty-eight swivels. An undecked schooner, fourteen swivels, 14 oars.
Ditto, twelve swivels, fourteen oars.

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1756.

my upon the lake in the calmest weather, General Shirley prepared to attack Niagara, under another most unhappy circumstance, the want of provisions to carry his army in sight of the enemy, and the impossibility of getting any supplies within 300 miles of the place they were going against. However, the improbability of succeeding in an expedition, undertaken without victuals, was discovered time enough to countermand the orders to embark; and a friendly storm, says an officer then present, prevented an embarkation, when a stock of provisions was got together, sufficient to prevent the men from eating one another, during the first twelve days. All thoughts of attacking Niagara were laid aside; the General, indeed, made a great shew of his intention to maintain the post of Oswego, by the directions given for strengthening the old, and for building new forts; but his leaving the place before the additional works were completed, and permitting the vessels belonging to the fort to be unrigged and laid up, without having been put to any use, while a French vessel was permitted to cruize on the lake, and to carry supplies to Niagara, without interruption, and five more, as large as ours, were ready to launch at Frontenac; and while our garrison at Oswego increased, by insensible degrees, to the number of eleven hundred, without pay, and in perpetual terror, on the brink of famine; it gave very little reason to believe that his inten-

As related before on page 163 to 165.

tion was real, and filled every one with sad apprehensions for the fate of that important post.

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1756.

The reason, why the French did not strike the blow, when Oswego remained in this defenceless state, was founded upon good policy, and not to be ascribed to any oversight or neglect in their commanders. They knew that it would be impossible for their arms from Canada to complete their grand scheme on the Ohio, without the aid of the Indian tribes, or at least against the united strength of the Indians and English. They also were acquainted with the sentiments, which the Indians entertained of the proceedings of the Ohio company, and particularly of their objection to the erecting fortifications at Oswego*, which they made the grounds of their refusing to join him in the pretended expedition against Niagara. Therefore, they first tried to inflame the Indians against the proceedings of the English on the lake Ontario; cast upon them the sole cause of the miseries to which their country was exposed by war; conciliated the friendship of the most considerable tribes, with promises to protect them from the encroachments of the English upon their lands, and prevailed with them to assist in the reduction of Oswego, with a promise to raze the forts to the ground; and, as soon as these Indians were, by those means, alienated from the English, and the French operations on the Ohio were thought to be irresistible, they, as you have read, put their design in execution.

Why not
attacked by
the French
before.

* See page 109 and page 165.

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1756.

Extraordi-
nary causes
of delay in
the defence
of Oswego.

General Shirley continued inactive from September 1755 to March 1756, when he resumed the project of his execution against Niagara or Frontenac, making proper provisions at a prodigious expence: but upon the crisis for carrying this plan into execution, orders arrived from England to attempt nothing till Lord Loudon should arrive, early in the spring, as it was signified by the same express. But this Lord's departure from England was attended with such delays, that, before he reached the army in North America, Montcalm had time to arrive from France at Canada with 3000 men, and to take the field before us; notwithstanding the navigation of the river of

Not only the departure of Lord Loudon was protracted to an unreasonable and to an unseasonable time, for an American campaign; but the inferior officers of his Lordship's regiment, together with arms, ammunition, and other military preparations, lay at Portsmouth so late as the 12th of June, waiting for transports; which were not then hired to take them on board. And when the military stores were shipped, it was done in such a manner as to make the risque of the voyage as great as possible: for the cannon were put on board one ship; the carriages, on which they were to be mounted, were shipped on board another; the balls on board a third, and the gunpowder on board a fourth. By which contrivance the chance of defeating the whole expedition, was encreased, as four to one; for the loss of any one of the four ships, would have made the contents of the other three useless. And as if there was never to be an end of this conduct, the powder sent upon this important expedition, which consisted of five hundred barrels, was bought of the Dutch, and taken away without proof of its capacity. So that, when it came into use, it was found no better than saw-dust.

St.

St. Lawrence being shut up with ice till the month of May. Whose success against Oswego entirely depended upon his activity, during the time that our armies were under orders, not to march in quest of the enemy, nor to defend our own forts; and the northern provinces, filled with apprehensions for their own safety only, opposed the expedition against Niagara, and the necessary supplies for the defence of Oswego.

A. D.
1756.

Thus, we say, fell the key of the lake Ontario, by the neglect of the managers; the impropriety and insufficiency of the means to defend it from the attacks of an enemy; from the delays that prevented a seasonable or timely relief, and from too great a fear for the preservation of New York, and New England: as Minorca, the key of the Mediterranean sea in Europe, was lost by the terrors of a pretended and impracticable invasion, which locked up our ships and soldiers at home, when they should have attacked the enemy on their own coasts; by paying no regard to the intelligence, given concerning the real design of the enemy against that island; by neglecting the necessary means to recruit and strengthen the garrison, and by sending an insufficient force, and at a time it was impracticable to save it.

The importance of this loss.

But the loss of this post, and of the garrison, and of the implements of war, which had been stowed up there without discretion, was not the worst effect of such fatal misconduct. It was followed with that imprudent measure of immediately stopping up Wood's Creek, our only communication from the

Its sad effects.

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1756.

the Mohawks river to Oneida, with great logs and trees for several miles; and of deserting and destroying the forts at the great Carrying-Place; which, after the loss of Oswego, was become our most advanced post into the country of the Six Nations; though there were at that time three thousand men, including 1200 battoemen, at that post: a post so strongly fortified, and so inaccessible to the enemy's artillery, that it might have defied the whole French army in North America, to take it. Which, with General Webb's retreat with his forces to a place called the German Flatts, about 60 miles nearer to Albany, and soon after to Schenectady, not more than 17 miles from that city; having exposed the Six Nations, and all the adjacent country, to the mercy of the enemy (who were at liberty to over-run the fine country on the Mohawks River down to Albany, and to penetrate into the provinces of Pensylvania, Maryland, New Jersey and Virginia) either encouraged the Indians to join our enemies, or to observe a strict neutrality, when they found, that we were either not able, or not willing to protect them; and that the French had not only conquered, but performed their promise to destroy the forts at Oswego^u.

Besides, during the state of inactivity, so fatal to the British nation, this year, both in Europe

^u It is remarkable, that while the French were busy in demolishing the works at Oswego; we, to save them the trouble and hazard of attacking the forts at the great Carrying-Place, had them demolished by General Webb, in his retreat.

and

and North America, there were above 1000 inhabitants of the western parts of Philadelphia massacred in cold blood by the Ohio Morians; against whom, nothing was attempted, till Colonel Armstrong, with a party of 280 provincials, marched from Fort Shirley, on the Juniata^{*} river, (150 miles west of Philadelphia) to Kittanning, an Indian town, and the rendezvous of the Morian murderers, situate about 25 miles above Fort du Quesne, on the Ohio, a rout of 140 miles through the woods; with whom he came up, in the morning early of the fifth day, while the Indian warriors were regaling themselves at a dance. Colonel

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Some advantages gained on the Ohio.

^{*} In order to revenge the particular cause of the inhabitants and of Fort Granville, on this river, which is thus related in a letter from Philadelphia, dated Aug. 19. That on the 30th of July, Captain Ward marched from the fort, with his ensign, and all the men belonging to it, except 24 under the command of Lieutenant Armstrong, to guard some reapers in Shearman's valley: that soon after he left the fort it was attacked by about 100 French and Indians, who took Juniata creek, and creeping under its banks to a gut about 12 feet deep, came within 30 or 40 feet of the fort, where the shot from our men could not hurt them, and there, by gathering together pine knots, and other combustible matter, they made a pile, and set fire to the fort. The enemy called to the besieged, offering them quarters, if they would surrender; on which one John Turner immediately opened the gates, and gave them possession; 22 soldiers, three women, and five or six children were made prisoners, of which the French took the young men and women, and the Indians the old men and children; and having loaded them with flour, &c. they set off in triumph; but when they had marched a little way, the French commander ordered Captain Jacobs back to burn the fort, which he did.

Armstrong

A. D.
1756.

Armstrong discovered their situation by their whooping; and, halting about 100 perches below the town, on the bank of the river, he prepared his men, and began the attack as soon as it was light.

Captain
Arm-
strong's
expedition.

Captain Jacobs, the chief of the Indians, gave the war whoop, and defended his house bravely through loop-holes in the logs. The Colonel offered them quarter; but they, fearful of our sincerity to pardon the many and inhuman murders they had been guilty of, upon the innocent and defenceless British subjects, most of them refused to submit prisoners of war. Wherefore Colonel Armstrong ordered their houses to be set on fire; which was immediately and with great activity done by the officers and soldiers. By this obstinacy many were sufficated and burnt; others were shot in their attempt to reach the river^{*}; and Captain Jacobs, his squaw and a boy, called the King's son, were shot as they were getting out of a window, and were scalped.

These Indians had a large quantity of arms loaded in their houses, and of gunpowder. The loaded arms went off in a quick succession, as the fire reached them; and the gunpowder, which was stowed in every house, completed their destruction, by blowing up the houses and all that were found in them, when it took fire.

Eleven English prisoners were happily released from captivity, or violent death; who informed

^{*} They were 40 in all that perished in this assault.

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1756.

the Colonel, that on that very day two battoes of Frenchmen, with a large party of Delawares and French Indians were expected to join Captain Jacobs, in order to proceed in an expedition concerted for attacking and reducing Fort Shirley, and that an advanced party of 24 warriors had been detached, the preceding evening, to reconnoitre and alarm the country. This was soon after confirmed by Lieutenant Hogg, who upon the report of the scouts, that there were not above four Indians about a fire, on the road, about six miles from Kittanning, was ordered, the night before, to halt with 12 men, and to endeavour to surprize them, and to bring them up to the main body: but the Lieutenant, upon his approach, found them to be the 24 warriors above mentioned. They stood upon their defence, killed three of his men, mortally wounded the Lieutenant, and put the other nine men to flight; who abandoned their commander, not able to help himself, when Colonel Armstrong sent out a party to bring him and his men into the conquered town.

These, we apprehend, are some of the bad circumstances to which Lord Loudon refers in his letter to the governors of the provinces, after the loss of Oswego. "As, says his lordship, by "accounts I have received, his Majesty's fort and "garrison of Oswego, together with the naval "armaments and stores, have, by a *series of bad* "circumstances, fallen into the hands of the "French; and as from the condition and number "of the troops left to me, when I came to my "command,

Lord Loudon's letter after the loss of Oswego.

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1756.

“ command, I can scarce hope to do more than
 “ to resist French power in that quarter: I most
 “ earnestly recommend to you, to consider with-
 “ out delay, how far the provincials, now in arms,
 “ are exposed to the weight of the French, in
 “ the parts towards Crown Point; and the dan-
 “ gerous events of any accident happening to
 “ them in consequence of these circumstances,
 “ and what forces you can send immediately to
 “ reinforce them, as it seems absolutely necessary
 “ to do, for the security and safety of the country.
 “ Therefore, in consequence of the power given
 “ to me by his Majesty’s commission, under the
 “ Great Seal; and of his orders signified to you
 “ by his Secretary of State, I do demand of you
 “ an aid of as considerably a body of men, with
 “ arms, as you can send off, as fast as raised; and
 “ also a number of carriages and ox-teams, where-
 “ with I may be able to transport provisions, as
 “ this province alone is not able to supply all.”

Remarks
on this let-
ter.

By this letter it is evident, That his lordship, the commander in chief of the British forces in North America, gave up all thoughts of acting offensively against the French this year. But how just so ever his lordship’s reasons were for that inactive resolution, it is certain that the delay, which followed our retreat from the lakes, when we had a sufficient force in the field, raised, maintained and supplied with all things necessary for the ex-

r Dated at Albany, October 20, 1756.

pedition

pedition against Crown Point, which was the only measure, that could promise to retrieve our late loss; and wasting the remainder of the season in entrenchments at Lake George; and fortifying Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, gave the enemy time to strengthen Crown Point, to recruit and to refresh their forces, and to improve their late success.

A. D.
1756.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.




THE LATE W. A. R.

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loss; and waiting the remainder of the season in
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enemy time to strengthen Crown Point, to receive
and to retake their forts, to improve their
late success.



END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.



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* * In the First Number of Volume the Second, (which will be published Saturday, May 28,) will be given a fine Head of his Royal Highness WILLIAM Duke of CUMBERLAND, engraved by Benoist.

A General INDEX to the whole Work, and Directions for placing the Cuts, will be printed in the last Volume.

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